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CBRNE
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Terrorism

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TERROR NEWS

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Terror News

Shields man arrested over Facebook 'threat' to bomb town's Muslims

Source:http://www.shieldsgazette.com/news/crime/shields-man-arrested-over-facebook-threat-to-bomb-town-s-muslims-1-4475638

A South Tyneside man has been arrested over allegations he threatened to launch a bomb attack on one of the borough's Muslim communities.

A police probe was launched after race-hate posts were allegedly made on social network

site Facebook threatening an "Oslo-style" attack on Ocean Road, South Shields.

Officers arrested Kenny Holden, 29, on suspicion of assault and possessing racially inflammatory material.

A website monitoring the activities of the English defence League (EDL) said detectives found comments he posted on his Facebook page that said he would bomb Ocean Road and surrounding areas - which has long-been the centre of the town's Bangladeshi community - and would use a gun to kill any Muslims "Oslo-style".

They refer to Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik who is currently on trial over the deaths of 77 people in Norway, eight in an Oslo bombing and 69 shot dead on Utoya Island.

South Tyneside Chief Inspector Michael Barton confirmed Northumbria Police had launched an investigation and said it would not tolerate "racial incitement" on the internet.

He said: "Extensive inquiries are being carried out. There is no place for any sort of racial incitement or use of social networking to place inappropriate comments and we take incidents such as this extremely seriously.

"I'd like to reassure the public that a full investigation is taking place into this allegation."

Holden, from Winskell Road, Simonside, was arrested on Saturday and has since been bailed while police investigate further.

A police spokesman said the arrest for assault relates to a domestic incident and is unrelated to the alleged racial offence.

The spokesman added: "Extensive inquiries have been carried out and there is no apparent threat to the general public."

Meanwhile, the EDL South Shields Division have used their Facebook page to distance

Got a pipe bomb just 4 ocean road and the stinken muslims off the wood bine kaboob u stinking arabs GOD WILL SORT U ALL OUT U INBREAD MUSLIM ███████ GIVE ME A GUN AND AL DO U ALL OSLO STYLE ! FACT BANG BANG KABOOM FACT EDL NFS !

Like · Comment

👍 5 people like this.

themselves from Holden after one website posted pictures of a man they identified as Holden, including one posing with EDL leader Tommy Robinson and another in front of a St George's flag saying EDL South Shields Division.

A post on their Facebook page read: "I would like to state that Kenny Holden is not nor will never be welcome in the South Shields Division of the EDL.

"We do not and will never promote violence, we are a peaceful division and always will be. If you don't like

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the fact that we are a peaceful division then don't join because you won't be welcome."

His arrest comes days after an anti-terror operation was carried out in the North East over the posting of alleged racist postings online.

Officers from the region's Counter Terrorism Unit carried out synchronised raids at 7.45am on Thursday at houses in North Tyneside and County Durham.

They took 43-year-old Darren Yateley, of Backworth, North Tyneside, and 46-year-old Paul Duffy, from Elgin Avenue, Seaham, County Durham, to local police stations for questioning. They were released on police bail pending further inquires.

Police wouldn't say what had been posted online but said it related to posts on social network sites that could provoke racial hatred.

Terrorist and criminal attacks targeting children

(incomplete--under construction)
By Wm. Robert Johnston (last updated 21 April 2012)
Source: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp39ch.html

Compiler's note: Terrorism, as a general rule, targets non-combatants--including men, women, and children. However, terrorist attacks specifically targeting children over other non-combatants are uncommon. Most terrorists have also traditionally avoided mass casualty terrorism. In either case, the shock value is so great that such attacks erode support for the terrorists' political objectives. The 9/11 attacks represent an increasing trend in mass casualty terrorism. At the same time policymakers are examining this evolving threat, they must increasingly consider the threat of terrorist attacks targeting children. In particular, the 2004 school attack in Beslan, Russia, has heightened awareness of a potentially developing threat. More recently, Afghanistan has seen 20 poison gas attacks on girls' schools in 2009-2010, and water poisoning at a girls' school in 2012, resulting in a total of 820 injuries.

This page identifies the following types of incidents:

- terrorist attacks in which the targets were preferentially children,
- attempted terrorist attacks preferentially targeting children,
- terrorist attacks which produced very high casualties among children, and
- non-terrorist criminal acts which are relevant in terms of methodology and child victims.

As possible, descriptions indicate ages of victims to clarify the possibly ambiguous term "children." This list is far from complete; more data from the United States and Israel is included in part for reasons of data availability and in part due to the particular policy impacts of these attacks. High numbers of child casualties are not unique to these countries, with terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka being a particular example.

Summary of included incidents (details below)

Date	Type of attack	Location	Method and target	Child casualties		Total casualties	
				Killed	Injured	Killed	Injured
18 May 1927	criminal	Bath, Michigan, United States	bombing of school	41	55	46	58
15 Sep 1959	criminal	Houston, Texas, United States	suicide bombing of school	3	17	6	18
15 Sep 1963	**terrorism**	Birmingham, Alabama, United States	bombing of church	4	2+	4	23

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Date	Type	Location	Attack				
18 Mar 1968	**terrorism**	Negev desert, Israel	landmine attack on school bus	2	28	2	28
22 May 1970	**terrorism**	Avivim, Israel	rocket attack on school bus	9	19	12	19
11 Apr 1974	**terrorism**	Qiryat Shemona, Israel	shooting attack on residential building	8	?	18	16
15 May 1974	**terrorism**	Ma'alot, Israel	hostage taking	20	66+	27	134
3 Feb 1976	**terrorism**	Djibouti	hostage taking of school bus	1	0	36	0
20 Aug 1978	**terrorism**	Abadan, Iran	arson of movie theater	many	0	477	10
7 Apr 1980	**terrorism**	Misgav Am Kibbutz, Israel	hostage taking at children's dormitory	1	4	8	16
16 May 1986	**terrorism**	Cokeville, Wyoming, United States	hostage taking and bombing of school	0	70	2	79
17 Jan 1989	criminal	Stockton, California, United States	suicide shooting attack at school	5	29	6	30
17 Mar 1992	**terrorism**	Buenos Aires, Argentina	suicide car bombing at Israeli embassy	many	?	29	252
19 Apr 1995	**terrorism**	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, United States	car bombing of federal office building	19	?	169	675
13 Mar 1996	criminal	Dunblane, Scotland, United Kingdom	suicide shooting attack at school	16	10	18	12
24 Mar 1998	criminal	Jonesboro, Arkansas, United States	shooting attack at school	4	9	5	11
29 Oct 1998	**terrorism**	Gush Katif, Gaza	attempted bombing of school bus	0	3	2	8
29 Oct 1998	criminal	Goteborg, Sweden	arson attack on dance hall	49	?	63	?
20 Apr 1999	criminal	Littleton, Colorado, United States	suicide shooting attack on school	12	25	15	27

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20 Nov 2000	**terrorism**	Gaza	bombing of school bus	0	5	2	9
26 Mar 2001	criminal	Machakos, Kenya	arson of secondary school	67	19	67	19
8 Jun 2001	criminal	Ikeda, Japan	knife attack on school	8	13	8	15
4 Sep 2001	**terrorism**	Jerusalem, Israel	attempted suicide bombing at school	0	?	1	20
9 Sep 2001	**terrorism**	Jerusalem, Israel	suicide bombing in pizzeria	7	5+	15	130
2 Mar 2002	**terrorism**	Jerusalem, Israel	suicide bombing outside synagogue	7	1+	11	50
26 Apr 2002	criminal	Erfurt, Germany	shooting attack in high school	2	?	17	?
9 May 2002	**terrorism**	Kaspiysk, Russia	bombing at parade	17	31	43	151
28 May 2002	**terrorism**	Itamar, Israel	shooting attack on school	3	2	4	2
3 June 2002	**terrorism**	Thailand	shooting attack on school bus	2	15	2	15
11 Nov 2002	criminal	Changde, P.R. China	poisoning of food at high school	0	many	0	193
25 Nov 2002	criminal	Zhanjiang City, Guangdong, P.R. China	poisoning of food at kindergarten school	0	70	0	72
2 May 2004	**terrorism**	Gush Katif, Gaza	shooting attack on vehicle	4	0	5	3
28 Jun 2004	terrorism	Sderot, Gaza	rocket attack on nursery school	1	?	2	11
4 Aug 2004	criminal	Beijing, P.R. China	knife attack at kindergarten school	1	14	1	17
3 Sep 2004	**terrorism**	Beslan, Russia	hostage taking and bombing at school	156	337	366	747

Date	Type	Location	Description				
30 Sep 2004	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	car bombing at public ceremony	35	72	42	69
25 Nov 2004	criminal	Ruzhou, Henan, P.R. China	knife attack at high school dormitory	8	4	8	4
21 Mar 2005	criminal	Red Lake, Minnesota, United States	shooting attack at high school	6	7	10	7
4 Apr 2005	criminal	Zhanjian, Guangdong, P.R. China	knife attack at middle school	0	8	0	8
10 Jun 2005	criminal	Hikari, Yamaguichi, Japan	bomb attack at high school	0	56	0	58
16 Jun 2005	criminal	Siem Reap, Cambodia	hostage taking at elementary school	1	0	1	0
13 Jul 2005	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	car bombing of gathered children	24	20	27	50
12 Oct 2005	criminal	Guangde, Anhui, P.R. China	shooting attack at primary school	0	16	0	18
15 Jun 2006	**terrorism**	Kabithigollewa, Sri Lanka	mine explosion against bus	15	?	64	80
27 Sep 2006	criminal	Bailey, Colorado, United States	hostage taking at school	1	?	2	?
2 Oct 2006	criminal	Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, United States	hostage taking and shooting at school	5	5	6	5
3 Dec 2006	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	mortar attack on school	0	10	0	10
28 Jan 2007	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	mortar attack on school	5	20	5	20
28 Jan 2007	**terrorism**	Ramadi, Iraq	bombing attack near school	2	10	5	10
20 Feb 2007	**terrorism**	Taji, Iraq	bombing of chlorine tanker truck near restaurant	0	52	9	150

16 Mar 2007	**terrorism**	Falluja, Iraq	suicide bombing with dump truck carrying chlorine tanks	0	7	6	250
2 Apr 2007	**terrorism**	Kirkuk, Iraq	truck bombing of police station next to school	2	50	12	200
12 Jun 2007	**terrorism**	Logar province, Afghanistan	shooting attack on girls leaving school	2	4	2	4
15 Jun 2007	**terrorism**	Tarinkot, Afghanistan	suicide bombing near school	11	3	11	3
6 Aug 2007	**terrorism**	Qubbak, Iraq	truck bombing of residential area	19	?	28	50
14 Aug 2007	**terrorism**	Al-Qataniyah and Al-Adnaniyah, Iraq	multiple truck bombings in villages	many	many	520	1,500
12 Oct 2007	**terrorism**	Tuz Khurmato, Iraq	bombing on playground	2	17	2	18
6 Nov 2007	**terrorism**	Baghlani-jadid, Afghanistan	suicide bombing at public ceremony	61	93	77	100
7 Nov 2007	criminal	Tuusula, Finland	shooting attack at high school	6	10	8	11
22 Jan 2008	**terrorism**	Ba'qubah, Iraq	suicide bombing at school	0	17	1	21
12 Nov 2008	**terrorism**	Kandahar City, Afghanistan	acid attack on schoolgirls	0	14	0	15
26 Dec 2008	**terrorism**	Beit Lahiya, Gaza Strip	rocket attack	2	3	2	3
28 Dec 2008	**terrorism**	Khost, Afghanistan	suicide car bombing at checkpoint near elementary school	14	?	16	58
13 Feb 2009	**terrorism**	Iskandiriya, Iraq	suicide bombing of Shiite pilgrimage	?	28	32	76
26 Apr 2009	**terrorism**	Charikar, Kapisa province, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	40	0	45

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11 May 2009	**terrorism**	Charikar, Kapisa province, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	61	0	62
12 May 2009	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	98	0	104
9 Jul 2009	**terrorism**	Logar province, Afghanistan	truck bombing near highway	16	?	25	5
25 Oct 2009	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	twin vehicle bombing of government buildings	20	6+	155	540
28 Oct 2009	**terrorism**	Peshawar, Pakistan	car bombing at marketplace	13	?	118	213
7 Dec 2009	**terrorism**	Baghdad, Iraq	bombing of school	6	25	8	41
21 Apr 2010	**terrorism**	Kunduz, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	23	0	23
24 Apr 2010	**terrorism**	Kunduz, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	48	0	51
25 Apr 2010	**terrorism**	Kunduz, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	13	0	13
4 May 2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	22	0	25
11 May 2010	**terrorism**	Kunduz, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	30	0	30
11 May 2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	6	0	6
Jun 2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	30	0	30
12 Jun 2010	**terrorism**	Ghazni City, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	60	0	60

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3 Aug 2010	criminal	Zibo, Shandong, P.R. China	knife attack at kindergarten school	3	?	4	20
25 Aug 2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	60	0	74
28 Aug 2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	48	0	52
31 Aug 2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	74	0	74
2010	**terrorism**	Kabul, Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
2010	**terrorism**	Afghanistan	gas poisoning attack on girls' school	0	?	0	?
22 Oct 2010	criminal	Zamboanga City, Philippines	knife attack at elementary school	1	4	2	6
7 Apr 2011	criminal	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	shooting attack at elementary school	12	12	13	12
7 Apr 2011	**terrorism**	Sa'ad, Israel	anti-tank missile attack on school bus	1	0	1	1
19 Jun 2011	**terrorism**	Kapisa province, Afghanistan	rocket strike on school during gunbattle	0	5	1	7

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4 Jul 2011	**terrorism**	Faryab province, Afghanistan	grenade attack on high school	0	17	0	25
22 Jul 2011	**terrorism**	Utoya and Oslo, Norway	shooting attack and bombing	50	40?	77	151
28 Nov 2011	criminal	Kunduz, Afghanistan	acid attack on family in home	0	3	0	4
31 Mar 2012	**terrorism**	Esfandi area, Ghazni province, Afghanistan	acid attack on children	2	0	2	0
17 Apr 2012	**terrorism**	Takhar province, Afghanistan	water poisoning attack on girls' school	0	150	0	171

Incident descriptions:

- **18 May 1927** *(criminal)*--Bombing of a school in Bath, Michigan, killed many children. Andrew Kehoe, whose farm had been foreclosed for failure to pay school taxes, had placed about 400 kg of dynamite in the school. One charge exploded, collapsing a portion of the school and killing about 40 children. The school superintendent confronted Kehoe on a nearby street, when Kehoe fired into dynamite in the back of his car killing himself and the superintendent. [1]
- **15 September 1959** *(criminal)*--Paul Orgeron entered Poe Elementary School, Houston, Texas, and asked about enrolling his 7-year-old son but had no relevant documents, with which he promised to return. He returned to the school playground with his son a few minutes later, about 8:30 AM, carrying a briefcase containing about six sticks of dynamite, and gave a threatening note to a teacher. The teacher called for assistance from other staff and began moving students to safety. When Orgeron was confronted by the school principal and a custodian, he detonated the explosives, killing himself, his son, two other 7-year-old students, a teacher and the custodian. Those injured included 17 children ages 6 to 10 and the school principal. [2]
- **15 September 1963** *(terrorism)*--A bomb exploded under the steps of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing 4 young girls (ages 11-14) attending Sunday school and injuring 23 people. [3]
- **18 March 1968** *(terrorism)*--A school bus in the Negev desert, Israel, struck a landmine set by Fatah terrorists. Two children were killed and 28 children injured. [4]
- **22 May 1970** *(terrorism)*--12 killed, 19 injured (mostly children) in attack on school bus with three bazooka rockets. [5]
- **11 April 1974** *(terrorism)*--18 killed (including 8 children), 16 injured in attack by three terrorists on residential building in Qiryat Shemona. [6]
- **15 May 1974** *(terrorism)*--27 killed, 134 injured in attack on Ma'alot; terrorists killed 2 people in initial attack and took 90 children hostage; most casualties were inflicted by the terrorists during a rescue attempt in which 20 children and 1 soldier were killed (along with all three terrorists). [7]
- **3 February 1976** *(terrorism)*--At 8:00 AM four terrorists seized a school bus with 30 French children in Djibouti and forced the driver to drive to the Djibouti-Somali border. Negotiations faltered and the following day French GIGN troops arranged to retake the bus. A meal with tranquilizers was sent to the bus for the children. GIGN snipers killed the four terrorists plus a fifth who had entered the bus from across the Somali border, but the fifth terrorist was able to shot and kill one girl. Additional terrorists engaged the troops from the Somali border, but GIGN troops killed 30 of these terrorists, suffering no losses themselves. [8]

- **20 August 1978** *(terrorism)*--A group of Islamic extremists set fire to a crowded theater in Abadan, Iran. The moviegoers were violating Islamist beliefs by watching movies during the Islamic month of Ramadan. The single exit to the theater was locked with the assistance of a theater employee while the building was set ablaze with incendiary bombs. A small number of occupants were able to escape; most, however, were stampeded or died of smoke inhalation or flames. Total fatalities were about 477, including many youth. [9]
- **7 April 1980** *(terrorism)*--Five terrorists attack Misgav Am Kibbutz, Israel and take 9 infants hostage in a children's dormitory. Soldiers killed the terrorists in a rescue operation during which one child was killed and four children injured. Another two people (including one soldier) were killed and 12 injured (including ten soldiers). [10]
- **16 May 1986** *(terrorism)*--A couple took 150 hostages in a school in Cokeville, Wyoming. Children were forced to surround a homemade bomb while the couple demanded a ransom. The bomb accidentally exploded, killing the female terrorist and injuring many children; the male terrorist, in another room at the time, killed himself. [11]
- **17 January 1989** *(criminal)*--An individual using a AK-47 fired into children playing in the playground of Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, California. Five children, ages 6 to 9, were killed and 29 others injured, as well as one teacher. The assailant then shot and killed himself. [12]
- **17 March 1992** *(terrorism)*--A suicide car bomb exploded at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The explosion destroyed or severely damaged the embassy building, a nearby Catholic primary school, and a nearby Catholic church. Many of the 29 killed were Argentine students at the school; also killed were Israeli embassy employees and their relatives, a priest at the church, and other Argentine civlians; 252 were injured. Iran has been implicated in the attack, although Argentine authorities failed to effectively pursue the case. []
- **19 April 1995** *(terrorism)*--At 9:02 AM a explosion from a truck bomb caused the partial collapse of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The explosion resulted from a 2,000-kg ammonium nitrate/fuel oil bomb in a truck parked in front of the building. The 168 killed included 15 children in a day care center on the second floor, 30 visitors (including 4 more children), one person outdoors, and 3 people in nearby buildings. Injuries numbered 675, including 166 in the Murrah building, 413 in nearby buildings, 60 outdoors, and 36 in unknown locations. One rescue worker also died of injuries sustained during recovery efforts.
  Timothy McVeigh was arrested 30 km away at 9:10 AM on a traffic violation and charged with the bombing on April 21. McVeigh held anti-government views and choose the target as a federal building with a BATF office on the second anniversary of the federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Outside experts have questioned some conclusions of federal investigators and argue that demolition charges would have had to have been emplaced within the building. [13]
- **13 March 1996** *(criminal)*--Thomas Hamilton entered the Dunblane Primary School in Dunblane, Scotland, shooting students and teachers in the school gym before shooting and killing himself. Sixteen children ages 4 to 5 were killed along with 1 teacher; another 10 children and 2 teachers were injured. [14]
- **24 March 1998** *(criminal)*--Two students engaged in a shooting attack on Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas. After one of the pair pulled a fire alarm, prompting evacuation of the school, the two students fired on students and teachers leaving the building. Four students and 1 teacher were killed; 9 students and two adults were injured. [15]
- **29 October 1998** *(terrorism)*--1 soldier killed by car bomb driven into jeep escorting a school bus in Gaza. A terrorist driving an explosive-laden car attempted to collide with the bus but the escorting jeep moved to intercept the vehicle. The terrorist detonated the bomb, killing himself and one soldier in the jeep. Injured included two others in the jeep, 3 children, and 3 other adults. [16]
- **29 October 1998** *(criminal)*--In Goteborg, Sweden, an arson fire by a disgruntled student at a dance hall killed 63. [17]
- **20 April 1999** *(criminal)*--Two students engagd in a shooting attack on their school, Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold entered the school about 11:00 AM, shooting several students in a stairway. They shot one

student outside and additional students en route to the library, where more were shot. The perpetrators went to the cafeteria and unsuccessfully tried to detonate two propane bombs, after which they returned to the library and committed suicide. Arriving police were uncertain of the situation, with the result that the school was not fully evacuated until at least 4 PM. Those killed included 12 students ages 15 to 18, one teacher, and the two perpetrators. Injured included 21 students ages 15 to 18 and two teachers. [18]

- **20 November 2000** *(terrorism)*--2 killed, 9 injured (including 5 children) by roadside bomb exploding next to a school bus near Gush Katif at 7:30 AM. [19]
- **26 March 2001** *(criminal)*--Two students set fire to a dormitory at Kyanguli Secondary School, Machakos, Kenya. The two students were retaliating against rejection of college-entrance exams due to suspicions of cheating. The fire was fueled by gasoline and trapped many students in the dormitory which had barred windows and only one of two doors unlocked. Fatalities included 67 male students ages 15 to 19, of whom 58 died immediately and 9 more died of injuries by the following day. Another 19 were seriously injured. [20]
- **8 June 2001** *(criminal)*--Mamoru Takuma enters Ikeda Elementary School in Ikeda, Japan, and attacks students with a kitchen knife. Eight students ages 6 to 8 were killed and 13 more injured along with 2 teachers. [21]
- **4 September 2001** *(terrorism)*--20 injured in suicide bombing at 8:00 AM near school in Jerusalem, Israel. The terrorist may have been attempting to enter the school but detonated his bomb outside the school. [22]
- **9 September 2001** *(terrorism)*--15 killed (including 7 children, 1 American, and 1 Brazilian), 130 injured in suicide bombing at Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem. The attacker detonated the bomb, 5 to 10 kg and filled with schrapnel, just before 2 PM. The children killed were ages 2, 4, 8, 10, 14, 15, and 16; a teen age 18 was also killed. One of those injured was an 8-year old who lost 5 family members. [23]
- **2 March 2002** *(terrorism)*--11 killed (including 7 children), over 50 injured by suicide bomber in Orthodox neighborhood of Jerusalem. The terrorist detonated the bomb at 7:15 PM next to a group of women with baby carriages outside a synagogue. Nine were killed immediately; one adult died 4 March and one 16-year-old died 20 June of injuries. Children killed were ages 7 months, 18 months, 3, 7, 12, 15, and 16. Those killed included 7 members of one family, attending a bar mitzvah. [24]
- **26 April 2002** *(criminal)*--An expelled former student entered Johann Gutenberg High School in Erfurt, Germany, and went on a shooting rampage. The student shot and killed 13 teachers, 2 students (both age 15), and 1 police officer before committing suicide. [25]
- **9 May 2002** *(terrorism)*--A bomb was set off at a Victory Day parade in Kaspiysk, Dagestan, Russia. The parade (commemorating the anniversary of victory in World War II) was in the main street of Kaspiysk. A shrapnel-packed bomb hidden in shrubbery by the street was detonated as a military band passed. Initial fatalities included 34 killed, including 19 soldiers, 12 children, and a number of World War II veterans. By the following day additional deaths from injuries brought the total to 41 killed, including 17 children; subsequently the death toll rose to 43. Over 150 were injured, including at least 31 children. The Russian authorities announced the arrest of 18 individuals in connection with the attack, reportedly masterminded by Rapani Khalilov, a Dagestani Muslim religious leader. [26]
- **28 May 2002** *(terrorism)*--A Palestinian terrorist shot several students on the grounds of Yeshivat Hetzim high school in Itamar, Israel. The gunman shot and killed two students (ages 15 and 17) playing basketball, then entered the school and shot three more students, killing one (age 17) and injuring two (both age 14). The gunman was then shot and killed by a security guard and the school principal. [27]
- **3 June 2002** *(terrorism)*--A gunman attacked a school bus in Thailand, killing 2 students and injuring 15. [28]
- **11 November 2002** *(criminal)*--Two men put rat poison in breakfast food at Number One High School in Changde, P.R. China. The men were in a dispute with the school regarding their catering contract. A total of 193 students and teachers became ill. [29]
- **25 November 2002** *(criminal)*--Huang Hu enters a kindergarten school in Zhanjiang City, Guangdong, P.R. China, on the evening of 24 Nov. and places rat poison in the

kitchen's table salt. The man blamed the school for the failure of his own kindergarten school business the previous month. The following day the salt was used in porridge and consumed by students and teachers. A total of 70 children and 2 teachers became seriously ill and required hospitalization. The perpetrator was executed 4 Jan. 2003. [30]

- **2 May 2004** *(terrorism)*--Palestinian terrorists fired on vehicles near Gush Katif, Gaza, stopping a car carrying a mother and her four children (ages 2, 7, 9, and 11). The terrorists approached the car and fatally shot each child, also shooting the pregnant mother in the belly. Another civilian in a separate vehicle was injured. Israeli soldiers arrived and exchanged fire with the terrorists, during which two soldiers were injured. [31]

- **28 June 2004** *(terrorism)*--A Kassam rocket fired by terrorists struck near a nursery school in Sderot, Gaza Strip. Two people were killed, including one child, and 11 were injured. [32]

- **4 August 2004** *(criminal)*--A mentally ill man, Xu Heping, enters a kindergarten at Beijing Unversity's Number One Hospital in the P.R. China and stabs a number of children with a kitchen knife. One four-year-old boy died of injuries. Another 14 children and 3 adults were injured, of whom 2 children and 1 teacher were injured seriously. [33]

- **3 September 2004** *(terrorism)*--A standoff involving hundreds of hostages held by Chechen terrorists at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, ended with heavy casualties. On 1 September at 8:30 AM about 32 terrorists (reportedly Chechens and at least 10 Arabs) burst into Beslan School Number One at the conclusion of ceremonies opening the school year and opened fire in the school courtyard. One male parent and one terrorist were killed during the takeover. About 1,181 hostages, including about 855 children, about 60 teachers, and about 266 parents and others, were forced into the school gymnasium. Adults were then forced to extract explosives and weapons placed under the gymnasium's floor during the summer. At 10:50 AM the terrorists threatened to blow up the school if it were stormed, placing children at windows as human shields. Two cars that approached the school were attacked with grenade launchers; at least one driver was killed. About 12 adult males were taken to the second floor and shot, with one more escaping with injuries by jumping out a window. Another person was killed outside the school and two died in hospitals. About 8 were killed, including injured hostages taken from the gymnasium and shot (one child and the remainder adults). Reportedly at some point during the day two female terrorists blew themselves up in school hallways, killing a number of male hostages; other information suggests that the group's leader remotely detonated the two terrorists explosives to deal with dissent among the terrorists. The terrorists requested a specific negotiator with whom they talked from 12:30 AM to 2:00 AM on 2 Sept., when the terrorists ended negotiations. The terrorists negotiated with a former president of Ingushetia region at noon and released 30 women and children at 3:40 PM. The terrorists refused to accept food and water for the hostages, however, who resorted to drinking urine while massed in the gymnasium; many suffered heat exhaustion and removed most clothing.

  The morning of 3 Sept. the terrorists agreed to allow an emergency vehicle to remove bodies of those killed two days earlier, and about noon the vehicle approached the school. As the vehicle was withdrawing, a bomb in the gym fell and exploded, prompting the terrorists to shoot and kill two emergency workers outside. Some hostages fled the building, drawing fire from the terrorists. Russian troops and local civilians fired on the terrorists, with disorganization among the latter group. The terrorists detonated their explosives with at least two explosions at 12:05 PM partially collapsing the gymnasium's roof and a wall. Dozens of hostage deaths resulted from the roof collapse. At 12:14 PM about 30 hostages escaped the school, including injured children. Some terrorists began trying to escape at 12:46 PM, and another explosion occurred at 12:53 PM. Troops entered the school around 1:00 PM, and hundreds of hostages fled with terrorists continuing to shoot at them, producing many injuries. At 1:40 PM troops blasted a hole in a wall to assist evacuation of the burning school building. Some terrorists escaped, including some who took hostages in a house. The school was reported clear of hostages by 2:15 PM, and at 2:25 PM troops attacked a house where 13 terrorists were believed hiding. Explosions and gunfire continued near and within the school to at least 4:05 PM. Most terrorists were killed in gunfire (two were killed by crowds of civilians), but some were still firing from the school around noon and at least three were hidden in the school's basement at 2:50 PM with child hostages. At 8:00 PM

some children were still being held hostage. Operations were declared over at 10:40 PM, with at least one terrorist captured alive and 30 terrorists killed; some reports claim 3 escaped. Final reports of the number killed include 336 civilian hostages (of whom 16 died in hospitals); this includes 156 children, 19 teachers, and 161 other adult hostages, mostly parents and other relatives. In addition 2 police officers and 11 soldiers were killed. Reported injuries numbered 727 hostages, about 18 soldiers, and at least 2 police officers. Those hospitalized peaked at 704 (including over 336 children). One survivor committed suicide shortly after 3 Sept., and another committed suicide in early 2005. The school attack followed suicide bombings of two airliners flying from Moscow on 25 Aug., which killed 90, and a suicide bombing in Moscow on 31 Aug. which killed 10. [34]

- **30 September 2004** *(terrorism)*--In the al-Amel neighborhood of Baghdad, a car bomb exploded near a public ceremony marking the opening of a new water treatment plant. A smaller bomb on the ground exploded at nearly the same time. The explosions occurred in crowds attending the ceremony, including children gathered to receive candy from U.S. soldiers. Those killed included 35 children and 7 adults; 141 were injured, including 69 children, 10 U.S. soldiers in a nearby convoy, and 62 other adults. [35]

- **25 November 2004** *(criminal)*--At 11:45 PM a man entered a dormitory of Number 2 High School in Ruzhou, Henan, P.R. China, and began attacking sleeping students in their sleep with a knife. Proceeding through three separate dormitory buildings, he killed 8 students and injured 4 more, all in lower bunk beds. [36]

- **21 March 2005** *(criminal)*--A student walked into a high school at Red Lake Indian Reservation, Minnesota, and shot multiple students and adults. Jeff Weise, a homebound student, shot and killed his grandfather and his grandfather's girlfriend. The grandfather was a police officer, and Weise then took two of the grandfather's service weapons and his squad car to Red Lack Senior High School. He entered the school about 2:50 PM, killing a security guard who confronted him, then fired on students and teachers in several classrooms. Within about 10 minutes, four police officers arrived and exchanged gunfight with Weise, after which Weise committed suicide. Five students at the school were killed (four 15-year-olds and one 14-year-old) plus one teacher and one security guard. Another seven students were injured (including four 15-year-olds). [37]

- **4 April 2005** *(criminal)*--A man entered a middle school in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, P.R.C., and attacked several students with a kitchen knife. The man, who had recented lost his job, injured 8 students in the head and/or hands after entering a classroom at Nansan Middle School. When police arrived at the school a 2-hour standoff ensued after which the man attempted suicide by jumping from a window but was captured by police. [38]

- **10 June 2005** *(criminal)*--At Hikari High Schoo, Hikari, Yamaguchi, Japan, a student threw a homemade bomb into a classroom, injuring 58 students and teachers. The bomb comprised a jar filled with nails and gunpowder from firecrackers. Injuries were minor. [39]

- **16 June 2005** *(criminal)*--A hostage-taking at an elementary school for international children in Siem Reap, Cambodia, ended with one child killed. Chea Sokhom, a Cambodian who had been employed to take two children to the school, had a disagreement with the children's father, a South Korean. Sokhom recruited three friends in a plot to enter the school and kill the two South Korean children. They stormed the school at 9:30 AM with guns and knives and took two kindergarten classes hostage (about 70 children ages 2 to 6), but could not locate their intended targets. They released all but 30 children and a teacher. Sokhom fatally shot a two-year-old Canadian boy who would not stop crying. The gunmen demanded a van, ransom, and weapons; police provided the van and ransom and stormed the gunmen as they loaded the van with hostages, ending the seige without further injury. [40]

- **13 July 2005** *(terrorism)*--At 10:50 AM a suicide car bomb was driven into a group of children receiving toys and candy from U.S. soldiers in Baghdad. Neighborhood children were gathered around U.S. soldiers next to their Humvee. The terrorist drove into the group of children before detonating the bomb, killing at least 24 Iraqi children (most from 10 to 13 years in age, but including one 5-year-old and one infant), 2 Iraqi adults, and 1 U.S.

soldier. The 50 injured included 20 children and 3 U.S. soldiers. Two nearby houses were destroyed by the explosion; several of those killed and injured were in the houses. [41]

- **12 October 2005** *(criminal)*--At 8:13 AM, a man opened fire at Niutoushan Primary School, Guangde, Anhui, P.R.C. Liu Shibing, who had previously professed jealousy of others who had children, took six guns and fired on students exercising on the school grounds. Liu shot 16 students, 7 seriously, and the school principal; a worker near the school ran to the scene and was struck in the head by Liu. [42]

- **15 June 2006** *(terrorism)*--In Kabithigollewa, Sri Lanka, a bus carrying 150 people struck a pair of land mines or bombs, killing 64 and injuring at least 80. Many children were aboard the bus en route to school, and at least 15 were killed. The attack was attributed to the Tamil Tigers; the Sri Lankan government launched air strikes against Tamil sites later that day. [43]

- **27 September 2006** *(criminal)*--At a high school in Bailey, Colorado, a man entered a classroom about 11:30 AM, fired a warning shot, and selected six female students as hostages before ordered the teacher and other students from the classroom. Several hundred other students in the school were evacuated by police over the next 20 minutes or so. Over the next few hours the man released four hostages, then set a deadline of 4 PM. When it became clear that the man was sexually assaulting the hostages, authorities chose to raid the classroom. The man fatally shot one hostage, then killed himself. [44]

- **2 October 2006** *(criminal)*--A man entered a one-room Amish schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, about 10:00 AM, and ordered all but ten female students out of the schoolhouse. He then tied up the students and barricaded the doors with prepared wood he had brought to the site. An adult ran to a nearby building to call police; when police arrived, the man shot all the students and then killed himself. Five students died (ages, 7, 7, 8, 12, 13), and one more is not expected to survive. [45]

- **3 December 2006** *(terrorism)*--The al-Gharbiya high school in Baghdad was struck by a mortar round, injuring 10 students. It is unclear whether the intended target was the school or the nearby Iraqi health ministry. [46]

- **28 January 2007** *(terrorism)*--An all-girls Kholoud Secondary School in a Sunni district of west Baghdad was struck by a mortar attack. Students had just begun a break from classes and were gathering in an inner courtyard about 11:00 AM. At least two mortars landed in the courtyard among at least 100 students; casualties occurred both in the courtyard and inside classrooms from blown out windows. Four girls were killed immediately and a fifth girl died at a hospital, all ages 12 to 16; over other 20 students were injured. [47]

- **28 January 2007** *(terrorism)*--A suicide truck bomber struck an Iraqi security base near a primary school in Ramadi, Iraq. Two children at the school were killed and 10 injured; 3 guards at the base were also killed. [48]

- **20 February 2007** *(terrorism)*--A bomb was detonated on a chlorine tanker truck near a restaurant in Taji, Iraq. The bomb was aboard the tanker truck, contrary to early reports that the truck struck a roadside bomb. Some accounts suggest the truck was parked and left by the driver shortly before it detonated near a restaurant. Most or all of the fatalities and some injuries were caused by the explosion itself. The majority of non-fatal injuries, however, were from inhalation of chlorine fumes, affecting nearby homes and schools. About 150 people, including 42 women and 52 children, were hopitalized; others were treated or checked and did not require admission. [49]

- **2 April 2007** *(terrorism)*--[50]

- **6 August 2007** *(terrorism)*--A truck bomb was detonated in a residential area of Qubbak, near Tal Afar, Iraq. A dump truck filled with explosives, covered by gravel, was detonated by a suicide bomber. The morning explosion caused the collapse of several houses, with ten houses damaged in total. The 28 killed included 19 children, and a total of 50 people were injured. [51]

- **14 August 2007** *(terrorism)*--Multiple truck bombings in Al-Qataniyah and Al-Adnaniyah, Iraq, killed and injured hundreds. Four truck bombs reportedly carrying 2 tons of explosives were set off within minutes of each other in the two small villages, targeting members of the Yazidi sect in northern Iraq. Early reports said the trucks were gas tankers, but later reports indicated they were garbage trucks driven into the two villages and announced to be carrying food rations; after crowds gathered around the trucks, they

were detonated. Hundreds of clay houses were destroyed, burying many victims. Both villages were largely destroyed, with 1,000 houses destroyed and 500 damaged. On 17 August the Sinjar governor reported that 344 were known dead, with 400 injured and 70 others missing. Subsequent estimates of the number of fatalities ranged from 360 to 500. On 21 August the Iraqi Red Crescent Society reported that between 500 and 525 were killed and 1,500 injured, of which perhaps 300 were injured seriously. Of 300 patients transported to Sinjar, all had been taken home by relatives by 21 August, most fearing for their safety; 15 remained hospitalized at Tal Afar. [52]

- **12 October 2007** *(terrorism)*--A bomb in a toy cart was detonated on a playground in Tuz Khurmato, Iraq. Two boys from 10 to 12 years old were killed, and 17 people under 18 years old were injured. The bomber, reportedly a would-be suicide bomber, was wounded after pushing the cart into the play area when the bomb exploded. [53]

- **6 November 2007** *(terrorism)*--A suicide bombing targeted a public event in Baghlani-jadid, Afghanistan. Afghan lawmakers were visiting a sugar factory and were being greeted by schoolchildren lined along the street when the attack occurred. Security personnel began shooting into crowds afterwards, firing for 3-5 minutes. The 77 killed included 6 Afghan lawmakers, 5 teachers, 5 adult civilians and police officers, and 61 children, all boys ranging in age from 8 to 18. Reports of the number injured vary, but include 93 students, at least 3 teachers, and possibly additional adults. Earlier reports of 106 injured of whom 84 were hospitalized may include some who later died of wounds. Five of those hospitalized were suffering from bullet wounds, and one lawmaker who died may have been killed by gunfire. On 17 November it was reported that a preliminary UN report found that up to two-thirds of the casualties were hit by bullets fired by bodyguards. [54]

- **7 November 2007** *(criminal)*--An 18-year-old entered a high school in Tuusula, Finland, and shot multiple students. The gunman had posted an online video warning of the attack about two hours before, showing a still image of the high school. The police received a call at 11:43 AM and arrived at 11:55 AM, making contact with the gunman who shot once at police and eventually shot himself in the head; he was found by police about 2 hours after they arrived at the school. Five students were killed, all boys 16 to 18 years old, along with a female adult education student, a school nurse, and the school principal. Ten students were lightly injured, one with a shooting-related injury. In addition the gunman died of his self-inflicted wound later that day. Students at the school range in age from 12 to 18. [55]

- **22 January 2008** *(terrorism)*--A suicide bomber detonated a bomb at the entrance to al-Mutwra school, Ba'qubah, Iraq. Casualties included 17 students and 4 teachers injured. [56]

- **12 November 2008** *(terrorism)*--A group of girls walking to school in Kandahar City, Afghanistan, were attacked at about 8:00 AM with acid by two men on a motorcycle. The men sprayed acid on the group of eight girls (15 girls in some reports), of whom three were seriously burned, three were treated and released from a hospital, and two were protected by full-length burkas and were uninjured. At least two of the seriously burned girls were blinded by the attack. According to some reports the men ripped headscarves off the girls before spraying them with acid. The girls' school, Mirwais Minna Girl's High School, was empty the following day with none of the 1500 students showing for school. Reported ages for injured girls include 14, 16, and 18. [57]

- **26 December 2008** *(terrorism)*--A rocket fired by terrorists struck a house in Biet Lahiya, Gaza Strip, killing two girls and injuring three other children. The rocket, fired from Gaza, was probably intended for civilian targets in Israel proper. The girls killed were ages 5 and 12. [58]

- **28 December 2008** *(terrorism)*--A suicide car bomber attacked a police and army post next to a primary school in Khost province, Afghanistan. The bomber apparently intended to strike a meeting of tribal elders meeting at the post, driving the explosive-laden 4x4 through the approach to the checkpoint and detonating it next to a group of about 20 children. Of 16 killed, 14 were children ages 8 to 10, one was an Afghan soldier, and the other may have been an Afghan security guard; another 58 people were injured including 40 civilians, many of them children. The children were gathering at the school for the last school day of the year to receive end-of-year certificates. [59]

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- **13 February 2009** *(terrorism)*--A suicide bomber struck Shiite pilgrims near Iskandiriya, Iraq. The female bomber detonated explosives about 11:30 AM near tents providing food and drink along the route from Baghdad to Karbala where Shiite pilgrims were commemorating Arbaeen. Some tents were left on fire by the explosion. Apparently the women's tents were targeted, and the victims were mostly women and children: 32 were killed, and of the 76 injured 28 were children, mostly under the age of 15. [60]

- **9 July 2009** *(terrorism)*--A truck bomb exploded along a highway 45 km south of Kabul, Afghanistan, in a village near Mohammad. The truck was loaded with explosives covered with a load of wood and had run off the main Afghan highway and overturned. The truck exploded as police officers approached the truck to check it. The truck had come to rest in a stream between two schools and near some shops. The explosion killed 4 police officers, 16 primary students (ages 8-12) at the schools, and 5 other civilians, including shopkeepers; 5 civilians were injured. Two shops were completely destroyed, many homes collapsed with some partially collapsing up to 200 meters away, and debris was reportedly thrown 2 km away. [61]

- **25 October 2009** *(terrorism)*--Bombs were detonated in two vehicles near government buildings in Baghdad, Iraq. About 10:30 AM a vehicle (either a van, a bus, or a stolen water department pickup truck) was driven alongside the Justice Ministry building and 1000 kg of explosives in the vehicle were detonated, virtually destroying the ministry building as well as the building of the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works across the street. One minute later and 400 meters away, a vehicle (either a van or a bus) carrying 700 kg of explosives blew up next to the Baghdad Provincial Council building, destroying that building. As of late 26 Oct. casualties were reported at 160 killed and 540 injured, with an unknown number missing. At least 25 staff members of the Baghdad Provincial Council were killed. Casualties at the Justice Ministry building include many children from two day care centers associated with the Justice Ministry. Official reports are that 20 children were killed, most of them in a minivan just leaving the center. Other children were killed in the playground of one day care center. Those injured included at least 3 American civilians. By 26 October authorities had arrested 76 people in connection with the bombings. [62]

- **28 October 2009** *(terrorism)*--A car bombing at a marketplace in Peshawar, Pakistan, killed 118 people. The bomb used 150 kg of explosives and was remotely deton ated shortly after 1300 at the Meena Bazaar marketplace used by women. Several buildings in the crowded marketplace collapsed and others were set on fire. Many of those killed were women shoppers; at least 68 men, 32 women, and 13 children were killed, including 7 children from a single family. Casualties also occurred in an adjacent mosque. At least 213 were injured. [63]

- **7 December 2009** *(terrorism)*--A bomb exploded outside an elementary school in the Sadr City district of Baghdad. Among the 8 killed and 41 injured were 6 children killed, ages 6 to 12, and 25 children injured (up to age 15). [64]

- **3 August 2010** *(criminal)*--An individual entered a kindergarten in Zibo, P.R. China, while children were being picked up in the afternoon, attacking students and adults with a knife. Casualties included 3 children and 1 teacher killed, 20 children and staff members injured. [65]

- **22 October 2010** *(criminal)*--An individual entered a 5th grade classroom at Talisayan Elementary School, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and began attacking people with a machete. Casualties included 1 12-year-old student, a teacher, and the child's grandfather killed, 4 students and 2 teachers injured. The perpetrator was attacked and killed by parents present at the school. [66]

- **7 April 2011** *(criminal)*--An individual entered Tasso da Silveria elementary school in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and began firing on students with two guns. Casualties included 11 students (ages 12-14) killed at the school, another student who died later of injuries, and 12 students hospitalized. The perpetrator killed himself after being shot and injured by police. [67]

- **7 April 2011** *(terrorism)*--A laser-guided anti-tank missile was fired from Gaza at a school bus near Sa'ad, Israel, injuring a 16-year-old boy and the driver. The boy died 10 days later of head injuries. The school bus was nearly empty at the time of the attack. [68]

- **22 July 2011** *(terrorism)*--A bombing and a shooting attack in Norway killed 77 and injured 151. Anders Breivik, espousing extremist right-wing/nationalist views, detonated a large car bomb next to government buildings in Oslo at 3:25 PM, killing 8 and injuring 89. While authorities were responding to the bombing, Breivik made his

way to a political youth rally on the island of Utoya in Tyrifjorden lake, 40 km away. Arriving at 5:07 PM posing as a police officer, he began firing on attendees at the rally. Breivik continued shooting unopposed for over one hour, until police arrived on the island and he ran out of ammunition, surrendering at 6:27 PM. Police became aware of the shooting by at least 5:27 PM but did not reach the island until 6:25 PM. At Utoya 69 were killed (including one victim who died of injuries on 29 July) and 62 injured; of those killed, 50 were youth aged 14-18 years (2 aged 14, 7 aged 15, 7 aged 16, 17 aged 17, 17 aged 18). [69]

Analysis: *(under construction)*

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Policing Terrorism
By Matthew Waxman
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In recent months, the New York Police Department (NYPD) has come under attack for its counterterrorism intelligence activities, including its alleged efforts to "map" ethnic communities and its surveillance of religious groups. It is easy to view this controversy in familiar terms of security versus privacy or non-discrimination. Seen in those terms, the natural solutions seem to lie in tightening and enforcing substantive restrictions and guidelines that govern police intelligence activities and investigations.

The natural and important focus on substantive restrictions on police surveillance and intelligence collection, however, should not obscure the broader structural and institutional issues at stake here: What role should local police agencies play in terrorism prevention, and how should their cooperation be organized horizontally (among local police agencies) and vertically (between the federal and local governments)? How much discretion should state and local governments have in performing counterterrorism intelligence functions? And how can counterterrorism tasks be integrated with other police functions?

The NYPD is a special case. It has a large intelligence unit and about 1,000 officers dedicated full-time to counterterrorism—far more than any other municipal police department—and New York City faces unique threats. That said, involvement of local police in counterterrorism intelligence tasks is not a unique phenomenon. That involvement may even grow in the future, as threats and counterterrorism strategies evolve.

Police powers are constitutionally divided vertically in the United States, so some key counterterrorism competencies and resources reside at the state and local level. A major architectural challenge, therefore, is integrating counterterrorism intelligence with local policing. The solution will not be one-size-fits-all; instead, the U.S. domestic intelligence system should embrace local government variation, input, and oversight.

OUR COUNTERTERRORIST FEDERALISM
Following the September 11, 2001 al Qaida attacks, governments at all levels—federal, state, and local—recognized that local police would play a significant counterterrorism role going forward. Many of the informational "dots" comprising the September 11 plot sequence had occurred and had been detected by someone, somewhere, at some level of government in the United States; others should have been seen and passed on, but were missed. Perhaps the attacks could have been averted with better systems and policies to discern, analyze, assemble, and act on such "dots" throughout the country.

Who would perform these functions, though? The FBI was reoriented after 9/11 toward intelligence functions and counterterrorism, but it is a relatively small domestic security agency for a country this size, and there is no American appetite for a new domestic

intelligence agency along the lines of Britain's MI-5. A significant part of the answer therefore had to be state and local law enforcement, where much of the human resources for intelligence functions reside.

Unlike most other democracies, though, the United States has a system of policing that is highly localized and heterogeneous. As a constitutional matter, the federal government may not "commandeer" state and local legislators or executive officials, such as police agents. Police scholars generally regard the U.S. system as the most fragmented in the industrialized world.

The result is that there are more than 700,000 local police officers from about 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies who may conduct relevant activities such as surveillance, profiling-based investigation, and data collection and sharing. Most of this activity is done in the service of broad local law enforcement and policing mandates, but it also contributes to a national security policy principally led by the federal government. These activities, moreover, are governed by a complex web of law: not just federal law, but also state statutes and state constitutional doctrine, municipal legislation and regulations, judicial consent decrees, and state and local administrative guidelines.

How effective are state and local counter-terror programs?

With a post-9/11 policy imperative of collecting, analyzing, and connecting informational dots to prevent terrorist attacks, the federal government launched a set of initiatives designed to enlist state and local partners. The FBI, for example, has invited state and local agencies to participate in joint investigative task forces, and the Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security have provided grants and training to support the establishment of local intelligence capabilities, state and major urban area intelligence "fusion centers," and data-sharing programs.

ARCHITECTURAL CHALLENGES

These efforts to mobilize and link together federal, state, and local agencies are still evolving, not only because working through the details is tricky, but also because the terrorist threat has been shifting, as have strategies for combating it. Some of the continuing architectural challenges in preventing terrorism include combining federal terrorism expertise with local knowledge, reconciling intelligence activities with community policing, and harnessing local, bottom-up learning to inform and improve our national efforts.

As to the issue of specialized expertise and local knowledge, a common mantra since 9/11 has been that local police are the "eyes and ears" or "front line" of the domestic war against terrorism. But there remains a dearth of systematic study of the effectiveness of state and local counter-terrorism programs. Critics argue that widely enlisting local agencies and agents into national counter-terrorism intelligence initiatives is, at best, inefficient because they lack the necessary expertise and institutional priorities to identify, investigate, and track the most significant terrorism threats; some local police forces also exhibit ethnic and religious biases that undermine their intelligence effectiveness (though recent controversies regarding federal training programs suggest that this problem is marbled through all layers of the law enforcement community).

Counter-balancing these concerns, local police are better suited than federal counterparts to perform some intelligence functions because of their superior familiarity with their local communities. This deep familiarity accrues because of local police agencies' broad public service and community order mandate and because police forces and their leadership are generally drawn from the local area.

Moreover, the strategic wager to invest in local police intelligence architecture versus centrally-managed capabilities is related to the structure of the terrorism threat it is built to combat. International terrorist networks—especially those like al Qaida that are controlled or supported by a central core—are often detectable through technological and institutional capabilities that only exist at the federal level (like large programs to monitor communications, significant cooperation efforts with foreign government agencies, and centralized analysis of seemingly disparate bits of information). By contrast, the more that terrorism threats include domestic, and perhaps homegrown, dangers, the more dependent the government will be on tips and observations generated and analyzed locally.

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We need to build trust between the government and Muslim communities.

Beside knowledge and expertise, relationships of trust between communities—and especially, when it comes to Islamist terrorism, Muslim communities—and government agencies and agents are important to acquiring information about potential threats. Leveraging such relationships requires reconciling intelligence activities with community policing.

Modern local policing strategy trends call for deep engagement with the community. Local police functions include preventing and investigating crime as well as maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services—and these are rarely distinct from their "national security" functions. The resulting familiarity and networks of relationships with community actors and other local agencies and institutions position local police to receive information and detect suspicious irregularities.

On the flip side, though, this means that local police intelligence efforts can badly backfire if agencies are perceived to harbor ethnic or religious biases or if their activities are viewed as casting an overbroad net, therefore alienating communities upon which police rely for information.

It is unsurprising that post-9/11, institutional reconfigurations that push counter-terrorism responsibilities to local police agencies would also raise concerns that local capabilities, refined over a long time to deal with other crime and public policy issues, match poorly with the national security imperatives of combating terrorism, or that saddling local police agencies with these responsibilities would distort and degrade their regular functions. Studies show, however, that post-9/11, counter-terrorism responsibilities have not widely resulted in radical changes to internal police agency structure or the way they manage their core local public policy functions. The above analysis suggests that some comparative counter-terrorism advantages derive from the very broad public service and order-protecting mandate of local police.

Furthermore, in the classic federalism sense of "laboratories of democracy," some long-term advantages of localism in American counter-terrorism intelligence may ultimately emerge through experimentation and the resulting adaptation as best practices spread. This sort of bottom-up learning through local innovation may be especially important in developing new

policy tools for combating terrorism. For example, the federal government has been working with select state and local intelligence fusion centers to develop and refine policies and practices for recording, filtering, and sharing suspicious activity reports possibly indicative of terrorist activity.

Learning from localized experimentation and adaptation might also be well-suited to the strategic problem of countering violent extremist recruitment and radicalization—a problem that overlaps significantly with intelligence policy and practice but is also sometimes in fragile tension with it. The federal government is therefore working to empower local partners in this area.

Lessons from European countries more experienced in dealing with domestic terrorism threats suggest that local governments may be better positioned than national ones to design and implement strategies for countering violent-extremist activity and recruitment, but that counter-radicalization and national security intelligence efforts are difficult to balance or meld because the latter may erode trust among communities perceived to be targeted for surveillance. Given their broader community protection and service mandate, local police and other local agencies may serve as a better bridge between those activities than could their federal counterparts, and may be better positioned to leverage the influence and capabilities of non-government actors.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In light of these interlocking challenges—combining federal terrorism expertise with local knowledge, reconciling intelligence activities with community policing, and harnessing bottom-up learning—two policy implications stand out. First, both the federal government and local communities have an interest in the continued role of local government in counterterrorism policy and programs. Institutional structures should be designed to leverage local input. This idea may seem counterintuitive to those who view police intelligence activities as threatening to civil liberties and to local community values—those who therefore want to see police separating or distancing themselves from national security functions—but local government involvement can also help protect against federal government intelligence overreach.

State and local governments need to develop varied forms of oversight.

Second, state and local governments will need to develop varied forms of oversight, tailored to local conditions. This will be a slow and uneven evolutionary process. Again, this idea may seem counterintuitive to those who see national security law as requiring uniformity, or who look to the federal government to provide rights-protective checks on aggressive state and local activities.

Further consideration of institutional design should focus on how federal-local partnerships can provide genuine opportunity for joint planning and policy formulation. For instance, the emergent intelligence architecture includes mechanisms for collaborative investigation among federal and local agencies (such as joint investigative task forces) and efforts to involve state and local governments in intelligence sharing and analysis.

It is important, though, that the evaluation of these programs looks beyond whether they adequately resource counter-terrorism efforts or break down barriers to necessary information sharing—the priority issues that most naturally flowed from assessments of pre-9/11 bureaucratic defects in "connecting dots"—to whether they promote meaningful analysis and opportunity for joint deliberation or mutual review between levels of government involved in counter-terrorism policy.

For these joint programs to work effectively over time, both local and federal agencies would have to commit to major cultural shifts as a matter of long-term strategy. State and local governments would need to purchase more clout by devoting substantial resources and senior-level attention to collaborative national security programs. Federal agencies like the FBI would have to view local agencies as essential players, and to demonstrate their commitment with greater flow of information and greater deference to local policy priorities.

A related priority is developing oversight systems of local intelligence activities that protect rights, promote accountability, and ensure effectiveness. This will take some time, though, and remain an evolutionary process. At the federal level, the intelligence abuse investigations of the Seventies eventually produced a constellation of formal oversight mechanisms and checks on domestic intelligence activities arrayed across all three branches of government—a complex undertaking that remains a work-in-progress nearly forty years later.

In the decades prior to 2001, by contrast, many state and local agencies dismantled their national security intelligence apparatuses altogether or adopted tight restrictions on their ability to function at all. As a result, governmental intelligence oversight mechanisms are considerably less mature and developed at the state and local level, and they are very patchy and uneven across jurisdictions.

Although the federal government will have some role to play in monitoring and constraining local government intelligence activities, much of this oversight gap must be filled by decentralized, locally-developed mechanisms. Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, state or local jurisdictions will need to develop, supplement, and retool their own oversight instruments—including internal agency review processes, legislative monitoring, and external audits—tailored to their particular interests, circumstances, and laws or guidelines. The result will be a locally-textured counterterrorism architecture rather than a nationally-homogenous intelligence system, but it will be one better able to reconcile or balance the multitude of policy imperatives in our federal system.

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CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – June 2012

Former Special Ops Adviser: Al Qaeda Is Coming Back

Source: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/05/04/former-special-ops-adviser-al-qaeda-is-coming-back_print.html

Triumphant from the successful pursuit of Osama bin Laden last year, President Obama proclaimed that al Qaeda was "on a path to defeat." But Seth Jones, a former U.S. Special Operations Command senior adviser, says the evidence he has collected points to the contrary. In Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qa'ida Since 9/11, Jones draws upon his expertise and thousands of pages of court transcripts, including wiretapped conversations and communications intelligence intercepts, to paint a picture of a terrorist organization that has been transformed, but not defeated. Jones recently spoke with *U.S. News* about his theory of "waves" of violence from the world's most notorious terrorist organization and what needs to be done to prevent the next cycle. Excerpts:

What are the three waves of al Qaeda terrorism?
When you look at fatality data, what you see is three major waves of activity. The first wave really begins around the time of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and crests around September 11 [2001]. And then it comes way down after that. By the invasion of Iraq [in 2003], we begin to see a major increase in al Qaeda attacks. And it first starts in Iraq itself, where al Qaeda in Iraq is established after the invasion. And then it starts to get reinvigorated overseas—Bali, Casablanca, Madrid, and a very successful attack in London. The third wave starts around 2008 and into 2009, in particular with al Qaeda's successful establishment of a sanctuary in Yemen.

Is there a pattern or a cause for the cycles?
Those waves tended to rise when the United States and its allies have deployed large numbers of conventional forces to Muslim countries, al Qaeda has adopted a selective engagement strategy, and governments collapse in countries where al Qaeda has a support base. And these waves have tended to ebb when the United States and foreign powers have

utilized a light-footprint, clandestine strategy, al Qaeda has embraced a punishment strategy that kills a large number of civilians and undermines its support, and local governments have developed competent security forces.

What else does your analysis show?
The struggle against al Qaeda really depends on the precise use of violence. It is a war in which the side that kills the most civilians loses.

Is there currently a threat of a fourth wave?
I would say the fourth wave is probably beginning to happen now. The biggest variable is the weakness of multiple governments coming from Arab Spring. Al Qaeda activities, the number of attacks now, have actually increased, even around the time of [the killing of] bin Laden.

Did bin Laden's death impact al Qaeda?
A little bit. What it appears to have done is probably weaken the core element in Pakistan, that central leadership lost its most important actor. But at the same time, and this is part of a conscious decision by al Qaeda, is they have established what you might call a mergers and acquisitions strategy, where they have reached out and cut deals with a range of affiliated groups. These are groups whose leaders have sworn loyalty to [al Qaeda's new leader Ayman al-] Zawahiri.

Who are these groups?
There are several. There's al Qaeda in Iraq, which still exists. The most recent one is al Shabaab, which in February formally announced that they were a part of al Qaeda. There's al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula based out of Yemen, and there's al Qaeda in the Maghreb. They are directly connected to al Qaeda central.

Do the new groups expand the threat?
They clearly, especially with the Yemen group, have continued to plot attacks against the U.S. homeland and its interests, including U.S. embassies in Africa. If you take the formal affiliates and the less formal allies, what al Qaeda's done is become a little more decentralized. The central part in Pakistan after bin Laden's death is less important than it was.

Is Pakistan helping root out al Qaeda?
Pakistan is trying to root out groups that threaten the Pakistan government's interest and threaten the state.

Do you expect to see a reaction to next month's 9/11 trials at Guantánamo Bay?
I would say, generally, if they can pull off an attack, they will, regardless of dates. The one-year anniversary of bin Laden's death is coming up as well. So I think at the very least, retaliation on the anniversary of bin Laden's death also might be tempting.

What advice would you give to President Obama today?
One, [I would emphasize] that al Qaeda is regenerating. And two, that we have got to focus our intelligence and special operations and FBI presence on probably about eight or nine countries, to work with their governments, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. We cannot leave in 2014 based on the trends right now in this area.

Should the United States stay in Afghanistan?
At the very least to have a very robust special operations presence.

Al Qaeda hoped 'angry Irish' might turn to Islam

Source:http://www.irishexaminer.com/world/al-qaeda-hoped-angry-irish-might-turn-to-islam-192790.html

Al Qaeda discussed trying to convert Irish people to Islam because of their disenchantment with the Catholic Church over the child abuse scandals and also anger over the economic crisis.
Details of the plan emerged in a letter from American al Qaeda spokesman Adam Gadahn

to an unidentified recipient. The correspondence was found in the house in Pakistan where al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden was shot dead by US forces last year.
"I was — in response to those directives and after consulting brother

Ubayd — starting to prepare a message to the Irish and I started searching for the information and materials necessary for that to be collected," Gadahn wrote.

"This was after I noticed the sympathy of the Irish people to the Palestinian issue, and the soft treatment by the Irish judicial system of the Muslims accused of terrorism, and also not participating with its troops in Bush's crusade wars.

"Also, what helped to prepare the message was the last economic crisis that affected Ireland a lot, thus forcing its youth to look for sources of living in the outside. The other matter is the increasing anger in Ireland towards the Catholic Church after exposing a number of sex scandals and others. The people there are moving towards secularism, after it was the most religious of atheist Europe, and why do not we face them with Islam?"

The letter was written in late Jan 2011.

It forms part of a selection of documents seized in last year's raid on Osama bin Laden's Pakistan house that have been posted online by the US army's Combating Terrorism Centre.

In letters from his last hideout, bin Laden fretted about dysfunction in his terrorist network and crumbling trust from Muslims he wished to incite against their government and the West.

The documents show what bin Laden saw as bumbling within his organisation and its terrorist allies.

"I plan to release a statement that we are starting a new phase to correct (the mistakes) we made," bin Laden wrote in 2010.

"In doing so, we shall reclaim, God willing, the trust of a large segment of those who lost their trust in the jihadis."

Until the end, bin Laden remained focused on attacking Americans and coming up with plots, however improbable, to kill US leaders.

He wished especially to target airplanes carrying Gen David Petraeus and President Barack Obama, reasoning that an

assassination would elevate an "utterly unprepared" vice-president Joe Biden into the presidency and plunge the US into crisis.

But an US analysts' report released along with bin Laden's correspondence describes him as upset over the inability of spin-off terrorist

groups to win public support for their cause, their unsuccessful media campaigns and poorly planned plots that, in bin Laden's view, killed too many innocent Muslims.

Al Qaeda's relationship with Iran, a point of deep interest to the US government, was rough.

Bin Laden wrote that "controlling children" was one of the keys to hiding in cities, as he did for years while US forces searched Pakistan's rugged frontier.

He encouraged his followers in hiding to teach their children the local language and not let them out of their homes "except for extreme necessity like medical care."

The correspondence suggests that al Qaeda carefully monitored US cable news networks and generally didn't like what it saw.

"We can say that there is no single channel that we could rely on for our messages," Gadahn wrote, although he described ABC as "all right, actually it could be one of the best channels as far as we are concerned."

He complained that Fox News "falls into the abyss, as you know, and lacks neutrality." CNN, he said, "seems to be in co-operation with the government more than the others except Fox News, of course."

German Trials Highlight the Role of the IMU as a Feeder for al-Qaeda Operations in Europe
By Raffaello Pantucci
Source: http://www.jamestown.org

Two separate trials are currently underway in Germany that have highlighted the particular role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU) as a feeder group for German jihadists who end up working alongside al-Qaeda. The first is a

case in Koblenz involving Ahmad Wali Siddiqui, a German-Afghan who was captured in July 2010 by American forces at a taxi stand in Kabul (*Der Speigel*, February 28, 2011). The second case involves Yusuf Ocak and Maqsood Lodin, German and Austrian nationals respectively who were captured after careful detective work by German forces seeking to intercept radicals they suspected were behind videos threatening Germany (*Der Spiegel*, June 18, 2011; AP, June 20, 2011). The three men are all standing trial accused of ties to the highest echelons of al-Qaeda and seem to have made their connections to the group through the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Their trials have cast a new light on the particular ties between Germany and the Central Asian militants.

The Unsuccessful Jihad of Ahmad Wali Siddiqui

Ahmad Wali Siddiqui's ties to militancy go back to his time in Hamburg as an Islamist on the fringes of the community in which Mohammed Atta's September 11 cell formed around the infamous al-Quds mosque (later renamed the Taiba Mosque) (*Der Spiegel*, August 9, 2010; AFP, August 9, 2010). After moving to Germany as a 16-year-old in 1990, Siddiqui achieved little in life beyond failing at business before encountering Moroccan Mounir al-Motassadeq while they both worked at the Hamburg airport in 1997 (AP, October 8, 2010; *Der Spiegel*, February 8). Al-Motassadeq was later convicted in Germany of supporting the September 11 cell. On the stand, Siddiqui denied being close to al-Motassadeq, though it was revealed that he had driven al-Motassadeq's father some 400km to visit his son in prison and had holidayed with al-Motassadeq and their wives in Morocco in 2002 (AP, March 19). [1] It was not until March 2009, however, that Siddiqui decided that it was time to join the fighters in Waziristan. Siddiqui joined a contingent of 11 Germans (nine men and two of their wives) that left in four separate groups starting on February 4, 2009. Along with his wife and brother, Siddiqui belonged to the second cell, which had intended to use as their guide an older member, Assadullah Muslih, an Afghan who had long been moving back and forth between Pakistan and Germany. However, Muslih seems to have disappeared soon after he took the first cell to Pakistan, leaving the aspiring

jihadis to their own devices (*Der Spiegel*, October 18, 2010).

Those that made it re-grouped in Mir Ali in Waziristan later in 2009. Here they were absorbed by the IMU, which had by this point established itself as a home for German jihadists. According to Siddiqui, the group had gone to the region to connect with al-Qaeda, but was instead re-directed to the IMU after they met a pair of German jihadists in the region. They were brought into the group's trust and met leader Tahir Yuldashev at a wedding where they pledged allegiance to him (*Der Spiegel*, February 28). Things were not always so positive, however, as they found themselves largely unable to communicate with the Uzbek jihadists. According to Siddiqui's account, a trainer at one point threatened to beat him after Siddiqui experienced a fall that aggravated an old injury and prevented him from training. The commander settled for firing a shot near his head. Siddiqui's brother similarly got into a clash with another of the trainers and the brothers were able to broker their way out of the IMU camp after they agreed to produce a recruitment video for the group (AP, March 20). At this point, they found their way to al-Qaeda, though the group was initially suspicious of the men.

As with the IMU, they seem to have been brought into the group's trust relatively quickly and were allowed to train alongside the group using heavy weapons. In the first half of 2010 they participated in a meeting at which they met a fellow German jihadist from the Hamburg cell, Said Bahaji, an individual connected to the September 11 Hamburg group who had fled to Pakistan a week prior to 9/11. However, the most significant encounter was much later with Yunis al-Mauretani, whom Siddiqui and German jihadist Rami Makanesi state they met in mid-2010. The al-Qaeda commander arrived at a camp where the Germans were staying with stories of a plot being planned with cells in Italy, France and the UK to launch Mumbai-style assaults on European cities. Al-Mauretani was apparently eager for the Germans to return home and undertake fundraising and planning in Germany (*Der Spiegel*, October 11, 2010). However, the plot was soon disrupted, with Rami Makanesi handing himself over to authorities, Ahmad Wali Siddiqui being captured by U.S. forces in Kabul as he plotted his trip back to Germany and the remaining members

being killed by a drone strike in late 2010.

The Deutsche Taliban Mujahideen

The story of Yusuf Ocak and Maqsood Lodin is different and yet similar in many ways to that of Siddiqui. Ocak and Lodin were drawn from a group of young German extremists who went to Pakistan to join the Deutsche Taliban Mujahideen (DTM), an offshoot of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) that formed under the tutelage of the Pakistani Taliban and the IJU in response to the growing numbers of Germans coming to fight jihad. [2] Leaving months after Siddiqui's Hamburg group, Yusuf Ocak was ensconced in Waziristan by September 2009 where he helped found the DTM (Deutsche Welle, January 25). By late December, 2009 he was videotaping missile attacks on U.S. bases in Afghanistan (*Der Spiegel*, June 19, 2011). Ocak appeared in a video where he threatened Germany with attacks, leaving an audio trail that German investigators were able to trace, leading to his capture (Austrian Times, February 2). As well as helping establish the DTM and producing videos for the group, Ocak used the internet to reach out to prospective members and recruits in Germany. Lodin, meanwhile, was an active fundraiser for the group (*Handelsblatt*, January 25).

The DTM was a short-lived group that for a while seemed to be a new hub of German-origin terrorist networks in Afghanistan-Pakistan. However, with the April, 2010 death of their leader Ahmet Manavbasi (a former drug dealer from Lower Saxony), the group seems to have largely collapsed with Yusuf Ocak being picked up by al-Qaeda. This was around the same time that Siddiqui and Makanesi were being recruited by Yunis al-Mauretani for his European terrorist plot and the new German recruits from the old DTM would have been prime targets for recruitment as well. Ocak denies having encountered al-Mauretani, but was apparently taught to use the same encryption programs (Asrar and Camouflage) as Rami Makanesi admits to having learned in the training camps (*Der Spiegel*, May 9, 2011; *Die Tageszeitung*, January 25). More incriminating than this, however, was a series of documents found on an encrypted flash drive in Ocak's underwear when he was captured that appear to be a series of internal al-Qaeda documents (*Die Zeit*, March 15). The documents are apparently a series of internal planning documents written by senior members of al-Qaeda. These include a series of reports believed to be written by British al-Qaeda member Rashid Rauf (allegedly killed by a drone strike in November, 2008). These reports appear to be post-operational assessments of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, the failed July 21, 2005 attacks on the London Underground and the 2006 "Airlines plot" to bring down around eight airliners on transatlantic routes.

Ocak and Lodin left Pakistan in early 2011, travelling via Iran and Turkey to Budapest where they were apparently tasked with raising funds and establishing networks of suicide bombers that could be used in future al-Qaeda operations (*Die Tageszeitung*, January 25). However, both operatives were captured together with a network of Austrian recruits, some of whom were believed to have sought flight training (*Der Spiegel*, June 18, 2011).

Conclusion

What is most interesting about both cases is the transfer of the German cells from the IMU and DTM to core al-Qaeda. In both cases, the German speakers seem to have first been drawn in using the IMU/DTM networks that are in themselves off-shoots of Central Asian networks, but ended up as part of the al-Qaeda network, tasked with carrying out terrorist attacks in Europe.

According to Siddiqui, however, this was contrary to their original intentions: "We wanted to fly [to Pakistan] to live life according to Shari'a law and fight jihad….we did not want to ever return" (AP, March 20). Similarly, Ocak seems to have enjoyed fighting the United States alongside the DTM members and their Central Asian associates. However, the men were easily turned from their Central Asian focus back towards the West, al-Qaeda's priority interest.

There are still a number of uncertainties surrounding these two cases. In particular, it is unclear whether the two groups interacted or were kept apart. Given their similar interactions with al-Mauretani and orders to head back to Europe to establish new networks, it seems as though they might have been part of a bigger scheme, explaining why al-Qaeda would have wanted to keep them apart. While a number of other cells have been disrupted in Germany of late, it remains unclear how many more might be out there. Nevertheless, these trials show that

the interaction between Central Asian terror groups in Waziristan, their German recruits and al-Qaeda is somewhat less organized than it appears at the outset and is highly influenced by the actions of individual personalities on the ground.

Far from being an organized targeting of Germany by al-Qaeda, the activities of these cells were instead an opportunistic effort that reflected the presence of numerous itinerant young Germans in Waziristan in 2009. In a pattern seen previously with the British-Pakistani connection in the lead-up to the July 7, 2005 bombings, young men fired up by parochial jihadist groups are drawn toward al-Qaeda's globalist message prior to returning home to carry out attacks there.

Notes
1. http://ojihad.wordpress.com/2010/10/22/why-the-hamburg-friends-matter-jihad-made-in-germany/.
2. "Mein Weg nach Jannah," by Abdul Ghaffar el Almani (Eric Breininger), released on forums May 2010. A translation summary can be found at: http://www.jihadica.com/guest-post-the-story-of-eric-breininger/.

Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) and the author of the forthcoming We Love Death as You Love Life: Britain's Suburban Mujahedeen *(Hurst/Columbia University Press).*

Has scourge of Somali piracy passed?
By John J. Metzler
Source:http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2012/05/137_110292.html

There s been a significant drop in ship seizures and hijackings by Somali pirates in the troubled waters off East Africa. Despite last year's spike in piracy with 28 vessels captured in the first half of 2011, there were only three ships seized in the second half of the year, according to the Commander of the European Union's anti-piracy task force. So far this year only four merchant ships have been seized by the latter-day buccaneers.

But has the scourge of Somali piracy passed? In a briefing at the European Union's U.N. delegation, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts of Britain's Royal Navy stressed while the activity level is down, the progress that we made is very definitely reversible.

After a record year for ransom demands last year, where they got almost $150 million in ransom demands, Potts added, I think it is fair to say at the moment the pirates may be cash rich but they are definitely asset poor; they have very few tradable assets.

A year ago, Somali pirate gangs held 24 ships and 500 sailors; today they are holding seven ships and 200 sailors. He advised that only three ships have a reasonable market for ransom

Part of the setbacks for Somali pirates stem from concerted international action to counter this seaborne threat. In 2008 the European Union set up a joint naval task force Operation Atalanta to deter and prevent piracy, to safeguard regional shipping, and to escort vessels carrying humanitarian aid. Pirates were targeting vulnerable but lucrative World Food Program humanitarian aid shipments en route to Somalia, for example.

Operation Atalanta currently deploys nine surface ships from six EU countries; France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Most are corvettes and frigates. Yet the area of responsibility is huge; from the waters off East Africa and deep into the Indian Ocean, the zone of operations covered is many times the size of Europe.

In parallel NATO maintains an equally needed naval contingent off the Horn of Africa. Operation Ocean Shield provides naval escorts and equally offers deterrence. Under Turkish command, six ships including the U.S. Navy and British navy joined by Denmark and Turkey patrol the still dangerous waters. Other countries such as South Korea, India and Japan maintain a separate presence in the region as well.

As naval patrols are successful, the pirates move deeper and deeper into new areas rich with targets of opportunity. Until recently, according to Vice Admiral Potts, piracy offered reward with little risk and even today pirates will seek to go where we are not and there are viable targets.

But who are the Somali pirates in the first place? According to most

observers, the pirate culture stems from Somali's fate as a failed state where endemic poverty, warlords, Islamic militants, and despair have led many fishermen and militiamen to follow what has become a very lucrative business. Today coastal clans run small speed boats and larger mother ships which attack with near impunity usually unarmed merchant vessels and yachts, traditional targets of opportunity.

Ransom payments have fueled an amazing lifestyle for pirate clans in Puntaland along the Somali coast who can live in pockets of unimaginable luxury in a destitute land.

Yet over 1,000 pirates, out of a suspected community of three to five thousand, have been captured and prosecuted in a score of countries. Last year pirates foolishly hijacked a South Korean merchant vessel seeking ransom. South Korean commandos soon stormed the ship, killed eight buccaneers and freed 21 crew members.

Rear Admiral Duncan Potts concedes the EU operation is conducting a constabulary operation which restrains what we can do. He asserts we can have an impact on the business model for piracy but have to change conditions on shore. Yet, he clearly states, there's no intention of putting EU boots on the ground, in Somalia.

Tragically the long running Somali crisis has confronted policy makes for 22 years and hints of stability are sparse. While the international naval operations are protecting vital maritime trade routes, the naval presence treats the symptoms and not the root problem.

Transforming Somalia's socio/economic and failed state status has eluded the world community for a quarter century. Any change at best emerges as a very long-term endeavor. Thus in the immediate term, given the clear and present danger pirates pose to the free passage of maritime traffic and innocent life, changing the rigid rules of engagement to authorize lethal force becomes a serious option. Putting the pirates in the crosshairs of naval guns would change the balance and ensure the rights of free navigation and commerce.

John J. Metzler is a United Nations correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He is the author of ``Transatlantic Divide; USA/Euroland Rift.''

Germany: loner terrorists are greatest threat

Source: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/27/germany-loner-terrorists-are-greatest-threat/

Germany's top security official said Friday the greatest terror threat to the country no longer stems from big networks like al-Qaida but from small, independent terrorist cells or "lone wolf" perpetrators.

Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich told The Associated Press that terrorist activities by Muslim extremist organizations have evolved to be decentralized, making their activities harder to track for authorities.

"What worries us" is that there will likely also be more lone wolf attackers who are not directly connected to a major terror group but have radicalized themselves, often through propaganda available online, he said. "There will likely be more of them because the Islamists' propaganda networks seem to be further gearing up."

"There is no more centralized planning... Single terror cells are being sent out, complete with information and propaganda. This is what worries us," he said.

Friedrich is headed to Washington next week to meet with officials such as President Barack Obama's top counterterrorism adviser John Brennan and Attorney General Eric Holder to discuss terrorism and cyber security issues.

There have been several unsuccessful or foiled attacks by Islamic radicals in Germany, and the first fatalities attributed to a Muslim extremist came last year in March when a 21-year-old Kosovo-born ethnic Albanian gunned down two U.S. airmen outside Frankfurt's airport. The lone attacker is believed to have been inspired by watching Salafist videos online.

Salafist groups — espousing an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam — have recently increased their presence and followers in Germany.

One radical group attracted as much public attention as criticism from

officials this month after announcing it plans to distribute millions of free copies of the Muslim Holy Book, the Quran, in Germany.

"In this context it is worrying us that they are strengthening their propaganda and that they are explicitly targeting to win over young people," Friedrich said.

He also said cyber crime also is concerning security officials since hacking and spy attacks could target companies and the country as a whole, including its critical infrastructure.

Stuxnet — a sophisticated virus that targeted Iranian nuclear installations — "came as a warning to all of us that much more is already possible to be done with malware and virus programs than one had imagined," Friedrich said.

Al-Qaeda magazine back, calls for firebombs in US

Source: http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=381767

Al-Qaeda's English-language magazine has reappeared months after its founders were killed in a US missile strike, with calls for firebomb campaigns in the United States and chemical weapons attacks.

Defiantly boasting that it was "still publishing America's worst nightmare," Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen released the eighth and ninth issue of the "Inspire" magazine, which first appeared online in July 2010.

The issues eulogized as "martyrs" the two Al-Qaeda figures who helped launch the publication, and then were killed in a US drone strike in September: radical US-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, a Pakistani-American.

"To the disappointment of our enemies, issue nine of Inspire magazine is out against all odds," an unsigned editorial note said. "Inspire is and will be an effective tool regardless of who is in charge of it."

In addition to specials on "Samir Khan: The Face of Joy" and "My Story with Al-Awlaki," the issue provides detailed instructions on how to ignite an "ember bomb" in the United States.

It suggested that the western state of Montana, with its rapid population growth in wooded areas, was a particularly auspicious place to set huge forest fires.

"In America, there are more houses built in the (countryside) than in the cities," read the article signed by "The AQ Chef."

"It is difficult to choose a better place other than in the valleys of Montana where the population increases rapidly."

In the eighth issue, Awlaki speaks from the grave with an article entitled "Targeting the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims" -- explaining that weapons of mass destruction can and should be used.

"The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and is strongly recommended due to its great effect on the enemy," the article read, listing the US, Britain and France as top targets.

The US-based IntelCenter, commenting on the release of the two issues, said Awlaki's article served as a "clear reminder" that groups linked to Al-Qaeda see such attacks as permissible and greatly important.

"Even though al-Awlaki is no longer alive, his unmatched ability to inspire attacks will continue through his writings and statements, especially

CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter – June 2012

with new releases such as this," it said.

The issue also includes an eight-page special on how to remotely detonate a bomb, along with necessary parts and detailed step-by-step photographs, and advice on training with a handgun.

Yet for all the fanfare, both issues are riddled with spelling errors and clumsy English. An ad in the eighth issue asks for "persons who can help the Inspire team with research & translation."

'Unleash Hell': New Al Qaeda magazine describes in detail how to start huge forest fires across the U.S..with instructions on how to make 'ember bombs'

Source:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2138758/Unleash-Hell-New-Al-Qaeda-magazine-describes-start-huge-forest-fires-U-S-instructions-make-ember-bombs.html

Al Qaeda has called upon its followers to unleash massive forest fires upon the United States this summer.

Published in the latest edition of the notorious terror magazine, 'Inspire', are graphic instructions for the creation and ignition of 'ember bombs'

Detailed in the memorably titled, 'It is of your Freedom to Ignite a Firebomb', the magazine encourages any would-be terrorist to target Montana, because of the rapid population growth in its wooded areas.

A fire burning out of control in a pine forest on the Mescalero Apache Indian Reservation in New Mexico: Al Qaeda has issued instructions to its followers to start intentional fires in the United States

'In America, there are more houses built in the countryside than in the cities,' explained the writer known as The AQ Chef according to **ABC News**.

'It is difficult to choose a better place than in the valleys of Montana.'

Reveling in the unsubstantiated claim that forest fires in Australia in December 2002, unleashed a heat energy equal to that of 23 nuclear bombs, the new edition of 'Inspire' wants the same destructive force unleashed on America.

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© AFP/GETTY IMAGES

Forty people died in a forest fire in the hills around Haifa in 2010: Al Qaeda wants to unleash a similar level of destruction on the U.S according to the latest edition of 'Inspire'

Produced by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the English language colourful magazine has released its first editions since the deaths in September 2011 of its editor Samir Khan and its star columnist Anwar al-Awlaki.

© Reuters

Even though they were killed by a drone strike on September 30 in Yemen, the new editions of 'Inspire' contain the last editorial input from the deceased terrorists.

The pair are praised inside the magazine's eighth and ninth edition as the 'spirit' and the 'tongue' of the internet publication.

Influential in death: Anwar al-Awlaki was the driving force behind 'Inspire' up until his death in a U.S missile strike in September 2011

Samir Khan who edited 'Inspire' was killed along with Anwar al-Awlaki in a drone attack in the Yemen in 2011

© AP

However, it is clear that following the deaths of the American born, English speaking pair, editorial standards have slipped at 'Inspire'.
The ninth edition's title 'Wining on the Ground' (sic) is clearly misspelt.
Both Khan and al-Awlaki were brought up in the U.S and that allowed them to bring a touch of humour to their deadly missives on terror, as gems from previous editions such as 'Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom' proved.

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
Anti-terror experts are pouring over the latest editions of 'Inspire' to confirm whether or not the hand of al-Qaeda is definitely behind it

However, joking aside, the eighth edition contains clear advice from al-Awlaki on launching attacks on Western Countries.

One five-page article is entitled, 'Targeting the Populations of Countries at War With Muslims' which sees al-Awlaki justify the killing of women and children and using chemical and biological weapons.

Even though he states that women and children are not to be deliberately targeted, al-Awlaki says that if they are among 'combatants', it is 'allowed for Muslims to attack them.'

'Muslims are allowed to target the populations of countries that are at war with Muslims by bombings or fire-arms attacks or other forms of attacks that inevitably lead to the deaths of non-combatants,' said al-Awlaki according to **CNN**.

Chillingly for Western governments, especially with the 2012 London Olympics on the horizon, al-Awlaki encourages the use of weapons of mass destruction.

'The use of poisons of chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and strongly recommended due to the effect on the enemy,' explained al-Awlaki.

'These statements of the scholars show that it is allowed to use poison or other methods of mass killing against the disbelievers who are at war with us.'

Throughout the two new eighth and ninth editions of 'Inspire', the magazine bays its readers to attack 'main political figures' in the West and 'large strategic economic targets such as the stock exchanges, power and oil installations, airports, harbours, railroad systems etc.'

The ninth issue of 'Inspire' magazine, Al-Qaeda's English-language magazine which surfaced Wednesday, May 2, 2012, called for firebombing campaigns in the United States and offered hand-gun training tips

There are articles on handgun training and how to best succeed as an urban assassin.

One article by Khan warns American Muslims that they will never be accepted in the United States and another takes a swipe at America's strained relationship with Pakistan.

'The services of the Pakistani Army to the Crusaders are so enormous and so significant that without them the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan would have been impossible,' explained the article in 'Inspire'.

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Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki were killed when their convoy was hit by American drones while traveling in Yemen in September 2011

Both editions of the magazine run to just over 60 pages and the editorials congratulate the publication for finally making it online, eight months after al-Awlaki and Khan's deaths.

'To the disappointment of our enemies ... we are still publishing America's worst nightmare,' wrote the editorial.

Going on to describe its editorial aim as 'to deliver to every inspired Muslim anywhere around the world the operational know-how of carrying out attacks from within the West.'

'Inspire' is published out of Yemen where radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and chief Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula propagandist Samir Khan lived

In fact, the majority of the magazines is given over to lengthy tributes to Khan and al-Awlaki.

One writer even confirms that al-Awlaki survived one missile strike before the deadly hit in September 2011.

'This time 11 missiles missed [their] target, but the next time the first rocket may hit it,' said a prophetic al-Awlaki.

OLYMPIC GAMES
from
Ancient Greece
to the World

The Continuing Threat of Libyan Missiles

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/continuing-threat-libyan-missiles?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120503&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=e7bec627c1d94f99a42e4c6f7d5ac992

In March 2011, while many of the arms depots belonging to the government of Libya were being looted, we wrote about how the weapons taken from Libyan government stockpiles could end up being used to fuel violence in the region and beyond. Since then we have seen Tuareg militants, who were previously employed by the regime of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, leave Libya with sizable stockpiles of weapons and return to their homes in northern Mali, where they have successfully wrested control of the region away from the Malian government.

These Tuareg militants were aided greatly in their battle against the government by the hundreds of light pickup trucks mounted with crew-served heavy weapons that they looted from Libyan depots. These vehicles, known as "technicals," permitted the Tuareg rebels to outmaneuver and at times outgun the Malian military. Moreover, we have recently received reports that Tuareg rebels also brought back a sizable quantity of SA-7b shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles, also known as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

While we have not yet seen reports of the Tuaregs using these missiles, reports of close interaction between the Tuaregs in northern Mali and regional jihadist franchise al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) raise concern that AQIM could buy or somehow acquire them from the Tuaregs. We have seen unconfirmed reports of AQIM fighters possessing MANPADS, and Algerian authorities have seized MANPADS among the weapons being smuggled into the country from Libya. For example, in mid-February, Algerian authorities seized 15 SA-24 and 28 SA-7 Russian-made MANPADS at a location in the southern desert called In Amenas.

For the Tuareg militants, the MANPADS are seen as a way to protect themselves against attack by government aircraft. They also serve the same function for AQIM, which has been attacked by Mauritanian aircraft in northern Mali. However, the possession of such weapons by a group like AQIM also raises the possibility of their being used against civilian aircraft in a terrorist attack -- a threat we will now examine in more detail.

Uses and Weaknesses of MANPADS

MANPADS were first fielded in the late 1960s, and since that time more than 1 million have been fielded by at least 25 different countries that manufacture them. These include large countries such as the United States, Russia and China as well as smaller countries such as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.

By definition, MANPADS are designed to be man-portable. The missiles are balanced on and fired from the shooter's shoulder, and the launch tube averages roughly 1.5 meters (5 feet) in length and 7 centimeters (3 inches) in diameter. Since MANPADS are intended to be operated by infantry soldiers on the front lines, durability is an important part of their design. Also, while the guidance mechanism within the missile itself can be quite complex, a simple targeting interface makes most MANPADS relatively easy to operate.

The SA-7 has a kill zone with an upper limit of 1,300 meters, while some newer models can reach altitudes of more than 3,658 meters. The average range of MANPADS is 4.8 kilometers (about 3 miles). This means that most large commercial aircraft, which generally cruise at around 9,140 meters, are out of the range of MANPADS, but the weapon can be employed against them effectively during the extremely vulnerable takeoff and landing portions of a flight or when they are operating at lower altitudes.

Despite their rugged design, MANPADS are not without limitations. Some research suggests that battery life makes the weapon obsolete after about 22 years. Missiles treated roughly, stored poorly and not maintained well may not last anywhere near that long. Since replacement batteries can be found on the black market, battery life is not necessarily a key limiting factor. For example, two SA-7s used by al Qaeda to target an Israeli civilian flight over Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 were 28 years old and appeared to be fully functional. It is believed they did not hit their target due to countermeasures employed by the aircraft. Some of the classified U.S. military reports

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released by WikiLeaks indicted that, many times in Iraq and Afghanistan, the older SA-7s were ejected from their tubes and had engine ignition but failed to acquire and lock onto the intended target. This may also have been the case in the Mombasa attack.

Perhaps the most limiting factor to MANPADS' utility has to do with the kind of aircraft being targeted. As MANPADS were developed and refined for military use, so were countermeasures for military aircraft. This means that most modern military aircraft are equipped with countermeasures that are effective against older models of MANPADS. Due to budget constraints, however, most commercial airliners and general aviation aircraft are not equipped with military-style countermeasures systems, which can alert a pilot that a missile has been launched so proper action can be taken, including evasive maneuvers, the deployment of infrared flares to decoy the missile or lasers to blind the missile's seeker. Industry estimates indicate that outfitting and maintaining the entire U.S. airline fleet with countermeasures that could foil missiles would cost $40 billion. Because of the high cost of such defensive systems, the bulk of the civilian aviation fleet worldwide remains undefended and vulnerable to MANPADS.

MANPADS in Terrorist Attacks

The SA-7 was first deployed by the Soviet army in 1968 and was sent to North Vietnam, where it was used in combat against American military aircraft in the early 1970s. But it did not take long for militant groups to understand how the weapons could be utilized in a terrorist attack. In January and September 1973, Black September militants attempted to use SA-7s against Israeli civilian aircraft in Rome (the January flight was carrying then-Prime Minister Golda Meir). Both attempts were thwarted in their final

minutes.

Two years later, the first successful MANPADS attack against a civilian aircraft occurred when North Vietnamese forces launched an SA-7 missile against an Air Vietnam flight, resulting in the deaths of all 26 passengers and crewmembers. One of the most famous civilian MANPADS attacks was in 1994, when two SA-16s were used to shoot down a Rwandan government flight, killing the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi and sparking the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in approximately 800,000 deaths in 100 days (the identity of the attackers remains a matter of debate). Over the years, MANPADS attacks have been plotted and actively attempted in at least 20 countries, resulting in more than 900 civilian fatalities. The most recent MANPADS attack that resulted in loss of life was the strike by al Shabaab over Somalia in 2007 against a Belarusian cargo plane. Eleven people were killed. The attack reportedly involved a Russian SA-18 that was manufactured in Russia in 1995. It was one of a batch of SA-18s sent from Russia to Eritrea, some of which were provided to the Somali jihadist group.

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A MANPADS attack does not necessarily mean certain death for an aircrew and passengers. In fact, some civilian airliners hit by MANPADS have made emergency landings without loss of human life. In November 2004, a DHL Airbus 300 was struck in the left wing by a MANPADS after leaving Baghdad International Airport on a mail delivery flight. While the aircraft was badly damaged and one engine caught fire, the pilot still was able to land safely.

The man-portable facet of MANPADS severely limits the size of the warhead that the weapon can carry compared to larger surface-to-air missile systems. They are also designed to engage and destroy low-flying military aircraft densely packed with fuel and ordnance. Because of this, MANPADS are not ideally suited for bringing down large civilian aircraft. Though airliners are hardly designed to absorb a missile strike, the damage a single MANPADS can inflict may not be catastrophic. MANPADS systems employ

infrared seekers that are drawn to the heat signature of an aircraft's engine, and therefore tend to hit the engine. Large commercial jets are designed to be able to fly and land if they lose an engine, and because of these factors, nearly 30 percent of the commercial aircraft struck by MANPADS have managed to make some sort of emergency or crash landing without loss of life, despite, in some cases, sustaining significant structural damage to the aircraft.

Still, the threat is not insignificant. The other 70 percent of civilian planes that have been hit by MANPADS have crashed with considerable loss of life. Indeed, on departure from or approach to an airport, airliners do have to traverse predictable airspace at low altitudes -- well within the engagement envelope of MANPADS -- and their airframes are under considerable stress. An attack at low altitude also provides the pilot less time to react and recover from an attack before the aircraft strikes the ground. These lower-level phases of flight also frequently occur over large swaths of built-up urban terrain that would be impossible to search and secure, even temporarily. Due to the noise involved with living under a flight path, this is usually low-rent real estate. With flight paths so well established, even casual observers generally have a sense of when and where large, low-flying aircraft can be found at any given time over their city.

Outlook

As noted in Stratfor's previous coverage of the MANPADS threat, since 1973 at least 30 civilian aircraft have been brought down and approximately 920 civilians have been killed by

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MANPADS attacks. These attacks brought about the concerted international effort to remove these weapons from the black and gray arms markets. Because of these efforts, attempts to use MANPADS against civilian airliners were down about 66 percent from 2000 to 2010 compared to the previous decade. Nevertheless, sting operations and seizures of illicit arms shipments clearly demonstrate that militant groups continue to work to acquire the weapons. There are at least 11 active non-state militant groups that are believed to possess MANPADS, and we have seen MANPADS employed sporadically in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are more than 10 other groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, that have been making efforts to obtain them. While there is no evidence that these groups now have them in their arsenals, their efforts may have become easier as missiles from Libya have trickled onto the black arms market.

Estimates vary widely, but it appears that the Libyans had an inventory of 20,000 MANPADS. It appears that the SA-7b seems to have been the most common MANPADS in the Libyan inventory, though there were also several far more advanced SA-24 missiles (the latest Russian design) that were intended to be used in vehicle-mounted launchers sold to the Libyans but that could be used as MANPADS if they were paired with the proper gripstocks and battery coolant units. Of those 20,000 missiles, teams from the United States and NATO have secured roughly 5,000; another 5,000 are thought to be in the hands of the various Libyan militias and to still be in the country. That leaves a remainder of 10,000 missiles. While a number of them were destroyed by NATO airstrikes or launched at aircraft, it is believed that somewhere around half have been smuggled out of the country. For obvious reasons, obtaining an accurate number of missiles is very difficult. Indeed, with a variety of parties involved in the smuggling, it is doubtful that anyone knows for sure how many missiles have been smuggled out of Libya.

The U.S. government has designated $40 million for a program intended to buy back Libyan MANPADS, but clearly many of them have already made it out of the country. In addition to the February seizure in Algeria, Egyptian authorities seized eight SA-24 missiles in the Sinai Peninsula in September 2011. A month earlier, two Israeli Cobra helicopters came under fire from a MANPADS fired from Sinai during a multi-stage attack launched from Sinai that resulted in the deaths of eight Israelis. The missile missed the Cobras. Indeed, the Jerusalem Post reported that, due to the perceived increase in the MANPADS threat from Sinai, commercial aircraft landing in Eilat have changed their approach pattern.

To date, we are not aware of any attacks or attempted attacks against commercial airliners using MANPADS taken from Libyan stocks. But with the missiles in the hands of Palestinian militants in Sinai and Gaza as well as in the inventory of groups such as AQIM, there is a legitimate concern that they will be used in an attack in the immediate future. Jihadists have long had a fixation on aviation as a target. With increases in airline passenger and luggage screening, MANPADS provide jihadists with the means to bypass those security measures and conduct attacks against civilian aircraft. They may have problems getting missiles into Europe or North America, but with active jihadist franchises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and North Africa, there is a very real threat of a MANPADS attack directed against U.S.- or European-flagged carriers in those regions. But with a year now gone since the Libyan weapons stockpiles were looted, Libyan MANPADS could be almost anywhere in the world, and it is somewhat surprising that they have not been more widely used.

Where Modern Jihad Flourishes
By Sadanand Dhume
Source:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303459004577361860657256098.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Until the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the American view of radical Islam and its many discontents was shaped more by the Middle East than South Asia. The U.S. has long been at odds with the raging Ayatollah in Iran, the murderous truck bomber in Lebanon and the masked Palestinian "freedom fighter." Only over the past decade has the geographical footprint of this scourge expanded in the popular imagination to include Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In this sense, the Navy SEALs raid on Osama bin Laden's home in Pakistan, a year ago, marked the culmination of a widely shared intellectual journey. Its milestones include the war against

the Taliban, the capture or killing of dozens of al Qaeda leaders in Pakistani safe houses, and the tracing of some of the world's most prominent terrorist acts—including the 2005 London bombings and the 2008 Mumbai attacks—to Karachi, Islamabad and the badlands straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Even so, our recently updated understanding of radical Islam tends to halt at Pakistan's border with India. Despite India's 150-million-strong Muslim population, its status as the birthplace of Islamist thought in South Asia, and a clutch of jihadist groups operating on its territory, the country figures only tangentially in the best-known books on the subject. It is this lack that the London-based journalist and historian Dilip Hiro seeks to address in "Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia." The jacket announces it as the "first complete history of Islamist terrorism in South Asia."

Compressing the contrasting trajectories of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India into 300-odd pages is no task for the fainthearted. In Afghanistan alone, the conflict between Islam and the West spans more than 150 years and includes wars with the imperial British, the Soviet Union and, of course, the U.S. Less well known are the domestic struggles between Afghan modernizers and reactionaries. In this drama, the mercurial Hamid Karzai is the latest in a roguish cast that includes the early-20th-century modernizing monarch Amanullah Khan, the communist strongman Mohammad Najibullah and the one-eyed Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

Mr. Hiro attempts to make a fist of these disparate stories. His purpose: "to show that the interrelated jihadist movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan have infected India, and that they pose a serious threat to the Pakistani state." In a familiar refrain, he blames the U.S. for its role in nurturing the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which he sees as the genesis of today's problems, and for a ham-handed campaign in Afghanistan since 2001 that has only made matters worse.

He argues that, thanks in part to the poor economic and social condition of India's Muslim community, the "cycle of violence" between "Muslims and Hindus in India is yet to run its course."

Along the way, the book offers potted histories of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India though not, oddly enough, Bangladesh, South Asia's third Muslim-majority nation. To readers familiar with the region, Mr. Hiro mostly covers old ground: In Afghanistan this is largely the story of three decades of fighting, as first the Soviets, then the Pakistan-backed Taliban and finally the U.S. failed to pacify the fractious land. In Pakistan, much of the blame for the country's continuing love affair with jihadism—used by the army's spy wing, Inter-Services Intelligence, to destabilize both India and Afghanistan—lies at the doorstep of Pakistan's military dictator of the 1980s, Gen. Zia ul-Haq. But it was under his ostensibly secular predecessor, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that Pakistan took its first major steps down a slippery slope. Eager to court a vocal Islamist fringe, Bhutto shuttered nightclubs, made Friday a holiday instead of Sunday and, to his undying shame, had the tiny Ahmadi sect declared non-Muslim, a green light for violent persecution that continues to this day.

The zealous Zia deepened what Bhutto had started, although out of conviction rather than convenience. He began the wholesale Islamization of government, including mandatory prayers and instruction for military officers on the "Quranic concept of war." He also introduced the harsh blasphemy laws that later governments have been powerless to repeal, including the death penalty for insulting the prophet Mohammad.

Independent India's brush with radical Islam is more recent. Though the country has experienced periodic Hindu-Muslim riots since the 1947 Partition, Islamic terrorism was virtually unknown to Indians before erupting in Kashmir in the late 1980s and spreading to the rest of the country. For this, Mr. Hiro blames not only the ISI but also the rise of Hindu

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nationalism and New Delhi's heavy-handed rule in Kashmir.

Mr. Hiro ought to be commended for attempting to bring a regional lens to a subject too often written about in narrower terms. Nobody can seriously disagree with his assertion that instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is bound to spill over into India. Nonetheless, "Apocalyptic Realm" falls short. Mr. Hiro spends too much time retelling events—at times month by month—and too little analyzing their import. He also fails to connect the dots between the Middle Eastern and South Asian strains of the ideology, represented not only by bin Laden but also by, among others, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the man who now leads al Qaeda. The intellectual cross-fertilization between

Sayyid Qutb (1906-66), chief ideologue of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and Abul Ala Maududi (1903-79), founder of South Asia's Jamaat-e-Islami, goes unnoticed, though between them the two organizations have spawned most of the world's Sunni jihadist offshoots.

It is hard to know precisely what threat is posed by the collection of violent incidents that Mr. Hiro surveys. One lesson of recent years has been that the West, if it does not view this conflict as a war of ideas, risks returning to the complacency of the 1990s that led up to 9/11. But one thing is certain: In South Asia, neither Islamism as an ideology nor jihadism as a tactic has run its course.

Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a columnist for WSJ.com.

Germans Find Treasure Trove of Al Qaeda Docs Hidden Within Porn Film

Source:http://www.dailytech.com/Germans+Find+Treasure+Trove+of+Al+Qaeda+Docs+Hidden+Within+Porn+Film/article24588c.htm

In the category of news items that might explain why an excess of petroleum jelly was found in the home of deceased terrorist

supervillain Osama Bin Laden, the international intelligence community claims to have found a massive treasure trove of plans from top ranking Al Qaeda officials hidden inside a pornographic movie.

The surprising contents were found almost a year ago during the May 16, 2011 detainment of Austrian Maqsood Lodin, 22, who returned overland to Germany after a trip to what is known as militant regions of Pakistan. The

investigators found a memory card hidden in his pants. On that card were numerous files including one which seemed typical enough for a 22 year old male -- porn.

But hidden inside the pornographic movie -- "Kick Ass" -- German investigators discovered an encryption-protected data file, which was also masked by sophisticated software. When they finally decrypted the file four weeks later, they gained access to a treasure trove of over 100 documents, detailing high-level Al Qaeda plans for terrorists attacks in the U.S. and Europe.

The documents hint that Al Qaeda is facing an identity crisis, having been unable to carry out a major attack in several years, its vision of destruction continually thwarted. One document suggests faster training for Al Qaeda

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operatives, to avoid law enforcement scrutiny. Traditionally Al Qaeda recruits trained for months or years, fighting in Afghanistan or

Pakistan. However, the international intelligence community has learned to flag anyone who goes on one of these "extended stays" as a person of high interest, making it nearly impossible for them to effectively attack.

Terrorist training manuals in English, Arabic, and German were found hidden inside the porn movie.

The documents also hint at a change in strategy for Al Qaeda. While they mentioned plans for a flashy cruiser hijacking, which would be geared at forcing America to release detained terrorism suspects from Guatanamo Bay, a second wave of simpler attacks was also planned.

The key strategy would be to buy automatic and semiautomatic weapons and use gun violence to kill many people, a successful strategy employed by a recent terrorist in Norway (76 confirmed deaths) and by terrorists in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008 (164 confirmed deaths).

Mr. Lodin is now awaiting trial on terrorism charges in Germany. He has plead not guilty.

The terrorist outrage in Munich in 1972
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2012/may/02/50-stunning-olympic-moments-munich-72?newsfeed=true

Armed police in the Olympic village in an incident that horrified the world. Photograph: CSU Archv/Everett / Rex Features/five

The 1972 Olympics were always going to be rich in symbolism, as the hosts set out to erase the memory of the 1936 Games, and attempted to wash the foul taint of warmongering and aggression from their public image. As much as in Berlin 36 years earlier, but with precisely the opposite intent, the event

was laden with propaganda, with Germany this time selling itself to the world as a nation of open-armed peaceniks with a particular dislike for aggressive nationalism. Organisers billed it as "the smiling Games", or "the Games of peace and joy".

But it was never going to be easy to forget the recent past. The Olympic Park had been built just six miles from the Dachau concentration camp, on the site of the Oberwiesenfeld airport, where Neville Chamberlain had landed in 1938 to meet Adolf Hitler and collect his famous piece of paper. After the war, the area had been used to dump 10 million cubic metres of debris created by the Allied bombing of Munich. "You can see there is a great deal that we are trying to bury – finally and forever – with the Games of 1972," a member of the organising committee told the Guardian's Peter Harvey before the opening ceremony. "We so much want these Games to be full of peace and sport and nothing else." What the Germans wanted least of all was to find themselves with yet more Jewish blood on their hands. Yet that was precisely what was about to happen.

Partly so as to help the Germans spread an image of peaceful openness, and partly as a response to the 1968 Games in Mexico – where the government massacred hundreds of demonstrating students 10 days before the opening ceremony, and the Olympic Park was surrounded throughout by thousands of highly armed soldiers – security in Munich was deliberately light. Not one uniformed policeman or soldier could be seen at venue or village, which were guarded instead by a small and unarmed force clad in light blue uniforms – the colour chosen when an opinion poll found that it was the most "unpolitical" of hues.

For the 42 representatives of Israel in Munich, the event had its own heavy meaning. Citizens of the young Jewish state, many of them Holocaust survivors or their children, were returning to the land whose government had so recently set out to wipe their people from the earth, and marching with pride behind their own flag. "Taking part in the opening ceremony, only 36 years after Berlin, was one of the most beautiful moments in my life," the fencer Dan Alon said later. "We were in heaven."

Palestine were not invited to join the Olympic party until 1996, but a group of Palestinians had travelled to Munich all the same, and planned to add some symbolism of their own.

On 4 September, midway through the Olympics, most of the Israeli delegation went for a night out at the theatre, watching a production of Fiddler on the Roof. Across town that same night, in a restaurant in Munich's main railway station, Abu Daoud, a leader of the Fatah movement, was briefing a group of eight members of his organisation's military wing, Black September, about the action they were about to attempt. A little after 4am that morning, the eight travelled to the Olympic village.

The village was ringed by a seven-foot wire fence. As barriers go this was unlikely to detain a reasonably fit adult, and in any case the Palestinians ran into a group of drunk Americans returning from a night out, who cheerfully helped them over. A group of passing post office workers noticed them, but thought nothing of it.

Two members of the group had already taken advantage of the lax security to visit the village, and knew exactly where they were going. They led the team straight to 31 Connollystrasse, where most of the Israeli delegation was split over five apartments. The front door was unlocked. First they forced their way into apartment one, which housed the coaches. One of them, the wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg, resisted and was shot in the mouth. Wounded, he was forced at gunpoint to lead the terrorists to the rest of the team. He took them past a flat housing physically slight fencers and race-walkers to the one where the wrestlers and weightlifters were staying. He may have hoped they would be more likely to overcome the Palestinians, but they were asleep and totally unprepared.

In all 12 hostages were taken, but as the wrestlers were led downstairs to join the coaches one of them, Gad Zabari, managed to escape, with the assistance of the wounded Weinberg. The latter was shot dead and his body thrown, naked, on to the street. The remaining 10 were shepherded into a single bedroom, where the weightlifter Yossef Romano attempted to overcome one of the intruders. He too was shot, apparently castrated and left to bleed to death on the floor. That left nine. A little after 5am the terrorists handed police a demand for the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, plus the imprisoned German terrorists Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, in return for their hostages' safe release. The deadline was 9am, after which point they would execute one hostage every hour, in public.

Golda Meir, the Israeli prime minister, was absolutely firm. "If we should give in, then no Israeli anywhere in the world can feel that his life is safe," she said. There would be no deal.

Negotiations were handled by Bruno Merk, the Bavarian interior minister, his federal counterpart Hans-

Dietrich Genscher, and Munich's chief of police, Manfred Schreiber, with the assistance of a female police officer who, it was hoped, would be a calming presence on all involved. No psychologists or trained hostage negotiators were consulted. Although the Red Army Faction, led by Baader and Meinhof, had been active for a couple of years, Germany had no specialist anti-terror unit (though one was created within weeks).

At 6am the outgoing president of the IOC, Avery Brundage, was told of the situation. He ordered that the Games should continue and at 8.15am, with two Olympians lying dead in the athletes' village, the day's first scheduled event began, on time. Brundage spent his day exerting pressure on German officials to get the Israelis out of the village and allow the Olympics to carry on in peace. "The Games," he said, "must continue at all costs."

Elsewhere in the village, just yards from the flat where the tragic drama was unfolding, competitors sunbathed innocently, or played table tennis. Others stood on a grassy bank opposite Flat One, where they could occasionally catch glimpses of balaclava-clad, gun-toting terrorists. By this point nobody was being allowed into the village without clearing a rigorous security process, or at least that was the idea: the Guardian's athletics correspondent, John Rodda, got inside by dressing in a tracksuit and simply jogging past. Meanwhile the Egyptian team, fearing reprisals, packed their bags and flew home, and the Jewish swimmer Mark Spitz, the hero of the Games with seven gold medals already in his pocket, was rushed on to the first flight for London.

The negotiators offered "an unlimited amount of money" to secure the Israelis' release, to no avail. They volunteered to take the Israelis' place, so as to avoid further Jewish bloodshed on German soil. This offer, too, was rejected. But the terrorists did repeatedly agree to extend their deadline, first to noon, then to 1pm, 3pm and finally to 5pm. Olympic events were finally halted at 3.51pm, 10 hours after news of the situation first reached the IOC leadership. Thousands of people filed out of the Olympic Stadium and stood on the hill overlooking the athletes' village, now home to the most grizzly of spectator sports. In this time various options had been investigated. A plan to flood instant-knockout gas through the air conditioning system was abandoned because no such gas could be found. A plan to get two crack soldiers into the building by dressing them as chefs and loading them with food was foiled when the terrorists opted to carry the food in themselves. Finally, police decided to storm the flat. A dozen policemen clad ludicrously in bright tracksuits and the country's famous Stahlhelm army helmet climbed the building and stood poised on the roof. All of this was captured by countless cameras and broadcast live to the world. When police realised that those inside were watching their every move on television, this plan too was abandoned.

Just before 5pm a new demand was made: now the terrorists wanted to be flown, with their captives, to Egypt. The terrorists agreed to let Genscher and Walther Tröger, mayor of the Olympic village, into the apartment to see if the Israelis were willing to go to the airport. Inside the captives were tied together, in one cramped bedroom, accompanied by Romano's grisly, bloodied corpse. The pair emerged to describe a flat "crawling" with terrorists.

Despite this, authorities proceeded in the belief that there were only four. They prepared helicopters to take them to Fürstenfeldbruck air base, and placed a Lufthansa jet on the runway, apparently set to whisk them away to Cairo. But the plane would never take off: the Egyptian government had refused to accept it, and besides police had come up with a plan to kill the terrorists and rescue the hostages. The 12 personnel waiting in the aeroplane, wearing Lufthansa uniforms, were actually armed police.

In addition four "snipers" were placed on the control tower, and another on the ground, on the other side of the tarmac. The term "sniper" can be applied only loosely to these motley marksmen: the army, better trained to deal with this kind of situation, could not get involved under the terms of the German constitution. These were just police officers who happened to have an interest in competitive shooting. They were armed with Heckler & Koch G3 rifles, totally unsuitable for the purpose of targeted, discriminate shooting.

At 10.06pm, the terrorists and their hostages left 31 Connollystrasse and boarded a bus which carried them to the helipad. At 10.26, as the helicopters made their final approach to Fürstenfeldbruck, the police waiting in the plane, afraid for their lives, voted unanimously to abandon their mission. Then the helicopters landed in the wrong place, leaving the ground-based sniper not only useless, but actually in the firing line of the other four. The terrorists' leader went to check the plane, and as he returned to the helicopters – at precisely 10.35pm – the snipers opened fire. One of them was moving positions at the

time, and failed to fire a single bullet in these crucial opening moments. Although the snipers were positioned only 30 yards away from their targets just two terrorists were hit, and their leader escaped. A gunfight ensued, in which one policeman was killed.

The second phase of the German plan had been to rescue the Israelis using armoured cars. But these cars had been dispatched too late. As news of the firefight spread the roads around the air base became clogged with locals desperate for a glimpse of the gruesome scene, and the armoured cars got stuck in the traffic.

At 10.50pm the terrorists were told, in Arabic, that their position was useless and asked to throw down their weapons and give themselves up. There was no further action for more than an hour. The terrorists had shot out the floodlights illuminating the runway, and with no night sights and no walkie-talkies the snipers were essentially blind and dumb. When something finally did happen, at 12.04am, it was disastrous: a terrorist threw a grenade into one of the helicopters, killing all but one of the four hostages on board. Another terrorist sprayed the second helicopter with bullets, killing the five tied together there. The final hostage, David Berger, died of smoke inhalation before he could be rescued. Police moved in, accidentally seriously injuring one of the snipers and a helicopter pilot. By the end of the battle all but three of the terrorists were dead.

At around this point Conrad Ahlers, a government spokesman, appeared at the media centre in Munich and announced that the operation had been a success: the terrorists are all dead, he said, the hostages freed. This news was also relayed to the Israeli government, to families of the hostages and to the 56 IOC members holding a crisis meeting at the Four Seasons hotel, who went straight to bed. An hour later an Olympic spokesman admitted that "the information given so far is too optimistic", and by 3am the true story had become clear. The following morning Schreiber and his deputy attended a press conference that lasted for four and a half chaotic hours. "The terrorists were too clever, too professional," he said. "The hostages were condemned to die, unless we could get the terrorists to make a mistake. We tried all we knew, but they were not amateurs."

A ceremony was held at the Olympic Stadium that morning, called by the IOC "to demonstrate that the Olympic ideal is stronger than terror and violence", and soon afterwards competition continued. "I know some are accusing us of callousness," admitted Lord Killanin, the IOC's president-in-waiting, "but the Games were stopped for a full 24 hours, though it was not a calendar day." (They were stopped, in fact, for a total of 24 hours and nine minutes.) The German government allowed the bodies of the dead terrorists to be flown to Libya, where they were buried as heroes.

If that was the cock-up, next came the conspiracy. A full report into the affair was ordered, and the chancellor, Willy Brandt, predicted "a miserable document of German helplessness and incompetence". But when the report was published on 19 September it cleared the authorities of any blame. "It is safe to say that the way the inquiry appears to have been conducted hardly justifies the description 'searching,'" reported the Guardian.

Seven weeks later, terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet flying from Damascus to Frankfurt via Beirut. The plane was taken to Munich, where the terrorists radioed a demand that the three surviving hostage-takers be released. They never even had to land, so quickly were the trio placed on a private jet and whisked to Zagreb, where they joined the Lufthansa plane and flew to Libya. The Israeli government was never consulted, and many years later it was revealed that the hijacking had been planned by Fatah in collusion with the German government, in exchange for a promise not to plan any further actions inside German borders. The hijacked jet, a Boeing 727 with a capacity of 150 passengers plus crew, contained just 14 people, none of them women or children.

In January 1977 Abu Daoud was arrested in Paris. Israel demanded his extradition, and put pressure on Germany to do the same. But the Bavarian authorities took so long to complete the necessary paperwork that by the time they got their act together the French government had acceded to pressure from Arab states and not only allowed him to leave for Algeria, but provided him with a first-class ticket. Yigal Allon, Israel's foreign minister, condemned "a shameful surrender".

After his release Abu Daoud insisted allegations of his involvement were "propaganda created by the Israelis", but in 1999 he released an autobiography admitting his role. He died of natural causes in Syria in 2010, having survived an apparent assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. Whether Israel had been responsible for that action remains in doubt, but they certainly had a hand in the violent deaths of several people involved in the plot, including two of the three hostage-takers who survived it (and one

totally innocent Moroccan waiter in Norway, victim of mistaken identity).

The sole remaining survivor, Jamal al-Gashey, was tracked down and interviewed for the Oscar-winning documentary One Day in September (a brilliant film, and currently available to watch here. "I am proud of what I did at Munich because it helped the Palestinian cause enormously," he said. "Before Munich the world had no idea about our struggle, but on that day the name of Palestine was repeated all over the world."

In the aftermath of the Games the federal government paid out $1m to families of the deceased, while denying all guilt. The families, though, continued to seek justice, and a charge of negligence was dismissed in a Munich court in 1973. They demanded the release of further documents, but the federal government insisted for 20 years that no such documents existed. This pretence collapsed in 1992, when a German archivist smuggled a bulging folder to the wife of Andre Spitzer, one of the victims. The number of files the Germans had been hiding eventually ran to 4,000. The families sued again, only for their case to be dismissed on a technicality. They continued through the German legal system and finally, in 2002, the case was settled out of court and a further payment of around €3m was made. "It is not an admission of guilt," their interior minister, Otto Schily, insisted. "It is a humanitarian gesture."

On 6 September 1972, as competition resumed hours after the bloody end of the siege, a group of spectators in the Olympic Stadium unfurled a sign: "17 dead, already forgotten?" Within moments, the sign was seized and the spectators thrown out. Forty years on the victims' families are still asking the IOC to stage an official commemoration; some are calling for a minute's silence to be held at the opening ceremony in London. Though a service has been held to coincide with recent summer Games, it has never taken place on site (this summer's will be at the Guildhall). "They don't want any kind of pall over the celebration," says Berger's sister, Barbara.

In 1972 Jacques Rogge, the current president of the IOC, competed as a sailor for Belgium, finishing 14th in the Finn class. The massacre, he says, "strengthened the determination of the Olympic movement to contribute more than ever to building a peaceful and better world". In February the British ambassador to Israel spoke to the nation's latest crop of athletes about plans for the 2012 Games. "We are doing everything possible to keep you safe," he said. "The lessons from Munich have not been forgotten."

He wasn't kidding: in London the security bill will top £1bn. Away from the Olympic gaze, meanwhile, Palestinians continue to die for their cause, and Israelis for theirs.

How John Rodda ran into the Olympic village

The Olympic village was closed to all but athletes, officials, and a vast number of police, but by putting on my running gear and jogging through the crowds in Olympic Park it was possible to find an entrance. Most of the gates were locked, with a guard explaining that gate 24 was open; so too, was the vehicle entrance and it was through the tunnel that I waved an acknowledgement to the guard who wanted to see my pass.

At 11 in the morning the pathway between the tiered blocks was quieter than I can remember since arriving in Munich. This was a rest day for the athletes, and the British team were off to the Turgensee, a lake near the hospital in which Lillian Board died.

There was a tension but it was constantly being broken when one encountered someone who had not heard the news of only knew a fragment of it. Pat Cropper, one of the British half-milers, returned to the British headquarters house, which is directly on the opposite side of the village, about a quarter of a mile form the Israeli house, and said that some of the gates had been closed. That was almost four hours after the first news had broken.

David Hemery, whom I met on the training track with his brother John, said: "You tell me what's happening." And those people playing on the crazy golf course could hardly have been aware that behind the drawn curtains on the grey concrete block just over their shoulders several men and women were under sentence of death.

Those officials in blue uniforms and white caps whom one suspected of being dressed up as policemen turned out to be exactly that. They were stationed at strategic points on the road leading to the black marked "ARG" for Argentina, in which the Israelis are housed. They were making a very casual job of it, just ushering people on to another road.

It is an uncanny feeling to sense this detachment amid such tension. I felt and saw it four years ago

Mexico after the riots in the Square of the Three Cultures, having been shot at on and off for three hours as I lay on a balcony while more than 200 people died in the square beneath me. I got back to the centre of the city to discover that people had hardly heard about the "shooting incident". That is just the phrase one of Britain's boxers used about it this afternoon after he made sure of an Olympic bronze medal.

The British Olympic Association had by midday issued no special security orders. People were coming and going almost normally, and several of the staff were sitting on their patios in the sun watching TV which was gradually moving cameras from the sporting sites to focus on the flats.

At 12 o'clock, the first deadline laid down by the guerrillas, I went up to the top of a skyscraper in the village to watch the curtained windows of the Israeli block. The sun was burning and those within were apparently still alive. A woman came out on to a balcony briefly and then turned back and went inside.

Outside the perimeter wire there were policemen every few yards on the main highway side of the village, but inside the crowds were gathering in knots, listening to transistor radios as the news was pieced together and demands of the guerrillas spelled out.

On a mound directly opposite the Israeli flats people were standing several deep and if one of the gunmen behind the curtains had chosen to, he surely could have poked out his sub-machine gun and sprayed them with bullets.

Down on the other side of the hill, next to one of the hockey fields and safely out of sight but not too far away, seven military vehicles were lined up with the troops in shirt sleeves just waiting. And it was to be a long wait.

Looking back to this morning, the noise of helicopters hovering about my 11th storey flat at about six o'clock was the first indication that something was amiss. Ironically, four years ago in Mexico it was the helicopters buzzing over the Square of the Three Cultures which provided the signal for that bloody battle 10 days before the Games began.

How Strong Is al Qaeda Today, Really?

Source:http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-today-really/256609/#

This week marks one year since Osama bin Laden's death. We're hearing a lot about what the anniversary means for the larger struggle against Islamist violence around the world. Most assessments of the "War on Terror" fall into one of two categories: al-Qaeda is stronger than ever or al-Qaeda is dead or dying. Whatever you think about al-Qaeda specifically, the global movement of violent Islamism is more complicated.

Analyst Seth Jones is leading the argument that al-Qaeda is doing better than we realize, that "the obituaries are premature" (Jones also has a book coming out soon taking a similar position). This argument is based in part on the idea that al-Qaeda's affiliates are part of the same larger collective as the and Pakistan-based group that Osama bin Laden helped lead. Mary Habeck says that al-Qaeda in Pakistan commands its subordinate groups in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel through "broad strategic guidance and resources as needed, but not specific daily orders with daily reportage back up the chain of command." This

control is not perfect, she concedes, but the arguments rests on the assumption that the groups are so similar, and so interlinked, that they can all be accurately referred to as "al-Qaeda."

Of course, lots of groups take on the role of advisers and mentors. The U.S. is fond of using proxies in many wars -- the *mujahidin* who defeated the Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s, for example -- but we don't assume that "mujahidin" and "American forces" are analytically interchangeable. Their goals and interests aligned for a time and thus they joined forces; they did not, however, become the same force. The relationship between Pakistan-based al-Qaeda Central (AQC) and its many affiliates is similar: they came into being separately, and only later did they reach out to the central group in Pakistan for legitimacy and support.

Terrorism is not getting worse. According to data released by the National Counter Terrorism Center on worldwide terrorist attacks, current

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levels of violence, though high, are far below their peak in 2006. The most recent year for which the NCTC has data, 2011, shows only a moderate reduction in violence from 2010, but it is still a reduction in violence.

While AQAP in Yemen is gaining some territory (by essentially usurping the southern secessionist movement, which is itself an interesting political move), in Somalia the local al-Qaeda affiliate (which only became official two months ago) is actually losing territory. In Iraq, the al-Qaeda in Iraq group never held any to begin with. At this point, no one can say for certain whether the Sahel affiliates will be able to consolidate and control their very modest gains in Mali.

In November 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney articulated the one percent doctrine. "If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It's not about our analysis," he said. "It's about our response." That idea is still informing our understanding of al-Qaeda's strength. "It only takes one attack to be successful," Jones warns in his piece.

On the other end of the spectrum, some analysts, many of them working for the Obama administration, say we've got al-Qaeda on the run. *National Journal* reporter Michael Hirsch quoted a State Department official last week as saying "The war on terror is over," in part because the core elements of al-Qaeda -- its vast network and logistics trail for planning and launching attacks -- are essentially destroyed. It's true that the primary elements of al-Qaeda that attacked us on September 11 are gone, but it's not yet time to declare victory against the broader movement.

The last successful attack by Islamist terrorists on a Western country took place in 2005 in London. But that doesn't mean the threat is gone; rather, the threat has changed.

Probably the most difficult challenge facing the U.S. right now is not so much al-Qaeda itself but the growing number of insurgencies reaching out to al-Qaeda for legitimacy and support. These groups are spread across the

Middle East and North Africa -- coincidentally, perhaps, along the periphery of the Arab Spring, in countries that did not experience a rapturous collapse of their tyrannical regimes. They confound easy attempts at labeling, too, since they combine elements of insurgencies, terrorist movements, local concerns (and local names -- al-Qaeda in *Iraq*, al-Qaeda in the *Arabian Peninsula*, and so on), and global allies.

Those local affiliate groups do not pose the same threat that al-Qaeda once did. Despite the danger and chaos al-Shabab can sow in Somalia, it is not blowing up embassies, punching holes in U.S. Navy vessels, or flying airplanes into American buildings. And even the most virulent, violent of these groups -- al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based group, seems to be the analysts' choice -- couldn't even manage to pull off a tiny underwear bomb that wouldn't have destroyed the airplane it was on anyway.

The many successes in the fight against al-Qaeda have also come with substantial costs. In Pakistan and Yemen, an obsession with kinetic activities -- killing the bad guys -- has worsened political chaos and entrenched anti-Americanism. Some other countries now deny the U.S. permission to fly drones over their territory because they fear the political backlash that Obama's favorite weapon could bring. We don't know yet if these political consequences can be overcome, though it's a safe bet that continuing the same terror policies won't lessen them.

The struggle isn't hopeless, but it does require some new thinking. I edited a collection of essays published this week, asking some new questions on how the conflict between violent Islamism and the rest of the world is progressing -- the writers identify some good things about the last ten years of policy but also try to see where we could be doing this better. This is not always an easy discussion, especially after over a decade of politicization of how and when and where and why we fight terrorism. But it is a discussion that we nevertheless very much need to have.

OLYMPIC GAMES from Ancient Greece to the World

Bin Laden files show al-Qaida and Taliban leaders in close contact

Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/29/bin-laden-al-qaida-taliban-contact

Documents found in the house where Osama bin Laden was killed a year ago show a close working relationship between

top al-Qaida leaders and Mullah Omar, the overall commander of the Taliban, including frequent discussions of joint operations against Nato forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan government and targets in Pakistan.

The communications show a three-way conversation between Bin Laden, his then deputy Ayman Zawahiri and Omar, who is believed to have been in Pakistan since fleeing Afghanistan after the collapse of his regime in 2001.

They indicate a "very considerable degree of ideological convergence", a Washington-based source familiar with the documents told the Guardian.

The news will undermine hopes of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan, where the key debate among analysts and policymakers is whether the Taliban – seen by many as following an Afghan nationalist agenda – might once again offer a safe haven to al-Qaida or like-minded militants, or whether they can be persuaded to renounce terrorism.

One possibility, experts say, is that although Omar built a strong relationship with Bin Laden and Zawahiri, other senior Taliban commanders see close alliance or co-operation with al-Qaida as deeply problematic.

Western intelligence officials estimate that there are less than 100 al-Qaida-linked fighters in Afghanistan, and last year the United Nations split its sanctions list to separate the Taliban and al-Qaida.

Both David Cameron and US secretary of state Hillary Clinton have said that some kind of political settlement involving the Taliban is key to the stability of Afghanistan once most western troops have withdrawn by 2014.

Some communications in the documents date back several years but others are said to be from only weeks before the raid on 2 May last year in which Bin Laden died.

"Questions and issues come up. They don't see eye to eye on everything but it's clear they understand they have an interest in co-operating [on attacks against Nato, Afghan government and Pakistani targets]," the source said. "Of those engaged in the conversation, two [Zawahiri and Omar] are still alive today and there is no reason to believe that either has substantially changed his views in the last year."

Zawahiri became leader of al-Qaida following Bin Laden's death.

The range of the al-Qaida senior leadership's interlocutors revealed by the documents has also surprised investigators, the source said.

Bin Laden appears to have been in direct or indirect communication with Nigerian-based militant group Boko Haram as well as many other militant outfits. As with the Taliban, the question of whether Boko Haram, which has been responsible for a series of suicide attacks and bombings in the last year, is in touch with al-Qaida or one of its affiliates has been hotly debated by analysts.

But documents in the cache show that leaders of the Nigerian group had been in contact with top levels of al-Qaida in the past 18 months – confirming claims made to the Guardian in January by a senior Boko Haram figure.

Other papers in the haul are now likely to be declassified. They include memos apparently dictated by Bin Laden urging followers to avoid indiscriminate attacks which kill Muslims and pondering a rebranding of al-Qaida under a new name.

The documents include memos stating broad strategic aims but little

"hands-on" planning, according to sources.

Despite the correspondence with Omar and other groups, Bin Laden still appears to have been largely out of touch with the day to day working of his organisation. His communications were written on a computer in the compound in Abbottabad where he lived, loaded on to memory sticks and then sent from distant internet cafes by a courier. It was this courier who eventually led the CIA to the al-Qaida chief.

A reliable account of Bin Laden's life on the run can now be established, pieced together from the testimony, viewed by the Guardian, of one of Bin Laden's wives, the recollections of the ISI officers who interviewed her compiled by retired Pakistani army brigadier Shaukat Qadir, statements of militants detained by the US published by WikiLeaks and interviews with former US officials.

Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in November 2001, Bin Laden's wives and children fled Afghanistan , travelling first to Karachi, the vast Pakistani port city, where they spent several months. Bin Laden himself headed north into the remote Afghan province of Kunar after the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. According to ISI officials quoted by Qadir, a senior militant detained by the ISI in 2006 told interrogators that Bin Laden had met Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Afghan insurgent leader, in Kunar at this time. ISI officials also maintain that Khaled Sheikh Mohamed told them that the al-Qaida chief was there.

Former American officials this weekend told the Guardian that there was considerable intelligence indicating that Bin Laden was in eastern Afghanistan and making occasional journeys across the border into Pakistan at this time.

By the summer of 2004, Bin Laden appears to have moved into Pakistan permanently. According to the testimony of his youngest, Yemeni-born wife, she and her two children were reunited with her husband in a house in a remote district of the rugged Swat valley, in northwest Pakistan, in March 2004, before moving to another safe house in a small town called Haripur, 20 miles from Abbottabad, that autumn. In early summer 2005 the family then moved into the newly constructed compound where they would spend the next six years. They were joined there by Bin Laden's second wife and her three children.

According to ISI officers interviewed by Qadir, the location had been scouted a year previously by senior militant Abu Farraj al-Libbi who then travelled to Swat to get Bin Laden's approval for the move. The al-Qaida chief insisted that the land for the house be bought, not rented, and sketched out a design for the construction – currently in the possession of the ISI.

The al-Qaida leader himself evaded detection while on the move by pretending to be an ailing Pashtun former militant, still on Pakistan's wanted list, who hoped to return home to die, Qadir has written.

Western security officials believe Bin Laden's oldest wife joined him in Abbottabad after being released in deal between Iranian authorities and a Pakistani militant group holding an Iranian diplomat.

By November 2010, the crucial courier had been identified and located. He then led the hunters to the Abbottabad house.

Al Shabaab's Threat to Kenya

By Scott Stewart

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/al-shabaabs-threat-kenya?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium =email&utm_campaign=20120426&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=3329ef2bf7e24fd4 913a08d2b89c657c

The U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, released a message April 23 informing U.S. citizens in the country that it had received credible information regarding a possible attack against Nairobi hotels and prominent Kenyan government buildings. According to the message, the embassy has reason to believe the attack is in the last stages of the attack planning cycle.

The warning comes as thousands of Kenyan troops occupy much of southern Somalia. Along with a force of Ethiopian troops, local militias and a contingent of African Union Mission in

Somalia (AMISOM) troops, the Kenyans are placing heavy pressure on al Shabaab, the al Qaeda-linked Somali militant group in southern Somalia.

This external military pressure has exacerbated frictions within al Shabaab between nationalist and transnationalist elements. Mukhtar Robow, aka Abu Mansur, leads the nationalist faction, which is based in the Bay and Bakool regions. Ahmad Abdi Godane, aka Abu Zubayr, leads the transnationalist faction, which is based in Kismayo.

It has been almost two years since we last examined al Shabaab's interest in conducting and ability to carry out transnational terrorist operations. The current warning in Nairobi provides a convenient opportunity to do so once again.

Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Birth of al Shabaab

Al Qaeda and Somali militants have long interacted. In a 1997 CNN interview, Osama bin Laden told Peter Bergen that his fighters helped the Somali militants in the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, the events memorialized in Mark Bowden's book *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (1999). Bin Laden and a good portion of the al Qaeda leadership relocated to Sudan in 1992, where they remained until 1996. During that period, they established a network of business and operational contacts across East Africa. By that point, they had trained militants in camps in Afghanistan for years. They could well have had operatives in Mogadishu in 1993 and could have provided training to militants involved in the incident.

After leaving Sudan in 1996, al Qaeda maintained its network in East Africa. It used the network to plan and execute the August 7, 1998, twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The Nairobi attack proved deadlier. A massive vehicle-borne improvised device (VBIED) heavily damaged the embassy in Nairobi and several nearby buildings, including the adjacent Ufundi Cooperative Plaza, a high-rise that collapsed from the blast. The attack killed 213 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded some 4,000 others.

Some of the men allegedly affiliated with the 1998 attacks, such as Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Taha al-Sudani and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, would later be accused of planning and executing the Nov. 28, 2002,

attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, in which a VBIED was used to target the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel and two SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles were launched at an Israeli Boeing 757 passenger jet departing Mombasa's airport. The missiles missed the aircraft, perhaps due to countermeasures, but the VBIED killed 10 Kenyans and three Israelis.

Abdullah Mohammed, al-Sudani and Nabhan all fled to Somalia, where they worked with and were protected by organizations, such as al-Ittihad al-Islam, a long-standing Somali militant group later folded into the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC), formerly the Islamic Courts Union. When Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in late 2006 and overthrew the SICC, many of the more hardcore elements joined the SICC youth wing, al Shabaab, which then became a separate militant organization. As noted, al Shabaab is not a unified organization. Instead, it comprises several factions led by individual warlords who each adhere to a slightly different ideology. The al Qaeda-linked foreign fighters in Somalia tend to associate with the more transnationally minded militants, such as the group led by Godane.

Since al Shabaab's spinoff, al-Sudani was killed in an airstrike in southern Somalia in January 2007. Nabhan was killed by a helicopter ambush in southern Somalia in September 2009, and Abdullah Mohammed was reportedly shot at a police checkpoint in Mogadishu in June 2011.

Al Shabaab Attacks Outside Somalia

Just over a month after we published our assessment of al Shabaab as a transnational threat, the group conducted suicide bomb attacks against two targets in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11, 2010. The attacks, which targeted people watching a World Cup soccer match, reportedly killed 74 and wounded another 70.

Shortly thereafter, al Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage claimed credit for the attacks, saying they were a response to Uganda's participation in AMISOM. Rage threatened additional attacks against Uganda and also threatened Burundi, which has furnished forces for AMISOM. But the group has not followed up on these threats, and there have been no additional attacks in Uganda or attacks in Burundi.

Kampala is not the only regional capital where militants associated

with, or sympathetic to, al Shabaab have conducted attacks. On Oct. 24, 2011, a Kenyan who claimed to be affiliated with al Shabaab conducted two hand-grenade attacks in Nairobi, one at a bus stop and the second at a disco. The attacks killed one person and wounded 20 others. Then on March 10, several hand grenades were thrown at a busy bus stop in central Nairobi while a bus was loading passengers headed to Kampala. That attack killed six and wounded 63. Kenyan officials have called the March 10 attack the deadliest terrorist attack in Nairobi since the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing.

To date, the attacks in Nairobi involved only grenades and were all directed against soft targets (as were the Kampala attacks). In Somalia, by contrast, al Shabaab has carried out devastating attacks against hard targets. For example, on Feb. 22, 2009, the group launched a suicide VBIED attack against an AMISOM base in Mogadishu that killed 11 Burundian soldiers. On Sept. 17, 2009, a suicide VBIED attack against the AMISOM headquarters at the Mogadishu airport killed 21, including AMISOM's deputy commander, and wounded 40. And on Oct. 4, 2011, al Shabaab detonated a massive VBIED outside a compound that housed government offices in Mogadishu. The attack killed at least 65 people and wounded hundreds of others. Al Shabaab can also conduct standoff attacks with rocket-propelled grenades or mortars launched at hardened targets, as seen by the frequent targeting of the presidential compound in Mogadishu.

Al Shabaab has also shown the ability to attack hotels in Mogadishu. On Dec. 3, 2009, a suicide bomber dressed as a woman attacked a graduation ceremony in a hotel meeting room and killed some 20 people, including four government ministers. On Aug. 24, 2010, al Shabaab gunmen disguised as government security forces conducted an armed assault on a hotel near the presidential palace in Mogadishu that killed 30, including seven parliament members and two government officials. On Feb. 8, 2012, a suicide VBIED was rammed into a cafe outside the Muna Hotel, killing 11.

Capability and Intent
Whenever judging the threat posed by a group, one must examine its capabilities and its intent to conduct such an attack. In this case, we

need to look at al Shabaab's capability and intent to attack prominent government buildings and hotels in Nairobi.

Al Shabaab has proved that it can conduct attacks against soft targets in Nairobi. The group has also demonstrated the ability to strike soft targets in Kampala, though it has not shown the ability to follow up on its threats to conduct attacks in Burundi. Inside Somalia, the group is capable of conducting devastating attacks against hardened targets and against hotels in Mogadishu, as outlined above.

It is interesting to note that two days prior to the Oct. 24, 2011, Nairobi grenade attacks, the U.S. government posted a warning that the U.S. Embassy in Kenya had received "credible information of an imminent threat of terrorist attacks directed at prominent Kenyan facilities and areas where foreigners are known to congregate such as malls and night clubs." In the wake of the warning, it appears the attackers redirected from high-profile malls and places where foreigners congregate toward softer targets in the form of a low-profile local bar and a bus stop. This is perhaps due to the increased security at high-profile venues because of the warning and Kenyan government initiatives to crack down on al Shabaab in Somali neighborhoods in Nairobi. Likewise, the March 10 attacks were against a bus stop, which is a soft target as well. This suggests the attackers were either unable -- or unwilling -- to target a more heavily secured facility. Notably, none of the incidents in Kenya were suicide attacks.

The wording in the April 23 warning is similar to that of the October 2011 warning, and the October 2011 warning proved accurate. Therefore, the U.S. Embassy likely has received credible information that another plot is being planned. Unless the attackers change their mode of attack, they are highly unlikely to succeed in targeting a prominent government building or a hotel housing Westerners -- especially in the wake of the warning, which undoubtedly has resulted in increased security at such sites.

To change their mode of attack from those using merely grenades to an attack that could damage a government building or a well-secured hotel, such as an attack involving a VBIED, al Shabaab would have to devote significant resources. While al Qaeda was able to do this in Nairobi in 1998, the present security

environment in Kenya is quite different. While ordnance is still available in the country, it is far more difficult to obtain a large quantity of explosives today than it was in 1998. Even smuggling them in from Somalia in small batches would be a difficult, though not impossible, task.

For al Shabaab to undertake such a process, it would need good operational security, something that would be difficult to achieve given the fractious nature of the jihadist movement in Somalia. As the warning prior to the October 2011 attack demonstrated, there was an intelligence leak somewhere.

Furthermore, al Shabaab would have to expect significant benefits from such an attack to warrant such a risky mission. And it is doubtful they would. At present, Kenyan troops with the help of local Ras Kamboni militants have occupied a buffer zone in southern Somalia, but they have not made much effort to approach al Shabaab bases in cities farther southwest than Afmadow, such as Kismayo. The Kenyan public has been quite outspoken about the price tag attached to the Somali Surge, known as Operation Linda Nchi. Many Kenyans consider it an expensive venture that adds to the country's mounting debt. A repeat of the August 1998 bombing, only this time directed against a Kenyan government ministry, could radically change public opinion, steeling it in favor of dramatic military action against al Shabaab. Even though the current Kenyan military offensive has been poorly supported and planned, an angry Kenyan public could see the military offensive become

much more aggressive, directly targeting al Shabaab. The issue would also gain notable political traction in the unfolding 2013 Kenyan presidential election.

Because of this dynamic, it seems the group is more likely to take any explosives it could devote toward a VBIED attack in Kenya and use them to conduct attacks against Kenyan forces in Somalia to make their presence in Somalia as uncomfortable -- and bloody -- as possible. The goal would be to influence Kenyan morale enough to encourage them to withdraw. Kenya, and specifically Nairobi, is also an important financial and logistical hub for al Shabaab. If the group did something to rouse the anger of the Kenyan government and alienate the population, its ability to use Kenya as a logistical hub for its operations in Somalia could be severely hampered.

Due to the importance of al Shabaab's Islamic base in Nairobi, Kenya's backlash against that community has been a point of concern in intra-al Shabaab politics. Notably, al Shabaab has denied responsibility for the past attacks in Nairobi, blaming them instead on its supporters. A major attack in Nairobi demonstrating an advanced degree of terrorist capability would make it difficult for the group to deny responsibility.

Even if al Shabaab could somehow muster the capability to conduct a spectacular attack in Nairobi, it would seem unlikely it would want to conduct a spectacular attack inside Kenya. We therefore believe it will stick to low-level attacks in Kenya for the foreseeable future.

Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat And Long War On Terrorism – Analysis

By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. , Steven Bucci and Jessica Zuckerman – The Heritage Foundation
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After the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, many worried that al-Qaeda would try to carry out another large-scale attack against the United States as an act of revenge. Indeed since bin Laden's death, at least nine publicly known Islamist-inspired terror plots against the United States have been foiled, bringing the total number of foiled plots since 9/11 to at least 50.

Ultimately, none of the plots foiled since bin Laden's death proved to be of the scale that

many feared, with the vast majority of the plots lacking major international connections. Instead, many of these plots could be categorized as homegrown terror plots— planned by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.[1]

United States
Combating this continued threat of homegrown terrorism requires not

only continued reliance on existing counterterrorism and intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act, but also enhancing cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities as well as mutual trust and partnerships with Muslim communities throughout the United States. Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Congress must continue to plug gaps to halt terrorist travel, and create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and interrogation of suspected terrorists.

Continued Threat of Homegrown Terrorism
Since 9/11, terrorist networks have been dismantled, training camps have been dispersed, and the terrorist leadership largely decimated. Internationally, al-Qaeda has become more decentralized, leading to a greater dependence on its affiliates and allies. At the same time, since increased domestic security has made it harder for terrorists to plan and carry out attacks, terrorists must increase their baseline skills and capabilities needed for a successful attack in the United States.[2]

With the global operating environment for terrorist networks having become increasingly hostile, homegrown terrorism has become more appealing to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. Homegrown terrorist actors can often bridge the divide between the United States and the other regions of the world in which terrorist networks operate, frequently possessing the cultural and linguistic skills to easily move between the two. It is this "duality" for instance, that served Najibullah Zazi in his attempt to bomb the New York City subway system, with Zazi "being able to operate with facility in environments as starkly different as New York and Peshawar."[3]

The value for terrorist networks also often lies in the ability of homegrown terrorists to more easily travel back and forth and work within the United States without raising suspicion. Of course, it is also these same abilities that can make it more challenging for U.S. intelligence and law enforcement to detect homegrown terrorist plots. Similarly, difficulties in detecting attempted homegrown attacks are also present in the fact that homegrown terror plots tend to involve significantly fewer actors and

connections to terrorist networks at home and abroad. The frequency of lone wolf actors, radicalized independent of direct connections to terrorist networks either through the Internet or social circles, can further elevate these challenges.

Yet, lacking the support of broader terrorist networks, violent extremists may lack a profound understanding of such specialized skills as bomb making, as well as financing, support networks, and training, causing them to be reluctant or even unable to carry out a large-scale, highly destructive attack independently.[4] This same lack of training and resources may also open up homegrown terror plots for detection by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement by affording more room for error on the part of the terrorist. Ultimately, while some signals of homegrown terror plots have gone unnoticed—most notably in the cases of Major Nidal Hasan's 2009 deadly attack on Fort Hood, the near-successful attempts in 2009 of Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and in 2010 of Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad—the vast majority of attempted attacks against the United States have been thwarted in their early stages through the concerted efforts of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence.

For the individual homegrown terrorist, personal motives may vary greatly. It could be a desire for collective revenge against the U.S. for the purported "war on Islam," poverty or social alienation, or brainwashing. There is no one path to radicalization. As DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis has indicated, motives and paths to radicalization can vary significantly depending on one's ideology and religious beliefs, geographic location, or socioeconomic condition.[5] Nevertheless, trends do seem to exist among those attempted homegrown terror plots thwarted since 9/11, most significantly a seeming aversion to suicide or martyrdom.[6]

50 Plots Foiled Since 9/11
Compiled by The Heritage Foundation since 2007, the following list outlines those publicly known terrorist plots against the U.S. that have been foiled since 9/11.[7] Based on Heritage's

research, at least 50 publicly known Islamist-inspired terror plots targeting the United States have been foiled since 9/11. Of these, at least 42 could be considered homegrown terror plots. While three of the 50 known plots were foiled by luck or the quick action of the American public, the remaining 47 were thwarted due to the concerted efforts of intelligence and law enforcement.

1. Richard Reid—December 2001. A British citizen and self-professed follower of Osama bin Laden who trained in Afghanistan, Richard Reid hid explosives inside his shoes before boarding a flight from Paris to Miami on which he attempted to light the fuse with a match. Reid was caught in the act and apprehended aboard the plane by passengers and flight attendants. FBI officials took Reid into custody after the plane made an emergency landing at Boston's Logan International Airport.[8]

In 2003, Reid was found guilty on charges of terrorism, and a U.S. federal court sentenced him to life in prison.[9] He is currently incarcerated at a federal maximum-security prison in Colorado.

Saajid Badat, a supporter to Reid, has been sentenced to 13 years in jail for planning to blow up a passenger plane. The 26-year-old, a religious teacher from Gloucester, England, was sentenced after he admitted conspiring with fellow Briton Reid. Badat pled guilty in February 2005 to the plot to blow up the transatlantic flight on its way to the U.S. in 2001.[10]

2. Jose Padilla—May 2002. U.S. officials arrested Jose Padilla in May 2002 at Chicago's O'Hare airport as he returned to the United States from Pakistan, where he met with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and received al-Qaeda training and instructions.[11] Upon his arrest, he was initially charged as an enemy combatant, and for planning to use a dirty bomb (an explosive laced with radioactive material) in an attack in the U.S.[12]

Along with Padilla, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi were convicted in August 2007 of terrorism conspiracy and material support. It was found that the men supported cells that sent recruits, money, and supplies to Islamic extremists worldwide, including al-Qaeda members. Hassoun was the recruiter and Jayyousi served as a financier and propagandist in the cell. Before his conviction, Padilla had brought a case against the federal government claiming that he had been denied the right of habeas corpus (the right of an individual to petition his unlawful imprisonment). In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the case against him had been filed improperly.[13] In 2005, the government indicted Padilla for conspiring against the U.S. with Islamic terrorist groups.

In August 2007, Padilla was found guilty by a civilian jury after a three-month trial. He was later sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to 17 years and four months in prison.[14] In September 2011, an appellate court ruling deemed Padilla's original sentence to be too lenient.[15] Padilla is being held at the same penitentiary as Richard Reid and is awaiting resentencing.

3. Lackawanna Six—September 2002. When the FBI arrested Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, and Mukhtar al-Bakri in Upstate New York, the press dubbed them the "Lackawanna Six," the "Buffalo Six," and the "Buffalo Cell." Five of the six had been born and raised in Lackawanna, New York.[16] All six are American citizens of Yemeni descent, and stated that they were going to Pakistan to attend a religious camp, but attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan instead. The six men pled guilty in 2003 to providing support to al-Qaeda. Goba and al-Bakri were sentenced to 10 years in prison, Taher and Mosed to eight years, Alwan to nine and a half years, and Galab to seven years.[17] Goba's sentence was later reduced to nine years after he, Alwan, and Taher testified at a Guantanamo Bay military tribunal in the case against Osama bin Laden's chief propagandist, Ali Hamza al-Bahlul.[18]

Recent reports indicate that Jaber Elbaneh, one of the FBI's most wanted and often considered to be a seventh member of the Lackawanna cell, has been captured in Yemen. It remains to be seen whether he will be tried in the U.S., since the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Yemen.[19]

4. Uzair and Saifullah Paracha—March 2003. Uzair Paracha, a Pakistani citizen with permanent residency status in the U.S., was arrested in March 2003 and charged with five counts of providing material and financial support to al-Qaeda. Uzair attempted to help another Pakistani, Majid Khan, an al-Qaeda operative, gain access to the United States via immigration fraud. Khan is said to have been in

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contact with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed and planned to bomb underground storage tanks at Maryland gas stations.[20] Uzair was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

Saifullah Paracha, Uzair's father, a 64-year-old citizen of Pakistan and resident alien of the U.S., is currently being held at Guantánamo Bay awaiting trial. Paracha was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 8, 2003, through the efforts of the FBI and information provided by his son. He is believed to have had close ties to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and Mohammed's nephew Ammar al-Baluchi. Saifullah is said to have used his international business connections to help al-Qaeda procure chemical and biological explosives and assist in their shipment to the U.S., along with the shipment of ready-made explosives.[21]

5. Iyman Faris—May 2003. Iyman Faris is a naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from Kashmir, who was living in Columbus, Ohio. He was arrested for conspiring to use blowtorches to collapse the Brooklyn Bridge, a plot devised after meetings with al-Qaeda leadership, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.[22] The New York City Police Department learned of the plot and increased police surveillance around the bridge. Faced with the additional security, Faris and his superiors called off the attack.[23]

Faris pled guilty to conspiracy and providing material support to al-Qaeda and was later sentenced in federal district court to 20 years in prison, the maximum allowed under his plea agreement.[24]

6. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—June 2003. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali is an American citizen of Jordanian descent who was arrested in Saudi Arabia on charges that he conspired to kill President George W. Bush, hijack airplanes, and provide support to al-Qaeda. He was arrested while attending Medina University, where he had joined an al-Qaeda cell. His plans, according to authorities, were to kill President Bush and then establish an al-Qaeda cell in the United States, with himself as the head.[25] He was convicted by an American court on November 22, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison on July 27, 2009, overturning a 2006 sentence of 30 years that was ruled to be too lenient.[26]

7. Virginia Jihad Network—June 2003. Eleven men were arrested in Alexandria, Virginia, for weapons counts and for violating the Neutrality Acts, which prohibit U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. Four of the 11 men pled guilty. Upon further investigation, the remaining seven were indicted on additional charges of conspiring to support terrorist organizations. They were found to have connections with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a terrorist organization that targets the Indian government. The authorities stated that the Virginia men had used paintball games to train and prepare for battle. The group had also acquired surveillance and night vision equipment and wireless video cameras.[27] Two more men were later indicted in the plot: Ali al-Timimi, the group's spiritual leader, and Ali Asad Chandia.

Ali al-Timimi was found guilty of soliciting individuals to assault the United States and was sentenced to life in prison. Ali Asad Chandia received 15 years for supporting Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.[28] Randall Todd Royer, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Yong Ki Kwon, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Muhammed Aatique, and Donald T. Surratt pled guilty and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three years and 10 months to 20 years. Masoud Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem were found guilty and later sentenced to prison terms ranging from 52 months to life.[29] Both Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem and Sabri Benkhala were acquitted at trial.[30]

8. Nuradin M. Abdi—November 2003. Nuradin M. Abdi, a Somali citizen living in Columbus, Ohio, was arrested and charged in a plot to bomb a local shopping mall. Abdi was an associate of convicted terrorists Christopher Paul and Iyman Faris and admitted to conspiring with the two to provide material support to terrorists. Following his arrest, Abdi admitted to traveling overseas to seek admittance to terrorist training camps, as well as meeting with a Somali warlord associated with Islamists.

Abdi has since pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, one of the four counts for which he was indicted. He was subsequently sentenced to 10 years in jail per the terms of a plea agreement.[31]

9. Dhiren Barot—August 2004. Seven members of a terrorist cell led by Dhiren Barot were arrested for plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial

institutions in New York, Washington, D.C., and Newark, New Jersey. They were later accused of planning attacks in England. The plots included a "memorable black day of terror" that would have included detonating a dirty bomb. A July 2004 police raid on Barot's house in Pakistan yielded a number of incriminating files on a laptop computer, including instructions for building car bombs.[32]

Barot pled guilty and was convicted in the United Kingdom for conspiracy to commit mass murder and sentenced to 40 years.[33] However, in May 2007, his sentence was reduced to 30 years.[34] His seven co-conspirators were sentenced to terms ranging from 15 to 26 years on related charges of conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to cause explosion.[35]

10. James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj—August 2004. James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj, both reportedly self-radicalized, were arrested for plotting to bomb a subway station near Madison Square Garden in New York City before the Republican National Convention.[36] An undercover detective from the New York City Police Department's Intelligence Division infiltrated the group, providing information to authorities, and later testified against Elshafay and Siraj.[37]

Siraj was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, pled guilty and received a lighter, five-year sentence for testifying against his co-conspirator.[38]

11. Yassin Aref and Mohammad Hossain—August 2004. Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, were charged with plotting to purchase a shoulder-fired grenade launcher to assassinate a Pakistani diplomat.[39] An investigation by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and local police contributed to the arrest. With the help of an informant, the FBI set up a sting that lured Mohammad Hossain into a fake terrorist conspiracy. Hossain brought Yassin Aref, a Kurdish refugee, as a witness. The informant offered details of a fake terrorist plot, claiming that he needed the missiles to murder a Pakistani diplomat in New York City. Both Aref and Hossain agreed to help.[40]

Aref and Hossain were found guilty of money laundering and conspiracy to conceal material support for terrorism and were sentenced to 15 years in prison.[41]

12. Hamid Hayat—June 2005. Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant, was arrested in Lodi, California, after allegedly lying to the FBI about his attendance at an Islamic terrorist training camp in Pakistan.

Hamid was found guilty of providing himself as "material support" to terrorists and three counts of providing false statements to the FBI.[42] In interviews with the FBI, he stated (correctly) that he specifically requested to come to the United States after receiving training in order to carry out jihad.[43] He was sentenced to 24 years in prison.[44]

13. Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, Hammad Riaz Samana, and Kevin James—August 2005. The members of the group were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with conspiring to attack National Guard facilities, synagogues, and other targets in the Los Angeles area. Kevin James allegedly founded Jamiyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), a radical Islamic prison group, and converted Levar Washington and others to the group's mission. The JIS allegedly planned to finance its operations by robbing gas stations. After Washington and Patterson were arrested for robbery, police and federal agents began a terrorist investigation, and a search of Washington's apartment revealed a target list.[45]

James and Washington pled guilty in December 2007. James was sentenced to 16 years in prison and Washington to 22 years. Patterson received 151 months, while Samana was found unfit to stand trial and was initially detained in a federal prison mental facility. He was later sentenced to 70 months in jail.[46]

14. Michael C. Reynolds—December 2005. Michael C. Reynolds was arrested by the FBI and charged with involvement in a plot to blow up a Wyoming natural gas refinery; the Transcontinental Pipeline, a natural-gas pipeline from the Gulf Coast to New York and New Jersey; and a Standard Oil refinery in New Jersey.[47] He was arrested while trying to pick up a $40,000 payment for planning the attack.[48] Shannen Rossmiller, his purported contact, was a Montana judge and private citizen working with the FBI. Rossmiller posed as a jihadist, tricking Reynolds into revealing his plan. The FBI later found explosives in a storage locker in Reynolds's hometown of Wilkes–Barre, Pennsylvania.[49] Reynolds claimed that he was doing much the same as

Rossmiller, and was working as a private citizen to find terrorists.[50]

Reynolds was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, soliciting a crime of violence, unlawful distribution of explosives, and unlawful possession of a hand grenade. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.[51]

15. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Zand Wassim Mazloum—February 2006. Amawi, El-Hindi, and Mazloum were arrested in Toledo, Ohio, for conspiring to kill people outside the United States, including U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.[52] The men also conspired to train and arm for a violent jihad against the United States, both domestically and abroad.[53] Training involved use of materials including those found on secure and exclusive jihadist websites, downloaded and copied training videos, and materials for jihad training sessions. The men also were found to have provided material support to terrorist organizations and to have verbally threatened attacks on President George W. Bush.[54] The investigation was begun with the help of an informant who was approached to help train the group.[55]

In June 2008, the three men were convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism against Americans overseas, including U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and other terrorism-related violations. Amawi was sentenced to 20 years, El-Hindi to 13 years, and Mazloum to approximately eight years.[56]

16. Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee—April 2006. Ahmed and Sadequee, from Atlanta, Georgia, were accused of conspiracy, having discussed terrorist targets with alleged terrorist organizations. They allegedly met with Islamic extremists in the U.S. and gathered video surveillance of potential targets in the Washington, D.C., area, including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters, and sent the videos to a London Islamist group. Ahmed is said also to have traveled to Pakistan with the goal of joining Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.[57]

Both men were indicted for providing material support to terrorist organizations and pled not guilty.[58] In June 2009, a federal district judge found Ahmed "guilty of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists here and overseas."[59] Ahmed was subsequently sentenced to 13 years in jail. Sadequee was

also found guilty and sentenced to 17 years.[60]

17. Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—June 2006. Seven men were arrested in Miami and Atlanta for plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, FBI offices, and other government buildings around the country. The arrests resulted from an investigation involving an FBI informant. Allegedly, Batiste was the leader of the group and first suggested attacking the Sears Tower in December 2005.[61]

All of the suspects pled not guilty. On December 13, 2007, Lemorin was acquitted of all charges, but the jury failed to reach a verdict on the other six.[62] The second trial ended in a mistrial in April 2008.[63] In the third trial, the jury convicted five of the men on multiple conspiracy charges and acquitted Herrera on all counts. On November 20, 2009, the five were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 13.5 years, with Batiste receiving the longest sentence.[64]

18. Assem Hammoud—July 2006. Conducting online surveillance of chat rooms, the FBI discovered a plot to attack underground transit links between New York City and New Jersey. Eight suspects, including Assem Hammoud, an al-Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, were arrested for plotting to bomb New York City train tunnels. Hammoud, a self-proclaimed operative for al-Qaeda, admitted to the plot.[65] He was held by Lebanese authorities but was not extradited because the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Lebanon. In June 2008, Lebanese authorities released him on bail.[66] In February 2012, Hammoud was convicted in a Lebanese court. He was sentenced to two years in prison, which he had already served.[67]

19. Liquid Explosives Plot—August 2006. British law enforcement stopped a terrorist plot to blow up 10 U.S.-bound commercial airliners with liquid explosives.[68] Twenty-four suspects were arrested in the London area. The style of the plot raised speculation that al-Qaeda was behind it, but no concrete evidence has established a link.

The United Kingdom initially indicted 15 of the 24 arrested individuals on charges ranging from conspiring to commit murder to planning to commit terrorist acts.[69] Eventually, in April

2008, only eight men were brought to trial. In September, the jury found none of the defendants guilty of conspiring to target aircraft, but three guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.[70] The jury was unable to reach verdicts on four of the men. One man was found not guilty on all counts.[71]

20. Derrick Shareef—December 2006. Derrick Shareef was arrested on charges of planning to set off hand grenades in a shopping mall outside Chicago. Shareef reportedly acted alone and was arrested after meeting with an undercover Joint Terrorism Task Force agent. FBI reports indicated that the mall was one of several potential targets, including courthouses, city halls, and government facilities. Shareef, however, settled on attacking a mall in the days immediately preceding Christmas because he believed it would cause the greatest amount of chaos and damage.[72] Shareef was also found to have connections to convicted terrorist Hassan Agujihaad, who was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and later sentenced to 35 years in prison.[73]

21. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—March 2007. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, captured in Pakistan in 2003, was involved in a number of terrorist plots and is one of the most senior bin Laden operatives ever captured.[74] He is being held at the U.S. military detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. In March 2007, Mohammed admitted to helping plan, organize, and run the 9/11 attacks. He also claimed responsibility for planning the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 2002 bombings of nightclubs in Bali and a Kenyan hotel. He has stated that he was involved in the decapitation of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl and took responsibility for helping to plan the failed shoe-bomb attack by Richard Reid, along with plots to attack Heathrow Airport, Canary Wharf, Big Ben, various targets in Israel, the Panama Canal, Los Angeles, Chicago, the Empire State building, and U.S. nuclear power stations. He had also plotted to assassinate Pope John Paul II and former President Bill Clinton.

In December 2008, Mohammed and his four co-defendants (Ramzi Binalshibh, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, and Walid Bin Attash) told the military tribunal judge that they wanted to confess and pleaded guilty to all charges.[75] The judge has approved the guilty plea of Mohammed and two co-

defendants but has required mental competency hearings before allowing the other two conspirators to plead guilty. In November 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Mohammed would be relocated to the United States to face a civilian trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.[76] That decision has now been reversed and the Administration announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other Guantanamo Bay detainees would be prosecuted in military tribunals at Guantanamo.[77] The date for the arraignment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his co-defendants has been set for May 5, 2012, beginning the long-awaited legal proceedings for the five men.[78]

22. Fort Dix Plot—May 2007. Six men were arrested in a plot to attack Fort Dix, a U.S. Army post in New Jersey. The plan involved using assault rifles and grenades to attack and kill U.S. soldiers. Five of the alleged conspirators had conducted training missions in the nearby Pocono Mountains. The sixth helped to obtain weapons. The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began after a store clerk alerted authorities after discovering a video file of the group firing weapons and calling for jihad. The group has no known direct connections to any international terrorist organization.[79]

In December 2008, five of the men were found guilty on conspiracy charges but were acquitted of charges of attempted murder.[80] Four were also convicted on weapons charges. The five men received sentences ranging from 33 years to life plus 30 years. The sixth co-defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the others in illegal possession of weapons and was sentenced to 20 months in jail.[81]

23. JFK Airport Plot—June 2007. Four men plotted to blow up "aviation fuel tanks and pipelines at the John F. Kennedy International Airport" in New York City. They believed that such an attack would cause "greater destruction than in the Sept. 11 attacks." Authorities stated that the attack "could have caused significant financial and psychological damage, but not major loss of life."[82]

Russell Defreitas, the leader of the group, was arrested in Brooklyn. The other three members of the group—Abdul Kadir, Kareem Ibrahim, and Abdel Nur—were detained in Trinidad and

extradited in June 2008. Kadir and Nur have links to Islamic extremists in South America and the Caribbean. Kadir was an imam in Guyana, a former member of the Guyanese Parliament, and mayor of Linden, Guyana. Ibrahim is a Trinidadian citizen and Nur is a Guyanese citizen.[83]

In 2010, Kadir was found guilty on five counts and sentenced to life in prison. In February, both Defreitas and Nur were also found guilty. Defreitas was sentenced to life in prison, while Nur was sentenced to 15 years.[84] The final conspirator, Kareem Ibrahim, was convicted in May 2011 and has been sentenced to life in prison.[85]

24. Hassan Abujihaad—March 2008. Hassan Abujihaad, a former U.S. Navy sailor from Phoenix, Arizona, was convicted of supporting terrorism and disclosing classified information, including the location of Navy ships and their vulnerabilities, to Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan, the alleged administrators of Azzam Publication websites (the London organization that provided material support and resources to terrorists). Abujihaad was arrested in March 2007 and pled not guilty to charges of supporting terrorism in April 2007. In May 2008, he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 10 years in prison.[86] In 2010, his conviction was upheld in a federal court of appeals.[87] Both Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan are being held in Britain on anti-terrorism charges and are fighting extradition to the U.S.[88]

25. Christopher Paul—June 2008. Christopher Paul is a U.S. citizen from Columbus, Ohio. He joined al-Qaeda in the 1990s and was involved in conspiracies to target Americans in the United States and overseas. In 1999, he became connected to an Islamic terrorist cell in Germany, where he was involved in a plot to target Americans at foreign vacation resorts. He later returned to Ohio and was subsequently arrested for conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction—specifically, explosive devices—"against targets in Europe and the United States." Paul pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.[89]

26. Bryant Neal Vinas—November 2008. Bryant Neal Vinas is an American citizen of Hispanic descent who converted to Islam in 2004.[90] In 2007, Vinas left home telling his parents he wanted to study Islam and Arabic. He then traveled to Pakistan where he was

trained by and joined the Taliban. During his time in Pakistan, Vinas assisted with unsuccessful attacks on American forces and provided al-Qaeda with extensive information regarding the Long Island Rail Road for a potential attack.[91] He was arrested by Pakistani forces and sent back to the United States, where he pleaded guilty and began cooperating with authorities. He is currently in the custody of the U.S. Marshals and is awaiting sentencing.[92]

27. Synagogue Terror Plot—May 2009. On May 20, 2009, the New York Police Department announced the arrest of James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen for plotting to blow up New York-area Jewish centers and shoot down planes at a nearby Air National Guard Base.[93] The four had attempted to gain access to Stinger missiles and were caught in the act of placing bombs in the buildings and in a car. (The bombs were duds, because undercover agents sold the four defendants fake explosives as part of an ongoing sting operation). All four men were found guilty. In June 2011, James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams were sentenced to 25 years in prison.[94] In September 2011, Laguerre Payen received the same sentence.[95]

28. Raleigh Jihad Group—July 2009. A group of seven men in North Carolina were arrested on charges of conspiring to support terrorist groups abroad, engage in terror attacks abroad and plotting an attack on the U.S. Marine base at Quantico, Virginia.[96] Their ringleader, Daniel Patrick Boyd, is believed to have a long association with radical groups, dating from his time living in Pakistan. In Pakistan, he is believed to have been an active member of Hezb-e-Islami (Party of Islam). The Raleigh group also raised funds and trained extensively in preparation to wage attacks both at home and abroad. [97] The men were denied bail and are awaiting trial.[98]

29. Najibullah Zazi—September 2009. Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old Afghan, was arrested after purchasing large quantities of chemicals used to make a TATP bomb, the same type of weapon used in the 2005 bombing of the London Underground and the 2001 shoe-bomb plot. Zazi had traveled to Pakistan, where he received instruction in bomb making and attended an al-Qaeda training camp. Zazi allegedly planned to detonate

TATP bombs on the New York City subway.[99] It has since been found that the plot was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.[100]

Najibullah Zazi's father, Mohammed Wali Zazi, was also indicted for obstructing justice, witness tampering, and lying to the FBI in attempts to help his son cover up plans for his attack.[101]A cousin of Zazi, Amanullah Zazi, also publicly admitted that he played a role in Zazi's 2009 plot. Amanullah pled guilty in secret and agreed to become a government witness in federal court in Brooklyn against Najibullah's father.[102] The father has since been found guilty and sentenced to four and a half years in prison.[103] Najibullah Zazi pled guilty, as the result of a plea bargain, and remains in jail. He is currently awaiting sentencing.[104]

At least three other individuals have since been arrested on allegations of conspiring to carry out the attack with Zazi. One of them, New York religious leader Ahmad Afzali, has pled guilty to charges of lying to federal agents about informing Zazi that he was being investigated by authorities. [105] As part of a plea deal, Afzali was sentenced to time served and ordered to leave the country within 90 days.[106] A second man, Zarein Ahmedzay has also pled guilty to conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction in the foiled plot and lying to investigators. Adis Medunjanin has pled not guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and to receiving terrorist training.[107] Ahmedzay and Medunjanin are thought to have traveled to Pakistan with Zazi, and to have met with wanted al-Qaeda operative Adnan El Shukrijumah, who has also been charged in the plot.[108] A fourth individual, Abid Nasser, has also been implicated in the plot led by Zazi, as well as other plots in England and Norway. He is currently in the United Kingdom facing extradition to the United States.[109] Also charged in the plot are, Tariq Ur Rehman, and a fifth defendant known as "Ahmad," "Sohaib," or "Zahid." Both El Shukrijumah and Rehman are not in custody.[110]

30. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi — September 2009. Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian, was apprehended in an attempt to plant a bomb in a Dallas skyscraper. Originally identified through FBI monitoring of extremist chat rooms, Smadi was arrested and charged after agents posing as terrorist cell members gave Smadi a fake bomb, which he later attempted to detonate.[111] Smadi was found guilty and sentenced to 24 years in prison.[112]

31. Michael Finton —September 2009. Michael Finton, an American citizen, was arrested on September 23, 2009, by undercover FBI agents after attempting to detonate a car bomb filled with what he believed to be close to one ton of explosives outside the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield, Illinois. The blast was also intended to destroy the nearby office of Representative Aaron Schock (R–IL).[113] Evidence presented against Finton has shown that he expressed a desire to become a jihadist fighter and was aware that his planned attack would cause civilian injuries. He has been arrested on charges of attempted murder of federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Finton pled guilty and was sentenced to 28 years in prison.[114]

32. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra—October 2009. Tarek Mehanna, previously indicted for lying to the FBI about the location of terrorist suspect Daniel Maldonado, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on allegations of conspiracy to kill two U.S. politicians, American troops in Iraq, and civilians in local shopping malls, as well as conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization.[115] Mehenna and Ahmad Abousamra, his co-conspirator, were indicted on charges of providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill Americans in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide false information to law enforcement.[116]

The two men are not believed to be associated with any known terrorist organization.[117] Mehanna has pled not guilty to charges held against him and has since been convicted, while Abousamra remains at large in Syria.[118]

33. The Christmas Day Bomber—2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student living in London, boarded a plane from Nigeria to Amsterdam and then flew from Amsterdam to the U.S. It was on this second flight when he attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear as the plane began to land. The device ignited but did not detonate, and passengers quickly stopped Abdulmutallab from trying again, leading to his arrest by

U.S. authorities upon landing in Detroit. The bomb, containing the explosives PETN and TATP, was similar to the failed device used by Richard Reid in his shoe in 2001.

Media accounts following the plot indicate that Abdulmutallab admits involvement with al-Qaeda in Yemen and has pleaded not guilty to charges including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.[119] In February 2012, Adulmutallab was sentenced to life in prison following his conviction.[120]

34. Raja Lahrasib Khan—March 2010. Chicago taxi driver Raja Lahrasib Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, was arrested by the Chicago FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force on two counts of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. According to the charges, Khan was affiliated with Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the al-Qaeda-linked extremist group Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami in Kashmir, and has previously been indicted in the U.S. on terrorism charges.[121]

Khan originally transferred $950 to Pakistan, to be delivered to Kashmiri, and later attempted to send around $1,000 provided to him by an undercover agent to Kashmiri by having his son carry the money to England, where Khan then planned to rendezvous with him and carry the money the rest of the way to Pakistan. His son was stopped by government agents at Chicago's O'Hare airport before leaving the country. The criminal complaint filed against Khan also alleges that he had discussed plans to bomb an unnamed sports stadium in the United States.

Khan has since pleaded guilty as part of a plea deal recommending a sentence of five to eight years. His sentencing has been scheduled for May 30, 2012.[122]

35. Faisal Shahzad—May 2010. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized citizen from Pakistan, attempted to detonate explosives in an SUV parked in Times Square. After explosives training in Pakistan, he is said to have received $12,000 from entities affiliated with the terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban to fund the attack. Following the failed bombing attempt, Shahzad attempted to flee the country to Dubai, but was arrested before the flight was able to leave New York's JFK airport.[123]

Shahzad pled guilty to 10 counts, including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and to use a weapon of mass destruction.[124] He was sentenced to life in prison and is being

held at the same Colorado maximum-security prison as Richard Reid and Jose Padilla.[125]

36. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr., and Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood—July 2010. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr., an American citizen, became an adherent to Anwar al-Awlaki's ideology of violent jihad after converting to Islam. In studying al-Awlaki's teachings, Rockwood came to believe it was his religious responsibility to seek revenge against anyone who defiled Islam. He created a list of 15 individuals to be targeted for assassination, including several members of the U.S. military. Rockwood is said to have researched explosive techniques and discussed the possibility of killing his targets with a gunshot to the head or through mail bombs. Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood, Paul's wife, knowingly transported the list to Anchorage, Alaska, to share with an unnamed individual who apparently shared Rockwood's ideology. The list then made it into the hands of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in Anchorage.

Paul was charged with making false statements to the FBI in a domestic terrorism charge, while Nadia was charged with making false statements to the FBI in connection to the case against her husband. Paul was sentenced to eight years in prison, while his wife was sentenced to five years probation.[126]

37. Farooque Ahmed—October 2010. Pakistani-American Farooque Ahmed was arrested following an FBI investigation into plots to attack the Washington, D.C., subway. Ahmed is said to have conducted surveillance on the D.C. Metrorail system on multiple occasions, and was in contact with undercover FBI agents whom he believed to be individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda.[127] According to an unsealed affidavit, Ahmed wanted to receive terrorist training overseas and become a martyr. The affidavit also indicates that he sought to specifically target military personnel in his bombing attempt.[128]

Ahmed pled guilty to charges of material support and collecting information for a terrorist attack on a transit facility. He was then immediately sentenced to 23 years in prison.[129]

38. Air Cargo Bomb Plot—October 2010. Two packages shipped from Yemen to Chicago-area synagogues were discovered to contain explosive materials of the same type used by Richard Reid and Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab in previously thwarted bombing attempts.[130] The packages contained printer cartridges filled with the explosive material and were identified with the help of intelligence tips from Saudi Arabian authorities while in transit on cargo planes in the United Kingdom and Dubai.[131] While no arrests have been made, the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has claimed responsibility for the failed attack.

39. Mohamed Osman Mohamud—November 2010. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-American, was arrested after attempting to detonate a car bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The bomb was composed of inert explosives given to him by undercover FBI agents. Mohamud had previously sought to travel overseas to obtain training in violent jihad. Having failed in that attempt, he wanted to commit an attack that would cause mass casualties to individuals and their families.[132] Mohamud has pled not guilty to the charges.[133]

40. Antonio Martinez—December 2010. Antonio Martinez, a 21-year-old American citizen also known as Muhammad Hussain, planned to bomb a military recruiting center in Maryland. The FBI learned of the plot from an unnamed informant. Martinez was arrested after attempting to detonate a fake explosive device supplied by FBI agents. He has been charged with attempted murder of federal officers and employees, as well as attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.[134] He has pled not guilty and awaits further trial.[135]

41. Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—February 2011. Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a Saudi citizen studying in Lubbock, Texas, was arrested by the FBI after placing an order for the toxic chemical phenol. Both the chemical supplier and the freight shipping company became suspicious of the order, which could be used to make an improvised explosive device (IED), and alerted the FBI and local police. Surveillance of Aldawsari's e-mail turned up a list of potential "nice targets" including dams, nuclear power plants, military targets, a nightclub, and the Dallas residence of former President George W. Bush. The search also recovered plans to acquire a forged U.S. birth certificate and multiple driver's licenses. Aldawsari seems to have considered using these documents to obtain rental cars for use in vehicle bombings. He has pled not guilty to charges of attempted

use of a weapon of mass destruction and faces up to life in prison.[136]

42. Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—May 2011. Ahmed Ferhani of Algeria, and Moroccan-born Mohamed Mamdouh, a U.S. citizen, were arrested by the New York Police Department after attempting to purchase a hand grenade, guns, and ammunition to attack an undetermined Manhattan synagogue. The men planned on disguising themselves as Orthodox Jews in order to sneak into the synagogue.[137] Reports have also cited the Empire State Building as a possible second target.[138] Both men face charges of conspiracy to commit a crime of terrorism and conspiracy to commit a hate crime, as well as criminal possession of a weapon.[139]

43. Yonathan Melaku—June 2011. On June 17, 2011, Yonathan Melaku, an Ethiopian and a naturalized U.S. citizen and former Marine Corp reservist, was arrested at Fort Myer near Arlington National Cemetery, where he was found with a backpack filled with ammonium nitrate, spray paint, and spent ammunition rounds. The discovery led authorities to unravel a series of mysterious events from the fall of 2010, when shots had been fired at night from the street at various military buildings, including the Pentagon, causing over $100,000 in damages. After searching his bag and house, authorities found video of Melaku shooting at the buildings and providing commentary, a series of notebooks written in Arabic with references to terrorism, and a list of equipment needed to make a timed explosive device. He has since pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.[140]

44. Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh—June 2011. In a raid on a warehouse in Seattle, the FBI arrested Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh. The two suspects had arranged to purchase weapons from an anonymous informant in contact with the Seattle Police Department. They were seeking to purchase automatic machine guns and grenades in preparation for an attack on a military recruiting station in Seattle. Since the arrests have been made, authorities have learned that Abdul-Latif, a felon and Muslim convert, had initially planned to attack the Joint Base Lewis–McChord with his friend, Los Angeles resident Mujahidh. The target was later changed to the Seattle Military

Entrance Processing Station for undisclosed reasons.[141]

The men have been charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the United States government, conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, and possession of firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Abdul-Latif has also been charged with two counts of illegal possession of firearms and is awaiting further trial.[142] Mujahidh has pled guilty and faces up to 32 years in prison.[143]

45. Emerson Winfield Begolly—August 2011. Begolly, a moderator and supporter for the internationally known Islamic extremist Web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum (AMEF), was arrested on charges of terrorist actions involving solicitation to commit a crime of violence and distribution of information in relation to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. Through his profile on AMEF, the Pennsylvania-born man solicited others to engage in violent acts of terrorism against post offices, water plants, military facilities, bridges, train lines, and Jewish schools. Begolly also used the website to post a downloadable 101-page document that contains information on how to create, conduct, and manufacture chemical explosives. The instructional document is loosely linked to al-Qaeda's former top chemical and biological weapons expert Abu Khabbab al Misri. Begolly pled guilty to counts of soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the U.S., and attempting to use a 9-mm semi-automatic handgun during an assault upon inquiring FBI agents. He is currently awaiting further trial.[144]

46. Rezwan Ferdaus—September 2011. Ferdaus, a self-radicalized 26-year-old U.S. citizen, was arrested for trying to provide material support to terrorist organizations when he gave a modified cell phone to someone he believed to be an al-Qaeda operative.[145] He did so believing the man would use the cell phone to detonate improvised explosive devices against American soldiers. The alleged al-Qaeda operative was an undercover FBI agent. Ferdaus also sought to use small drone aircraft laden with explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol, followed by a ground attack carried out by armed men with automatic rifles. He had already purchased some items, including C4 and AK-47s, toward

this goal from an undercover agent.[146] He is being held awaiting trial.[147]

47. Iranian Terror Plot -October 2011. On October 11, 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar, an Iranian-born U.S. citizen, was arrested for plotting to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S., as well as bomb the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington, D.C. He claims he was working for the Iranian Quds Forces, a special unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. On behalf of the Quds Forces, Arbabsiar is said to have contacted members of a Mexican drug cartel with the goal of hiring them to assassinate the Saudi ambassador. The two parties allegedly agreed on a payment of $1.5 million, with a down payment of $100,000 that Arbabsiar wired to members of the cartel, supposedly from the Iranian government. The plot was uncovered because the supposed members of the cartel he approached were informants for the Drug Enforcmeent Agency.[148] He was arrested at JFK airport in New York, has pleaded not guilty, and is currently awaiting trial.[149] Another man, Gholam Shakuri, is an Iranian citizen who is wanted in connection with the plot; he is believed to be in Iran.[150] This is the first publicly known post-9/11 Islamist-inspired terror plot aimed at the United States specifically linked to state-sponsored terrorism.

48. Jose Pimentel -November 2011. On November 20, 2011, Jose Pimentel, a naturalized U.S. citizen from the Dominican Republic, was arrested on charges of planning to use pipe bombs to attack targets throughout New York City. His proposed targets included police stations, post offices, and U.S. soldiers. He was a homegrown radical inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki. Pimentel also managed his own radical website espousing his beliefs in violent jihad.[151] The plot was uncovered by an informant and Pimentel was arrested by the NYPD. He has pleaded not guilty and awaits trial.[152]

49. Sami Osmakac—January 2012. On January 7, 2012, Sami Osmakac, a naturalized U.S. citizen from the Kosovo region of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, was arrested on charges of planning attacks against night clubs, businesses, and a sheriff's office.[153] He came to the attention of the authorities when a source alerted them that Osmakac had asked how to locate an al-Qaeda flag. He planned to conduct a multi-pronged attack against his proposed

targets with vehicle-born explosives. He also wished to take hostages. He was introduced to an undercover FBI agent who he believed was an arms dealer and procured disabled AK-47s and explosives from him.[154] He was arrested by the FBI's Tampa office and has since pleaded not guilty.[155]

50. Amine El Khalifi—February 2012. Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan citizen illegally in the United States, was arrested on charges of plotting to attack the U.S. Capitol. He was arrested as he left his parked car with guns and a bomb. He did not know that the weapons had already been rendered inoperable, as they had been provided to him by FBI agents he believed to be al-Qaeda operatives. Before choosing the Capitol building as a target, El Khalifi had proposed targets including D.C. office buildings, restaurants, and synagogues.[156] He is currently being held in federal custody in Alexandria, Virginia, awaiting trial.

Preventing the Next Terrorist Attack

The death of Osama bin Laden marked an important victory in the long war on terrorism. The war, however, is not won. Terrorists, including those radicalized in the United States, continue to seek to harm the U.S. and its people. As the first anniversary of the death of bin Laden approaches, Congress and the Administration should be mindful of what is needed to continue to combat the threat of terrorism at home and abroad. In order to prevent the next terrorist attack, lawmakers should:

- Preserve existing counterterrorism and intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act. Support for important investigative tools, such as the PATRIOT Act, is essential to maintaining the security of the United States and combating terrorist threats. Key provisions in the act, such as the roving surveillance authority and business records provisions, have proven essential in thwarting numerous terror plots. For instance, the PATRIOT Act's information-sharing provisions were essential for investigating and prosecuting homegrown terrorists, such as the Lackawanna Six. This case, along with others, demonstrates that national security investigators continue to require the authorities provided by the PATRIOT Act to track leads and dismantle plots before the public is put in danger. Bearing this fact in mind, Congress should not let key provisions of the PATRIOT Act expire, and instead, should make them permanent.

- Plug gaps in procedures for halting terrorist travel. The problem in stopping terrorist travel to the U.S. is not airport screening per se. Turning every airport into another Maginot Line or Fort Knox will fail at some point. Instead, the best way to discourage terrorists is to frustrate the groups or individuals long before they are able to put the American public in danger. One of the advantages of homegrown terrorism is that potential terrorists, lacking any criminal network, and by merits of U.S. citizenship or legal permanent resident status, are able to travel freely between the U.S. and other nations. In order to stop these and other terrorist travelers, the U.S. should improve visa security coordination between the Departments of State and Homeland Security, put more air marshals in the skies and in airports, speed up the deployment of the Secure Flight program, and fully fund cost-effective measures, such as the Federal Flight Deck Officers program. DHS should also step up implementation of REAL ID and expand the Visa Waiver Program, while Congress should seek to end the 100 percent visa interview requirement that requires consular officers to interview all individuals who apply for visas to the United States, rather than being able to focus resources on those individuals who may pose the greatest risk. Efforts should also be made to improve the Terrorist Watchlist, including ensuring that the intelligence community has complete information access in real time, the implementation of "Person-centric" travel histories, and the incorporation of data obtained from abroad by the

Immigration and Custom Enforcement's Visa Security Units at U.S. embassies and consulates.[157] Until the terrorists are rooted out, the free nations under threat from global terrorism have to do a better job of thwarting terrorist travel.

- Improve cooperation between federal, state, and local authorities. Since 9/11, the federal government has worked to improve cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities through the promotion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), fusion centers, and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). Today, almost every major law enforcement jurisdiction belongs to a Joint Terrorism Task Force, while only 72 jurisdictions participate in, or have, a fusion or data center. Similarly, while many state and local agencies have embraced their roles in the development of suspicious activity reporting (SAR), far too may have yet to do so. Particularly in the case of homegrown terrorism, the importance of further enhancing these relationships cannot be overlooked. Local cops on the beat know their communities and are best able to notice when something is not right. All too often, however, information sharing continues to mean that state and local authorities are expected to share information with the federal government, while information fails to effectively flow in the opposite direction. This relationship must be improved. Likewise, one of the central failures leading up to the attempted 2009 Christmas Day airplane bombing was the lack of sufficient information sharing between entities across the federal government. Interagency communications between the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, therefore, must also be improved.

- Create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and lawful interrogation of terrorists. As of August 2011, the United States is holding 171 detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Under the international law of armed conflict, or law of war, and as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States has the authority to detain enemies who have engaged in combatant actions, including acts of belligerence, until the end of hostilities to keep them from returning to the battlefield. Military detention, authorized by Congress and properly calibrated to protect national security, will enhance the nation's ability to prosecute this war. The Commander in Chief should have all tools available to defeat this enemy, including the ability to determine whom to capture, where to detain them, whether to prosecute via military commissions or federal court, and whom to release. Efforts by Congress to unnecessarily restrict the Commander in Chief in these areas are problematic and should be avoided. At the same time, the Administration should continue to use Guantanamo as the default detention facility for high-value captures, including future captures and dangerous high-value detainees currently in custody in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- Enhance mutual trust and partnerships with the Muslim communities throughout the United States. In 2005, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke clearly when he said, "The best defense of the Muslim community in this country is for that leadership to be exercised and for the mainstream Muslim community to take on the extremists within their midst, within our midst."[158] These words continue to ring true today. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) has undertaken efforts to reach out to Muslim communities throughout the U.S. Similarly, the Obama Administration's 2011 strategy for combating violent extremism (CVE) in the U.S. placed a strong focus on a "community-based approach" to CVE. Members of the Muslim community have also proved integral in thwarting terrorist attacks both through

community resistance to radicalization and unsolicited tips to law enforcement in reporting suspicious activity and behavior. Both government outreach efforts and the vigilance of Muslim communities against terrorism have proven vital in protecting the U.S.; however, more must be done to enhance mutual trust and partnerships between government, intelligence, and law enforcement and Muslim communities.

At least 50 publicly known terrorist plots against the United States have been thwarted since 9/11—of these, at least 42 could be considered homegrown terrorist threats. What these plots show is that terrorists, both at home and abroad, continue to seek to harm the United States and its citizens. Ensuring that the U.S. is able to thwart the next terrorist plots requires the continued vigilance of law enforcement, intelligence, and the American people.

Notes:

[1]For the purposes of this report, the Congressional Research Service's definition of homegrown terrorism is employed: "'[H]omegrown' and 'domestic' [terrorism] are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States." All plots discussed in this report, however, involved targets in the United States. For more information on international terror plots, see David Muhlhausen and Jena Baker McNeill, "Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and Domestic Terrorism," Heritage Foundation *Special Report* No. 93, May 20, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/terror-trends-40-years-data-on-international-and-domestic-terrorism A plot was designated as homegrown if one or more of the actors met the definition above.

[2]Unpublished remarks by Brian Jerkins and Risa Brooks, "Evaluating the Homegrown Terrorist Threat," CATO Institute, April 13, 2012.

[3]Rick "Ozzie" Nelson and Ben Bodurian, "A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing 'Homegrown' Extremism in the United States," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_Nelson_GrowingTerroristThreat_Web.pdf (accessed April 17, 2012).

[4]Jerome P. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," Congressional Research Service *Report for Congress* R41416, November 15, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf (accessed April 17, 2012).

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Since 2007, The Heritage Foundation has continuously refined the data provided in this report. In this latest report, several previously unnoted plots have been added. Plots included in previous drafts may also not appear due to new developing information. It is worth noting that there have been three successful terrorist attacks against the United States since 9/11: (1) the shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas, military recruiting center in 2009; (2) the Los Angeles airport ticket counter shooting in 2002; and (3) the Fort Hood shooting in 2009, during which 16 people were killed.

[8]Pam Belluck, "Crew Grabs Man; Explosive Feared," *The New York Times*, December 23, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/23/us/crew-grabs-man-explosive-feared.html (accessed May 5, 2011).

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USS Cole attack mastermind killed in drone strike in Yemen

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120507-uss-cole-attack-mastermind-killed-in-drone-strike-in-yemen

A U.S. drone fired a missile which killed Fahd al-Quso, 37, an al Qaeda operative who was sentenced to ten years in prison in 2002 for his role in the bombing of USS Cole. The 2000 attack on U.S. Navy ship took the lives of seventeen American soldiers and injured thirty-nine.

Al-Quso escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2003. He was on the FBI's most wanted list, with a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture. He turned himself in to the Yemeni authorities in 2005, and served two more years in prison. He was released in 2007.

The *Guardian* reports that one, and possibly two, more al Qaeda operatives died in the missile attack on a car they were driving in the Wadi Rafad valley in the country's southern Shabwa province.

Al Qaeda admitted the death, saying in a statement: "Al-Qaida affirms the martyrdom of the Fahd al-Quso in an American attack this afternoon in Rafad."

The United States, unhappy with al-Quso's 2007 release from jail, used its intelligence network in Yemen to track him. In 2009, following a CIA

drone attack which was coordinated with the Yemeni authorities, the Yemeni government announced that al-Quso was killed, but he resurfaced after a couple of month.

In his teens, al-Quso, who would later be known for his talent for disguises, studied Salafi Islam in northern Yemen, then returned to the south and became to a welder.

Al-Quso was involved in plotting the Christmas 2009 bombing, and met with the Nigerian bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, in Yemen before the latter left on his way to execute his failed attack over Detroit with a bomb concealed in his underwear.

The use of drones to target terrorists was initiated by the Bush administration in 2004, but was dramatically intensified under the Obama. The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that since Obama took office on 20 January 2009, there have been 260 attacks by Predators or Reapers in Pakistan — averaging one every four days. In addition, there have also been some three dozen drone attacks on terrorist targets in Yemen, and a few in Somalia.

The Obama administration also escalated to drone war in another respect: the president has authorized the use of drones against American citizens consorting with al Qaeda. Last September, CIA drones killed Anwar al Awlaqi, a New Mexico-born Jihadist involved in operational planning for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and North Carolina blogger Samir Khan, who was the editor of *Inspire*, al Qaeda's English-language magazine. Two weeks after the attack on al Awlaqi, his 16-year old son, Abdulrahman, was killed in a drone strike on a training camp for al Qaeda militants.

In addition to their al Qaeda affiliation, and their untimely demise, Fahd al-Quso and Anwar al Awlaqi share something else in common: both hail from the same tribe in the Shabwa province in south Yemen.

London 2012: Armoured cars drafted in as security tightens ahead of the Olympic Games
Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/other-sports/london-2012-armoured-cars-drafted-824089

Fears of a terror attack at the London Olympics has seen demand for heavy-duty armoured cars soar by 200 per cent, it has been revealed.

The International Armoring (CORR) Corporation (IAC) supply heads of state and wealthy businessmen with vehicles that can withstand rocket attacks in some of the most dangerous countries in the world.

Now, they have reported a massive rise in interest from UK-based clients willing to pay up to £60,000 to have their cars secured as the countdown to the Games continues.

Mark Burton, 50, who is chief executive and president of the company who are world leaders in armoured car manufacturing, said: "The UK is one of our two fastest growing markets, along with South Africa.

"There has been a huge increase in interest and I would say it is around 200 per cent in the last year-and-a-half.

"This is a trend that has been going on for a number of years here, probably since the bombings in 2005 occurred."

Business in Britain is now booming with the eyes of the world on London ahead of the Olympics and the Diamond Jubilee.

Mr Burton added: "Here in the UK, there is such an international feel and a lot of individuals who work here are accustomed to a certain level of security in their own country so when they come here, that is something that they want.

"In early 2002, Salt Lake City hosted the Winter Olympics just after the September 11 attacks and we saw the same demands and requirements.

"Local security forces got involved and we are seeing similar interest here from forces who need added protection.

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"They have recognised there is a threat and need to be discreet in what they offer.

"We do quite a few government agencies around the world, and a lot of corporations depending on there certain individuals are going and the type of concerns they face."

The company also produces high-tech vehicles that come complete with James Bond-style grenade-launchers, tear gas and laser cannon. The cars are

The company are based in Salt Lake City, Utah, and have more than 300 employees worldwide.

Their UK operation is based in Ipswich, Suffolk, where they have 12 members of staff.

Since 1993, they have built and enhanced almost 8,000 vehicles for a variety of clients including more than 40 different heads of state and the Popemobile.

Armormax provide strengthened vehicles to protect VIPs in the event of a terrorist attack

Although they cannot disclose details of customers, they include some of the wealthiest people in the world.

Mr Burton said: "In terms of highest demand, there is a lot of business in countries such as Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, the Phillipines and all over the Middle East too, such as Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

created to withstand "almost anything you can bring to your shoulder" such as a rocket launcher, says Mr Burton.

The al-Qaeda attacks in New York in 2001 and London in 2005 have created a flourishing market in the both England and America.

He added: "Before 2000, there was a feeling - a lot like there was in the United States - that it would not happen here.

"But post 9/11, there has been more awareness and these fears have been brought home more.

"People used to find it secure and safe, but now we're finding it a lot more that people are willing to pay additional amounts of money for peace of mind.

"I think that is because of an increased awareness that the situation out there is of concern.

"In the UK, a lot of it is perceived threat because of who the individual is - because they are wealthy or because of their political affiliation."

"These vehicles are not tanks, but the entire passenger compartment is protected.

"It is like you're in a cocoon, but doesn't look like it. If you went past one of our cars, you wouldn't notice that it was armoured at all."

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) are currently running a massive test of their preparation for the Olympics.

The operation - dubbed Exercise Olympic Guardian - has seen police, army, navy and RAF working together to test their ability to combat potential threats to the summer Games.

Defence Secretary Phillip Hammond said: "Whilst there is no specific threat to the Games, we have to be ready to assist in delivering a safe and secure Olympics for all to enjoy."

It was also revealed that surface-to-air missiles could be deployed at six sites in London during the Games.

OLYMPIC GAMES from Ancient Greece to the World

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Iran turning U.S. mosques into command centers

By Reza Kahlili
Source: http://www.wnd.com/2012/05/iran-turning-u-s-mosques-into-command-centers/

The Revolutionary Guards and its Quds Forces, which run Iran's terror networks worldwide, have created two special units to undermine the regimes in the Persian Gulf and push America out of the region.

The Guards are using Imam Ali mosques around the globe, including some in the U.S., as terror command centers.

Unit 110 and Unit of Madinah – named after the second holiest city in Islam, the burial place of the Prophet Mohammad – were established to remove the U.S from the Gulf, sources report.

Unit 110 gathers intelligence while Unit of Madinah is in charge of military operations. Both are stationed in the city of Shiraz in Fars

military operations against those countries' governmental facilities.

Bahrain's monarchy faces daily protests and occasional terrorist attacks against its police forces and facilities. Protests are also taking place in Saudi Arabia within the minority Shiite population. Yemen is battling al-Qaida forces in addition to government protesters. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are key Gulf allies of the United States. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, and Saudi Arabia can help stabilize oil markets should a

conflict develop with Iran.

Province, under the command of Gholam Hossein Gheib Parvar, according to sources.

Parvar, one of the regime's most radical military commanders, is in charge of all Guard forces.

According to a former intelligence officer who served in that specific region, their orders are twofold: Incite uprisings within the Shiite minorities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other countries in the region, and prepare for

The Guards' intelligence office also runs operations out of mosques and Islamic centers around the world, according to sources. It finances the facilities, guides assets, recruits Muslims for reconnaissance of potential targets in host countries and forms alliances with other Islamic minorities such as Afghans, Pakistanis, Turks for terrorist operations.

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In Afghanistan alone, the Guards have more than 1,000 terror cells that help fund the Taliban and al-Qaida and provide intelligence to attack NATO forces with the hope of pushing America out, according to a former intelligence officer.

The former officer, who defected to a country in Europe, revealed that all Imam Ali mosques worldwide are under the operation of the Guards' intelligence office.

Noteworthy are the ones in Stockholm and Hamburg. Other mosques are in New Jersey, New York and Ohio, the former officer said.

Last June, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Naghdi, the commander of the Basij told the Guard forces: "Today we are in a full-scale war with our enemies … and you all have managed to infiltrate into the heart of the enemy's nest, where even in the streets of New York and London, mourning and prayers for Ashura (the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Shiites' third imam, Hossein) are observed. This is what it means to penetrate into the enemy camp."

Hassan Rahimpour Azghodi, a close adviser to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a speech on Iranian TV boasted: "Our forces are present all across the globe. … We must get ready for a global operation and an international jihad."

According to the source, the Guards, in collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are working on overthrowing the military junta and creating another front against Israel and America. Days ago, Iranian cleric Ahmad Mobaleghi stated that if Iran and Egypt become one, the future of the Islamic world will be guaranteed.

The Guards are also active in other African countries, where they train and arm Islamic militias and fund mosques and Islamic centers.

As reported recently, the Guards' grand plan, "Time for The Collapse," includes trafficking in arms, counterfeit money and illegal drugs not only to fund their worldwide terror networks but to destabilize the West through terror and drugs.

In a recent speech, Khamenei stated: "In light of the realization of the divine promise by almighty God, the Zionists and the Great Satan (America) will soon be defeated. Allah's promise will be delivered, and Islam will be victorious."

Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran's Revolutionary Guards and the author of the award-winning book, A Time to Betray. He is a senior Fellow with EMPact America, a member of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and teaches at the U.S. Department of Defense's Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA).

▶ **NOTE:** Watch the above video at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WwiadYT-N9k&feature=player_embedded

Searching for Connections Amid Terrorist Threats

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/searching-connections-amid-terrorist-threats?utm_source =freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120510&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content= readmore&elq=c5bb4c41cc484e1ebc6c88b6ccba1e05

In past Security Weeklies we have often noted how analyzing terrorism is like assembling a puzzle. After an attack has transpired, it is easier to piece the disparate clues together because you have the luxury of knowing what the finished puzzle should look like. You know the target, the method of attack, the time, the place, etc. These factors frame your approach to the bits of evidence you gather and allow you to assemble them into a cohesive, logical framework. While there will certainly be missing pieces at times, having the reference point of the attack itself is helpful to investigators and analysts.

On the other hand, analyzing a *potential* threat before an attack takes place is far more difficult. It is like sifting through pieces of thousands of different puzzles, all jumbled together in one big pile, and attempting to create a complete picture without knowing what the end result -- the attack -- will look like. Sometimes pieces look like they could be related, but it is often difficult to determine if they really are without

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having the picture of the finished attack and the important framework for investigative reference: target, method of attack, time and place. It is often easy to look back after an attack and criticize authorities for not making a critical connection, but it is difficult to piece things together before the attack occurs without the assistance of hindsight.

Over the past few weeks we have been studying a number of interesting puzzle pieces pertaining to potential threats to U.S. interests by transnational jihadists. It is currently unclear if they all fit together to form a seamless narrative, but the implications of a potential convergence are too big to ignore. We feel compelled to write about this potential convergence in much the same way we did in September 2009, when we discussed the possibility of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) using innovative bomb designs to bring down passenger aircraft rather than to assassinate individuals. The earlier convergence came to fruition on Dec. 25, 2009, when AQAP attempted to destroy a Northwest/Delta flight from Amsterdam to Detroit using an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed in the suicide operative's underwear. Time will tell if the current grouping of events is a true picture of what is about to happen or is simply a false positive.

The Pieces

The pieces of the current case began emerging a few weeks ago, before the May 2 anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death. Reports began to surface that AQAP's lead bombmaker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, had been seen again. American officials originally said al-Asiri was killed in the Sept. 30, 2011, airstrike that also resulted in the death of AQAP's English-speaking ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki. A few days after the strike, reports surfaced that al-Asiri had in fact survived the attack, but he has maintained a low profile since then.

While al-Asiri is certainly not AQAP's only bombmaker, he is an innovative, out-of-the-box thinker. Not only was he behind the device that his brother, Abdullah al-Asiri, used in his suicide bombing attempt against Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef on Aug. 27, 2009, and the underwear bomb used in December 2009, he was also responsible for the attempted attack against two U.S. cargo aircraft in October 2010 using IEDs hidden in computer printer ink cartridges.

Indeed, he is the technical author of every AQAP transnational attack attempted so far. Even though all of those attacks have failed, he is still considered a threat. This fact was highlighted by the May 7 reports of a thwarted bomb plot using an improved version of al-Asiri's underwear device.

A second, AQAP-related piece of the puzzle surfaced on May 2, when the group published two editions of its English-language Inspire magazine, ending the publishing hiatus that began after the magazine's editor, Samir Khan, died in the same Sept. 30, 2011, airstrike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki. AQAP watchers wondered why the group released two editions of the magazine so closely together, and the revelation of a plan for another transnational bomb plot directed against American aircraft appears to provide the answer to that question.

Last week, we wrote about the third piece of the puzzle: the proliferation of Libyan shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, also known as MANPADS, among jihadist militants in Africa and perhaps elsewhere. Many of these missiles are older SA-7s that have limited utility against modern military aircraft equipped with countermeasures, but they could be employed effectively against a commercial airliner during the vulnerable takeoff or landing phases of a flight. While this threat has existed for some time, we are hearing recent reports of missile dissemination and planning discussions.

Another important piece of the puzzle is the ongoing trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed before a military tribunal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mohammed, better known by his initials KSM, is the captured al Qaeda operational planner who was named the principal architect of the 9/11 operation in the 9/11 Commission Report. He was also involved in a number of other plots prior to 9/11, including the 1994 Operation Bojinka plot in the Philippines, the 2001 shoe-bomb plot and the 2002 Library Tower plot.

KSM's operational style had several distinctive hallmarks, including the frequent choice of aircraft as targets; the notion of multiple, simultaneous strikes; and the use of modular IEDs smuggled aboard the aircraft. Although KSM was arrested in March 2003, he continued to influence other jihadist planners. This influence was clearly seen in the August 2006 Heathrow liquid-bomb plot, which targeted nine American airliners. AQAP's cargo

bombing attempt, which targeted multiple aircraft, reflected KSM's preference for multi-pronged plots, and the reports of the thwarted May 7 bombing attempt indicate that aircraft are still considered desirable targets for jihadist groups.

KSM's trial began May 5, three days after the anniversary of bin Laden's death. With the trial in the world's media spotlight, it is quite possible that jihadists are planning an operation in homage to KSM and bin Laden, and that KSM's operational hallmarks could be seen again.

Paradigm Shifts

Of course, this is nothing new. Commercial aviation has been threatened by terrorism for decades now, and as discussed above, airliners have been under constant threat from jihadist groups because they are highly visible targets that are readily associated with specific nations, and a successful attack generates a large number of casualties and a high level of press coverage.

But as airline security measures have shifted in response to threats, so too have the modes of attack. When security measures were put in place to protect against Bojinka-style attacks in the 1990s -- attacks that involved modular explosive devices smuggled onto planes and left on board -- the jihadists adapted and conducted 9/11-style attacks. When security measures were put in place to counter 9/11-style attacks, jihadists quickly responded by shifting to onboard suicide attacks with concealed IEDs inside shoes. When that tactic was discovered and shoes began to be screened, they switched to camouflaging containers filled with liquid explosives. When security measures were adjusted to restrict the quantity of liquids that people could take aboard aircraft, jihadists altered the paradigm once more and attempted the underwear bombing using a device with no metal components. When security measures were taken to increase passenger screening in response to the underwear bombing, AQAP decided to attack cargo aircraft with IEDs hidden in printer cartridges.

It is notable that, after the failed underwear-bomb attack in December 2009, air security measures began to include additional pat downs and an increased use of body scanners that have the ability to identify items hidden under passengers' clothing. As with the previous changes in security procedures, al-Asiri and AQAP's operational planners likely accounted for these changes while planning the devices for the latest plot. They would need to use a device that would not be detected by a pat down or a body scanner. The reports indicate that they attempted to do this by creating a more form-fitting device hidden inside briefs.

Another way planners could evade detection is by using devices that are either implanted inside a suicide operative or hidden inside a body cavity. The advantage to using a body cavity to smuggle the device is that the device could then be removed from the body and detonated in close proximity to a critical component of the aircraft. Removing it from the body would also prevent the body from attenuating the force of the blast, which is what appeared to have happened in the Nayef attack. Creating security measures to search for devices hidden inside a potential bomber's body would be difficult and more intrusive than current procedures.

The original underwear IED reportedly contained less than three ounces of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), a high explosive. One could fabricate five such devices with a single pound of PETN, and explosives have always been extremely easy to acquire in Yemen -- even more so now that the country has been ravaged by civil war and AQAP and tribal elements have ransacked government arms depots. To date, al-Asiri's imaginative bombs have been successfully deployed in the underwear-bomb, printer-bomb and Nayef plots, but they all failed to destroy their targets. If AQAP is able to address this quality-control issue, the only thing effectively limiting AQAP from launching multiple suicide IED attacks is the availability of operatives who are willing to conduct such attacks and able to travel abroad.

Since the suicide operative is a critical node in this type of operation, the United States and its allies have a place to focus their efforts. If they can find the suicide operatives before they depart Yemen, the threat can be minimized. It is worth noting that the suicide operative involved in the plot disclosed May 7 was reportedly a double agent. It is unclear if the purported bomber in the recent threat case was a plant sent in to penetrate AQAP, a loyal jihadist who was intercepted and turned, or an

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operative that simply got cold feet -- something we have seen in the past. It is also not clear if the group hoped to deploy more than one of the devices in a KSM-style, multi-pronged attack, as it did in the printer-bomb plot. We have noted recent reports of European citizens arrested in Yemen for having ties to AQAP, but we have seen no indication that they are related to this threat.

An attack against multiple airliners would be the type of spectacular terrorist strike that would have international repercussions and would deeply affect international air transportation. If such an attack was coordinated with, or followed closely by, an attack against multiple airliners using MANPADS, it could have an even deeper impact. This would affect the American people -- and, consequently, the American government -- especially given that 2012 is a presidential election year in the United States, and President Barack Obama would almost certainly take measures to demonstrate that he was tough on terrorism. We stress the impact on the United States because, as the latest edition of AQAP's Inspire magazine indicated,

the United States remains the prime jihadist target and U.S. airliners will likely be targeted again in any plot.

Of course, it would not be easy for AQAP to recruit multiple suicide operatives and transport the operatives and their IEDs out of Yemen without detection. (Although it does appear the operative in the thwarted plot was able to successfully get the device out of Yemen.) It would also be quite difficult for different al Qaeda franchises to coordinate their attacks in either a multi-pronged or parallel attack scenario. We have not seen them take such an approach in the past, although we have in recent months seen increased indications of communication and coordination between AQIM, Boko Haram, al Shabaab and AQAP. This lends itself to the idea of a convergence, especially one related to the MANPADS threat, but it does not provide any direct evidence.

Still, with so many puzzle pieces suggesting some sort of merging of threats is taking place -- even if it is only accidental -- a possible convergence is worth discussing because of the significant consequences it could have.

Russia 'foils Islamist plot to attack Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics'
Source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/10/russia-plot-sochi-winter-olympics

Russia says it has foiled a plot by Islamist rebels to attack the southern city of Sochi when it hosts the Winter Olympics in 2014.

The Olympic skating centre under construction in Sochi, southern Russia. Photograph: Misha Japaridze/AP

The country's anti-terror committee said agents from the Federal Security Service (FSB) had arrested three suspected rebels and seized a large cache of weapons during a raid last week in Abkhazia, the Georgian breakaway region that borders Sochi. "Russia's FSB could establish that militants were planning to move these weapons to Sochi during 2012-2014 to use for terror acts while planning and hosting the Olympic Games," the committee said in a statement.

They said the plot had been devised by the Chechen rebel Doku Umarov, the head of Caucasus Emirate, a rebel group that seeks to wrest the Caucasus region from Russia in

order to set up an Islamist state. It has taken responsibility for devastating attacks on Russian territory, including the bombing of the Moscow metro in 2010 and the bombing of a Moscow airport last year.

The group has carried out no major attacks since then, although analysts have long feared it would seek to

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target the Olympic site in Sochi, which is just 300 miles from Chechnya. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has made Sochi's hosting of the Olympics one of his pet projects. **The committee said surface-to-air missiles, TNT and grenade launchers were among**

the weapons seized.

In a move likely to strain ties further, it accused Georgia, with which Russia has frozen

delivery of materials to carry out acts of terror," the committee statement said. It also accused Georgia's security services and "associated representatives of illegal armed groups in Turkey" of smuggling 300 detonators from Georgia to Abkhazia in an operation that was discovered in February. Several Chechen exiles have been assassinated in Turkey in plots believed to involve the Russian security services.

Georgian officials denied the claim. "I can only say that the national anti-terrorist committee is staffed with people with peculiar fantasies," Shota Khizanishvili, chief of staff at Georgia's interior ministry, told the Associated Press. "They are always trying to accuse Georgia and its secret services of everything in any situation and without any grounds. This is a sign of a

relations since its August 2008 war over South Ossetia, another breakaway region, of aiding the plot.

"Doku Umarov, while maintaining close contacts with the Georgian special services, co-ordinated all activities to organise the

severe paranoia."

Russia maintains close ties to Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia after the fall of the Soviet Union and lies just 10 miles from Sochi. Russia recognised the independence of both

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South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 war, which broke out one year after Sochi was awarded the Olympics following a personal push from Putin.

Security in the restive North Caucasus region has long been a concern. The Foreign Office advises against all travel to the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia and says the country includes a "high level of threat from terrorism".

Russia has tried to ease fears. The anti-terrorist committee said the weapons seizure was a "notable blow to the terrorist underground, leaving it no intention to disrupt the Olympic games in Sochi and destabilise the situation in the North Caucasus region".

The International Olympic Committee said: "Security at the Games is the responsibility of the local authorities and we have no doubt that the Russians will be up to the task."

MILITANT LEADERSHIP MONITOR
Personalities Behind the Insurgency

The Jamestown Foundation is proud to introduce the new *Militant Leadership Monitor* Index:
http://mlm.jamestown.org/mlm-index/
The MLM Index will allow readers to search for profiles of key militant leaders by organizational affiliation. The MLM Index categorizes articles covering over 60 militant groups and over 110 profiles of key leadership figures. This index serves as a resource to our subscribers who need in-depth information about individuals critical to strategic assessments of security and global terrorism.

Anarchists 'shot nuclear boss Roberto Adinolfi'
Source: http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18036388

An Italian anarchist group has said it carried out an attack last Monday on a senior executive of nuclear engineering group Ansaldo Nucleare.

Roberto Adinolfi, 53, was shot in the leg by a gunman on a motorbike in the northern Italian city of Genoa.

He has undergone surgery and colleagues have said his condition is not serious.

The "Olga Cell" of the FAI (Informal Anarchist Federation), made the claim by a letter sent to the Italian daily Corriere della Sera.

The letter says that the attack "was carried out to punish one of the many sorcerers of the atomic industry".

Strong presence
The Ansaldo group is part of aerospace and defence giant Finmeccanica.

Four of its managers were targets of attacks in the 1970s and '80s by the far-left Red Brigades movement.

The shooting of Mr Adinolfi has prompted investigators to draw similarities with the previous attacks.

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Investigative sources have pointed at anarchists involved in extremist activity as possible suspects.

The incident has sparked fears that the shooting could be a signal for sleeper cells to carry out more attacks or spark copycat shootings.

The anarchist movement has a strong presence in Genoa.

According to Italian news agency Ansa, police were examining recent pronouncements by some anarchist groups which have called for "a shift to a new phase that could lead to armed action".

The FAI has carried out a string of attacks on European institutions, including parcel bombs that exploded at the Swiss and Chilean embassies in the Italian capital Rome in 2010, badly wounding the two people who opened them.

A third bomb sent to the Greek Embassy four days later was defused. In December last year, a parcel bomb exploded at a tax collection office in Rome, injuring the director. Police said the package also contained a leaflet signed by the anarchist group FAI.

Escalation in Somalia piracy
Source: http://hellasfrappe.blogspot.com/2012/05/greek-tanker-hijacked-by-pirates.html

Somali pirates approached the Golden Lady tanker as well, which is owned by the Martinou Group. According to a report the pirates approached the ship and asked the captain to halt it. When the captain refused the **pirates shot from 50m seven (!) RPG-7 rockets on the ship four of which were successful in striking at the tanker. The report said that two of the rockets, fell to the deck and caused major damages, while the others pulverized the bridge!**

Luckily, the crew was not killed. The pirates then approached the tanker to seize it, but were confronted by an armed security team and were not successful in doing so. Escorted by the Indian coast guard ship, the Golden Lady finally reached the Indian port of Galle, but the ship was reported to be heavily damaged.

EDITOR'S COMMENT

Following piracy events off-shore Somalia for the last six years, I think this is the first time that so many RPGs were shot against a commercial vessel. It seems that either pirates have more heavy equipment now (Libya unrest?) or are more determined into their objectives. In another event (the day before) more than 600 rounds (AK-47) were shot. Perhaps the rules of engagement that armed guards on board should be rapidly modified to prevent them coming into fire range. Also keep in mind that recently (May 2012), a Lynx helicopter from the Dutch frigate HMS *Van Amstel* was shot at of the coast of Somalia during night reconnaissance flight at high altitude. Also for the first time…

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Al-Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Only Inspires the Work of Satan's Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source:http://www.faithinallah.org/al-qaedas-inspire-magazine-only-inspires-the-work-of-satans-weapons-of-mass-destruction/

The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization continues to threaten Muslims and the world with weapons of mass-destruction. In the latest edition of *Inspire* magazine, published by Al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, they encourage the use of biological and chemical weapons against innocent people:

> The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons against population centers is allowed and is strongly recommended due to its great effect on the enemy.

Chemical and biological weapons are classified as weapons of mass-destruction because they are certain to kill innocent people and otherwise destroy property needlessly. These terrible weapons are banned by the Geneva Protocol, an international treaty that has been ratified by the majority of Muslim countries. Upholding treaty obligations is essential to the character of a Muslim, but even without this treaty it should be clear that these weapons are inherently unlawful. Allah Almighty said:

مِن أَجْلِ ذَٰلِكَ كَتَبْنَا عَلَىٰ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ أَنَّهُ مَن قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا

Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for punishing murder or for corruption in the land – it is as if he had slain mankind entirely.
[Surah Al-Ma'idah 5:32]

Killing a single person without right is a crime that will take its perpetrators to Hell, but this severe warning in the Quran does not stir the hearts of Al-Qaeda's partisans as they strive to serve Satan. Even the animals will be avenged by Allah on the Day of Judgment. The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said:

لَتُؤَدُّنَّ الْحُقُوقَ إِلَى أَهْلِهَا يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ حَتَّى يُقَادَ لِلشَّاةِ الْجَلْحَاءِ مِنَ الشَّاةِ الْقَرْنَاءِ

Certainly, the rights of every people will be restored on the Day of Resurrection, until even the hornless sheep will settle the score with the horned sheep.
[Sahih Muslim, Book 32, Number 6252]

Indeed, great men who fought for the cause of Islam showed incredible fear that Allah would punish them for misappropriating the rights of a single animal. Umar ibn Al-Khattab famously said:

لو مات جمل ضياعاً على شط الفرات لخشيت أن يسألني الله عنه

If even a lost camel were to die upon the banks of the Euphrates, I fear that Allah would ask me about it.

How, then, can the publishers of this magazine endorse the use of weapons of mass destruction? We hear from them endlessly about the glories of fighting in the way of Allah, but Ibn Al-Qayyim said:

والجهاد بالحجة واللسان مقدم على الجهاد بالسيف والسنان

The jihad with decisive proofs and the tongue takes precedence over the jihad with the sword and the spear.
[Al-Jawab us-Sahih of Ibn Taymiyyah 1/237]

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The jihad of non-violence, the jihad of education, is the needed jihad and it is even greater than fighting on the battlefield, but this has been entirely abandoned by these terrorists. Why do they not glorify the seeking of knowledge, or the giving of charity, or the exercise of mercy, or the beauty of patience, or the excellence of good character, or the power of prayer? Rather, they are like those about whom Hasan Al-Basri has said:

ولكنهــم ، عنهم يفــرج أن لبثـــوا ما صـــبروا سـلطانهم قبـل من ابتلـــوا إذا النـاس أن لـو قـطخـير بيــوم جاءوا ما فــواﷲ ، إليــه فيوكلـــون السـيف إلـى يجـزعون
If the people had patience when they are being tested by their unjust ruler, it will not be long before Allah will give them a way out. However, they always rush for their swords, so they are left with their swords. By Allah! Not even for a single day did they bring about any good.
[Tabaqat Al-Kubra 7/163-165]

There is no doubt that Muslims are obligated to resist oppression, but it is entirely unlawful to resist oppression with more oppression. The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization has abandoned every rule of Islam that hinders the advancement of their heretical sect of death and murder.
We ask Allah to protect the innocent from their wicked ideology.

Drug War at Sea: Rise of the Narco Subs

Source:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/13/the-drug-war-at-sea-rise-of-the-narco-subs.print.html

After a two-year manhunt, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency last week arrested Colombian drug kingpin Javier Antonio Calle Serna, a senior leader of Los Rastrojos, one of the country's most formidable drug-trafficking organizations. After being indicted last summer by the Eastern District of New York, Serna reportedly felt so squeezed by the agency and rival drug dealers that he began negotiating for his surrender.

His arrest is by all accounts good news, especially due to Los Rastrojos alleged connections to Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Mexico's most wanted man and perhaps the world's most notorious drug lord. Yet Serna's capture is also a reminder of one of the growing challenges in the seemingly never-ending war on drugs: combating narco subs. Serna headed an organization well known for its ability to rapidly build and use roughly 50-foot-long fiberglass vessels, which float just above the waterline, to surreptitiously smuggle drugs across the globe.

Despite concerted efforts by governments to patrol their coastlines, drug traffickers have shown a remarkable ability to adapt, according to experts such as Rear Adm. Joseph L. Nimmich, former commander of the U.S. Coast Guard's Joint Interagency Task Force South. And over the past five years, drug-trafficking organizations and terrorist groups have increasingly been moving massive amounts of narcotics by way of these vessels. Indeed, U.S. counter-drug officials have estimated that roughly 32 percent of all cocaine sent between Latin America and the United States is transported by way of narco sub.

Historically, each innovation in drug trafficking has come about when existing methods have reached a state of crisis. Early in the drug war, Colombian drug cartels preferred to move their product by small planes, which landed on secret air strips in Central America. American authorities eventually started tracking these planes and closing down the secret airports. During the *Miami Vice* era, drug traffickers used high-speed boats for transport, but again American authorities caught on. And so in the early '90s, the narco sub was born.

Over the past few years, law-enforcement officials have received reports that terrorist organizations, such as the FARC in Colombia and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, have been constructing semi-submersible narco subs to fund their activities. So too have drug-trafficking organizations such as Mexico's powerful Sinaloa Cartel. And though it hasn't been reported that al Qaeda and Hizbullah have ever tried to rent space on a narco sub or build one themselves in an effort to move drugs, weapons, or terrorists, it's not much of a stretch to

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imagine this development, especially considering the latter's alleged links to drug traffickers in parts of Latin America.

Colombian soldiers guard a homemade submersible in a rural area of Timbiqui, department of Cauca, Colombia, on February 14, 2011. (Luis Robayo, AFP / Getty Images)

Bigfoots reportedly move as much as 12 tons of cocaine per trip; cut and sold, that translates to up to $4 million.

In an interview with VICE's VBS TV, former drug trafficker Miguel Angel Montoya said that most narco submarines are made in the Buenaventura Jungle, one of Colombia's poorest regions and an area that is accessible only by boat. Under the cover of the jungle's heavy foliage, traffickers are able to hide in plain sight from law enforcement as they carry out their nefarious activities. For access and protection, narco traffickers pay the FARC and other paramilitary groups undisclosed sums, according to Montoya. The traffickers then assign each sub a four-man crew and pay them roughly $40,000 total per voyage.

The reason these vessels are so successful, according to U.S. and Latin American law-enforcement officials, is that they're difficult to capture. Their hulls are painted dark blue, making them nearly impossible to spot. Powered by ordinary diesel engines, they leave little wake and produce an extremely small radar signature. The DEA claims that roughly 10 percent of all narco subs leaving Latin America are caught, but the true number is probably much lower since crews often sink their craft if they fear they might be discovered. During the 1990s, American drug-enforcement officials heard of narco subs operating in Central America. In fact, the subs earned the named Bigfoots because some considered them a myth. In 2006, that myth was shattered when U.S. authorities spotted and seized their first vessel. By 2008, they began spotting about 10 a month.

Analysts have estimated that drug-trafficking organizations manufacture more than 120 narco subs every year. The building process, they say, takes anywhere from three months to a year, and costs up to $2 million per sub. The price may be well worth it, though, as these

Semi-submersible subs generally leave Colombia and make their way to drop off their cargo in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. But narco subs have been captured in Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Spain. And some are even rumored to have tried to reach Italy. For drugs intended for the U.S. market, traffickers tend to ship their wares over land or transfer them to smaller crafts for smuggling across the border. Narco subs can be used multiple times, but Colombian Coast Guard members have reported that crews tend to sink them after their first voyage to decrease the chances of future detection.

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As difficult as these subs are to detect, the situation is not hopeless. Allies in the war on drugs can create obstacles for drug runners. The U.S. and Colombia have passed laws criminalizing the financing, construction, storage, transport, or use of semi-submersible submarines. Other Latin American countries should follow suit, especially now as successes in the drug war have increasingly pushed cocaine producers into countries such as Peru and Bolivia.

Drug traffickers have reportedly already built full-blown submarines, equipped with a periscopes and electric motors, which are able to dive to a depth of 20 meters.

Vigilance is especially important. The next generation of narco subs, Montoya says, will be piloted remotely like unmanned aerial vehicles. And drug traffickers have reportedly already built full-blown submarines, equipped with a periscopes and electric motors, which are able to dive to a depth of 20 meters.

Such rapid innovation is cause for concern, and law-enforcement officials throughout the Americas should bolster their operations and increase their intelligence-sharing activities. In particular, the Organization of American States' Anti-Money-Laundering Section, which provides training and technical assistance to countries throughout the Western hemisphere, has an important role to play in assisting countries to curb this threat. And the U.S. and its allies in Central and South America should devote resources allocated in regional security pacts such as the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia, specifically to thwarting narco subs. Doing so is vital to our national security.

Why Do Terrorists So Often Go For Planes?

Source: http://www.npr.org/2012/05/15/152750767/why-do-terrorists-so-often-go-for-planes?ps=cprs

Despite the multiple layers of security at

airports, terrorists still often target planes. But terrorism analysts say they are also concerned about soft targets. Here, a Transportation Security Administration agent looks at an identity card at the Portland International Airport earlier this month.

Ever since the Sept. 11 attacks, airports have probably been the most heavily guarded sites when it comes to preventing terrorist attacks.

And yet the most recent terrorism plot in Yemen involved an attempt to blow up a U.S. airliner with a bomber wearing a difficult-to-detect explosive bomb in his underwear, according to U.S. officials.

Why do terrorist groups keep trying to defeat the multiple layers of security at airports when there are so many soft targets?

For one, a plane heading into the U.S. represents the first available target to strike against a large number of Americans. It doesn't require reaching the U.S. first, and then acquiring a weapon and launching an attack from U.S. soil.

Also, terrorist groups have learned from previous attacks on planes.

"Terrorists like to do what they know how to do," says terrorism analyst Jessica Stern.

But the difficulty of breaching airport security does appear to be generating other approaches.

Two Different Types Of Plots

Stern says she sees two trends. One involves developing new and more sophisticated techniques for evading security measures and attacking airplanes.

The other involves "looking for low-tech ways to attack softer targets," she says. This is a way of encouraging "leaderless resistance," says Stern, the author of *Terror in the Name of God.*

People have been fed this paternalistic thing about fears. We need to tell the public, 'Here's the limit of what we can do. Here's what you need to live with.'

- Steve Flynn, who studies security at Northeastern University

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For example, the latest issue of *Inspire,* the jihadi magazine produced by the Yemen-based group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, includes an eight-page feature that encourages readers to start wildfires in Australia and the United States.

It recommends that would-be saboteurs in the U.S. study weather patterns in order to determine when vegetation will be dry and winds favorable for a wildfire.

It specifically suggests Montana as a good site for practicing pyro-terrorism, because of the residential housing that is in wooded areas.

Stern says the aim of terrorism is to frighten the public and push governments into over-reacting — so spectacular, random-seeming attacks like airplane bombings work well.

"Terrorists do really aim for what we call symbolic targets," she says. "Terrorism is a form of theater, so they're going to hit targets that will make us maximally afraid, and inflict the maximum amount of humiliation."

In that sense, she says, arson in populated forest areas could be "a good second best" for a target.

A Range Of Vulnerabilities

Security analysts have pointed to dozens of potential terrorist targets and vulnerabilities, from military bases to passenger trains, chemical plants to storage for liquefied natural gas.

Former CIA agent Charles Faddis says he expects that there will be more attacks on targets that, by their nature, are hard to defend. Faddis, the author of *Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security,* says he particularly fears situations where suicide gunmen might attack people at a public event.

"There are an infinite number of targets where you can find large numbers of people — college campuses, pro sports events," he says. Even where such events have security screening, Faddis adds, they often don't have armed guards, so a determined, suicidal shooter would be hard to stop.

A Focus On Resiliency

That problem is causing analysts to rethink the balance between guarding against an attack and recovering from one.

"We've got to recognize that we're never going to be able to answer the question, 'Are we safe?' with a definitive 'Yes,' " says Juliette Kayyem, a lecturer on public policy at

Harvard's Belfer Center. "So how do we prioritize risks?"

Kayyem says the government still needs to keep attention on "high consequence" targets, such as nuclear power plants or toxic chemical storage facilities.

Army National Guard officers patrol Grand Central Station in New York on Sept. 10, 2011, the day before the 10th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks.

But she says the country also needs to focus on resiliency — the ability to recover from destruction ranging from terrorist attacks to natural disasters.

"When you prepare society to deal with destruction, you reduce the incentive for terrorist attacks," says Steve Flynn, co-director of the Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security at Northeastern University.

Flynn cites the example of forest fires. "If you can respond capably to someone who sets a fire, there isn't a lot of incentive for someone to set them," he says. "And we should be ready to deal with them anyway, because Mother Nature is the ultimate arsonist."

Flynn has his own list of critical targets that need strong security measures, beginning with refineries and petrochemical plants. "Why import a weapon," he asks, "when we already have them pre-positioned around urban areas?"

Government also needs to take steps to protect the power grid, he says, because if assets such as power substations are destroyed, they can take from one to two years to rebuild.

Limits Of Security

But Flynn warns against overstating what government can do to protect against attacks.

"People have been fed this paternalistic thing about fears," he says. "We need to tell the public,

'Here's the limit of what we can do. Here's what you need to live with.' "
Juliette Kayyem says experience shows that the American people are up to it. "Studies show that when bad things happen, people don't panic, they don't run for the hills. They help the people around them."

Mapping Contemporary Terrorism Courses at Top-Ranked National Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges in the U.S.

By Ivan Sascha Sheehan
Source:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/sheehan-mapping-contemporary/html

Abstract
Most of the scholarly work on Terrorism Studies focuses on terrorism research (knowledge production). By contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to teaching about terrorism (knowledge dissemination) at universities. This paper addresses this gap by providing a systematic analysis of contemporary terrorism courses at 106 top-ranked U.S. based universities and colleges. The study uses 1) key word searches of course catalogues for the academic year 2010-2011 to identify terrorism courses; 2) descriptive statistics to document the field and disciplinary distributions of these courses 2) stepwise regression to assess the relative contributions of institutional characteristics to the frequency of these courses; 3) text analysis to extract dominant topics and a qualitative review of a sample of syllabi. The results indicate that a) most of the these academic institutions offer terrorism courses but courses only secondarily on terrorism outnumber those explicitly or primarily on terrorism by 3:1; b) the institutional presence of a highly cited terrorism scholar, a security studies program and terrorism research center are significantly associated with more terrorism courses c) courses explicitly on terrorism tend to emphasize non-state terrorism and prescriptively focus on counterterrorism while those only secondarily on terrorism have a broader focus. The results have implications for the development of Terrorism Studies as an academic discipline.

Introduction

The study of terrorism has been described alternately as a "booming field" and as one that is "unbounded" and "unruly" barely existing at the margins or "interstices" of academia. [1] Routinely critiqued for not being able to come to a consensus on a definition of terrorism [2] and for insufficient rigor in research [3], accused by the those on the right of the political spectrum of producing experts who sympathize too much with their subjects [4] and by the left for having too state-centric a security focus (and not considering violence perpetrated by states) [5], Terrorism Studies could be said to be under siege. Still, publications and dissertations on terrorism are increasing, Terrorism Studies programs are exploding at many of the world's colleges and universities and although federal funding for terrorism research has declined in the U.S. in the last two years, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security still allocates millions of dollars to university-based homeland security research and development programs, especially those in its designated COEs (Centers of Excellence). [6] How are America's top-ranked universities, the ones that are often assumed to set academic trends, handling this situation?

Most of the scholarly work on Terrorism Studies has focused on terrorism research (knowledge production). [1-3] [7-14] By contrast, relatively little attention has been paid to how universities treat Terrorism Studies in terms of teaching (knowledge dissemination).[15] This may be because research is viewed as more important to the legitimization of a field or simply because knowledge creation is seen as something that inevitably and necessarily precedes knowledge dissemination. The history of the development of academic fields, however, suggests that although research is critical, teaching also matters and indeed new fields may emerge and become integrated into college curricula, as many area and ethnic studies did, in response to a need and demand for teaching on a subject. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that researchers have much to learn from teachers who may refine, re-define or re-construct a

subject in ways that cast new light on avenues for new research. [16]

This study was designed to address the gap in data on the teaching component of Terrorism Studies by providing a systematic review and analysis of recent catalogue descriptions and syllabi from academic courses on terrorism and courses with terrorism content at America's top 80 national universities and top 26 liberal arts colleges.

Fundamental questions addressed in the study include the following: How visibly committed are America's top academic institutions to offering courses on terrorism? How many offer distinct courses on terrorism? How many only offer courses that include content on terrorism, secondarily or peripherally, as a topic among other topics? To what extent are institutional characteristics associated with more or fewer terrorism courses? Which institutions and which academic departments offer the most terrorism courses? What are the dominant topics? Are there differences in the number or types of terrorism courses across undergraduate vs. graduate curricula? And to what extent does a closer examination of syllabi provide other insights e.g. about the scholarly nature of these courses?

Since visible teaching at universities or colleges is one component of the evolution of an academic discipline, this study has implications for the legitimization of terrorism as a field or discipline. It also has implications for the generation of new terrorism scholars since academic preparation, especially at the undergraduate level, is an important influence in the choice of research topics at graduate levels.

Background

Evolution of Terrorism Studies

Terrorist activities became a concern for Western governments in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but, unlike war, it was often considered too fuzzy or too policy-oriented for academics. There was no one universally accepted definition of the phenomenon. [17-18] The subject, moreover, did not fit "neatly" into any one department. It could be researched from the perspective of psychology, history, political science, sociology, religion, ethics, and even area studies. And while it might appear to fit best in political science or international relations, it was not a topic that could be easily adapted to either the realist or liberal paradigms that dominated those departments.[19] Perhaps more importantly, terrorism was considered too driven by short-term policy agendas and government contracts to deserve serious or sustained attention. A few important scholars within university settings e.g. Martha Crenshaw, David Rapoport, Walter Laqueur and Paul Wilkinson did make sustained scholarly contributions in these early years, but they were exceptional and all too frequently terrorism was viewed as a topic that was risky for academics and one that belonged outside the ivory tower. Indeed, as late as 2002, a full year after 9/11, Audrey Kurth Cronin observed that for graduate students a "principal interest in terrorism virtually guarantees exclusion from consideration for most academic positions." [19]

Still, in the context of 9/11, dissertations proliferated and the number of terrorism publications was estimated to have increased by as much as 60 percent by 2004. [20] [21] The period after 9/11 also witnessed an infusion of federal money into research and into research facilities designed to find solutions to "pressing security concerns"; dozens of homeland security programs emerged at community colleges, universities and graduate schools across the U.S. [22] Today, according to a listing maintained by the Naval Postgraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, there are more than 340 such programs located among 260 universities and colleges across the country [23] and a growing number of universities now host Terrorism Research Centers. [24] Although federal funding for such programs and centers is not as generous as it was a few years ago [25], some of these academic institutions, designated as Centers of Excellence (COE) [26], receive millions of dollars in federal grants annually. These trends have helped launch new sub-fields (e.g. cyberterrorism and information security) and are believed by some to be opening new career pathways for junior faculty. [27]

The study of terrorism was on its way to becoming a distinct academic field, discipline or specialty. Or, was it? For some, the answer was no. Despite initial optimism, writes Andrew Silke, the field has not "crystallized" into an academic discipline or even a sub-discipline or specialty. [28] Although many

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explanations for this state of affairs have been advanced, the most common ones are that terrorism as an object of study is too diffuse, too unbounded, crosses too many disciplines and lacks conceptual clarity.[1] Today the field is also being contested and problematized by advocates of "Critical Terrorism Studies" [29] and by subscribers to a theory that the field is still dominated by a core of 42 "key terrorism researchers," many from think tanks and non-academic settings. [30]

The Problem of Disciplinarity

But how important "disciplining" is to the future of Terrorism Studies is a matter of debate. Avishag Gordon, a proponent of promoting terrorism to an academic discipline, has gone on record to state that an important opportunity was missed. [15] Silke, on the other hand, has stated that the failure of Terrorism Studies to become a discipline "is not necessarily a bad thing" since "good science does not need a ring-fenced academy." [21]

Whether Terrorism Studies will go on to become a distinct discipline is not yet known. What is clear is that the future of terrorism research depends on generating new cohorts of scholars and the production of scholars depends on generating interest, enthusiasm and skills, tasks that are best accomplished in academic courses that in some way address terrorism as a puzzle that requires inquiry and investigation. This consideration highlights the need to take a closer look at how terrorism as a subject of academic inquiry is taught in our universities and colleges. The present article is designed to contribute to this discussion.

Data and Methods

The top 80 national universities and 26 liberal arts colleges were identified using *US News and World Reports* undergraduate rankings for 2010-2011. [31] Although these institutions constitute an admittedly limited sample of all higher education institutions in the U.S., their "center-to-periphery" influence as creators or distributors of knowledge has long been acknowledged [32]. Many of these national universities train graduate students who "diffuse" or "radiate" models of orientation when they go on to teach in other sectors. Similarly, top liberal arts colleges, thought to "uphold the traditions of liberal education," often become models, in the words of the sociologist Burton Clark, "for what education would be if properly

carried out." [33] As such they may be viewed as trendsetters, both domestically and globally. Key word searches of course catalogue descriptions, available online, were used to identify courses explicitly or primarily on terrorism (defined here as courses with the term "terrorism" in the title) or only secondarily on terrorism (defined here as courses with "terrorism" content as evidenced in the text of the course description but not in the title). To minimize the potential for changes in courses during an academic year, all of the searches of course catalogues were performed at about mid term (March-April) in the spring of 2011. To avoid duplication, courses that were cross-listed across departments or listed more than once because they had multiple sections were only counted once.

Courses meeting the above criteria were listed by nine institutional characteristics. They included type of institution (national university or liberal arts college), level of study (undergraduate or graduate), institutional funding (public or private), institutional size (in terms of undergraduate enrollment), regional location, ranking, the presence of a peace- or security studies program or degree, the presence of a Terrorism Research Center, and the presence of at least one well-known (i.e. highly cited) scholar. For the purpose of the study, the presence of a security program or degree (concentration, minor, major, certificate or graduate degree in security, biodefense, intelligence analysis, emergency preparedness) was based on catalogue information, supplemented by a listing prepared by the Naval PostGraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. [34] The presence of a peace studies program (concentration, minor, major or degree in peace studies or peace and conflict or conflict resolution) was based on catalogue listings supplemented by a listing of academic peace studies programs prepared by Pilgrim Pathways. [35] The presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar was documented using *Google Scholar* listings of scholars with 75 or more terrorism related citations using March 2012 data for the period 2000-2012. [36] All courses were further listed by academic discipline and field (defined broadly as Social Sciences, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Area Studies, other Interdisciplinary Studies, Professional or Pre-professional fields such as Law

and Criminal Justice and other Pre-Professional fields such as communications, journalism, social work and health).

Dominant topics were identified using course titles and catalogue descriptions for a sub-sample of undergraduate courses primarily on terrorism (n=90 courses) and courses only secondarily on the subject (n=329 courses). Only universities and colleges institutions with 7 or more undergraduate terrorism courses (n=38 institutions) were used for these analyses. To extract dominant topics from undergraduate course listings, counts of key words associated with the study of terrorism (e.g. war, crime, tactics, counterterrorism, rights, religion, moral) were identified in course descriptions and recorded.

Additional data relating to required readings and scholarly content were obtained from a review of syllabi and textbook requirements from a smaller sample these courses.

Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics were employed to document the overall frequency and distribution of terrorism courses, primary and secondary. Text analysis, using the *Text Analysis* tool created by the Office for Mathematics, Science, and Technology Education (MSTE), a unit within the Department of Curriculum and Instruction in the College of Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, was employed to extract dominant topics from course descriptions for undergraduate courses.[37] To facilitate comparison of key words for primary and secondary courses, rates for key word counts are presented per 100 primary courses and per 100 secondary courses. The relationship between institutional characteristics and the number of terrorism courses was evaluated by using stepwise forward multiple regression techniques. An advantage of stepwise multiple regression is that it allows for simultaneous control of many variables and takes into account the overall patterning of a group of variables in predicting a single variable. A disadvantage of this, as with all statistical models, is that unknown variables that could have an important influence on the outcome may be omitted.

Results

Institutional characteristics for the 80 national universities and 26 liberal colleges in the study are shown in Table 1. Most (69%) of the institutions were privately funded. The Northeast had the largest concentration (40%) and the Mid-Atlantic had the smallest (8.5%). One fourth of the institutions (mostly liberal arts colleges) were of small size (enrolling 3,000 or fewer undergraduates), 48% were of medium size (enrolling 3,000-9,999 undergraduates) and the remaining institutions were either large (20%) enrolling 10,000-19,999 undergraduates or very large (30%), enrolling more than 20,000 undergraduates. Twenty-five institutions (29 national universities and 2 liberal arts colleges offered a security studies program or degree, 22 (15 national universities and 8 liberal arts colleges) offered a peace studies program or degree and 21 (24 national universities and one liberal arts college (USMA/West Point) hosted a Terrorism Research Center (TRC). Of these TRC, 7 were designated Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. [38] Twenty-two institutions (21 national universities terrorism and one liberal arts college (USMA/West Point) had at least one well-known terrorism scholar on the faculty and many had more than one. [39]

	National Universities (N=80)		Liberal Arts Colleges (N=26)		Total (N=106)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Type						
National Univ.	80	100	-	-	80	75
Liberal Arts	-	-	26	100	26	25
Funding						
Public	31	39	2	8	33	31.1
Private	49	61	24	92	73	68.9
Region						
Northeast	28	35	14	53	42	40
Mid Atlantic	6	8	3	12	9	8.5
Midwest	15	19	3	12	18	17
South	19	24	2	8	21	20
West	12	15	4	15	16	15
Size[a]						
Small	2	2	24	92	26	25
Medium	38	48	2	8	40	38
Large	16	20	-	-	16	15
Very large	24	30	-	-	24	23
Security degree[b]	23	29	2	8	25	24
Peace studies degree/program[c]	15	19	8	31	23	22
Terrorism Research Center[d]	20	25	1	4	21	20
Terrorism scholar[e]	21	26	1	4	22	21
Ranking, range	1-80		1-26			

Table 1 . Institutional characteristics of study sample

a. Size: small defined as <3,000 undergraduates; medium as 3,000-9,999 undergraduates; large as 10,000-19,999 undergraduates; very large as 20,000 or more undergraduates.

b. Homeland Security program or degree: includes degree offerings such as a minor, major, certificate or graduate degree security, biodefense, intelligence analysis, emergency preparedness. Based on catalogue information and listing provided by the Naval PostGraduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Available at http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions

c. Peace studies degree: presence of a peace studies or peace and conflict studies program or degree; based on catalogue descriptions and Pilgrim Pathways' "Listing of Colleges/Universities with Peace Studies Programs." Available at http://pilgrimpathways.wordpress.com/about/

d. Terrorism Research Center (TRC): presence of a TRC based on Freedman, B. "Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies," Perspectives on Terrorism 4 (5). Additions to the list include Northeastern U, which opened the George J Kostas Institute for Homeland Security in 2011, NYU which houses the Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response.

e. Terrorism Scholar: presence of at least one well-known or highly cited terrorism scholar on the faculty. Defined as a scholar with 75 or more citations for terrorism-related publications (journal articles and books). Based on Google Scholar search for 2000-2012, accessed March 2012.

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Undergraduate Terrorism Courses
Number of courses. The key word catalogue search on terrorism yielded a total 689 distinct undergraduate courses on terrorism for the institutions in the sample. Of these, 159 (23%) could be classified as primarily on terrorism since they contained the word terrorism in the course title. The remainder (530) were classified as secondarily or more peripherally on terrorism since they contained content on terrorism among other subjects but did not use the term terrorism in the title of the course description.
More than half of the institutions studied (66% of the 80 national universities and 54% of the 26 liberal arts colleges) offered at least one undergraduate course with terrorism in the title of the course and more than 9 out of 10 of each type of institution offered a course with terrorism content either in the course title or description. The total numbers of terrorism courses, however, showed considerable variation. Within institutions with any terrorism courses, the number of courses explicitly on terrorism ranged from 1-11 while the number with any terrorism content ranged from 1-35.

Institution	Number of Primary Terrorism Courses
National University	
Georgetown	11
Penn State	7
U North Carolina Chapel Hill	7
University of Notre Dame	7
Duke University	6
Ohio State University	6
U Southern California	5
American University	4
Cornell University	4
New York University	4
Northeastern University	4
Stanford	4
Tulane	4
U Georgia	4
U Maryland College Park	4
U Virginia	4
Washington U St. Louis	4
Columbia University	3
UCLA	3
Liberal Arts College	
Barnard	3
Vassar	3
USMA/West Point	2
Williams	2
Smith	2

Table 2 . Institutions with the most undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism
Notes: Based on study sample of 80 top-tier national universities and 26 top-ranked liberal arts colleges, academic year 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word "terrorism" in the title of the course. Includes national universities with 3 or more such courses at undergraduate level, 2 or more for small colleges. Courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.
Most courses on terrorism. The universities and liberal arts colleges with the most undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism (primary courses) are listed in Table 2. Georgetown topped the list with 11 courses in the national university sample (n=80), but 17 top national universities offered a core of at least four undergraduate courses explicitly on

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terrorism for the academic year 2010-2011 and the University of Maryland College Park offered an undergraduate minor in the field. In the liberal arts college sample (n=26), 5 institutions offered 2 or 3 courses explicitly on terrorism and the USMA/West Point offered a minor in Terrorism Studies.

Most courses overall. Institutions with the ten or more courses either explicitly on terrorism (primary courses) or with terrorism content (secondary courses) are listed in Table 3. Again, Georgetown with 45 courses overall dominated the list, but several institutions not listed as having a high number of primary courses showed visible commitment to teaching about terrorism in secondary courses.

Ratio of primary to secondary courses. On average, the ratio of secondary terrorism courses to primary ones at the undergraduate level was 3:1 for national universities and 6:1 for liberal arts colleges. These differences are not surprising given the historically broad orientation of liberal arts colleges and the more specialized orientations of national universities. Still, within the national university cohort, there were distinct differences. At the undergraduate level, the ratio of secondary courses to primary ones was greater than 5:1 at three of the nation's top universities, Harvard, Stanford and Yale. Moreover, two West coast universities (Washington University at Seattle and UC Berkeley) offered 9 or more courses with terrorism content, but none with terrorism in the title. Conversely, primary courses on terrorism outnumbered those only with terrorism content by 7:0 at the University of North Carolina while some institutions (e.g. University of Maryland College Park, American University) offered approximately equal numbers of courses that were explicitly on terrorism or only had content on the subject.

Institution	Number of Terrorism Courses (Primary & Secondary)
National University	
Georgetown	45
University of Notre Dame	42
Stanford	25
UCLA	16
Northeastern University	15
U Washington	15
Harvard University	13
Boston College	12
Cornell University	12
U Pennsylvania	12
U Southern California	12
Indiana U- Bloomington	11
Lehigh	11
Duke	10
New York University	10
Ohio State	10
U Michigan	10
UC Irvine	10
Liberal Arts College	
Wesleyan	14
Amherst	13
Williams	12
Colgate	11
Vassar	10

Table 3. Institutions with 10 or more undergraduate courses with any terrorism content
Notes: Based on study sample of 80 top-tier national universities and 26 top-ranked liberal arts colleges, academic year 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly

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on terrorism, i.e. with the word "terrorism" in the title of the course. Secondary terrorism courses defined as ones with the word "terrorism" only in the course description. This is a conservative listing since courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.

Institutional predictors: Many of the universities with the most terrorism courses were associated with terrorism research centers, securities studies programs, peace studies or the presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. To explore the influence of these characteristics on the number of terrorism courses while controlling for other institutional characteristics (e.g. type of institution, regional location, funding, ranking, size) we conducted an exploratory stepwise regression. The results, shown in Table 4, indicate that institutional characteristics explained a relatively small percent of the variability in terrorism courses (R2=38% for primary courses and 24% for secondary courses). For courses explicitly on terrorism (primary courses), size (large) and the presence of a well-known terrorism scholar were both positively and significantly associated with the number of courses ($p<0.02$). None of the other institutional characteristics were significant. For all courses (primary and secondary), the presence of a terrorism scholar and the presence of a peace studies program were both positively and significantly associated with the number of courses ($p<0.01$). None of the other institutional characteristics were significant, except regional location in the South ($p<0.03$) which was negatively associated with the number of all terrorism courses. This effect was not a function of fewer primary courses but rather of fewer secondary ones in the South.

Dependent Variable		Standardized coefficient	t	p
Primary Terrorism Courses	Terrorism scholar	1.0	4.4	0.0001*
	Size (large)	0.5	2.3	0.02*
	Peace studies	0.4	1.9	0.06
	Security studies	0.4	1.8	0.08
	Region (Mid-Atlantic)	0.5	1.8	0.08
		$R^2=0.38$	F (df 5,100) =12.1, p<0.0001	
All Terrorism Courses	Terrorism scholar	2.9	3.4	0.0001
	Peace studies	1.9	2.7	0.009
	Region (South)	-1.6	2.5	0.03
		$R^2=0.24$	F (df 3,102) =10.7, p<0.0001	

Table 4 . Stepwise regression of undergraduate terrorism courses by institutional characteristics
Notes: Number of institutions = 106. The dependent variables are the numbers of primary terrorism courses and of all terrorism courses (primary and secondary). The following 9 variables were permitted to enter the regression: institution type, funding source, ranking, regional location, size of undergraduate student body, presence of a terrorism research center, security or peace studies degree or program and presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. The table shows variables in the final model with p values <0.10.

Disciplinary distribution of courses: As shown in Figure 1, more than half (52%) of the courses explicitly or primarily on terrorism were in the field of Social Sciences (defined here to include political science, international relations, international studies, sociology, anthropology and psychology), but almost one fifth (17%) were in the Humanities (including history, philosophy, religion, literature, film and drama). About 13% could be classified as falling under Interdisciplinary Studies (including freshmen seminars and area studies e.g. Middle Eastern Studies, African Studies, Latin American Studies). Relatively few fell under the rubric of Law and Criminal Justice (6%), or Pre-professional studies such as journalism and communications, security studies (4%), and natural sciences (4%).

Figure 1 . Distribution of undergraduate terrorism primary courses by academic field
Notes: Primary terrorism course defined as one with the word "terrorism" in the title.
Broken down by discipline (Figure 2), the total number of courses with any terrorism content (in the text or title) was highest at the undergraduate level for political science (164), history (100), and international relations (92). Courses explicitly on terrorism were most frequent in political science (38), international relations (27) and sociology (18) followed by history (14). Only one institution in the national university sample (University of Maryland) offered a minor in Terrorism Studies and none offered a major. As shown in this figure, there were distinct disciplinary differences in the ratio of courses only peripherally on terrorism to those explicitly on the subject. For some disciplines (e.g. philosophy, anthropology, literature/drama, area studies, history) peripheral courses outnumbered explicit ones by as much as 6:1. However, for IR, political science and religion the ratio was closer to 3:1.

Figure 2 . Frequency of undergraduate terrorism courses (primary and secondary) by discipline
Notes
a.   Course primarily on terrorism defined as one with the word "terrorism" in the title; course secondarily on terrorism defined as one with the word "terrorism" only in the content of the course description.
b.   Bars show total number of courses by discipline and breakdown for primary and secondary terrorism courses.
c.   Basic science includes biology, microbiology, engineering, space sciences. International Relations includes courses in International Studies and in Global Studies.
d.   Data based on catalogue description for top-tier national universities (n=80) and liberal arts colleges (n=26).

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Dominant topics. Figure 3 shows the relative rates of references to specific topics per 100 course descriptions of courses primarily on terrorism and per 100 course descriptions of courses only secondarily on the subject.

Figure 3 . Dominant topics in undergraduate terrorism course descriptions
Notes: Bars show number of references to topics per 100 courses primarily on terrorism and per 100

courses secondarily on terrorism. Rates per 100 courses calculated from catalogue course descriptions of 90 courses primarily on terrorism and 329 courses secondarily on the subject at the 38 institutions in the sample with a minimum of 7 terrorism courses (primary or secondary).

These rates are based on adjusted totals of 90 courses primarily on terrorism and 329 secondary ones from the studied universities and colleges with at least seven undergraduate terrorism courses overall (n=38 institutions). While counts of key words from text descriptions in catalogues could be viewed as somewhat impressionistic, the results provide valuable insights into the ways terrorism courses are constructed and summarized for potential students.

The most common words for courses primarily on terrorism in order were *war*, *violence*, *counterterrorism*, *response* and *threat.* The most common words for courses only secondarily on terrorism were *war*, *policy*, *security*, *conflict* and *history.* Although the word "war" dominated both lists, it was more than two times as frequent in the descriptions for courses only secondarily on terrorism compared to those explicitly or primarily on the subject. "Peace", while it occurred more rarely, was also more common in the descriptions for secondary courses. Terrorism perpetrated by states ("state terrorism") was not a dominant topic in the courses explicitly on terrorism. The concept of state terror, however, did appear relatively often courses secondarily on terrorism (especially in history, in the context of terror perpetrated by Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and some Latin American regimes).

The two types of courses referred to the "war on terror" about equally often. They also placed terrorism in the context of "insurgency" about equally often. However, they differed in their relative emphases on many other topics. For example, there was much more emphasis in the primary courses on terrorism as a "threat" and the construct was more often framed in terms of "violence." The words "Islam" and "Islamic" and the events of "9-11" were more prominent. There was a greater emphasis on "terrorist organizations." There was also a greater emphasis on recent

events such as "9/11" as opposed to the past ("history"). In addition, there was a more frequent focus on terrorism as "crime" and on immediate prescriptive measures such as "counterterrorism" and "response."

By contrast, courses only secondarily on terrorism placed more emphasis on contexts of "conflict". They placed less emphasis on direct "response" and greater emphasis on more reflective measures such as "intelligence" and "policy." In addition, they framed the subject of terrorism in broader contexts, e.g. social and political "movements" rather than terrorist "organizations." They referred more often to "ethics" and "morality" and to issues of "human rights." In addition, they focused more often on other broad constructs and processes that might affect the emergence or manifestation of terrorism e.g. "ethnic" issues, "culture", "religion", "development", "democracy", "economics," and "globalization."

Required readings and scholarly focus. There was no evidence from the syllabi review of courses explicitly on terrorism that non-academic texts dominated the required course readings. Most of the courses had 1-3 textbook requirements. Of these, two out of three on average were from scholarly (academic) presses and only one out of three were from general publication presses. Almost all required 2-3 additional weekly readings in the form of scholarly articles from journals or chapters from books. Among these, works by ten of a "core" 42 researchers, identified by Reid and Chen [10] as dominating the field as of 2003, appeared at least once. However, with the exceptions of now classic papers and chapters by Bruce Hoffmann and by Martha Crenshaw, the most frequently required readings were produced by a newer group of scholars not on that list. [40] Almost all of the courses focused primarily on non-state terrorism. Only two provided full modules on state terrorism. There was no evidence, however, to support contentions made by advocates of Critical Terrorism Studies, that the concept of terrorism as a practice or phenomenon was not interrogated or challenged. Most (82%) contained a distinct module addressing the problem of defining terrorism. Fewer than half (40%) had a distinct module on bioterrorism and/or nuclear terrorism, but 70% had a module on suicide terrorism. About half (48%) emphasized case studies as a methodology in teaching.

Graduate Terrorism Courses

Number of Courses. Catalogue descriptions were more limited for graduate courses than for undergraduate courses. Within this constraint, data was available (if sometimes limited) for 76 of the 80 national universities. This set of data yielded 491 distinct graduate courses with terrorism content (in the title and/or text description of the course). Of these, 136 (28%) contained the word terrorism in the title and could be viewed as courses primarily on terrorism and the remaining 355 courses (72%) could be viewed as secondarily or more peripherally on the subject.

Compared to undergraduate programs, a lower proportion of the national universities studied offered at least one graduate course explicitly on terrorism (52% vs. 66%) and fewer (7 of 10 vs. 9 of 10) appeared to offer courses with any terrorism content. These differences may have been a function of the more limited number of institutions with available data, the more specialized missions of graduate programs [41] or simply an artifact of using catalogue descriptions. (At the graduate level, course descriptions are often more condensed; they may only refer generally to a seminar or independent study). As at the undergraduate level, the overall number of graduate courses varied widely, in this case from 1-18 courses.

Most primary terrorism courses. The graduate programs with the most courses primarily on terrorism are listed in Table 5. As at the undergraduate level, Georgetown dominated the list with 18 such courses, but 5 other graduate programs (including George Washington University, Johns Hopkins, University of Chicago, the University of Maryland College Park and Penn State) offered 6 or more courses and 13 institutions in all offered a core of 4 or more such courses. Most of these institutions (11 of 13) offered a security studies degree. Several hosted a terrorism related research center (TRC) and some (George Washington University, Northeastern, New York University, Penn State and U Maryland) offered both. These characteristics of the institutions help explain the higher number of primary courses. One or more terrorism courses may be required for a security degree or may fit into a terrorism research mission and the institution may decide to invest the time and resources to develop such courses. In the case of Georgetown, where 7 of the 18 primary courses (39%) were law courses, this institution's unique offerings in security law, international affairs and law and international human rights law may also have played a role in the number of primary graduate courses. [42]

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Most courses overall. The graduate programs with the most courses overall (primary and secondary), identified from catalogue descriptions, are listed in Table 6. Among national universities Georgetown dominated the list, but several other private institutions (Harvard, New York University, George Washington University and Boston University) also showed very high numbers of courses with any terrorism content at all. The exceptionally high number of courses found for Georgetown is likely to have been a function of two factors. First, Georgetown (like Harvard, NYU and several other of the private institutions) offered longer (less condensed) course descriptions in its graduate course catalogues. As a result, it was easier to detect a large number of secondary courses with terrorism content. (Some of the public institutions may include as much or almost as much terrorism content in secondary courses, but it may not be identifiable in catalogue descriptions). Second, Georgetown's unique law offerings through its law center and its graduate programs in foreign service, as well as security studies and international affairs, are likely to have played a role. Twenty-eight (32%) of its 87 secondary terrorism courses (courses with terrorism content) were law courses, twenty (23%) were in security studies, 15 (17%) in government and international affairs and 11 (13%) were in its graduate foreign service program. Law courses also made up significant numbers of graduate courses with any terrorism content for American University (12 courses), University of Pennsylvania (9 courses), UCLA (9 courses), and Harvard (8 courses).

Ratio. On average, the ratio of secondary graduate courses to primary ones was similar to that at the undergraduate level (3:1). Again, however, graduate programs differed in these ratios. At some institutions (e.g. Harvard, Yale and University of Pennsylvania), secondary courses were 10-14 times as frequent as primary ones at the graduate level. At others, (e.g. the University of Maryland at College Park, Johns Hopkins and the University of Chicago) the reverse was the case and graduate courses explicitly on terrorism were seven times as frequent as courses only secondarily on the subject. These differences are likely to be a function of the broader missions of the former institutions and the more specialized offerings in security and terrorism in the latter. However, they could also be a function of differences in how much information is provided in catalogue descriptions.

Institution	Number of Primary Terrorism Courses
Georgetown	18
George Washington U	10
Johns Hopkins	7
U Chicago	7
U Maryland College Park	7
Penn State	6
New York University	5
Baylor	4
Boston University	4
Duke University	4
Northeastern University	4
Northwestern	4
Tulane	4
American University	3
Columbia University	3
Case Western	3
Rutgers	3
Syracuse	3
U Pittsburgh	3
U Texas Austin	3
UCLA	3

Table 5 . Institutions with the most primary terrorism courses, graduate level
Notes: Based on study sample of graduate programs associated with 76 top-ranked national universities, 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word "terrorism" in the title of the course. Includes graduate programs with 3 or more such courses. Courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.

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Institution	Number of Terrorism Courses (Primary & Secondary)
Georgetown	105
Harvard U	29
NYU	24
George Washington U	23
Boston U	20
Northeastern	18
UCLA	18
American U	14
Northwestern	12
Penn State	12
Yale U	11
Case Western	10
Princeton U	10
Tulane U	10
U Michigan	10
U Pennsylvania	10

Table 6. Institutions with 10 or more graduate courses on terrorism overall
Based on study sample of graduate programs associated with 76 top-ranked national universities, 2010-2011. Primary terrorism courses defined as courses explicitly on terrorism, i.e. with the word "terrorism" in the title of the course. Secondary terrorism courses defined as ones with the word "terrorism" only in the course description. Includes graduate programs with 3 or more such courses. This is a conservative listing since courses with multiple sections and ones cross-listed across departments are only counted once.
Institutional Predictors. Region and Security Studies were the only variables which accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in terrorism courses at the graduate level when all institutions (n=76) were considered. Examination of the residuals revealed one significant outlier for the number of terrorism courses (the numbers of explicit and all courses were 3 SD above the mean for the group) and the analysis was recalculated excluding that institution. The results of the regression analyses, excluding the outlier, are shown in Table 7. These results indicate that that when the other predictor variables were held constant, three variables (location in the Mid-Atlantic, the presence of a Security Studies program, and the presence of a Terrorism Research Center and) explained 43% of the variability in the number of primary terrorism courses. The same three variables, with the addition of regional location in the Northeast, explained 27% of the variability in all terrorism courses (primary and secondary).

Dependent Variable		Standardized coefficient	t	p
Primary Terrorism Courses	Region (Mid-Atlantic)	1.7	4.5	0.0001
	Terrorism Research Center	0.7	3.0	0.004
	Security studies	0.7	3.1	0.002
	$R^2=0.43$	F (df 3,71) =18.1, p<0.0001		
All Terrorism Courses	Region (Mid-Atlantic)	2.8	2.1	0.04
	Region (Northeast)	1.7	2.4	0.02
	Terrorism Research Center	1.7	2.1	0.04
	Security studies	1.6	2.1	0.04
	$R^2=0.25$	F (df 4,70) =6.0, p<0.0004		

Table 7. Stepwise regression of graduate terrorism courses by institutional characteristics
No. of institutions = 75. The dependent variables are the numbers of primary terrorism courses and all terrorism courses (primary and secondary). The following 8 variables were permitted to enter the regression: funding source, ranking, regional location, size of undergraduate student body, presence of a terrorism research center, security or peace studies degree or program and presence of at least one well-known terrorism scholar. The table shows variables in the final model with p <0.10.

Distribution of Courses. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the field and disciplinary profiles of graduate terrorism courses differed in important ways from those at the undergraduate level. Much larger proportions of explicit (primary) courses were in the fields of Law and Criminal justice (43% vs. 6 %) while lower proportions were in the Social Sciences (27% vs. 52%) and humanities (6% vs. 17%). Surprisingly, considering the security image of Terrorism Studies, only 6% of graduate courses explicitly on terrorism could be classified as belonging in the field of Security or military studies. There were 3 times as many courses at the graduate level in other Professional fields e.g. health sciences, communications, urban planning, engineering (15% vs. 4%). Overall, these differences are in line with the more career-oriented focus of graduate degrees compared to undergraduate ones.

Figure 4 . Distribution of graduate courses by academic field (primary courses only)

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Note: Based on study sample of 76 national universities with graduate studies programs, 2010-2011.

Broken down by discipline (Figure 5), the highest numbers of courses explicitly on terrorism were in law

and criminal justice (56) followed by international relations/studies (22), health sciences (12) and political science (11). Among graduate courses with *any terrorism content* in the text or title the highest numbers were in law and criminal justice (189), international relations or international studies (69), security (46) and the health sciences including public health (34). The high number of graduate terrorism courses in law and criminal justice compared to the social sciences in general may reflect a consensus at this level that terrorism is best addressed in terms of criminal and legal constructs (as opposed, for example, to political ones) or it may simply be a function of allocating more resources to develop courses in marketable career fields and fewer to less marketable research oriented ones. As at the undergraduate level, there were distinct disciplinary

differences in the ratio of secondary courses to primary ones. For security studies the ratio was almost 5:1. However, for law and the health sciences it was closer to 3:1 while for international relations it was closer to 2:1.

Figure 5 . Frequency of graduate terrorism courses by academic discipline
Notes: Based on study sample of 76 institutions with graduate programs; courses primarily on terrorism defined as courses with "terrorism" in title. Courses secondarily on terrorism defined as ones only with "terrorism in text of course description. Basic science includes biology, microbiology, engineering, space sciences. Health Sciences includes public health, nursing, and medicine.

Discussion

This study focuses on a relatively understudied area, namely the teaching component of Terrorism Studies. The study has several limitations. First, it is limited to one academic year (2010-2011). As such it only provides a snapshot at one point in time. Since university curricula change from year to year, inclusion of other years could have produced different results. There is good evidence that the number of university courses on terrorism exploded in the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Gordon, for example reports that UCLA had 50 terrorism-related courses the following academic year. [43] The results presented here suggest that this trend may have moderated.

Second, the study is limited to a small sample of colleges and universities in the U.S. that are ranked at the top of the *U.S. News and World Reports* ranking system. Although these

institutions have long been thought to set trends, the strength of their influence on other institutions in the U.S. and elsewhere is a matter of increasing debate. [44] Extension of the study to a wider range of colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad could have generated different results in terms of numbers and topics. A recent Homeland Security report lists as many as 56 academic institutions are currently addressing homeland security, defense and terrorism in their curricula. [45] Of these only four (Johns Hopkins, Penn State, University of Connecticut and University of Washington) are included in this study. Other reports estimate that as many as 271 higher education institutions offered Homeland Security degrees or certificates with content on terrorism in 2009. It is unclear whether the mix of courses in such programs would or would not mirror those in the study reported here. Some of these programs may offer certificate or graduate degrees that are more skills-oriented, targeted to combating terrorism. [46] The frequency and mix of terrorism courses in European institutions may also differ significantly from the U.S. profile. [47]

Third, many terrorism courses are cross-listed across two or more departments. They may be listed under political science, but also under international relations, sociology or even religion. Course catalogues also frequently describe multiple sections of a course more than once. Since this study counted cross-listed courses and multiple sections only once, it has the potential to *underestimate* the overall frequency of courses on terrorism as well as the number in some disciplines.

Fourth, the results could have been distorted by the study's use of text descriptions of courses on terrorism or with terrorism content in course catalogues. In a few cases, course descriptions were not available. Only titles of courses were provided. Additionally, some universities (e.g. Harvard) offered long and rich (3-4 paragraph) descriptions of each course. Others, especially very large universities, e.g. (Penn State, U California Berkeley) often gave only condensed (1-2 line) descriptions. These differences could have led to underestimation of the number of courses with terrorism content for some universities and may also have led to underestimation of key terms related to dominant topics.

Fifth, following recommendations made by Martha Crenshaw [48] and adopted by the Task Force on Political Violence and Terrorism of the American Political Science Association, terrorism content is now often subsumed in political science and international relations curricula under the rubric "political violence" and may not be visible in catalogue course descriptions in political science courses.

Despite these limitations, the study has several important strengths including its systematic approach, its inclusion of different types of higher education institutions (e.g. liberal arts colleges as well as national universities) and its effort to separate out courses uniquely on terrorism from those only secondarily on the subject at undergraduate and graduate levels.

Overall, the results suggest that top ranked academic institutions in the U.S. are visibly but still somewhat cautiously committed to offering content on terrorism in their curricula. While two-thirds of the national universities offered at least one distinct undergraduate course explicitly on terrorism and 52% offered at least one distinct graduate course, most offered only one or two courses specifically on terrorism in 2010-2011. For the most part, terrorism was addressed secondarily as one topic among other topics in courses on other subjects. This pattern was especially apparent in liberal arts colleges where the ratio of primary to secondary terrorism courses was 6:1 and at national universities with some of the highest *US News and World Reports* rankings (e.g. Harvard, Yale and Stanford) where the ratios of primary to secondary courses was at least 5:1.

Placing terrorism content in other courses may signal recognition that terrorism is still a contested concept [49] or reflect a tacit policy of "reticence" towards using the word terrorism in course titles because of its negative connotations and more specifically because it "implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions." [50] On the other hand, departments and programs may place terrorism within courses on other subjects because they believe that the topic is best studied in the context of other constructs and problems (e.g. political violence) or because of the missions of individual institutions. (In the U.S., liberal arts colleges are generally committed to a broad education, but some of America's national universities, including Harvard, Yale and Stanford, are multitier structures that have evolved to contain colleges with a broad mission *and* universities with

more a more specialized focus.[51]).

About 20% (17/80) of the top-tier national universities studied here have clearly made a niche for undergraduate courses on terrorism. These institutions offer 4 or more courses explicitly on the subject. A slightly smaller proportion (17%) (13/76) of the graduate programs offered at least 4 distinct courses explicitly on terrorism.

The R squares for the exploratory stepwise regressions of institutional characteristics on the number of terrorism courses were low, indicating that the studied characteristics explained only a small percentage of the variability (24-43%) in the number of terrorism courses. This result is likely to be a function of the relatively small but diverse set of institutions used. It should not be taken to mean that the characteristics identified as relevant are meaningless. As James Colton and Keith Bower observe, a small R square indicates that not everything was explained, but a few important variables were identified.[52]

The presence of a well-known terrorism scholar showed the strongest associations and was significantly related to the number of explicit courses and to the number of courses with any terrorism content at the undergraduate level. This finding suggests that terrorism knowledge dissemination tends to be furthered when the knowledge producers are on campus. Institutional size was also identified as having an influence (large institutions were associated with more explicit terrorism courses). This result is likely to be a function of more resources in large institutions. Three other variables (the presence of a security studies or peace studies program and regional location in the Mid-Atlantic, near the nation's capitol) showed similar but non-significant effects for the number of explicit courses. The presence of a peace or peace and conflict studies program clearly enhanced the number of courses with any terrorism content (primary and secondary courses) for undergraduates. This finding was an interesting one given the growing and now sometimes contested coordination of activities between the peace and conflict and security sectors. [53]

At the graduate level, regional location in the Mid-Atlantic had the strongest effects on the number of explicit courses and all courses, but the presence of a security studies program and the presence of a Terrorism Research Center also showed significant independent effects

enhancing the number of graduate terrorism courses overall. The high concentration of courses in the Mid-Atlantic is understandable since this region can more easily draw on security and policy experts in the nation's capitol than institutions at a greater distance. There may also be greater demand in the mid-Atlantic since students (and faculty) see opportunities to influence terrorism policy when they are near the capitol. On the other hand, this heavy concentration in one region also speaks to the need for academic institutions at a greater distance from the capitol to develop more courses on terrorism and with terrorism content.

Within the universities and colleges studied, there was wide variation across disciplines in the extent to which terrorism was treated as a primary or secondary course topic. In disciplines such as political science, international relations, communications and religion, primary courses (those with terrorism in the title) constituted 25-30% of all courses with any terrorism content. In history, however, courses primary courses constituted only about 14% of all courses with terrorism content. This distribution in history departments is unfortunate given growing criticism that Terrorism Studies have become too focused on contemporary terrorism and ignore valuable lessons of the past. [54]

On the other hand, the overall multi-disciplinarity of terrorism courses, explicit and peripheral, is encouraging. Terrorism research has previously been criticized for being too narrowly concentrated in a few disciplines, namely political science, international relations and security studies. The multi-disciplinary of terrorism research, however, may be one of its strengths. The results presented here on the teaching component of undergraduate Terrorism Studies bodes well for generating new cohorts of graduate students who may study the topic from a wide diversity of perspectives including anthropology, sociology, economics, philosophy, religion, peace studies, area studies, basic sciences and communications.

The perspective that the study of terrorism focuses too narrowly on terrorism "from below" (ignoring state terrorism) [10], "exceptionalizes 9/11" and so-called "Islamic" or "Islamist" terrorism and is overly prescriptive [55] was largely supported in the review of dominant

topics in the texts of catalogue descriptions of courses explicitly (primarily) on terrorism. However, the results suggested that courses secondarily or more peripherally on the subject were more likely to frame terrorism in broader contexts incorporating "religion" in general (rather than Islam in particular) and other broad constructs such as "democracy", "development" and "globalization."

The syllabi review of undergraduate courses explicitly on terrorism indicated a strong emphasis on scholarly publications and wide readings well beyond the "core" once thought to dominate the field. There was no evidence from this review that courses explicitly on terrorism focused only or even predominantly on strategic threats or Osama bin Laden. Further, the presumption put forth recently by Dixit and Stump, that terrorism courses in the U.S. do not, as a rule, interrogate terrorism (i.e. question the assumptions behind the concept) [56] was not supported in this sample of syllabi from top-tier universities and colleges. In fact, the syllabi review indicated that 88% of the courses, even ones requiring the textbooks cited by Dixit and Strump, contained specific modules on the challenge of defining terrorism.

Going forward, what do the results mean for the academic development of Terrorism Studies? The evolution of "studies" programs into disciplines is a complex process in part because the concept of academic discipline is itself "neither simple nor undisputed." [57] The term *discipline* as Krishnan points out, comes from the Latin word *discipulus*, which means pupil, and *disciplina*, which means teaching (noun). Krishnan observes that as a verb it means "training someone to follow a rigorous set of instructions, but also punishing and enforcing obedience." As such, it has a moral dimension that "defines how people should behave or think." At an academic level, disciplines are most often visibly associated with subjects taught at universities but usually have to meet five other criteria including the presence of 1) an object of research 2) a body of accumulated specialist knowledge 3) theories and concepts related to that knowledge 4) specific terminology 5) specific agreed on research methods. Not all disciplines meet all of the above criteria. English literature, for example, as Krishnan observes, "lacks a unifying theoretical paradigm or method and a definable stable object of research but still passes as an

academic discipline." Criminology too, although viewed as a discipline, lacks one "overarching theory that explains all the complexities of crime" and draws on a multiplicity of perspectives. [58] However, as Krishnan further points out, the more "boxes a discipline can tick, the more likely it becomes that a certain field of academic enquiry becomes a recognized discipline capable of reproducing itself and building upon a growing body of its own scholarship." In general, when a discipline is called "studies", it usually means that it "falls short of some of the above mentioned criteria." Such *studies* disciplines can go on to discipline themselves or remain "undisciplined" as some *studies* programs (e.g. Women's Studies) consciously chose to do in the 1970s.[59] Some studies programs may come to be perceived as disciplines as has happened with Peace & Conflict Studies.

Whether Terrorism Studies will or should go on to become a distinct discipline is still unclear. This study demonstrates that the field meets the minimum criterion of a taught subject. While debate continues about the ability of the subject to meet the other five criteria, the fact that content on terrorism is taught across so many disciplines suggests that it is still best constituted as an interdisciplinary field. Such fields, as Julie Thompson Klein points out, are well suited to the task of trying to "answer complex questions" and trying "to solve problems that are beyond the scope of any one discipline." [60] Although progression from multi-disciplinarity to inter-disciplinarity takes time and, in Klein's words, requires moving through a series of stages (including "playing the old songs," playing "the glass bead game" of building common jargon and finally coming to synthesis) an interdisciplinary paradigm may be particularly well suited to Terrorism Studies because of its potential to bridge the current divide between 'mainstream' and 'Critical Terrorism Studies.'

Conclusion

The future of Terrorism Studies depends on generating new cohorts of scholars and the production of this cohort depends at least in part on the availability of teaching faculty and courses on terrorism. This study investigated the still relatively unstudied area of the curricular component of Terrorism Studies. Future research on the subject could

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be enhanced by extending investigations such as the current one to a larger range of colleges and universities in the U.S., by conducting cross-national studies of terrorism courses and programs, by looking at differences in traditional and newer online courses, and by examining changes in the frequency and dominant topics of terrorism courses over time. Studies over time, in particular, could help us better gauge the evolving state and maturity of the Terrorism Studies field. To further measure growth in institutional commitment and the unique relationship between teaching (knowledge dissemination) and research (knowledge production), data should be collected on the number of faculty, researchers and graduate students that different institutions send each year to national and international conferences (e.g. ISA) to present scholarly papers on the subject of terrorism. Since no two institutions or degree programs (nor the faculty within them) are alike, quantitative analyses such as the ones presented here should also be paired with thorough qualitative analyses to enrich our understanding of the field of Terrorism Studies and how it has evolved (and continues to evolve). In addition, since research can benefit from a better understanding of the challenges of teaching a subject, qualitative work on the experiences faced by faculty trying to clarify content on the subject to students is recommended.

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Notes

[1] Lisa Stampnitzy, "Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/Intellectual Production," *Qualitative Sociology* 34, no.1 (2010): 1-19.

[2] Alex P. Schmid, "The Definition of Terrorism", in Schmid, Alex P (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (NY: Routledge, 2011), p. 39-99.

[3] Andrew Silke, Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures (NY: Routledge, 2004).

[4] David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, "The Commentariat and Discourse Failure: Language and Atrocity in Cool Britannia," *International Affairs* 82 (2006): 1117-112

[5] See Richard Jackson, "The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies," Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2008. Full paper available at: http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/_2/5/2/9/0/pages252900/p252900-1.php

[6] See L. J. Daniels, and G.L. Epstein, "Department of Homeland Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS Report XXXVI, Research and Development FY 2012." Available at: http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/rdreport2012; DHS funding, although high in 2003, was cut dramatically in 2007. The budget was increased in 2009 and 2010, then decreased by 10% in 2011 with university programs expected to experience a 19% drop from $49 million in FY 2010 to $40 million in FY2011 eliminating one or more university COEs and cutting $600,000 from scholarship and fellowship funding.

[7] Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*. With a Bibliography by the Author and a World Directory of 'Terrorist' Organizations by A.J. Jongman (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984.revised in 1988 and reprinted in 2005). See also Alex P. Schmid (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (NY: Routledge, 2011).

[8] Martha Crenshaw, "Current Research on Terrorism: the Academic Perspective." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 15 (1992): 1-11.

[9] Edna Reid, "Evolution of a Body of Knowledge: An Analysis of Terrorism Research," *Information Processing and Management* 33, no.1 (1997): 91-106.

[10] Edna Reid and Hsinchun Chen ,"Mapping the Contemporary Terrorism Research Domain," *International Journal Human-Computer Studies* 65 (2007): 42-56.

[11] Andrew Silke. "The Devil You Know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13 (2001): 1-14.

[12] Edna Reid and H. Chen, "Domain mapping of contemporary terrorism research," in H. Chen, E Reid, J. Sinai, A. Silke and B. Ganor (eds.), *Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security* (New York: Springer, 2008), p. 3-26.

[13] Magnus Ranstorp. Mapping Terrorist Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions (London: Rutledge, 2006).

[14] Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (NY: Routledge, 2009).

[15] An exception is the work of Avishag Gordon. See, for example, A. Gordon, "Terrorism as an Academic Subject after 9/11: Searching the Internet Reveals a Stockholm Syndrome Trend." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28 (2005): 45-59.

[16] Huberman, Michael, "The Mind is its Own Place: The Influence of Sustained Interactivity with Practitioners on Educational Researchers," *Harvard Educational Review* 69, no. 3 (1999): 289-319.

[17] As Schmid and Jongman pointed out in a 1988 review, as many as 109 definitions had been floated by the mid-1980s. See Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).

[18] More recently Joseph J. Easson and Alex P. Schmid have calculated that academic, governmental and intergovernmental agencies are using 250 or more definitions of terrorism. See "Appendix 2.1. 250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions of Terrorism," in Schmid, Alex P. (ed.) "The Definition of Terrorism", *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (NY: Routledge, 2011), 39-99.

[19] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve Globalization and International Terrorism." *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002/2003): 30-58.

[20] See Avishag Gordon, "The Effects of Database and Website Inconstancy on the Terrorism Field's Delineation," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 2 (2004): 79-88.

[21] According to Silke, as many as 2,281 nonfiction books with "terrorism" in the title were published from September 2001 to September 2008. In comparison, prior to September 2001, only 1,310 such books had been published. See Andrew Silke, "Contemporary Terrorism Studies: Issues in Research," in R. Jackson, M.B. Smith and J. Gunnings (eds.) *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Abingdon: Routledge) 2009, 234.

[22] "9/11 generates growth of homeland security college programs," *Homeland Security News Wire*, 8 Sep 2011, available at http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/911-generates-growth-homeland-security-college-programs

[23] Today, according to data from the Naval Post Graduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security there are as many as 342 homeland security degree or certificate programs at 260 US Colleges and Universities. See http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions . Of these, 84 are bachelors programs, 89 are masters programs, 117 are certificate programs and 5 are doctoral programs in homeland security or a related field e.g. biodefense strategic security or emergency risk management. See "Colleges and Universities Offering Homeland Security Programs," Available at http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions

[24] Benjamin Freedman, "Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 5 (2010). Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/123

[25] DHS funding for university programs is proposed to be budgeted in FY 2012 at $36.6 million, $29 million or 44% less than its FY 2010 budget. See L. J. Daniels and G.L. Epstein, Department of Homeland Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, *AAAS Report XXXVI, Research and Development FY 2012.* Available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/rdreport2012o

[26] See "Homeland Security Centers of Excellence" for a current listing of the 12 designated Centers of Excellence, Available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0498.shtm

[27] See "Higher Education in a post 9/11 World," Q & A with Jason Lane (Department of Educational Administration & Policy Studies, University of Albany), Sep 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.albany.edu/news/16124.php

[28] Andrew Silke, "The Impact of 9/11 on Research on Terrorism," In Magnus Ranstorp (ed.) *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (NY: Routledge, 2007), 91.

[29] Richard Jackson, "The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6 (2007): 225–227.

[30] In 1997, Edna Reid, using online bibliometrics and citation analysis, put forward a theory, that terrorism research was dominated by "invisible colleges of pro-western terrorism researchers" generating a one-sided perspective of terrorism from below (See footnote 9). In 2007, Reid and Chen, using ISI Web of Science citation data, published an updated list of 42 "core terrorism researchers" that they determined to be influential knowledge producers in the field as of 2003 (See footnote 10). More recently, the authors have republished this list of "core" researchers, as of 2003, in book form. See Chin, Hsinchun, Reid, Edna, Sinai, Joshua, Silke, Andrew and Ganor, Boaz, *Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security* (Springer, 2008).

[31] *U.S. News and World Reports* provides annual rankings of more than 1,600 accredited U.S. institutes of higher learning. These rankings include 281 national universities, 250 liberal arts colleges, 996 regional colleges and universities and 81 specialty schools. Their rankings are based on a weighted formula that uses seven broad indicators: peer assessment, graduation and retention rates, faculty resources, student selectivity (e.g. admission test scores), financial resources and alumni giving.

[32] See Philip G. Altbach, "The University as Center and Periphery", in: *Teachers College Record* 82 (Summer, 1981): 601-622. Altbach's conception of center-periphery influence was developed in the context of international education but has often been used "to explain" domestic trends.

[33] See Burton Clark, "Faculty: Differentiation and Dispersion," In Arthur Levine (ed.), *Higher Learning in America 1980:2000* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 175.

[34] See "Colleges and Universities Offering Homeland Defense and Security" prepared by Naval Post Graduate School and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Available at: http://www.chds.us/?partners/institutions

[35] See "Listing of Colleges/Universities with Peace Studies Programs" prepared by Pilgrim Pathways. Available at: http://pilgrimpathways.wordpress.com/2011/05/03/colleges-and-universities-with-peace-studies-programs/

[36] *Google Scholar* citations have been found to be significantly correlated with ISI citations but tend to be more comprehensive for the social sciences. See Kayvan Kousha and Mike Thewall, "Google Scholar citations and Google Web/URL citations: A multi-discipline exploratory analysis," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 58, no. 7 (2007): 1055-1065.

[37] The *Text Analysis* tool is available online at University of Illinois at Urbana website at http://mste.illinois.edu/pavel/java/text

[38] The 7 institutions designated as Centers of Excellence in the sample included George Washington U, Johns Hopkins, Northeastern, Texas A&M, U Maryland College Park, U North Carolina and UC Berkeley. See Department of Homeland Security (DHS) listing of Designated Centers of Excellence. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0498.shtm

[39] Among the terrorism scholars identified using the Google Scholar search of authors with 75+ citations for articles, chapters or books on terrorism and matched with institutions were: R.K. Betts and B. Nacos (Columbia); B. Hoffman, D. Byman, P. Pillar, F. Moghaddam (Georgetown); L. Richardson, J. Stern, P. Norris, G. Allison, B. Posen (Harvard); J. Mueller (Ohio State); J. Horgan, M. Bloom, J.A. Piazza (Penn State); A. Krueger (Princeton); L.R. Beres (Purdue); M. Crenshaw, S. Flynn (Stanford); Q. Li (Texas A&M); B. de Mesquita, R. Pape (U Chicago); C. Flint (U Illinois Urbana); T.R. Gurr (University of Maryland); S. Atran (U North Carolina Chapel Hill); G.A. Lopez (U Notre Dame); A. Kydd (U Pennsylvania); T. Sandler (U Southern California); A. Pedazhur, R. Adams (U Texas Austin); V. Volkan (U Virginia); M. Stohl (UC Santa Barbara); D. Rapoport (UCLA); R.D. Howard, R. Sawyer, J.F. Forest, J.M. Brachman,.

[40] These frequently required readings included journal articles and chapters by Mark Jurgensmeyer, Marc Sageman, Robert Pape, Russell Howard, Reid Sawyer and Natasha Bazjema, Alan Krueger and Ahmed Rashid among others.

[41] See Burton Clark. The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective (Berkeley University of California Press, 1986), 51.

[42] Georgetown's graduate law program offers specific degrees including JD/LLM and LLM in National Security Law, International Affairs and Law and International Human Rights Law.

[43] A. Gordon (see note 15 above).

[44] In recent years, relevance of the center-periphery concept has undergone re-examination in the context of the changing nature of academic work, faculty flows and commodification of knowledge. See S. Gopinathan and Philip Altbach, "Rethinking Centre-Periphery," *Asia Pacific Journal of Education* 24, no. 2 (2005): 117-123. Internationally, the concept is also increasingly being challenged for overestimating "central hegemony" and underestimating the agency of local actors. See Thi Kim Quy Nguyen , "Beyond Center Periphery Higher Education Development in South East Asia," *Journal of the Pacific Circle Consortium for Education* 22, no. 2 (2010): 21-36.

[45] The Emergency Management Network, "U.S. Homeland Security/Defense & Terrorism Higher Education Programs," Available at: http://www.emergencymgt.net/homelandsecurityprograms.html

[46] Cheryl Polson, John Persyn, and Shawn Capp. "Partnership in Progress: A Model for Development of a Homeland Security Graduate Degree Program," *Homeland Security Affairs: The Journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security* 4, no. 2 (2010). Available at: http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=6.2.3 - fn4

[47] See David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, "Terrorology and Methodology: A Reply to Dixit and Strump," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (2011): 512-522.

[48] See Martha Crenshaw, "Current Research on Terrorism: the Academic Perspective," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 15, no. 1 (1992): 1-11. See more information on the Task Force in Political Violence and Terrorism of the American Political Science Association at http://www.apsanet.org/content_15710.cfm

[49] Alex P. Schmid. Letter from the Editor, *Perspectives on Terrorism* 3, no. 2 (2009). Available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/64/html

[50] See R. Jackson who describes "Critical Terrorism Studies" as characterized, ontologically by a "general skepticism towards, a resultant reticence to employ, the 'terrorism' label' because in practice "this label has always been a pejorative rather than analytical term and thus to use the term is to apply a label that implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions." Richard Jackson, "The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies," Paper prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, 2007. Available at: http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1945/APSA-2007-Paper-final2.pdf?sequence=1

[51] See Burton Clark above, 51.

[52] James A. Colton and Keith M. Bower, "Some Misconceptions about R2", *International Society of Six Sigma Professionals, EXTRAOrdinary Sense* 3, no. 2 (2002): 20-22.

[53] Ivan Sascha Sheehan, "Conflict Transformation as Counterinsurgency: Implications for the Management of Terrorism: Is the Concept of Conflict Transformation Being Misappropriated?" Working Paper, presented at International Studies Association 53rd Annual Convention, San Diego California, April 2, 2012.

[54] See A. Silke (see note 21 above). See also Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies," *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 228-236

[55] See Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), 185.

[56] Priya Dixit and Jacob Stump, "A Response to Jones and Smith: It's Not as Bad as it Seems; Or, Five Ways to Move Critical Terrorism Studies Forward," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34 (2011): 501-511

[57] Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, *Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity* (University of Virginia Press, 1993), 206.

[58] See Suzette Cote, *Criminological Theories: Bridging the Past to the Future* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 2002).

[59] Armin Krishnan, "What are Academic Disciplines? Some Observations on the Disciplinarity vs. Interdisciplinarity Debate," NCRM Working Paper, Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) National Centre for Research Methods, March 2009. Available at: http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/783/1/what_are_academic_disciplines.pdf

[60] Julie Thompson Klein, *Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice* (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1990), 11.

Terrorism Bookshelf: Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Selected and reviewed by Joshua Sinai

Source:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/sinai-terrorism-bookshelf/html

PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

a journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative

Terrorist rebellions, in all their configurations, constitute first order national security threats facing the international community. This was especially the case following September 2001, when al Qaida demonstrated that it had world class ambitions to inflict catastrophic damages on its adversaries. Although substantially degraded militarily and geographically dispersed since then, al-Qaida, its affiliates and allies around the world continue to wage their insurgencies, whether localized or transnational. Of great concern is that not only have they succeeded in embedding themselves with terrorist networks that are spearheading internal conflicts in weak and failed states, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but as an ideological movement they have been able to radicalize new generations of adherents around the world using cyberspace, including social media.

In another development, terrorist targeting in other conflicts, such as the Palestinian-Israeli arena, is primarily localized against Israel, although as demonstrated by Hizballah's rocket guerrilla warfare against Israel in their summer 2006 war and Hamas's firing of rockets against Israel's southern towns since then, terrorist warfare continues to evolve, for instance, from

suicide bombings to firing rockets over great distances. In other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorists are resorting to placing IEDs against their adversaries.

Even counterterrorism campaigns now span the spectrum of latest trends in warfare technology, from deploying specially equipped special operations forces to launching aerial drones that can remotely target terrorist operatives in far-away locations.

Moreover, the Internet has provided terrorist groups and their supporters a new virtual space to conduct activities that were previously restricted to "physical" space, such as radicalization, recruitment, fundraising, and even command and control of operations, thereby enabling them to bypass physical borders where national governments have vastly upgraded their defenses. As a result, the worldwide reach of groups such as al Qaida and its affiliates has led to what are termed "self-starter" home-grown cells in Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere, although foreign terrorist groups still retain some influence over their operations.

To gain an analytical understanding of the origins, magnitude, and evolution of the terrorist threats around the world and how to counteract them, the academic and public policy communities have produced a plethora of books on terrorism in general, the groups that engage in terrorist warfare, the extremist religious movements that drive individuals to join terrorist groups and employ terrorist tactics on their behalf, the conflict zones where such warfare is being waged, and the types of counteractions that governments are employing in response.

The books listed in this review essay are organized into seventeen sections, which are not intended to be mutually exclusive:

(i) encyclopedias and reference resources,
(ii) textbooks and general histories,
(iii) using the social, behavioral, and economic sciences to study terrorism,
(iv) journalistic case studies,
(v) case studies of terrorist groups,
(vi) root causes of terrorism,
(vii) radicalization and recruitment into terrorism,
(viii) funding terrorism,
(ix) suicide terrorism,
(x) international law and terrorism,
(xi) terrorism on the internet,
(xii) terrorism and WMD,
(xiii) counterterrorism,
(xiv) intelligence in counterterrorism,
and, under the general category of resolving terrorist rebellions,
(xv) de-radicalization and disengagement from terrorism,
(xvi) peace negotiations with terrorists, and
(xvii) how terrorist conflicts end.

Within each section, the nominated books are listed in order of their publication date. Although the most recently published books obviously merit the most attention, the earlier published books still retain sufficient importance for inclusion in the listing. Every effort was made to list the most updated and revised editions of earlier published books. Also, please note that the prices listed are the publishers' official prices, with many of the books available for purchase at discounted rates at bookseller sites such as Amazon.com.

In the absence of consensus on the Romanization of Arabic names, the spelling of group names such as al Qaida have been left as published in their original title (e.g., "al Qaeda"), although the reviews spell it as "al Qaida."

This listing of top 150 books is intended to provide an overview of many of the discipline's pre-eminent books, but space considerations limit coverage of additional topics and the dozens of worthy books that cover all these topics. Readers are encouraged to nominate additional topics and books for inclusion in future lists.

(i) Encyclopedias and Reference Resources
Encyclopedias are highly useful in covering a wide range of knowledge about terrorism and counterterrorism issues in alphabetical order at a basic level, while reference handbooks

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generally cover them thematically and in greater depth. The following volumes provide excellent information and analysis about virtually all aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism:

James Ciment, editor, <u>World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era</u> [Three Volumes] [Second Edition] (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2011), 1016 pages, $349.00. [Hardcover]
This illustrated, three volume set is a substantially revised, updated, and reorganized successor to the 2003 edition of <u>Encyclopedia of World Terrorism</u>. It includes more than 200 in-depth articles providing background information and analysis on the spectrum of categories and types of terrorist groups ranging from domestic to international, religious and nationalist, state and non-state supported, left-wing and right-wing, as well as entries on worldwide terrorist incidents. Other sections include entries on terrorists' agendas, modus operandi, weaponry, targeting and governmental counterterrorism programs, including the role of intelligence in counterterrorism (written by this reviewer), and issues involving security and civil liberties. The appendix includes hundreds of photographs, maps, and diagrams.

Edward E. Mickolus and Susan I. Simmons, <u>The Terrorist List</u> [Five Volumes: Volume 1: Asia, Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa; Volume 2: Western Europe; Volume 3: Eastern Europe; Volume 4: North America; and Volume 5: South America] (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 1333 pages, $464.95. [Hardcover]
This five-volume set is an authoritatively-produced encyclopedic compilation of biographical information about individuals who were involved in terrorist activities, whether domestic or international, dating back 35 years. The terrorist biographies are arranged by their continent of origin, and provide detailed information regarding the incidents they were involved in, including their outcomes. As explained by the authors, "The list is designed to serve as a directory of leaders, perpetrators, financiers, defendants, detainees, persons of interest, conspirators, and aliases in the regions" in which they are listed. Each volume includes a separate index of the terrorists listed in that particular geographical volume.

Alex P. Schmid, editor, <u>The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research</u> (New York: Routledge, 2011), 718 pages, $210.00. [Hardcover]
This handbook represents the most up-to-date analytic findings and reference resources on terrorism and counterterrorism studies, compiled by Alex Schmid, one of the world's leading academic experts. These findings are arranged in an easy to follow chapter framework, beginning with Dr. Schmid's comprehensive overview in which he champions greater use of evidence-based empirical research, such as compiling biographies of terrorist operatives in order to generate insight into what types of individuals become terrorists. This is essential because of the nature of terrorism itself, which Dr. Schmid describes as an underground "war in the shadows," that makes it difficult to ferret out all the information needed to thwart terrorist endeavors unless an understanding of the characteristics of the operatives who conduct such warfare is known. It is a big book with a price tag to match, but the depth of its detail merits its cost.

Gus Martin, editor, <u>The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism</u> [Second Edition] (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Reference, 2011), 720 pages, $135.00. [Hardcover]
A substantially updated and expanded edition of the original encyclopedia, which was published in 2005. The entries by the contributors to this expertly written volume's new material and expanded coverage explore in a comprehensive fashion terrorist groups and individuals involved in terrorism, the culture and ideology of terrorism, significant terrorism events, types and methods of terrorism, components of counterterrorism, and the impact of terrorism on society, such as civil liberties.

Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, editors, <u>The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency</u> (New York: Routledge, 2012), 400 pages, $200.00. [Hardcover]
This masterful handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an-up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and government counter-insurgency campaigns around the world. The volume is divided into three parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues, Part II: Insurgent Movements, and Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases. With each of the handbook's

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chapters providing extensive reference resources, it is also organized to serve as a guide for further study and research. This volume is included in the listing for this review essay because of the substantial overlap between many of these insurgent movements and terrorist organizations (e.g., Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban are considered as both insurgent and terrorist organizations) and the governments' counterinsurgent campaigns are similar in many ways to counterterrorism measures.

(ii) Textbooks and General Histories
Textbooks and general histories provide a foundation for our understanding about terrorism and counterterrorism, both past and present, which need to be supplemented with additional resources that go into greater detail. The following are considered among the leading classics in the field:

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism [Second and Expanded Edition] (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 456 pages, $24.95. [Paperback]
An updated and substantial expansion of the widely acclaimed original edition published in 1998 – despite being somewhat out of date in 2012 – is still considered one of the most comprehensive books on terrorism. Like its original edition, its chapters discuss how to define terrorism, the origins of contemporary terrorism, the internationalization of terrorism, the role of extremist religions in driving terrorism, the nature of suicide terrorism, the exploitation by terrorist groups of old and new media, terrorists' objectives, tactics, and technological innovations in their use of weapons, targeting, and future trends in terrorist warfare.

Peter R. Neumann, Old & New Terrorism (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), 204 pages, $22.95. [Paperback]
This innovative book investigates how and why terrorism's organizational structures, modus operandi, political agendas and types of warfare have changed over the years as a result of certain dynamics, such as the information revolution created by modernity and globalization. It concludes that both governments and societies need to better confront the challenges created by these "new" forms of terrorism in the areas where it has evolved.

Adrian Guelke, The New Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 256 pages, $29.00. [Paperback]
The Belfast, Northern Ireland-based author, a widely published academic expert on terrorism (who was mistakenly attacked by a terrorist group in Belfast in 1991), questions whether terrorism since 9/11 has evolved into a new form of mass-casualty, politically-motivated violence by groups of a global reach or whether it remains essentially unchanged, with small groups employing violence in their struggles against their 'imperialist' adversaries. He also explores the responses by governments to how terrorism has evolved and whether it is possible to facilitate the engagement of terrorist groups in a peace process in order to terminate such conflicts peacefully.

Michael Burleigh, Blood & Rage: A Cultural History of Terrorism (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009), 592 pages, $29.99. [Hardcover]
A sweeping, well-written historical overview by a prominent British historian on the nature of modern terrorism from its origins in 19th century Western Europe to the contemporary period. The book's chapters cover terrorist groups ranging from the early Russian nihilists, the Black International anarchists, the nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood, to post 1960s terrorism in the form of Palestinian groups, the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction, as well as the contemporary global threats fueled by al Qaida and its affiliated jihadist groups.

Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2011), 268 pages, $43.95. [Paperback]
In this important volume, the author, a prominent academic expert on terrorism, has assembled her articles, many of which were previously published in the 1980s and 1990s, with a few published after 2001. The result is a comprehensive compilation that is divided into four parts:
(1) the concept of terrorism, its causes, and the distinction between "old" and "new" terrorism;
(2) how terrorists organize, their strategies, and the psychology of terrorism; (3) governmental

responses to terrorism, such as coercive diplomacy, the formulation of counterterrorism strategies and "grand strategies," and (4) how terrorism ends, including why and how terrorism may be rejected or renounced by its adherents.

John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, editors, Terrorism Studies: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 2011), 504 pages, $44.95. [Paperback]
A comprehensive compilation of articles by leading experts on the historical context of terrorism, this reader serves as an excellent supplementary text. The volume covers issues such as David Rapoport's notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism; the challenges in defining terrorism; terrorism's root causes; the psychological processes involved in the development of terrorists and motivations to join terrorist groups; the spectrum of terrorist movements, ranging from the Lebanese Hizballah, the Provisional IRA, right-wing religio-super-nationalist groups, to al Qaida; narco-terrorism and insurgency; the nature of suicide terrorism; the components of counterterrorism, and future trends in terrorism, including WMD warfare.

Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism [Fourth Edition] (Boston, MA: Longman, 2011), 352 pages, $64.40. [Paperback]
A well-organized and comprehensive textbook on terrorism and counterterrorism. Divided into three parts, it covers subjects ranging from (1) defining terrorism, global terrorism, terrorism in the American context, religiously driven terrorism, the causes and drivers of terrorism, state sponsorship of terrorist groups, terrorists' goals, tactics and targeting, organizational formations, and how terrorism is funded; (2) the components of counterterrorism, such as the use of "hard" and "soft" power, balancing security and civil liberties, and the components of homeland security; and (3) the role of the media in covering terrorism, and how terrorists exploit the mass media of communications, including the Internet.

Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen Smyth, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 352 pages, $40.00. [Paperback]
The authors are leading academics in what is called "Critical Terrorism Studies." In this textbook, they outline their critique of "conventional" terrorism studies by providing a counter-explanation of terrorism over issues such as defining terrorism, the nature of the terrorist threat and what they consider to be effective and ineffectual counter-terrorism strategies. Chapters cover issues such as the "Orthodox study of terrorism," "critical approaches to terrorism studies," "the cultural construction of terrorism," "bringing gender into the study of terrorism," conceptualizing terrorism, reconsidering the terrorism threat, types of terrorism, understanding state terrorism, the causes of non-state terrorism, responding to non-state terrorism, and assessing the war on terror. While one may not necessarily agree with their political positions on the terrorist threat, it is important to take note of their assumptions and critiques of the field.

Gus Martin, Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies [Second Edition] (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2011), 440 pages, $56.00. [Paperback]
This is an excellent and up-to-date coverage of the latest trends in terrorism and counterterrorism studies. Chapters cover a conceptual overview of terrorism (defining terrorism, historical and ideological origins, and causes of terrorism), terrorist environments (typologies of terrorist groups, including state terrorism), and terrorist battlegrounds (the role of the media in covering terrorism, warfare tactics and targeting), counterterrorism, and future trends and projections. Also noteworthy are the discussions and case studies on a range of topics featured in each chapter and various end-of-chapter materials, including key terms and Internet-based exercises.

Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues [Fourth Edition] (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012), 616 pages, $80.00. [Paperback]
This widely used book's fourth edition – and the author's second textbook on terrorism – is a multidisciplinary, comprehensive examination of terrorism in general and terrorist incidents in particular. Also noteworthy is the coverage of major theories on terrorism, case studies, terrorist group profiles, and significant events. Each chapter begins with "Opening Viewpoints" that are illustrated with relevant examples to introduce readers to the themes and theories in

the discussion that follows, and ends with "Discussion Boxes" that provide controversial information, along with critical thinking questions to stimulate classroom discussion. The text is accompanied by photographs, tables, and graphics.

Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair, editors. <u>Contemporary Debates on Terrorism</u> **(New York: Routledge, 2012), 240 pages, $42.95. [Paperback]**
An innovative pedagogic approach to studying terrorism and counterterrorism through a debate format, with scholars representing different perspectives debating one another over controversial issues. Although one may challenge the editors' use of 'traditional' and 'critical' perspectives since some of the 'critical' approaches can be quite dogmatic and partisan in their own way (aside from other problem areas), this is still a valuable textbook for the way its contributors address significant issues in the discipline. These include theoretical issues, such as how to define terrorism and state terrorism, substantive issues, such as the magnitude of the threat presented by al Qaida and its affiliates, the effectiveness of various counterterrorism responses, and ethical issues, such as the use of torture in interrogations of prisoners and targeted killings.

(iii) Using the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences to Study Terrorism
As exemplified by the following books, the counterterrorism community has greatly benefited from the application of social, behavioral, and economic science concepts and methodologies to investigate components of terrorism such as the underlying root causes driving terrorist rebellions, the psychological nature of terrorist groups and their operatives, and the factors driving individuals to become radicalized into extremism and recruited into terrorism.

Ely Karmon's <u>Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, Nationalists, and Islamists</u> **(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 426 pages; $206.00. [Hardcover]**
An innovative examination of how terrorist organizations form cooperative coalitions and how they function within the changing international system. Although out-of-date in terms of capturing latest trends in the nature of such coalitions, its theoretical framework and historic overview are useful in conceptualizing how such linkages originate and are sustained over time.

John Horgan, <u>The Psychology of Terrorism</u> **(New York: Routledge, 2005), 224 pages, $49.95. [Paperback]**
When published in 2005, this book was considered one of the best applications of psychology to explain the drivers that motivate individuals to become terrorists, function as terrorists, and, in ideal cases, disengage from terrorism. Also noteworthy is the author's discussion of how to define terrorism and conduct academic research on terrorist subjects. A revised and updated second edition is scheduled for publication in late 2012.

James J.F. Forest, editor, <u>The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes</u> **[Three Volumes] (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 1280 pages, $315. [Hardcover]**
The three volumes bring together contributions by dozens of experts to discuss the central question of how individuals are transformed into becoming a terrorist. The first volume's chapters cover the recruitment of terrorists, with emphasis on the psychological and religious appeals of joining a terrorist organization. The second volume focuses on how and where terrorists are trained by their groups. The third volume addresses the political, social, and economic root causes that contribute to terrorism globally and within specific countries and regions.

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, <u>The Political Economy of Terrorism</u> **(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 294 pages, $29.99. [Paperback]**
This important volume applies a theoretical and empirical economics-based methodology, together with political analysis, to qualitatively and quantitatively examine the incidents domestic and transnational terrorism, in order to generate a spectrum of terrorist warfare trends. It also evaluates the effectiveness of governments' counterterrorism policies, including dilemmas for liberal democracies in balancing security and civil liberties. A separate case study analyzes

governmental responses to hostage incidents.

Magnus Ranstorp, editor, <u>Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction</u> (New York: Routledge, 2007), 352 pages, $160.00. [Hardcover]
When this volume was published, it represented one of the first attempts to inventory the strengths and weaknesses in terrorism research in order to identify a set of priorities for future research. Fourteen academic experts (including this reviewer) contributed chapters on topics such as new trends in terrorism studies, the impact of 9/11 on terrorism research, responding to the roots of terror, the socio-psychological components of terrorist motivations, the nature of al Qaida's warfare, recruitment of Islamist terrorists in Europe, the landscape of intelligence analysis and counterterrorism, terrorism in cyberspace, and the components of terrorism and counterterrorism studies.

Bruce Bongar, et al., editors, <u>Psychology of Terrorism</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 512 pages, $85.00. [Hardcover]
In this important comprehensive volume, leading academic experts present their findings on the psychology of individuals who become terrorists and the psychological theories that are relevant to the treatment and clinical responses to terrorist events, including the treatment of special populations such as children and older adults.

Adam Dolnik, <u>Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends</u> (New York: Routledge, 2007), 224 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
An important examination of innovations in terrorist tactics and technologies over the years in order to develop an empirical theory of innovation by terrorist groups. Also considered are the critical factors responsible for the differences in such learning and innovation practices among terrorist organizations. Case studies of four terrorist organizations (Aum Shinrikyo, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, the Riyadus-Salikhin Suicide Battalion, and the Revolutionary Organization November 17) highlight the key factors in producing innovative tactics and weaponry by such groups. The author concludes by highlighting key trends for the future in order to identify signature characteristics of innovation-based terrorist organizations, which is a critical element in predictive threat assessment and in countering such groups' warfare.

Ekaterina Stepanova, <u>Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 200 pages, $74.00. [Hardcover]
In this innovative theoretical volume, the author focuses on the extremist ideologies and structural capabilities of terrorist groups. This, the author writes, is a crucial element that enables resolution by the threatened governments of the asymmetrical threats confronting them at all levels, from the local to the global, which is dependent on disrupting terrorists' structural capabilities and neutralizing the appeal of their extremist ideologies. Using Islamist terrorism as the book's primary case study, the author argues that defeating its "quasi-religious, supra-national ideology" requires 'nationalizing' its transnational nature and co-opting it in a "more regular process."

Paul K. Davis, et al, <u>Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 540 pages, $59.50. [Paperback]
A significant groundbreaking volume by RAND academic experts that surveys the social-science literature on counterterrorism and then applies relevant conceptual models to examine issues such as terrorism's root causes, radicalization into violent extremism, how terrorists generate, maintain, or lose public support, how terrorists make decisions, how terrorists disengage from violence, and why and how does terrorism decline.

Jeffrey Kaplan, <u>Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism's Fifth Wave</u> (New York: Routledge, 2010), 256 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]
This insightful study examines David Rapoport's thesis of the four waves of the history of modern terrorism to demonstrate how a new insurgent grouping has emerged to constitute a distinct 'fifth wave' of modern terrorism, which the author terms as the "New Tribalism". The

terrorist groups constituting the 'fifth wave' share similar strategic ambitions and tactics, which the author characterizes as "radical localism, tribalism and xenophobia."

Jean E. Rosenfeld, editor, <u>Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence</u> (New York: Routledge, 2011), 272 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]
The contributors to this conceptually interesting edited volume, who come from many disciplines and contrasting perspectives, apply David Rapoport's notion of the four historical waves of modern terrorism – with each one lasting for 40 year "generations" – to explain the trajectories of terrorism and their impact on society over time, including how mob violence breaks out, how political violence spreads, the role of religion in driving terrorism and violence, the relationship between technology and terrorist warfare, and other issues, in order to analyze the questions that such phenomena present, including future trends.

(iv) Journalistic Case Studies
As criminal enterprises, terrorism and its radicalization and recruitment precursors take place underground. Generally, only government counterterrorism agencies possess the capability to monitor and track their activities through covert intelligence means, limiting the ability of those outside government to study this subject with empirically valid data. Nevertheless, our understanding of those who engage in terrorism as well as the nature of counterterrorism campaigns has greatly benefited from the reporting of investigative journalists, who often travel great distances and interview countless people in assembling their books. Some of the best reporting on terrorism includes the following books:

Ed Moloney, <u>A Secret History of the IRA</u> (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 640 pages, $18.95. [Paperback]
A veteran Irish journalist's investigatory account of the inner workings of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), including how it came to end its 30-year terrorist insurgency by agreeing to a peace process that attempted to resolve the conflict's underlying causes.

Steve Coll, <u>Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001</u> (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 720 pages, $18.00. [Paperback]
A veteran journalist's insider account of the American intelligence agencies' involvement with counterparts from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the covert wars in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s that succeeded in overthrowing the Soviet-backed government in that country. However, this involvement also ended up bolstering the Islamist militancy in that country which laid the basis for the emergence of the Taliban and, indirectly, gave rise to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida in that country, which sowed the seeds of al Qaida's 9/11 attacks against America. The author also discusses the unsuccessful efforts by U.S. intelligence to capture or kill bin Laden in Afghanistan after 1998. The book is considered one of the most authoritative accounts on this period in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Alston Chase, <u>A Mind for Murder: The Education of the Unabomber and the Origins of Modern Terrorism</u> (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 448 pages, $15.95. [Paperback]
An examination of the life and motives of Ted Kaczynski, known as "The Unabomber." Mr. Alston's account begins with Kaczynski's unhappy adolescence in Illinois and proceeds to Harvard College. There, he studied psychology, but ultimately fled from what was supposed to be a brilliant academic career to the edge of the wilderness in Montana. It was in his book-lined cabin, however, that he formulated an extremist view of the world that he used to justify his later terrorist activities, which took the form of letter bombs and explosive-laden packages. The author's narration is especially noteworthy not only for detailing Kaczynski's planning and execution of his attacks, but the political context that drove him into such violent extremism.

Stewart Bell, <u>The Martyr's Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist</u> [Second Edition] (Toronto, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 288 pages, $36.95. [Hardcover]
Canadian journalist Stewart Bell's important account of Mohammed Jabarah, a young Canadian Muslim who became radicalized and recruited by al Qaida for a bombing mission in

Singapore in 2001. By investigating why such a young person who grew up in a comfortable middle class family in Canada (although the family was originally from Kuwait) would end up as an operative in a terrorist organization in East Asia, the author searches for answers on how to counter the proliferation of similar types of recruits in North America and Europe into radical Islamic terrorism.

Samuel M. Katz, Jihad in Brooklyn: The NYPD Raid that Stopped America's First Suicide Bombers (New York: New American Library, 2005), 336 pages, $13.95. [Paperback]
A gripping account by a veteran investigative journalist of how three young Palestinian men living in a cramped Brooklyn apartment decided in late July 1997 to carry out a suicide bombing attack against a rush-hour subway train. Fortunately, an Egyptian dishwasher who had been living with them informed two NYPD policemen about their plot, resulting in their arrest and thwarting what would have been America's first Islamist suicide bombing.

Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007), 553 pages, $17.00. [Paperback]
One of the most sweeping and extensively researched narratives of the events leading to al-Qaida's 9/11 attacks, including the rise of Islamic extremism. It also examines al Qaida's 9/11 plot from the perspective of American counterterrorism agencies that had tried, but failed, to prevent it.

Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 304 pages, $32.95. [Hardcover]
Although dated by much improved Canadian counterterrorism measures, this is an account by an acclaimed Canadian investigative journalist of how international terrorist groups, such as the Indian Sikh Babbar Khalsa, Hizballah, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, Algerian GIA, and al Qaida, used to operate in Canada, which they regarded as a "safe haven" by raising funds (often through criminal enterprises), and recruiting and planning terrorist acts. The author explains how such terrorist networks were able to operate in Canada, who their central figures were, and Canada's previous counterterrorism measures. This account of the terrorist underworld in Canada is enriched by his travels to Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

Dina Temple-Raston, The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 304 pages; $26.00. [Hardcover]
A compelling and important journalistic investigation into "The Lackawanna Six" – a group of Yemeni American "bunch of guys" living in a close-knit Yemeni community outside Buffalo, New York, who fell in with Kamel Derwish, an al Qaida radicalizer who facilitated their travel in Spring 2001 to one of the organization's training camps in Afghanistan. When five of them returned to America just prior to 9/11, they found themselves involved in a high-profile investigation and prosecution. Derwish, who made his way to Yemen, was eventually killed by a U.S. Predator drone in 2002.

Sally Neighbour, The Mother of Mohammed: An Australian Woman's Extraordinary Journey into Jihad (Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2010), 304 pages, $26.50. [Paperback]
An important insider account, based on extensive interviews with its subject, by a prominent Australian journalist of Robyn Mary Hutchinson, an Australian woman, who grew up as a drug-using surfing groupie who converted to Islam while on a "hippie" visit to Bali, Indonesia, where she met her husband, who came from a Javanese royal family, with whom she had two children. Later she left her husband, when he became a drug addict, married again and had more children, before coming into contact with Abu Bakar Bashir, the imam who envisioned an Islamic caliphate across an arc of South-East Asia and whose name had been linked to several terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Eventually, Ms Hutchinson moved to Pakistan, where she lived a spartan existence among a community of devout Muslims. Later, she moved to Afghanistan, where she became known as Umm Mohammed ("mother of Mohammed", the name of one of her sons) and got to know the leaders of al Qaida, including Usama bin Laden.
Bin Laden provided her an air conditioner and may have even have proposed marriage, according to the author.

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Ian Johnson, <u>A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West</u> **(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010), 336 pages, $27.00. [Hardcover]**
A first rate, captivating account by veteran journalist Ian Johnson who used primary sources, including unclassified documents, to investigate the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood's first beachhead in the West during the post-World War II period, when a group of ex-Soviet Muslims defected to Germany and established a mosque in Munich. Over the years, they became entangled in the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union, including becoming instrumental in recruiting fighters against the Soviet military in Afghanistan. This book is crucial in providing an understanding of how the Muslim Brotherhood had become such an influential force in contemporary Western Europe.

Andrew Welsh-Huggins, <u>Hatred at Home: Al-Qaida on Trial in the American Midwest</u> **(Athens, OH: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 2011), 196 pages, $26.95. [Hardcover]**
This extensively researched journalistic investigation of the arrests of three terrorism suspects in Ohio in the years following the 9/11 attacks focuses mainly on the story of Iyman Faris, one of the conspirators, who was convicted in 2003. Using court transcripts and interviews with law enforcement officials and members of Ohio's Muslim community, the author recreates the events and circumstances leading up to the arrests. Although these cases may not be widely known, this is an important account of "homegrown" radicalization in America.

Joby Warrick, <u>The Triple Agent: The Al Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA</u> **(New York: Doubleday, 2011), 272 pages, $26.95. [Hardcover]**
Overcoming the "insider" threat is one of the most bedeviling challenges in counterterrorism. This is especially the case when, in the attempt to penetrate an adversary terrorist organization, a decision has to be made about who will be deployed as a double agent. Can he be trusted? How is it possible to know if he has a hidden agenda that will lead him to turn against his unsuspecting handlers? What follows is *Washington Post* investigative journalist Joby Warrick's compelling tale, based on interviews conducted across several continents, of the clash between high expectations and deceit, set against the backdrop of the inner workings of al Qaida and its Taliban affiliate, and their monitoring and countermeasures by America's intelligence services.

Catherine Herridge, <u>The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda's American Recruits</u> **(New York: Crown Forum, 2011), 272 pages, $25.00. [Hardcover]**
An account by an American investigative reporter of how homegrown extremists have become recruits for al Qaida's next wave of terrorist attack. Terming this "al Qaeda 2.0," the author shows how such recruits use modern technology, such as Facebook and Skype, to radicalize and communicate with one another. The book contains informative accounts of Major Nidal Hasan, Najibullah Zazi, and Anwar al Awlaki.

Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, <u>Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against al Qaeda</u> **(New York: Times Books/Henry Holt & Company, 2011), 336 pages, $27.00. [Hardcover]**
An informed account by two veteran *New York Times'* journalists of how the U.S. government's counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida and its affiliates was transformed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Adapting methods from classic Cold War deterrence theory, governmental counterterrorism now includes not only military measures, but the geographical field of battle has been expanded to disrupt jihadist networks in ever more creative ways, including in cyberspace. The authors discuss how these new counterterrorism strategies, adopted under President George W. Bush and expanded under Barack Obama, were successfully employed in planning and carrying out the dramatic May 2011 raid in which Usama bin Laden was killed.

Andrew Gumbel and Roger Charles, <u>Oklahoma City: What the Investigation Missed – and Why It Still Matters</u> **(New York: William Morrow, 2012), 448 pages, $27.99. [Hardcover]**
This account by two investigative journalists claims that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols did not act alone in plotting and carrying out the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995. Drawing on their more than 150 interviews, including correspondence with Mr. Nichols, as well

as access to case records, the authors claim that additional far-right extremist elements were involved in the conspiracy, that the bombing could have been prevented if certain leads on these individuals had been properly followed up, and that the Alfred P. Murrah federal building may not have been the original target but was selected at the last minute.

Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, <u>The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed</u> (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 2012), 368 pages, $27.99. [Hardcover]
A detailed and dramatic account by two former *Los Angeles Times* investigative reporters of how it took 18 months after al Qaida's September 11 attacks for U.S. government investigators to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the operational mastermind of the attacks, and, now, the most prominent al Qaida operative in U.S. custody. The authors also describe how KSM set up al Qaida's global terrorist network, personally identified and trained its terrorists, and even flew bomb parts on commercial airlines to test their invisibility. Of special interest is the authors' account of the U.S. government's pursuit of KSM, including numerous false leads and close escapes that kept him from being captured for five years before 9/11.

(v) Case Studies of Terrorist Groups
Zachary Abuza, <u>Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucibles of Terror</u> (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 281 pages, $22.50. [Paperback]
Drawing on extensive fieldwork and interviews with militant leaders, the author examines how extremist Islamist groups emerged in Southeast Asia, with al Qaida serving as their organizational catalyst. Also examined are the grievances that shape Islamist militancy, how certain groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya were transformed from "parochial" jihadis to international terrorists as part of al Qaida's expanding network, and the region's governments' counterterrorism responses. A key question, the author concludes, is whether these governments were sincere about resolving the root causes driving such rebellions or merely employing coercive countermeasures to suppress the symptoms.

Daniel Levitas, <u>The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right</u> (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2004), 544 pages, $23.99. [Paperback]
An extensively researched and documented account on the origins, leaders, ideas and activities of the far right extremist paramilitary groups in America, such as the White Supremacists and the neo-Nazis, who seek to bring about a racist revolution in the country.

Donald R. Liddick, <u>Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements</u> (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 200 pages, $39.95. [Hardcover]
With eco-terrorism one of the outcomes of radical environmentalism, this is one of the few books published on these violent groups. The author's authoritative account discusses how such eco-terrorists engage in arson, such as property destruction, and other types of violence. He discusses the major groups, such as ALF/ELF, as well as less well-known ones, focusing on their history, who they are, their motivations, ideologies, rhetoric, and tactics, and how to respond to their acts of violence.

Matthew Levitt, <u>Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad</u> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 336 pages; $17.00. [Paperback]
In one of the most comprehensive and meticulously documented accounts of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, the author explains how it succeeded in blending terrorism, extremist political activism, and social welfare services to become the dominant political force in the Palestinian territories. Although this account is out-of-date, with important geo-political and military developments taking place since its publication, it still provides important background information on the organization.

Daniel Byman, <u>Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 380 pages, $44.00. [Hardover]
An in-depth account of the states that sponsor terrorist groups, focusing primarily on Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya, and their linkages with groups such as al Qaida, Hizballah, and Hamas. Different types of support are discussed, including their

motivations for sponsoring such groups, and the impact of such sponsorship on their terrorist proxies. Also considered are governments that permit terrorists to raise money and recruit new members within their countries without, however, providing more "active" support.

Stefan Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 480 pages, $29.95. [Hardcover]
The left-wing Baader-Meinhof Group—later known as the Red Army Faction (RAF)—operated in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Their terrorist violence took the form of murder, hostage taking, and bank robberies. In the 1980s, the group's leaders committed mass suicide while imprisoned, with a tiny faction continuing its terrorist campaign until the group's breakup in 1998. In this comprehensive history of the group, German reporter Stefan Aust incorporates new information to present a full portrait of the group, based on testimonies by former group members to investigators and formerly classified Stasi documents.

Alessandro Orsini, Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of Modern Terrorists [Translated by Sarah Nodes] (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 296 pages, $29.95. [Hardcover]
An insightful account of the Red Brigades, an extremist left-wing terrorist group in Italy, formed in 1970 and active throughout the 1980s. In addition to their campaign of assassinations, kidnappings, and bank robberies, their most famous operation was the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, Italy's former prime minister, in 1978. In the late 1990s, a new extremist group revived the name Red Brigades and began a campaign of killing Italian professors and government officials they considered to be their adversaries. The author applies a micro-sociological approach to this study, termed the "subversive-revolutionary feedback theory," which states that for such "purifiers of the world" the willingness to engage in political homicide and suffer death depends on how far a group's members have been incorporated into such a revolutionary sect, much like a cult.

Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 172 pages, $16.95. [Paperback]
An insightful account by a leading academic expert on terrorism in Southeast Asia, focusing on the sectarian-based insurgency in southern Thailand, which has raged since January 2004 and resulted in more than 3,000 fatalities. What distinguishes this insurgency from previous ones in Thailand, the author points out, is its radical jihadist overtones and unprecedented levels of violence. Drawing on original research and extensive fieldwork, the author examines the conflict's underlying causes, its impact on the south's Buddhist community, and the Thai government's response, which he characterizes as ineffectual. The author warns that international jihadist groups, such as al Qaida, are likely to involve themselves in the conflict, thereby escalating its intensity and lethality, with regional and international consequences.

Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America and Its First Age of Terror (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 416 pages, $27.95. [Hardcover]
An extensively researched and gripping account of one of the first homegrown terrorist attacks in America against one of its most iconic symbols: Wall Street. The four-year hunt for the perpetrators stretched as far as Italy and the new Soviet nation. Especially interesting are the author's accounts of the lives of the victims, the suspects, and the investigators, including the polarized political climate at the time which was dominated by the likes of banking mogul J.P. Morgan, Jr., labor radical "Big Bill" Haywood, anarchist firebrands Emma Goldman and Luigi Galleani, and William J. Burns, "America's Sherlock Holmes."

Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 264 pages, $22.50. [Paperback]
The authors place contemporary anti-regime Jewish terrorist activity in Israel within its historical context, with its "totalistic ideology" similar in many ways to Islamist extremism. It was such a mindset that drove Yigal Amir, a fringe member of Jewish extremism, to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 as part of that movement's

opposition to the Oslo Peace Accords with the Palestinians. The book, one of the very few published on this subject, benefits from the authors extensive interviews with former Jewish terrorists and extremist political and religious leaders, as well as Israeli law-enforcement officials.

Anna Geifman, Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 229 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]
With 19th century Russia considered the birthplace of modern terrorism, the author views it as a precursor to the psycho-historical patterns of worldwide terrorist activity that evolved over the next century. Especially noteworthy is the author's analysis of how terrorists' objectives have degenerated from punishment of individual adversaries and attempts to intimidate political elites to carrying out indiscriminate acts of political violence. Moreover, as the author explains, a group's stated ideology and rhetoric will invariably be transformed in practice into brutal violence. The author's examination of such Russian precedents in political violence helps illuminate many of the brutal aspects of current terrorism.

J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 244 pages, $49.95. [Hardcover]
This volume is an authoritative and comprehensive account of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the most significant Muslim terrorist group in China, which demands an independent Muslim state for the Uyghur ethnic minority in northwest China. In what is one of the few books on this subject, the authors discuss the group's origins, objectives, ideology, leadership, tactics, and ties to international terrorist networks. They conclude with an assessment of how other governments view ETIM's activities and how this has affected their relations with China.

Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 303 pages, $59.95. [Hardcover]
An insightful overview by a U.S. military expert on the Chechen and North Caucasus insurgencies against Russia and its government's primarily military response to such terrorist threats. Thematically organized, it examines the origins of the conflict in the North Caucasus, including the influences of different strains of Islamism and al Qaida. It also features a detailed critique of Russia's counterterrorism campaigns over years. Especially noteworthy is the author's use of information from the North Caucasus Incident Database (NCID), including terrorist incidents, as well as informative charts that outline aspects of Russia's counterterrorism campaigns.

Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God From Revolution to Institutionalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 308 pages, $31.00. [Paperback]
An authoritative account of the Lebanese Hizballah by a veteran Israeli national security expert. In the author's view, as Hizballah has become increasingly institutionalized over the years, it began using a "controlled policy" which integrates guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks while taking into account "profit and loss" political considerations. Such pragmatism, the author argues, has made it far more dangerous than that its 1980s revolutionary model. This pragmatism, he concludes, merely masks the fact that it has not abandoned its goals, only changed their pace of application.

Daniel Baracskay, The Palestine Liberation Organization: Terrorism and Prospects for Peace in the Holy Land (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 225 pages, $44.95. [Hardcover]
This book provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the historical events which culminated in the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and leadership of the Palestinian people for the next three decades. The author's discussion of the organization's key leaders, ideology, support base, financial structure, and recruitment strategies, is especially noteworthy. Also discussed are the PLO's activities in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and its evolution from a primarily terrorist organization into a ruling political regime in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although in recent years its historical rival, Hamas, has succeeded in overtaking it in Gaza.

Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 288 pages, $35.00. [Hardcover]

In what is one of the few comprehensive books published on Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let), based on his extensive field research in Pakistan the author traces its development from its origins as a small resistance group in Kashmir to its current role as the largest Pakistani terrorist organization operating in South Asia, including India. With the November 2009 Mumbai attacks placing the LeT high on the world's radar, the author discusses its overall threat and how its warfare may evolve in the coming years. The LeT rose to prominence with Pakistani state support, especially as its proxy in Kashmir's civil war with India. One may dispute the author's judgment that the LeT may "fear" to associate too closely with al Qaida, which is also closely tied to sectors of Pakistan's government (as is the Taliban). With the LeT likely to continue mounting terrorist attacks in India – Pakistan's historic rival – it will be interesting to see whether it is likely to mount any operations, as the Taliban has done, in the West, although it has used American operatives on overseas missions.

(vi) Root Causes of Terrorism

Tore Bjorge, editor, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward (New York: Routledge, 2005), 288 pages; $47.95. [Paperback]
This collection of papers is the product of an experts' workshop (in which this reviewer participated) that was held in Oslo, Norway, in June 2003, under the auspices of the Norwegian government. It represented the first time that an academic meeting had been held to explore, in a systematic manner, the concepts and methodologies to conduct analysis on root causes of terrorism. So innovative at the time, it is unfortunate that a follow up meeting has not been held to review, update, and revise the contributors' initial findings in order to advance understanding of these issues and align them with the latest developments and trends in the field.

Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism [New Edition] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 216 pages, $19.95. [Paperback]
The author, an influential American economist, discusses what he considers to be some of the root causes underlying terrorist insurgencies and the factors that motivate individuals to become terrorists – all of which need to be addressed in order to resolve them. Using empirically derived data, his inferences are drawn from terrorists' own backgrounds and the economic, social, and political conditions in the societies where they originate. He also discusses which countries he considers to be the most likely breeding grounds for terrorists, as well as their targets for terrorist warfare.

Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), 336 pages, $17.00. [Paperback]
According to the author, who grew up in Northern Ireland where she experienced the effects of terrorism first-hand, terrorists are basically rational political actors who calibrate their tactics in a measured and reasoned way, including going to great lengths to justify their actions to themselves, their followers, and the world. To defeat terrorism, the author argues, governments must therefore understand a terrorist adversary's motivations and grievances. These consist of three elements: a legitimizing ideology, such as a belief that they are doing the right thing or God's will in seeking revenge for a humiliation, a real or imagined defeat of their constituency by a government's forces, and, on a personal level, some sort of dissatisfaction. For terrorism to succeed a group requires an enabling society that views its members as "heroes' and provides them a measure of sanctuary or safe haven. To resolve terrorist rebellions, the author proposes a strategy to contain the threat and reduce its local support.

Jason Franks, Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 26 4 pages, $107.00. [Hardcover]
This is a comprehensive interdisciplinary examination of the motivations and causes of terrorism in general and specifically in the context of the Middle East. While critical of what he terms as 'orthodox' terrorism discourse which he argues has been faulty in addressing its roots causes, he employs the methods and approaches of conflict resolution to align it with the causes of conflict in general in order to gain a more complete understanding of its political, social, and economic causes and motivations.

(vii) Radicalization and Recruitment into Terrorism

Although each of the world's major religions includes a tiny minority of militant elements that engage in terrorism, most of the literature on radicalization and recruitment into terrorism focuses on militant Islam because terrorist groups that have "hijacked" Islam represent the major threats against their own societies and the Western world. Like the root causes that drive terrorism in general, militant Islamic terrorism has not emerged in a vacuum, but is the product of the confluence of historical and contemporary drivers and "real world" factors. To understand the narrative that is central to Muslim belief, it is essential to read the Quran. The following books provide an excellent overview of radicalization and recruitment into militant Islam, within the context of the larger Muslim world.

Quintan Wiktorowicz, editor, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 328 pages, $25.95. [Paperback]
This edited volume represents one of the first attempts to apply social movement theory to the study of contemporary Islamic activism as the basis for social and political action in the Middle East and North Africa. Social movement theory is then examined in the volume's case studies on Islamic activism, whether Sunni or Shi'a, in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia Turkey, and Yemen.

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks: (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 232 pages, $29.95. [Hardcover]
At the time of its publication, this was considered a pioneering study on the global Salafi jihad – the interlocking radical Islamist terrorist networks led and shaped by Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization. Compiling biographies of 172 Islamist terrorist operatives gathered from open sources, the author employs social network analysis to unravel al Qaida's operations since 1998. He identifies four large clusters of terrorist operatives: the first, consisting of the central staff of al Qaida and of the global Salafist jihad movement, which formed the movement's overall leadership (many of whom were hiding in the Pakistan-Afghan border regions); the second, including operatives from core Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait); the third, also known as the Maghreb Arabs (the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria), who resided in France and England; and the fourth belonging to al Qaida's ally, Jemaah Islamiyah, which was centered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Such unraveling of al Qaida's origins, evolution, organizational and demographic characteristics are the prerequisites for effective counteraction.

Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 264 pages, $32.95. [Paperback]
An important book which represented at the time of its publication one of the first attempts to formulate a systematic conceptual framework on radicalization into violent extremism in Western societies. According to the author, the mechanisms that drive potential recruits into violent extremism in the West begin with a "cognitive opening" in the form of "religious seeking" by individuals, perceiving an extremist movement and its religious ideology as "legitimate," and, finally, being persuaded by the extremist movement to engage in "risky activism" on its behalf. Also innovative is the author's application of his framework to the case of al-Muhajiroun, an extremist transnational movement based in London that supports al Qaida and other Islamist terrorist groups.

Elena Mastors and Alyssa Deffenbaugh, The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the Al-Qaida Network (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 174 pages, $28.95. [Paperback]
To understand how terrorist groups operate, it is crucial to uncover how they go about recruiting new operatives to maintain themselves as viable organizational networks and, if possible, expand their activities. In this excellent study, focusing primarily on the al Qaida network, the authors examine "why, how, and where individuals" become involved in that network, which they define as "financial backers and fund-raisers, operators, logisticians, recruiters, trainers, and leaders." It is important to uncover such recruitment patterns to enable counterterrorism agencies to derive potential strategies for dealing with the "entry" points into their networks in order to defeat them.

Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 208 pages, $24.95. [Paperback]

This book updates and expands on the author's earlier pioneering work, <u>Understanding Terror Networks</u> (2004) on the factors that drive radicalization into terrorism within the Salafi jihadist context. According to the author, the pre-9/11 al Qaida "Central" had morphed into a social movement consisting of several thousand members. Although decentralized and fragmented, this made al Qaida even more dangerous because as a social movement it had exponentially grown beyond its organizational origins. How do al Qaida's supporters become radicalized into violent extremism? The author formulates a four phase process that depends on an individual's sense of moral outrage in response to perceived suffering by fellow Muslims around the world; interpreting such moral outrage within the context of a larger war against Islam; having such a sense of "moral outrage" resonating with one's own personal experience, for example, a sense of discrimination or difficulty in making it in Western society, and, finally, being mobilized by networks that take one to the next level of violent radicalization in the form of terrorist cells. The author's "leaderless jihad" paradigm has been challenged for downplaying the role of facilitators in the West who play a crucial role in recruiting new members into al Qaida and its affiliated groups, thereby resulting in a new organizational hybrid that characterizes how al Qaida and its affiliates operate. Despite this criticism, the author's innovative use of empirically derived data to generate al Qaida-related trends is a significant contribution to counterterrorism studies.

Allison Pargeter, <u>The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe</u> (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 256 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]
An authoritative account of how Western Europe became a host to militant Islamists of varying backgrounds, ranging from returnee veterans of the war in Afghanistan, members of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, to second-generation Muslim immigrants and European converts. Together, these extremists made Europe a breeding ground for Islamist activism, with some of them turning to terrorist activities following 9/11 such as the catastrophic attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, as well as numerous plots and attacks since then. The author, who is based in Italy, draws on original research and interviews with extremists and moderate Muslims to delve into the causes, motivations, and diverse forms of Islamic extremism in Europe.

Shmuel Bar, <u>Warrants for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad</u> (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 152 pages, $18.95. [Paperback]
An examination of how fatwas, which are legal opinions declaring whether a given act under Islam is obligatory, permitted, or forbidden, serve as an instrument for religious leaders to justify believers to engage in acts of jihad. The author argues that fatwas, particularly those that originate in the Arab world, should not be dismissed as a cynical use of religious terminology in political propaganda, but that Islamist terrorists testify that they are motivated to act by them. The author examines the underlying religious, legal, and moral logic of fatwas and the depth of their influence, particularly in contrast to alternative moderate Islamic interpretations, and applies them to issues involved in Islamic "laws of war", such as the justification for declaring jihad, the territory in which the jihad should be fought, whether women and children can participate in jihad, the legality of killing women, children and other non-combatants, the justification for killing hostages and mutilating their bodies, and the permissibility of lethal tactics, such as suicide attacks, and employing weapons of mass destruction.

Brynjar Lia, <u>Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 256 pages, $22.50. [Paperback]
A meticulously researched biography of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, one of al Qaida's most important theoreticians and strategists. In addition to writing an influential 1,600 page book, al-Suri had trained a generation of young jihadists in the Afghan training camps and helped establish the organization's European networks. Syrian-born al-Suri was captured in Pakistan in late 2005 but released by the Syrian government in 2012. The author is a research professor at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Kumar Ramakrishna, <u>Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia</u> (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 292 pages, $75.00. [Hardcover]

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An important and insightful case study on the pathways to extremism and violent jihad in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, which experienced one of the worst terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002. Specifically, the book explores the factors driving a minority of the country's Muslim population to turn to violent jihad, and the continuing danger they pose to the country's political stability. The author, based in Singapore, is one of Southeast Asia's leading counterterrorism experts.

Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 302 pages, $31.99. [Paperback]
An authoritative account of how Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Usama bin Laden and many of the 9/11 hijackers, became the heartland of radical Islamism until the government began to clamp down on extremism. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, including many primary sources in Arabic, the author explains how over the course of several decades the religiously orthodox and oil-rich kingdom found itself contributing recruits, ideologues and funds to jihadi groups worldwide, including the rise of "home grown" Muslim militants who began to threaten the kingdom internally. The author is a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 288 pages, $37.95. [Hardcover]
In this highly informative and important account, the author defines the threats posed by militant Islamists who, he writes, cloak themselves in Islam but are not representative of its mainstream religion and practices. In an innovative typology, he distinguishes between "Islam," "Islamist" and "Militant Islamist," with the latter presenting the "true threat." Using this framework, Cmdr. Aboul-Enein then proceeds to discuss how militant Islamists abuse Quranic verses. He shows how they embrace violence (jihad) against those who disagree with their extremist views rather than seeking ways to improve their situation. He explains the ideas of the ideological founders of Islamism and militant Islamism, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. Also valuable is his prescription for using al Qaida's rhetoric and actions to marginalize and counter it, including exposing Usama bin Laden as a malignant force. He concludes with a penetrating analysis of what he terms "mindsets that hamper America's capabilities."

J.M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 280 pages, $29.95. [Hardcover]
This is one of the most comprehensive accounts published on the several hundred American Muslims, some of them converts, who chose to join and fight on behalf of extremist Islamist terrorist groups overseas in conflicts regions such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Yemen, beginning in the late 1970s and through the contemporary period. While many of them chose to fight overseas, including against Americans and Westerners deployed in those conflicts, some of them also plotted to carry out terrorist attacks on American soil. Written by an investigative journalist, the book presents fascinating profiles of many of these fighters and how they were radicalized and recruited into militant Islamist terrorism.

Patrick T. Dunleavy, The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Terrorism's Prison Connection (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 160 pages, $22.00. [Hardcover]
This important study greatly benefits from the author's unique operational experience. He had served as a former deputy inspector general of the Criminal Intelligence Unit of the New York State Department of Correctional Services and is a veteran senior investigator of Islamist recruitment in American prisons,. This is one of the very few books written on Islamist radicalization and recruitment in American prisons. The author's account begins in January and February 1993 with the incarceration of a young Palestinian in New York City for kidnapping and robbery, with the World Trade Center having been bombed a month later. According to the author, these two events were connected by common threads, signaling the arrival of "jihad" in America. Unknown at the time was the fact that this young man, initially thought to have been a common criminal, in fact had sworn allegiance to Usama bin Laden and began to convert other young prisoners to the cause. The rest of the narrative explores how the American prison subculture served to foster radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, including how religious and social welfare resources in prisons are used to promote violent extremism.

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Rik Coolsaet, editor, <u>Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences</u> [Second Edition] (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 340 pages, $49.95. [Paperback]
An important compilation of papers by leading experts on radicalization. Utilizing empirically-generated case studies, the contributors find that since 9/11 jihadi terrorism in the form of al Qaida "Central" has been greatly weakened, now resembling a patchwork of self-radicalizing local cells with international contacts but without any central al Qaida organizational direction and control, which is compared to the radical left-wing terrorism of the 1970s. Another finding is that "self-starter" type radicalization processes are at work in Western Europe and the United States. A separate section in the book examines the components of effective government strategies to de-radicalize extremists.

Daniela Pisoiu, <u>Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: An Occupational Change Process</u> (New York: Routledge, 2011), 216 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]
The author employs a theoretical model to examine the process of radicalization into Islamist extremism in Europe, based on an empirical study of how such extremists interact with their social environment and how, and under what conditions, individuals choose to radicalize. Especially noteworthy is the author's biographical approach which uses trial and court materials, along with extensive interviews, to explain how radicalization takes place at the individual level. Also valuable is the author's explanatory framework, which critiques simplistic deterministic paradigms that posit grievances as causes as well as certain psychological models. She argus that radicalization is a process much like one's occupational choice – a rational choice made with social and ideational significance. The European governments' counter-radicalization policies are also assessed.

Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, editors, <u>Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures</u> (New York: Routledge, 2011), 288 pages, $138.00. [Hardcover]
This important edited volume focuses on the causes, nature, and impact of the ideological and theological divisions within the jihadi movement, and the splits between jihadis and other Islamist groups, which are contributing to the weakening of the jihadi movement. After discussing the fissures dividing the jihadis over strategic, tactical, and organizational issues, the book's second part addresses several case studies of jihadi disagreements with other Muslim and Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Shi'a community, all of which affect the global jihadi movement's overall cohesion.

Mitchell D. Silber, <u>The Al Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West</u> (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 368 pages, $39.95. [Hardcover]
Written by the Director of Intelligence Analysis, with a primary focus on terrorism, for the New York Police Department, this is an important account, based on primary sources. It covers 16 al Qaida-associated plots and attacks and investigates the specifics of al Qaida's role in the inspiration, formation, membership, organization, planning and operational command and control over terrorist attacks directed against the West, since the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Specifically, the author examines the factors that serve to connect radicalized groups in the West to al Qaida's organization in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He investigates whether such plotters have to attend an al Qaida training camp or meet with an al Qaida trainer in those foreign, or whether they simply can be inspired by al Qaida's ideology, e.g. over the Internet. Although the author finds that the role of al Qaida "Central" may be limited in directly controlling attacks in the West, with more cases of individuals who have sought its aid or training, the continued interest by Western jihadi wannabes demonstrates that even a weakened al Qaida "Central" is not preventing new plots that are inspired by the group to continuously spring up in the West.

Robert S. Leiken, <u>Europe's Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 337 pages, $27.95. [Hardcover]
An in-depth study, based on extensive field research and interviews, of the dynamics that have created the ground for Europe to become a hotbed of Islamist extremism by its second generation of Muslim immigrants. Torn between their ancestral cultures, Europe's secularism, their parents' attempts to assimilate into their host societies, and feeling aggrieved over perceived discrimination and hardships, many members of this second generation have turned

to extremist versions of Islam, with some taking the next step into terrorist activities. These issues are covered in the book's case studies on France, Britain, and Germany.

(viii) Funding Terrorism
Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, editors, <u>Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective</u> **(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 384 pages, $24.95. [Paperback]**
This edited volume's thematic chapters and organizational and regional case studies examine how terrorist organizations such as al Qaida, Hizballah, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Taliban organize to raise, transfer, and spend funds in regions such as East Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and South East Asia. The chapters also assess the effectiveness of governmental responses, such as problems of coordination and oversight.

Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, editors, <u>Countering the Financing of Terrorism</u> **(New York: Routledge, 2008), 360 pages, $44.95. [Paperback]**
This edited volume brings together leading experts from the disciplines of terrorism, international relations, global finance, law, and criminology, to assess the effectiveness of governments and international organizations in countering the methods employed by terrorists to fund their operations.

Gretchen Peters, <u>Seeds of Terror: How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda</u> **(New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), 300 pages, $25.95. [Hardcover]**
An important account by a veteran investigative journalist, based on extensive field research and interviews in Pakistan and Afghanistan, of how the Taliban and al Qaida succeeded in mounting a financial comeback after they were overthrown in Afghanistan in Fall 2001. One of the reasons, the author explains, is the Taliban's transformation into a criminal network that earns an estimated half a billion dollars annually from the opium trade, which spans from vast poppy fields in southern Afghanistan to heroin labs run by Taliban commanders, as well as the networks of money launderers in Karachi and Dubai. The author argues that the Taliban must be cut off from their drug earnings in order to defeat them in Afghanistan and Pakistan and create a new economy for Afghanistan that will ultimately break that country's cycle of violence and extremism. Since some members of the Afghanistan government's elite are also dependent on wealth generated by the drug trade, this may be difficult to accomplish, but at least the author succeeds in highlighting the issues at stake.

Jodi Vittori, <u>Terrorist Financing and Resourcing</u> **(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 240 pages, $85.00. [Hardcover]**
An authoritative primer on terrorist financing, it examines what terrorist organizations need to acquire in order to survive and operate. Vittori describes the various means used to meet these needs. Of particular interest is the author's discussion of how terrorism financing has evolved over the years and his formulation of what he terms a "seven category typology of terrorist resourcing" based on how each selected strategy affects a group's operational autonomy. To illustrate this typology, case studies for each category are provided, based on actual examples drawn from the history of terrorism that apply to the spectrum of groups ranging from hierarchical organizations to "lone wolf" cells.

Timothy Wittig, Understanding Terrorist Finance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 256 pages, $85.00. [Hardcover]
The author presents a comprehensive framework to analyze how terrorist groups go about financing their activities. This framework is applied to empirical case studies of terrorist group financing in Europe, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, focusing on fund raising activities ranging from donations, criminality, to legitimate enterprises. Especially noteworthy are tables that estimate the cost of various types of terrorist operations and the impact of real-world counter-terrorist financing regimes on terrorist groups' illicit economic activities.

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(ix) Suicide Terrorism
Suicide terrorism, in which mission success is dependent on the perpetrators intentionally killing themselves together with their intended victims, has been examined extensively in the literature, as exemplified by the following books:

Diego Gambetta, editor, <u>Making Sense of Suicide Missions</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 432 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
With suicide attacks becoming a defining act of the terrorist type of political violence in many conflicts around the world, the contributors to this insightful edited volume attempt to answer questions such as: are these the actions of aggressive religious zealots and irrational extremists, or is there a logic driving their perpetrators? Are their motivations religious or do they use the language of religion to express what are essentially political causes? How do the perpetrators maintain their motivation in carrying out their operations in the face of certain death? And: do these disparate attacks share a common cause?

Ami Pedahzur, editor, <u>Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom</u> (New York: Routledge, 2006), 224 pages, $43.95. [Paperback]
The contributors to this edited volume examine the root causes of suicide terrorism at the organizational and rank-and-file levels. Although their thesis that in the case of Muslim operatives suicide bombing is not closely connected to Islam can be challenged, the conceptual methodologies they present are worth noting.

Cindy D. Ness, editor, <u>Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization</u> (New York: Routledge, 2008), 242 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
This important edited volume discusses the drivers behind why and how women and girls become radicalized into extremism and terrorism, and the strategies that are required to counter this phenomenon. Unlike their male counterparts, females who engage in terrorism, especially suicide martyrdom attacks, the authors point out, are generally viewed as violating conventional notions of gender and power in traditional societies where women's roles are subservient to those of men. Several of the volume's articles are based on field research where the authors interviewed incarcerated female terrorists.

Anat Berko, <u>The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers</u> (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 196 pages, $19.95. [Paperback]
One of the most insightful examinations of Palestinian suicide bombers and the men who dispatch them on their martyrdom missions. While perceived grievances against Israel and its occupation policy — primarily in the West Bank (since Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip) — drive most Palestinian suicide bombers to attack Israelis, the cult of death through martyrdom is reinforced daily through indoctrination and hate propaganda in Palestinian mosques, schools, media and popular music, which give free reign to recruiters to spot vulnerable individuals to carry out such missions. How can suicide bombings be stopped? The key, Israeli criminologist Dr. Berko believes, rests with Muslim religious leaders, who "have the moral responsibility to forcefully condemn suicide bombing attacks and to issue unequivocal fatwas [religious rulings] against them." They must emphatically state that those who carry out such attacks "not only do not automatically go to paradise, but that they automatically go to hell." The book contains a wealth of information about Palestinian society, such as the impact of polygamous families and arranged marriages on the sons and daughters who decide to become suicide martyrs.

Ariel Merari, <u>Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 328 pages, $42.95. [Hardcover]
The author, a clinical psychologist, is one of the world's preeminent experts on suicide terrorism, and a long-time adviser to Israeli governments on these issues. In this important book, the author discusses the psychological, cultural and political factors that drive individuals to intentionally kill themselves in order to kill others on behalf of their political or religious cause. In the case of Palestinian suicide bombers, the author's findings are based on empirical data gathered by a team of Israeli researchers (including Dr. Anat Berko), who interviewed Palestinian prisoners who had 'failed' to carry out their suicide attacks. The result was a first-hand assessment of the

personality characteristics and motivation of such suicide bombers. Also discussed are the ways suicide bombers are recruited, prepared and dispatched to their planned death, as well as how they feel and behave along this road. Although focused primarily on Palestinian suicide bombers, the book also discusses other groups, such as al Qaida.

Paul J. Murphy, Allah's Angels: Chechen Women in War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 320 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]
A comprehensive account of the involvement by Chechnya women in terrorism, which the author writes began with the eruption of the Islamist insurgency against Russia in the early 1990s. Initially known as the "Black Widows," these Chechen women have ventured beyond their traditional societal roles only to be manipulated and exploited by their male recruiters into carrying out suicide missions. Drawing on extensive field research in the region, the author presents valuable portrayals of the women who participate in the Chechen jihad as suicide bombers, as well those who perform noncombatant roles such as collecting intelligence, logistics, and managing safe houses.

Mordecai Dzikansky, Gil Kleiman, and Robert Slater, Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011), 342 pages, $79.9 5. [Hardcover]
What sets this book apart is that it was written by veteran law enforcement officers (one an Israeli and the other an American NYPD detective who was detailed to Israel) with first-hand investigatory experience in handling suicide bombings. Among the many issues discussed are *how to* fortify potential suicide bombing targets, how suicide bomber teams operate and the types of weapons they are likely to employ. Also valuable are the *accounts of actual incidents which the authors had investigated, i*ncluding managing the aftermath of bombing scenes, where first responder teams take over. Also discussed are the p*sychological effects of suicide bombings, including how* terrorists seek to exploit the media, and recommendations for measures that government and media can implement to diffuse the terrorists' propaganda.

Mia Bloom, Bombshell: Women and Terrorism (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 320 pages, $29.95. [Hardcover]
With female suicide bombers committing more than 200 such attacks since 1985, women have become increasingly prominent in conducting such operations. The book provides interesting case studies ranging from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka, where female operatives have been used to conduct a variety of terrorist activities, such as propaganda, logistics, and bombing attacks. Their motivations, the author points out, range from a desire to serve their groups' as martyrs to having some of them coerced by physical threats or other means of social control. The author also discusses how terrorist groups such as al Qaida target women for radicalization and recruitment through Internet publications such as the March 2011 issue of its magazine *Al Shamikha*, dubbed the jihadi *Cosmo*.

Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks [Reprint Edition] (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011 [originally published in December 2008]), 360 pages, $30.00. [Paperback]
An important and comprehensive analysis of the rise and spread of religiously-motivated suicide attacks around the world between 1981 and 2007. Numbering some 1,270 suicide operations, the author attributes their proliferation to the ascendance of al Qaida and its Salafi jihad ideology, which not only rejects the spread of secularism, but, most importantly, the "Western-imposed" notion of national boundaries, as part of its objective to create a global Muslim community. As a result, its martyrdom operations take place worldwide. This differentiates it, for example, from the 'traditional' suicide bombing operations of Palestinian groups which are primarily localized in their targeting.

Tamara Herath, Women in Terrorism: Case of the LTTE (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2012), 264 pages, $40.00. [Hardcover]
An interesting examination of the significance of the growing numbers of women who engage in terrorist activities around the world in order to formulate social science theories about the changing roles of women in such warfare. Toward that end, and based on extensive field

research in Sri Lanka, the author analyzes the role of Tamil women combatants belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in all aspects of its terrorist warfare, including martyrdom suicide operations.

(x) International Law and Terrorism

Since terrorism is considered a violation of a country's criminal laws as well as international conventions on military warfare, authoritative studies and handbooks have been published on the legal instruments to define and prosecute those who engage in terrorist activities. These are ranging from directly engaging in combat to providing ideological, financial and logistical support to such groups, as well as the judicial frameworks that can be used to prosecute them. Excellent and authoritative books on these subjects include the following:

Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of Democracy against Terrorism: Lessons from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 320 pages, $35.00. [Hardcover]
One of the best studies on the legal challenges and moral dilemmas faced by democracies in countering the threats posed by terrorists in terms of balancing security against civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law. Mr. Gross, a law professor at Haifa University and a former military court judge in Israel, covers the spectrum of topics such as defining terrorism, the laws of war in countering terrorism, interrogating terrorists, the powers of military commanders in administering areas where terrorists operate (such as in Iraq or the West Bank), administrative detention, the right to privacy by citizens during emergency periods, the use of civilians by terrorists or armies as human shields, and thwarting terrorist acts through targeted killings of terrorist leaders and operatives.

Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 408 pages, $65.00. [Paperback]
An important exploration of the public policy need to define terrorism, which is necessary in formulating the basic elements of a consensual international definition with the power to criminalize such acts. With terrorist acts undermining human rights and peaceful politics, the author argues that a new consensual definition would be able to distinguish between political and "private" violence and enable governments to apply "acceptable proportionality" in their counter-terrorism measures. At the same time, the author points out, any consensual definition of terrorism must also accommodate "reasonable claims" to resorting to political violence, particularly against repressive governments. It is necessary, therefore, to define the range of exceptions and justifications that "self-determination" movements can turn to, as well as to define what is meant by 'State terrorism' and the resort to violence in armed conflict.

Benjamin Wittes, editor, Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 288 pages, $34.95. [Hardcover]
An examination by experts, many of whom served in the U.S. government, on how 9/11's catastrophic attacks transformed America's anti-terrorism judicial legislation. They discuss issues such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whether a National Security Court is required, interrogation laws, the legal regime for covert actions, the relationship between immigration law and counterterrorism, the appropriate legal regime of trying accused terrorists as criminals.

Clive Walker, Terrorism and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 720 pages, $300.00. [Hardcover]
Written by a leading British expert on anti-terrorism legislation, this important volume contains extensive, up-to-date analysis of key materials on anti-terrorism law and legal practice, including a comprehensive coverage of major domestic, European, and international laws, and their impact on the United Kingdom. The book's first part discusses the relationship between anti-terrorism law and politics, while the second part focuses on major United Kingdom anti-terrorism legislations. The final part discusses the impact of European, international and transnational anti-terrorism laws and practices on issues such as international cooperation in the extradition of terrorists, in countering terrorist activities, and how they relate to adherence to human rights considerations.

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Amos N. Guiora, Global Perspectives on Counterterrorism [Second Edition] (Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer, 2011), 432 pages, $68.00. [Paperback]
The author, a specialist in law of armed conflict and a former attorney in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), presents an interdisciplinary and global exploration of the laws, policies, intelligence gathering, and operational decisions surrounding governmental counter-terrorism strategies and tactics. The counterterrorism policies of seven nations (India, Israel, Russia, Spain, the United States, China and Colombia) are presented and discussed in a comparative perspective. As a valuable textbook, each chapter includes issues to consider, such as actual dilemmas and scenarios, including simulation exercises that put students in the role of policy decision-makers. Specific issues covered include interrogations, the proper forum for trying terrorists, judicial review, international law, intelligence gathering, and policy responses to terrorism. A separate chapter discusses future hotspots of terrorism, such as Mexico, where new types of counterterrorism against new types of threats might require the formulation of new legal requirements. An appendix includes policy documents and a discussion of terrorism incidents around the world.

Norman Abrams, Anti-Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement [Fourth Edition] (St. Paul, MN: West, 2012), 848 pages, $176.00. [Hardcover]
This new and revised edition of a classic reference text discusses current issues in the field of United States antiterrorism law. The materials in this comprehensive volume cover issues such as extraordinary rendition, interrogation, torture, the National Security Agency's electronic surveillance program, the president's inherent authority, and trying enemy combatants in military commissions. The volume also contains the text and notes from relevant legal cases, which are intended for use by legal practitioners as well as law school classes.

Maria O'Neill, The Evolving EU Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework (New York: Routledge, 2012), 328 pages, $145.00. [Hardcover]
With Europe increasingly targeted by terrorism, this book examines the rapidly emerging area of European Union (EU) law and policy regarding counter-terrorism, addressing these twin disciplines from both a theoretical and practical perspective.

Ana Maria Salinas De Frias, et al, editors, Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1120 pages, $290.00. [Hardcover]
A valuable comprehensive reference resource that brings together leading experts on the spectrum of legal issues involved in formulating and applying counter-terrorism policies domestically and internationally. Some of these issues include policy choices involved in implementing security measures, such as balancing security and civil liberties, the tensions between criminal justice, counter-terrorism and military measures, and legal aspects associated with counter-radicalization programs.

(xi) Terrorism on the Internet
As today's generations of terrorists are tracked and monitored by government counterterrorism agencies, they possess a distinct advantage that their older predecessors lacked: access to computers, the worldwide Internet, and cyberspace's myriad technological benefits in enabling them to bypass a country's physical borders to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train operatives in warfare, direct operations, and then broadcast such incidents on their supporting websites. The following books illustrate some of the latest findings on how terrorists exploit the Internet:

Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 256 pages, $19.96. [Paperback]
When Terror on the Internet was published in 2006 it was considered ground breaking and an instant classic as the first comprehensive study of this issue. Still highly relevant, it discusses how terrorist groups and their extremist affiliates have established a sophisticated and dynamic presence on the Internet, which has transformed the way they communicate, obtain information, conduct propaganda and issue threats against their adversaries. Terrorists also use the Internet to radicalize and recruit new members, raise funds, train followers in tactics and weaponry, organize and carry out warfare, and then broadcast such incidents on their own websites. The

author's discussion is illustrated with numerous examples from terrorist websites.

Boaz Ganor, et al, editors, <u>Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting</u> (Amsterdam, Holland: IOS Press, 2007), 289 pages, $155.96. [Hardcover]
This edited volume (in which this reviewer participated) is an important collection of papers by an eclectic group of international experts on terrorism and terrorists' use of the Internet, advertising, and graphic design, who gathered at a NATO Advanced Workshop to formulate a comprehensive campaign to counter terrorists' appeal on the Internet. The volume's chapters examine the "seductive" appeal of radical Islamist websites for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment, the use of symbolism in Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad, and how to uncover a terrorist group's rebellion's root causes by examining its Internet presence. The author provides practical ways to counter the "seductive" terrorist web by monitoring their cyberspace activities.

Yaakov Lappin, <u>Virtual Caliphate: Exposing the Islamist State on the Internet</u> (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 212 pages, $21.56. [Hardcover]
A compelling account by an Israeli journalist who covers terrorism, of how al Qaida, which sees itself as a government in exile, along with its myriad affiliate organizations, while failing to achieve its goal of reestablishing the Islamic caliphate on the ground, has succeeded in establishing a virtual caliphate in cyberspace. As an Islamist state that exists on computer servers around the world, the virtual caliphate is used by such Islamists to carry out functions typically reserved for a physical state, such as creating training camps, mapping out a state's constitution, and drafting tax laws. In such a way, he explains, these groups hope to upload the virtual caliphate into the physical world. Also noteworthy is the author's discussion of the components of effective countermeasures.

Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, <u>Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation</u> (New York: Routledge, 2011), 146 pages, $$43.95. [Paperback]
A comprehensive account of how terrorist groups use the Internet's new media by examining the content of their websites, including their extremist television programs. Based on the authors' content analysis of the discussion in such extremist forums and chat-rooms, they discuss how terrorism 1.0 has migrated to 2.0 where the interactive nature of new media is used to build virtual organizations and communities that transcend physical boundaries. Terrorist groups' media efforts are also directed at women and children, which are part of their long term strategies to radicalize whole communities. Of particular interest is the authors' examination of the relationship between terrorists' media presence and their actual terrorist activity on the ground. They conclude that, although the use of social networking tools such as Facebook and YouTube may advance terrorist groups' broadcast reach, the full impact of their use of such new media remains uncertain. Also discussed is the future of cyber terrorism and lessons learned from government counterterrorism strategies against terrorists' use of the Internet.

(xii) Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
While conventional weapons continue to represent terrorists' "weapons of choice," past incidents, such as Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 sarin gas attack against the Tokyo subway system and the post 9/11's anthrax letters attacks, as well as several thwarted plots involving ricin and radiological dispersal devices, are reminders that the resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) warfare represents the "next frontier" in catastrophic terrorist attacks. These issues are discussed in the following books:

Brian Michael Jenkins, <u>Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?</u> (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 457 pages, $26.95. [Hardcover]
An authoritative discussion by a veteran counterterrorism expert of terrorists' motivations and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the availability of nuclear black markets, whether 'suitcase' nuclear bombs are feasible, and how mysterious substances such as red mercury have been thought of being instrumental in manufacturing such weapons.

Stephen M. Maurer, editor, <u>WMD Terrorsim: Science and Policy Choices</u> (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 619 pages, $38.00. [Paperback]

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A comprehensive, multidisciplinary account on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism and governments' options for counter-action. Topics covered include terrorists' incentives for acquiring WMD; nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons technologies and genetically engineered weapons; sensor technologies; mathematical methods for analyzing terrorist threats and allocating governmental response resources; the role of domestic U.S. politics in shaping defense investments to counter WMD; port and airport defense; response and recovery technologies for WMD-contaminated sites; research and development incentives for bio-weapon vaccines and other homeland security technologies; psychological treatment of WMD survivors, and international initiatives to limit WMD proliferation by terrorist groups.

Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, editors, <u>Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction</u> (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2009), 494 pages, $82.95. [Hardcover]
An authoritative and comprehensive examination by leading experts of the likelihood of Islamist terrorist groups resorting to WMD warfare by documenting current trends in the ideology, strategy, and tactics of jihadists as these relate to WMD proliferation. Topics discussed include terrorists' interest in using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, an exploration of the roles of governments' intelligence, law enforcement, and policymakers in anticipating, deterring, and mitigating WMD attacks, an overview of nonproliferation policies designed to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists, a groundbreaking quantitative empirical analysis of terrorist behavior, and a polling of leading experts' estimates of the likelihood of a future WMD threat by such terrorist groups.

Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark, editors, <u>Unconventional Weapons and International Terrorism: Challenges and New Approaches</u> (New York: Routledge, 2009), 224 pages, $148.00. [Hardcover] [Paperback, 2012, $39.95]
The volume's editors have assembled an important collection of papers originally presented at a 2007 workshop on these issues, held at the Swedish National Defence College. The book's chapters discuss issues such as identifying early warning indicators to identify terrorists' possible acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, although such inquiry is hampered by the dearth of reliable data since there have been so few cases of such terrorist warfare. To address this challenge, the volume's essays attempt to develop a new methodological framework that encompasses both the technical factors contributing to a terrorist organization's ability to use such weapons and the motivational factors that might drive it to plan and conduct such attacks.

Benjamin Cole, <u>The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons?</u> (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2011), 320 pages, $25.00. [Paperback]
With terrorists expressing interest in potentially deploying chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in their warfare, the author evaluates the likelihood of such threats ever materializing. Also discussed are the components of effective governmental counter measures, such as police, military, and intelligence means, as well as carefully evaluating the politics, motivations (including personal and religious), scientific and technical abilities of the groups expressing an interest in resorting to such catastrophic warfare. The author's previous edition of this volume, co-authored with Nadine Gurr, was published in 2001.

Todd M. Masse, <u>Nuclear Jihad: A Clear and Present Danger?</u> (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 360 pages, $27.96. [Hardcover]
Written by a branch chief at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this is a highly authoritative account of the likelihood that Islamist terrorist groups might resort to nuclear warfare in pursuit of their political objectives. The author's appraisal of this threat is based on two major contending schools of thought: (1) the "conventionalists," who view the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack as highly likely over the next five to ten years, and (2) the "skeptics" who recognize the grave consequences of a terrorist nuclear detonation but discount the potential of terrorists ever deploying a nuclear fission device in the United States because massive casualties and widespread panic can still be produced by 'conventional' attacks. This is an important and objective assessment of the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist threat and the range of policy options required to address such threats.

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Russell D. Howard and James J.F. Forest, editors, <u>Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism</u> [Second Edition] (New York: McGraw Hill, 2012), 821 pages, $77.33. [Paperback]
A substantially revised and updated collection of original and previously published articles by scientists, academics, and government officials from the communities of counter-WMD proliferation and counterterrorism. The volume's first part presents an overview of key terms and significant strategic and policy debates on the current security environment and outlines how such catastrophic weapons might be employed by terrorist groups. The second part discusses the characteristics, availability, and dangers posed by specific types of such weapons, including how they play out in five case studies. The third part focuses on key dimensions of the WMD threat to a nation's critical infrastructure. The fourth part looks at past, present, and future national and international responses to such threats. In the final part, several analytical frameworks are provided (including one co-authored by this reviewer on threat convergence) to predict future WMD threats and identify lessons and strategies for the future. The appendices include U.S. national strategy documents on countering terrorism and standards for controlling WMD materials and technologies.

(xiii) Counterterrorism
The literature on governmental counterterrorism programs has produced valuable concepts and methodologies on the components required to formulate effective counterterrorism campaigns, including metrics to assess their effectiveness. Domestically, counterterrorism – or, anti-terrorism, its 'defensive' manifestation – is an important component of what is termed 'homeland security.' These and other issues are discussed in the following books:

Boaz Ganor, <u>The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers</u> (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 317 pages, $29.95. [Paperback]
The author, one of Israel's top academic experts on counterterrorism, presents an important model for effective governmental counterterrorism. The "puzzle" of the book's title refers to the myriad ways a governmental response to a terrorist rebellion can affect policy making, intelligence analysis, and offensive and defensive law enforcement and military countermeasures, and how to avoid the "boomerang effect" in exacerbating a terrorist rebellion that can result from faulty policies.

Paul Wilkinson, editor, <u>Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attacks Since 9/11</u> (New York: Routledge, 2007), 432 pages, $44.95. [Paperback]
The volume's contributors assess the effectiveness of the British government's responses to terrorism in terms of preventing, pre-empting, and countering such threats, and, in the event of an attack, mitigating its consequences. Effective counterterrorism, they point out, needs to consider a matrix of factors such as the nature of the adversaries' terrorist networks, tactics and targeting. The contributors also compare and contrast the UK's response with other states in the European Union and the United States. Also discussed are whether the post 9/11 era's domestic security measures in the UK are able to balance homeland security measures and civil liberties.

Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, editors, <u>Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons From the Past</u> (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 481 pages, $35.00. [Paperback]
Although dated, this edited volume is an important comparative study of the policies, strategies, and measures employed by thirteen democratic governments in countering the terrorist threats facing them. With many of the chapters using similar methodological frameworks, some of the findings include the need to understand one's adversary through effective intelligence, integrating counterterrorism agencies to work in unison, employing discriminate and proportional force to avoid unnecessarily escalating a conflict, and engaging moderate elements among the insurgents' constituencies to marginalize and reject the legitimacy of violent extremists in order to create the foundation for a possible negotiated settlement.

James J.F. Forest, editor, <u>Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives</u> [Three Volumes] (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 2016 pages, $400.00. [Hardcover]

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The three volumes bring together contributions by dozens of experts (including this reviewer) to discuss terrorist threats around the world and the components required for governments to defeat them. Volume I covers "Strategic and Tactical Considerations", Volume II examines "Sources and Facilitators", and Volume III discusses "Lessons Learned from Combating Terrorism and Insurgency".

Amos N. Guiora, <u>Fundamentals of Counterterrorism</u> (Austin, TX: Wolters Kluwer, 2008), 208 pages, $44.00. [Paperback]
An authoritative, multidisciplinary discussion of the multiple issues affecting governmental counterterrorism, written from a legal and policy perspective as they apply to nations around the world. The author is a former senior official in the Israel Defense Forces' Judge Advocate General's Corps, which gives the volume a practitioner's expertise on these issues. Issues discussed include defining terrorism, what motivates terrorists, terrorism and geo-politics, the limits of governments' power, terrorism and the media, state-sponsored terrorism, where terrorists are to be tried, and responding to terrorism as it affects the separation of a government's constitutional powers.

Daniel Byman, <u>The Five Front War: The Better Way to Fight Global Jihad</u> (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 320 pages, $27.95. [Hardcover]
A discussion by a leading academic expert of the components required for effective counterterrorism against al Qaida-type terrorism through the use of intelligence, law enforcement, counter ideological narratives, reforms in the targeted countries, and strong international alliances.

James J.F. Forest, editor, <u>Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas</u> (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 392 pages, $59.95. [Hardcover]
This edited volume focuses on the components involved in the competition for strategic influence between governments and their terrorist adversaries, including ways to neutralize terrorists' use of the Internet in spreading their propaganda. These issues are further discussed in the volume's case studies.

Stewart Baker, <u>Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren't Stopping Tomorrow's Terrorism</u> (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), 375 pages, $19.95. [Hardcover]
The author, who served as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's first Assistant Secretary for Policy, draws on this experience to give the reader an insider's account of his agency's post-9/11 strategy to upgrade border and aviation security. This involved obtaining improved information about travelers who might have a nexus to terrorism, and the strong resistance from privacy advocacy groups against expanding such databases. As a result, the author argues, certain security gaps still remain open and resistance by privacy groups is making it difficult to forestall future threats posed by new technologies, such as biotech viruses, which he argues could be more devastating than 9/11.

David Omand, <u>Securing the State</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 320 pages, $29.50. [Hardcover]
While democratic governments recognize that their citizens expect certainty and protection in their daily lives, especially safety from terrorism, this also places enormous pressures on their institutions to balance justice and civil liberty in the pursuit of such comprehensive security. The author, a retired former senior level security official in the British government, argues that while public security is necessary for good government, it should not come at the expense of eroding civil liberties, which might tip the balance in favor of bad government and, ultimately, result in an insecure state. To remedy this problem, the author establishes a set of principles and approaches for upgrading intelligence in counterterrorism while respecting the requirements of basic civil liberties.

Christopher Paul, et al., <u>Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 188 pages, $18.00. [Paperback]
An examination of the components of effectiveness in counterinsurgency, based on some 30 cases of resolved insurgencies. With several of these insurgencies featuring terrorist groups, the authors' analysis is highly relevant to counterterrorism. Also examined are the factors that

serve to hinder effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Especially noteworthy are the tables and figures that illustrate the volume's analysis.

Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response [Third Edition] (New York: Routledge, 2011), 238 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
Paul Wilkinson who passed away in 2011, was one of the founders of terrorism studies in the early 1970s and became one of its most prominent experts. In Terrorism Versus Democracy, Dr. Wilkinson continues his assessment of the terrorism threat, which he outlined in his earlier seminal book, Terrorism and the Liberal State, first published in 1977. Here, he examines the terrorist networks that operate globally and analyzes the long-term future of terrorism and terrorist-backed insurgencies. This new edition discusses the political and strategic impact of modern transnational terrorism, the need for maximum international cooperation by law-abiding states to counter not only direct threats to the safety and security of their own citizens but also to preserve international peace and security through strengthening counter-proliferation and cooperative threat reduction (CTR) regimes.

Andrew Silke, editor, The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2011), 216 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
Beginning with a discussion of the psychology of terrorists, such as their motivations, the factors that sustain them in their involvement in terrorist groups, and what eventually might drive some of them to end their involvement in terrorism, the chapters' primary focus is on the psychological challenges involved in responding to terrorism. Practical information is provided on short-term tactical problems (e.g. interviewing), as well long-term strategic questions involved in terminating a terrorist campaign. The authors find that more complex countermeasures are required than merely a quest for apprehension of individuals who engage in terrorism because otherwise they may result in deficient outcomes and needlessly prolonged terrorist violence.

Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011), 400 pages, $89.95. [Hardcover]
Organized topically, the textbook begins with an explanation of homeland security, and then proceeds to discuss the comparative homeland strategies and measures adopted by nine countries to combat terrorism, including countering radicalization, emergency response, border and transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, public health and military support for civil authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident.

Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (New York: Routledge, 2011), 376 pages, $138.00. [Hardcover]
An innovative approach to assess effectiveness in governmental counterterrorism measures through what the author terms "the concept of the performative power of counterterrorism," which is "the extent to which governments succeed in mobilizing public and political support in favor of their policies, thereby weakening terrorists' ability to create their "social drama." This concept is then applied to governmental counterterrorism campaigns in the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in the 1970s. Drawing on a case study approach which utilizes primary sources and interviews with counterterrorist officials and former terrorists, the author finds a correlation between a high level of counterterrorism "performative power" and a corresponding decline in terrorist incidents when linked to effective counter- radicalization efforts. Thus, addressing a terrorist conflict's underlying causes is an important factor in improved counterterrorism performance.

Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges, editors, The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 218 pages, $19.95. [Paperback]
This edited volume by RAND analysts addresses the issue of the American government's response to the terrorist threat in the 10 years since 9/11, by assessing the military, political, fiscal, social, cultural, psychological, and moral implications of U.S. policymaking, and suggests policy options for effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the future.

Michael B. Kraft and Edward Marks, U.S. Government Counterterrorism: A Guide to Who Does What (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 407 pages, $69.95.
This is the first published guide to many of the U.S. government's departments, agencies, and programs involved in all aspects of countering terrorism domestically and overseas. The authors, veterans of the U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts, present an insider's view of these counterterrorism efforts, addressing such topics as government training initiatives, countering weapons of mass destruction, interagency coordination, research and development, and the congressional role in legislative issues covering policies and budgets. Also covered are the still contested issues of defining terrorism and the government's efforts to counter violent extremism by susceptible communities. The authors also raise new trends in global events that are likely to affect how government agencies will need to approach counterterrorism in the future.

(xiv) Intelligence in Counterterrorism
The following books discuss intelligence issues involved in counterterrorism, such as using analytic methods to identify key players, map how terrorist groups are organized, track terrorist funding, and forecast future terrorist warfare.

Sundri Khalsa, Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 103 pages; $40.00. [Paperback]
In this highly innovative book, the author identifies 68 indicators that span the spectrum of terrorist activity, based on terrorist capability and intention, that, when applied to an actual group, serve as an early warning framework to anticipate future terrorist activity. A CD-ROM is included to graphically display the forecasting system and explain the author's methodology.

Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 126 pages, $20.00. [Paperback]
The authors develop a methodology to assess, forecast, and prioritize likely threats posed by terrorist groups under investigation. It is a highly practical methodology, with the assessment of terrorist threats, for example, consisting of identifying indicators of terrorists' intentions and capabilities which are then applied to assessing the threats presented in the case studies of four terrorist groups. Also examined are how different terrorist groups adapt and change over time, which is important in identifying their strengths and potential vulnerabilities.

Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman, Outsmarting the Terrorists (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 316 pages, $49.95. [Hardcover]
The authors contend that effective counterterrorism should strive to stop terrorists before they can attack by reducing opportunities for such attacks by protecting likely targets, controlling the weapons likely to be used by terrorists, and removing any vulnerable conditions that might make such attacks possible. The authors believe that such countermeasures are essential because response agencies need to prepare for what the terrorists are likely to do: identify vulnerable targets, analyze their specific weaknesses, consider the weapons needed to be used in an attack, and assess access to the targets. Once these countermeasures are implemented, counterterrorism agencies will then be able to provide appropriate protection, limit accessibility to potential targets, anticipate the response forces that might be required to prevent a potential attack, and be prepared to mitigate the consequences of an attack if it does occur. By employing such a methodology, terrorists can be 'outsmarted' and effectively defeated before they strike.

Hsinchun Chen, et al, editors, Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security (New York: Springer, 2008), 640 pages, $169.00. [Hardcover]
Terrorism informatics (a term invented by this reviewer in 2004) is the application of social science methodologies, information technology and computational software to analyze and model terrorism in all its configurations, making it one of the cutting edge methodologies used in the discipline of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. The contributors to this important volume (including this reviewer) discuss a multidisciplinary spectrum of topics in terrorism informatics

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ranging from mapping terrorism research, including identifying key figures in "terrorism studies"; applying methodologies and templates to identify and map terrorism's root causes in order to generate solutions; developing information technology-based knowledge management databases, such as incident databases and group profiles in order to generate future warfare trends; applying techniques to conduct threat assessments; identifying "learning patterns" by terrorist groups in order to counter them technologically; utilizing data mining technologies to "hunt" for potential terrorists in government and commercial databases and the civil liberties issues associated with such searches; applying social network analysis software tools to map how terrorist groups are organized and operate; using "web mining" technologies to analyze terrorists' use of the Internet; and applying situational awareness technologies for disaster response.

Malcolm W. Nance, Terrorist Recognition Handbook: A Practitioner's Manual for Predicting and Identifying Terrorist Activities (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 480 pages, $64.95. [Paperback]
Written by a 20-year veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, this book provides an assessment of terrorists' motivations and methods, including a listing of pre-incident indicators of potential terrorist activity, and the methodologies required to organize such information into actionable intelligence for effective response measures. Also discussed are the measures required to mitigate damage from terrorist attacks. The information is explained through numerous illustrations, including explanations of the types of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction that might be used by terrorists.

Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 328 pages, $19.99. [Paperback]
An account of the challenges posed by the transformation of U.S. intelligence to take into account new trends in the threats posed by terrorist groups. Such threats, the author writes, are of a different order of magnitude than those posed by state actors, which still pose first order threats, because terrorist groups are organized differently than state adversaries, as well as being geographically decentralized. This presents different types of challenges, such as forcing greater cooperation in information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and less demarcation between foreign and domestic jurisdictions in countering such threats.

Michael R. Ronczkowski, Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations [Third Edition] (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012), 417 pages, $89.95. [Hardcover]
Written by a recently retired senior law enforcement officer in Miami – Dade County Florida police department who also held command position in the county's homeland security department, this is an authoritative handbook on how to manage intelligence in countering terrorism at the local level. Especially useful is the author's practical protocol for gathering, analyzing, investigating, and disseminating terrorism-related intelligence, including how to recognize the radicalization process, behavioral and activity indicators of an impending terrorist operation and how to deter such an attack before it can take place. Also discussed are informer source development and its use in investigations, the role of fusion centers, terrorism financing, the handling of classified materials, and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative.

Resolving Terrorist Rebellions
Effective counterterrorism is expected to resolve terrorist insurgencies either through military/law enforcement or political/socio-economic conciliatory measures or through a creative mix of these response categories. Conciliatory measures are intended not only to address and solve the root causes underlying a terrorist rebellion, and, if possible, engage terrorist groups in a negotiation process, but also to facilitate the disengagement of a group's operatives from terrorist to peaceful activities. Terrorism can also end through the implosion of a terrorist group on its own, independent of a government's counterterrorism campaign. These issues are discussed in the following books:

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(xv) Deradicalization and Disengagement from Terrorism
Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, editors, <u>Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement</u> (New York: Routledge, 2009), 327 pages, $39.95. [Paperback]
An important collection of case studies, using empirical data to analyze the processes by which individuals and groups are likely to disengage from terrorism – a crucial component in the research on how to resolve terrorist insurgencies. Using a comparative method, the chapters compare and assess the various strengths and weaknesses in the disengagement programs in Colombia, northern Europe, Italy, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. The lessons learned from these cases are valuable in explaining their potential utility in a counter-terrorism program's ability to facilitate this crucial component in insurgency resolution.

John Horgan, <u>Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements</u> (New York: Routledge, 2009), 216 pages, $36.95. [Paperback]
An important overview of how and why individuals are likely to leave terrorist movements, as well as the lessons and implications that emerge from this process. Focusing on the tipping points for disengagement from groups such as al Qaida, the IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the author's account uses field research and interviews to explain why former terrorists left terrorism behind. The book examines three major issues: what we currently know about de-radicalization and disengagement, how discussions with terrorists about their experiences of disengagement can help identify how such exit routes come about, and how they fare as 'ex-terrorists' away from the terrorist "structures" that previously protected them, and the implications of these findings for counterterrorism agencies.

(xvi) Peace Negotiations With Terrorists
John Bew, Martyn Frampton, and Inigo Gurruchaga, <u>Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 256 pages, $27.50. [Paperback]
Northern Ireland's 1998 peace agreement, which put an end to some 30 years of the Provisional IRA's terrorist insurgency, is widely regarded as a "best practice" model of enlightened conflict resolution by governments and terrorist groups. In this important volume, the authors discuss the range of variables that played out in the Ulster negotiations, such as the selection of state representatives, the information provided by intelligence agencies, the wielding of hard power, and the wider democratic process used to manage the peace process. One of the reasons the negotiations succeeded, the authors point out, is that a sufficiently large faction within the PIRA had begun to realize that their aims were no longer attainable through violent means, with the British and Irish governments, in turn, realizing that the underlying conditions driving the conflict needed to be resolved. At the same time, the American government was able to provide neutral third party mediation, which was trusted by all the parties to the conflict. This volume is important in explaining the basis on which such a peace process was initially established and how its lessons can be applied to other cases, such as Spain and its Basque insurgency.

Carolin Goerzig, <u>Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence</u> (New York: Routledge, 2010), 192 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]
An examination, based on empirical field research in several countries, including interviews with current and former terrorists, of the effectiveness of governments' responses to terrorism based on their position on whether or not to negotiate with terrorist insurgents. The empirically derived findings are then used to establish whether there is any link between negotiating with such groups in order to address a conflict's underlying causes and the spread of terrorist violence when such negotiations either do not take place or fail. It also tests the hypothesis of whether terrorist groups proliferate when they realize that such acts of violence succeed in achieving their political goals or if they spread if governments give in to their demands. The author concludes that a qualitative relationship exists between providing concessions to terrorists and limiting the proliferation of terrorist groups, because it is through concessions that the "mentalities" and actions of terrorist groups are likely to change in favor of a peaceful resolution to their conflict.

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Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman, editors, <u>Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategy, Tactics, and Politics</u> (New York: Routledge, 2010), 256 pages, $138.00. [Hardover]
An important collection of papers analyzing when, why, and how governments and NGOs can negotiate with terrorist groups, including recommendations for best practice in negotiation processes. Part I discusses the theory and quantifiable data produced from analysis of hostage situations, while Part II explores several high profile case studies and the lessons that can be learnt from them. Negotiations involve attempts to align what began as completely polarized parties, with governments viewing terrorism as unacceptable means used to promote extremist demands, while terrorists view their actions as completely justified, even on moral and religious grounds. If both sides are to try and reconcile these polarized positions, the authors explain, it is essential for those in charge of negotiations to understand the terrorists' culture, profiles and personalities, their views of the world, and, for the terrorist "negotiators" to understand the nature of the government authorities, their values and how they frame the problems raised by the resort to terrorism, including hostage taking.

William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, editors, <u>Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing and Diplomacy</u> (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 300 pages, $19.95. [Paperback]
The volume's contributors contend that engaging extremists by governments is possible when it becomes part of a comprehensive roadmap that can ultimately lead to a conflict's negotiated agreement by addressing underlying problems and promoting factions that can be engaged with. Case studies focus on how such engagements have worked out in practice in the past.

Judith Renner and Alexander Spencer, editors, <u>Reconciliation after Terrorism: Strategy, Possibility or Absurdity?</u> (New York: Routledge, 2012), 248 pages, $130.00. [Hardcover]
The edited volume brings together scholars from the disparate fields of terrorism and reconciliation studies to examine from theoretical and empirical perspectives whether and how reconciliation may be a feasible strategy for dealing with, and ending, a terrorist conflict. This is an important issue for policy makers involved in responding to terrorist rebellions because terrorism is often a sign of deep societal rifts which reconciliation measures may help to overcome, if properly managed. Interestingly, as noted by some of the contributors, in some cases terrorist leaders might turn into political actors during the reconciliation process, making such a past no longer a contentious issue (e.g., the ANC in South Africa), while in others, their persistence in violence makes them an untenable partner for negotiations. To explain these issues, the contributors analyze the central questions involved in the reconciliation process, such as what constitutes 'reconciliation' as a process and an outcome, and how reconciliation can be facilitated in a situation of social conflict.

(xvii) How Terrorist Conflicts End
Audrey Kurth Cronin, <u>How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns</u> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 432 pages, $22.95. [Paperback]
Starting with the assumption that terrorist campaigns usually "come to an end," the author contends that it is important to examine the processes facilitating such terminal points in order for counterterrorism agencies to understand how to formulate effective strategies to hasten the decline of terrorist groups. The book addresses crucial questions such as: how long do terrorist campaigns generally last? When does targeting the leadership for assassination actually severely damage a group's capability? When do negotiations between governments and terrorist groups result in terminating the conflict? What conditions enable terrorist groups to transition to more widespread forms of warfare, such as guerrilla insurgency or civil war? How and when do terrorist groups succeed, fail, or disappear on their own? These theoretical issues are applied to a range of historical examples, such as the anti-tsarist Narodnaya Volya, the Provisional IRA, Peru's Shining Path, Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, and various Palestinian groups.

Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, <u>How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida</u> (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 250 pages, $33.00. [Paperback]
Utilizing empirical research, the authors find that terrorist rebellions usually end when they join the political process or local police and intelligence agencies succeed in arresting or killing key

leaders. Their recommendation, however, that in dealing with groups such as al Qaida policing and intelligence, not military force, should form the backbone of U.S. counterterrorism efforts might be questioned, since it has been demonstrated that a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism is most effective in countering terrorist groups whose political and religious extremism is so unyielding that it needs to be countered with military measures, such as the targeted killings of their leaders, as well.

Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 268 pages, $32.80. [Paperback]
Although focusing primarily on guerrilla insurgencies, many of this important volume's case studies also include terrorist rebellions, making their analysis of how insurgencies end highly relevant to counterterrorism studies. Their examination of 89 insurgencies finds that most last for about ten years, that being organized hierarchically increases their operational capabilities, as is the provision to them of state sponsorship. Having a sanctuary from which to organize their operations is also vital. They also contend that insurgents' use of terrorism often backfires. The authors conclude that there are no shortcuts to defeating insurgent groups, but that some key indicators for tipping points include an increase in insurgent fighter desertions and defections.

Leonard Weinberg, The End of Terrorism? (New York: Routledge, 2011), 168 pages, $41.95. [Paperback]
Written by a veteran scholar on terrorism, this is an insightful discussion of how warfare by terrorist groups generally comes to an end, based on an historical empirical examination of terrorism since the 1960s. Especially interesting is the author's discussion of the factors driving individuals who embarked on 'careers' in terrorism over the years to begin to disengage from violence. In addition to studying the roles of defection or the de-radicalization of individuals who engage in terrorism, the author also focuses on how terrorist groups are defeated, or how they end up defeating themselves.

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Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber:a Thought Experiment

By Anne Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch & Valentijn Vanrompay
Source:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/speckhard-taking-on-the-persona/html

Abstract
Nineteen university students experimented taking on the persona of an apprehended suicide bomber. The role play explored the psychological mechanisms of dissociative phenomena, euphoria or a sense of empowerment contemplating suicide bombing; responses of imagined secondary traumatization; identification with the victim group; creation of fictive kin; choosing the (imagined) target; and their (imagined) moral reasoning. Results were eerily similar to accounts of real (failed) suicide bombers. Subjects identified with secondary trauma and fictive kin; and reported revenge and justice seeking as motivators; dissociation, some having experiences of euphoria or empowerment when contemplating strapping on a bomb. Their moral reasoning was nearly identical with the one of suicide bombers, despite none of them being Muslim. Most imagined targeting children or civilians. This leads us to the tentative conclusion that psychological mechanisms underlying the contemplation to engage in suicide terrorism may be universal.

I. Understanding Suicide Terrorism
In the West, we live in a post-modern society in which we have lost our understanding of communal values and the ideas of self-sacrifice on behalf of the group. Indeed, we struggle to comprehend an individual who does not deem his own life and pursuit of it as more sacred than anything he could achieve by setting it aside. For this reason most of the early writings on the 9-11 bombers and on suicide terrorists in general found them incomprehensible, mad,

beyond reason or driven by poverty and illiteracy to commit inhuman deeds. However, in time researchers found that these conclusions were wrong and that human bombers are in the main not psychologically disturbed [1], are less impoverished and more educated than their peers (Atran, 2003; Sageman, 2004, Speckhard, 2005; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Indeed among samples of Palestinian (from the second intifada) and Chechen bombers it was found that suicide terrorists were often college educated and came from less impoverished sectors of their societies than their peers (Atran, 2004; Merari, 2003; Merari, 2005; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006; Akmedova, & Speckhard, 2006).

Those who study suicide terrorism have argued that as a phenomenon it arises from a unique synergy between the personal factors and individual motivations and social political concerns that foster it. As a tactic, suicide terrorism requires an ideology of martyrdom to sustain it. This ideology, which may exist completely independent of religion, is the glue that marries the individual motivations of the "would be" human bomber to the social political factors and groups that promote its use. That the ideologies that promote the use of suicide terrorism as a tactic may exist completely independent of any religion and be utilized in support of human bombing is a crucial point to make - one that is often missed by those who lump all suicide terrorism together with so-called "Islamic" based terrorism. Indeed suicide terrorism has been used by Marxist and non-religious groups as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and is as prevalent in groups whose ideologies are *not* related to Islamic beliefs as those that are.

Religion, poverty, illiteracy and madness put aside, one still must ask - once the marriage of individual motivations, ideology and political goals of the sponsoring organization has been achieved - how does an individual go forward to become a human bomb? How is he or she able to knowingly get in a car, truck or even on a bicycle, or most horrific of all - strap a bomb onto his or her own body - to in essence become a human bomb that goes directly to his target to explode him- or herself? How are these individuals psychologically able to manage their fears and put aside the universal instinct for self-preservation? If it is not religion

sustaining them in all cases, or madness driving them, how do suicide bombers make the decision to carry out such acts and what psychological processes aid them to go forward to their own deaths and the destruction of others - often including innocent civilians? These are the questions for which we sought answers.

We have limited answers to some of these questions from our own interviews and the research of others with failed suicide bombers – those who were apprehended prior to detonating their devices; interviews with their family members, acquaintances and handlers or senders as well as the study of the last testaments of successful bombers (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Speckhard, 2005; Argo, 2003; Hafez, 2004; Atran, 2003; Merari 2003). From these sources it appears that bombers are fairly rational in their decision-making processes and that they do not appear depressed, psychologically disturbed [2] (Akhmedova, K., 2003) or suicidal in the normal sense of the word, or psychopathological in their views of others (Atran, 2003). Yet there must be some active psychological ingredient present in all of them, which makes it possible for them to do the unthinkable – die in order to kill. We were curious to explore if the ability to put aside one's instinct for self preservation consists of universal traits that could be identified and studied and perhaps addressed when one seeks to curb the use of this particularly horrific terror tactic?

II. The Bomber Within

Indeed, after studying human bombers in Chechnya and the Palestinian territories and finding that personal experiences of daily humiliation; severe bereavement and traumatic stress, loss, frustration, desire for justice and nationhood, loss of all meaningful roles, and the desire for revenge often act as individual motivations for this type of self sacrifice, the lead author wondered if perhaps there is a universal capacity within all individuals to carry out such an act, a capacity that perhaps extends to all human beings? That perhaps we all carry a human bomber within - that every individual has their breaking point and given the right situation, circumstances, politics, and ideology anyone can become a suicide bomber? [3]

As researchers of suicide terrorism we were curious to learn about this potential breaking point and wondered if there are universal rationalizations given for and psychological defenses that are enacted by people of any nationality or religion when they consider, or actually carry out, strapping a bomb to their own bodies to go and explode themselves. Given that many real would-be bombers have been apprehended and given interviews about their decision-making process, psychological state and thoughts in carrying out such a mission, we wondered how similar the responses of 'normal' subjects of a similar age and educational background might be if the 'normals' were placed in a similar situation – even in a fantasy – to those of actual bombers. If so, we asked ourselves: would they make similar or very different rationalizations, speak of similar or different use of defenses? We wanted to know, if placed in such a fantasy role, whether they might voice similar or very different thoughts and feelings to those expressed by actual suicide bombers apprehended before detonating themselves.

To study this we decided to conduct a "thought experiment" in which subjects – that is university students of varied international backgrounds – were asked to take part in an exercise in which they would be asked to briefly imagine taking on the persona of a suicide bomber in order that we could study what psychological states they would experience in that role. In this exercise they were asked to enter briefly into a role play in which they took on the role of a bomber apprehended shortly after strapping on a bomb and going to his target but apprehended just prior to exploding himself and to give an interview from that psychological point of view.

We wanted to learn whether, once in role, 'normal' students might give evidence of the use of psychological defenses reportedly utilized by real bombers, and whether they might identify from a distance with the traumas of others. We also wanted to know whether the concept of "fictive kin" might be operational for them. In addition, we wanted to study their decision-making process in the imaginative exercise - of how they picked a target and whether or not they justified targeting civilians.

III. Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber - The "Thought Experiment"
Sample

Our thought experiment was conducted in English at a Belgian University within an English speaking college in Brussels (the Free University of Brussels, Vesalius College). 19 subjects of varied nationalities (1 each of Swedish, Bulgarian, German, Indian, Norwegian, Italian, British, Puerto Rican, Dutch, 2 unspecified, 2 Belgians, 6 Americans) and varied majors (1 philosophy; 1 anthropology; 1 economics; 1 communication; 2 psychology; 2 international studies; 3 computer science, 6 political science, and 2 unspecified), all aged between 19-24 and of both genders (7 female and 12 male) were recruited to take part in the experiment. In regard to their religious upbringing, 6 had an atheistic/agnostic background, 8 had a Christian background (5 Catholic, 1 Protestant, and 2 Orthodox), 2 had a Christian/atheist background, 2 had a Jewish background and 1 unspecified. The sample contained no one of Islamic heritage. None of the subjects had prior military experience.

Recruitment

The subjects (none of whom declined) were invited by the student members of the experimental team to take part – being invited from the hallway immediately during the time of the experiment - and told if they agreed that they should wait a short time period in the hall before being invited into the experimental room to take part in a brief psychologically oriented "thought experiment", giving an interview on a subject that should not be embarrassing to them (following an informed consent protocol). Upon their arrival for the interview the subjects were invited to take part in the "thought experiment" in which they were asked, immediately at the time of the interview if they would be willing to take on the persona of an individual that we would describe to them and then once having assumed that role give an interview based on the thoughts and feelings that they experienced in the role described to them. All of the subjects were told that we did not reasonably expect the experiment to cause them any harm or significant distress or humiliate them and that the only foreseeable risk to them was if they were actively suicidal. All students were screened negative for any active suicidality and informed consent was obtained prior to proceeding with the experiment, making clear to the students that they

could discontinue the experiment at any time and for any reason.

The Role Play
Following obtaining informed consent and the proceeding introduction, we verbally presented to the subject the scenario for the experiment as follows:
For this experiment we would like you to take on the persona of a suicide bomber. For this role you will be a Palestinian living in the Palestinian territories. You probably know something about the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, no? (Affirmation was gained in all cases, although one (American) subject was particularly naïve and even unsure where Israel was located). As a Palestinian living in the Palestinian territories you are from time to time subjected to all day curfews lasting sometimes for several days in which you are required to stay in your home. You suffer many small indignities and your life is not easy. Your economic situation is difficult and you often face the necessity to cross checkpoints to get to school or work if you work. You are aware of the Israeli practice of destroying the homes of suicide bombers, although, on the other hand, you also know of the practice of families of "martyrs" receiving financial compensations often including new homes and raised standards of living as a reward for their family member's action. You have, for various reasons, decided to become a suicide bomber.
You may have many motivations for deciding to become a bomber, which you are free to make up as you role play, but we would like you to consider that there was a particular galvanizing event in your decision making process - the fact that you witnessed, not in person, but on television, the mistaken shootings of two young children (boys) by Israelis special forces - an event which may in reality occur occasionally. This event disturbed you greatly. Likewise you were not actively recruited by a terrorist organization to become a bomber, but instead you volunteered, seeking out the terrorist organization yourself, asking for the means to carry out this act. You also picked your own target, which you are free now to pick in the role-play. It might be a pizza parlor, a bus, a military checkpoint, or any crowded area, or place. You are free to choose it. You may have a preference for a place populated by soldiers or by civilians. You may choose to avoid a place where there are many mothers

and children or that may be less important to you. In any case you were furnished by the terrorist organization with a suicide belt and the instructions on how to use it– you know this device by which suicide terrorists carry out their acts - it's strapped to their bodies and they have a detonator? (This was answered in the affirmative in all cases). Now, to make this "thought experiment" plausible we ask you to pretend that you went so far as to strapping on the belt and going to the target where you were about to detonate, but that you were discovered and apprehended before detonating – hence you are still alive and we can now interview you about your thoughts and feelings up to that point. Having been apprehended you are, in this scenario, currently in an Israeli prison and life is not so great for you. (Then asking the subject directly.) Is this okay of you? You can take on this role and we can begin our interview? (The answer was affirmative in all cases, although often with some nervous laughter and brief expressions of doubt about one's ability to carry on "in role").
The rational for giving this scenario was as follows: We were interested to compare what average college students of varied nationalities and religious backgrounds would say when role playing the part of a Palestinian bomber to what actually apprehended Palestinian and other human bombers often say about themselves; we also wanted to compare what our subjects would say with what the experts on real human bombers have to say about them.[4] To do so, we wanted our person in role-play to have suggestions about how stressful and humiliating aspects of daily life can be for Palestinians (economic hardships, curfews, checkpoints, etc.), particularly during the time period of the Second Intifada when there was a huge spike in suicide terrorism. Likewise, we wanted our fantasy role-play bomber to reflect on the current Palestinian terrorism situation in which bombers more often recruit themselves than are being recruited. We were also curious to know how active and strong the concept of "fictive kin" and secondary traumatization might be if we introduced into the imagined role play the aspect of having witnessed not in person - but over the television - an Israeli act of aggression (admittedly a mistaken shooting) of children not related by blood to the person witnessing it via

television. We wanted to know whether our role player would show somehow that he or she had psychologically identified with the children victims, even going so far as to consider them related to him or her in some manner (i.e. fictive kin). We also wished to learn how our role player would pick his or her target if free to do so and what he or she would feel in imagination when "recalling" strapping on an explosive self-detonating device. We did, however, not give any additional information about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict other than these specific bits of information because we did not want to introduce any potential bias to the role-play. The information was presented verbally because the subjects were of many different nationalities and more proficient in oral versus written English. The verbal explanation also opened rapport and facilitated the move to the experimental interview.

The interview began immediately at this point, with the experimenters asking the subject how he was being treated in prison, about their family members and if their families knew where he was and if he had contact with them and concerns about them. All of the subjects went immediately "into role" and deepened their experience of the role as they proceeded with the interview. The subjects were asked how they decided to become "martyrs", using this word to affirm their assumed world-view. After discussing the jail and their imagination of their families all of the subjects went deeply into their assumed roles and moved easily to speaking freely in response to research questions posed to them about how they decided to become bombers and how they picked their targets. After this, the subjects were asked to describe how they felt upon receiving the bomb and strapping it on to their bodies, what they felt at that moment and what happened as they moved to their target. The interview ended with their imagined description of how the scenario ended in arrest and imprisonment.

Following the conclusion of their role play, all of the subjects were carefully debriefed with questions about how they felt participating in the experiment, whether or not they were surprised by their own answers (most were), whether it was difficult to move into the role play (all said it was strange at first but that they easily moved into it as they began to make up their story and that they strongly identified with

the character they role-played - even though most had little to no knowledge of either the subject of suicide bombing or the Palestinian/Israeli conflict). Lastly, subjects were assessed to be sure they had moved completely out of the role play, were back to "normal", and were not emotionally upset. (The process upset only one woman and this was due to her alarm over the fact that she had expressed a strong aspect of revenge stating when in role that she would target young children. She received further debriefing about her strong identification with the traumas of the children "shot on television" and became calm and self accepting again, although she remained surprised at the intensity of her desire for revenge in the role play). Subjects were then thanked for their help in the research project.

IV. Results
The results of this experiment are quite interesting in light of how "normal" college students approach the role of a suicide bomber in comparison with the information available about the mentality and decision-making of real suicide bombers (from interviews with apprehended bombers, their family members, close associates, hostages and senders). We were particularly struck by how easily a normal student would take on this role and imagine making similar decisions and describe similar mental processes to real suicide bombers. This leads us to conclude that perhaps the mentality of revenge, generalizability of revenge to wider targets than those who caused the original harm, and the psychological defenses enacted to face one's own death by self-explosion are not limited to bombers but are universal to all persons. We discuss our results in comparison with existing data below:

Witnessing Trauma, Identifying with the Victim and the Concept of Fictive Kin
The concepts of secondary traumatization (Atran, 2003; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006)[5], witnessing or identifying with the victim has a large psychological literature. Indeed the current definition of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) defines an event capable of engendering acute or posttraumatic stress disorder as one in which the person experiences, *witnesses*, or is confronted with an event or events that involves actual or

threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others and that the person's response involves intense fear, helplessness, or horror (*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 4th ed DSM-IV-R, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

The fact that *witnessing* or experiencing injustices in a conflict zone can be an individual motivator for terrorist activity including becoming a human bomber has been borne out in many research endeavors including research interviews of both Chechens and Palestinians (Argo, 2004; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005; Speckhard, & Akmedova, 2006a; Speckhard, & Akhmedova, 2006b; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Clearly absorbing the traumas of others and identifying with them can be a motivating force both within conflict zones and even far from them.

The likelihood of posttraumatic responses occurring in those living in conflict and terror ridden zones via witnessing versus personal and direct experience and even outside those zones is greatly increased these days by satellite television and Internet coverage. Indeed Nicole Argo (2006) reported the following from one of her Palestinian research interviews:

The difference between the first intifada and the second is television. Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I cannot get away from Israeli attacks - the TV brings them into my living room. When they are not in my camp, they are in Rafah, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin.... And you can't turn the TV off. How could you live with yourself? At the same time, you can't ignore the problem - what are you doing to protect your people? We live in an internal struggle. Whether you choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle. - PFLP leader, Khan Yunis, June 2004.

Incarcerated Palestinian "would be" suicide terrorists also recount their traumatic stress responses after viewing televised images of violence. "The things we see on television are nauseating and make us lose our taste for life.…" "Beforehand I saw pictures of dead or wounded children on television.." One such respondent even goes so far as to credit what he saw on television as the main motivation for his thwarted act of suicide terrorism, "The pictures we saw on television are what

influenced me and pushed me to make the decision to do the operation" (Hass, 2004).

Terror-sponsoring organizations understand this psychological effect and make use of televised and Internet images to motivate and capture impressionistic youth into joining *Jihadist* groups. Indeed some of the images found on the Internet used on behalf of promoting Al Qaeda type terrorist ideologies urging violent responses to the West have become iconic. When one delves deeper into the images and stories behind them, the truth is often much different than what is portrayed, but like all iconic images – the truth is often of much less importance than what the images have come to represent – a rallying call to action on behalf of the downtrodden and victimized.

In this research we were curious to learn if we introduced the element of witnessing trauma into an imaginary role play – in this case witnessing an act of mistaken aggression over the television, but not in person – in which an Israeli soldier mistakenly fires upon and kills two Palestinian boys would act strongly as a motivator and rationalization for becoming a suicide terrorist. We suggested to our subject that this was a type of "galvanizing event", something that pushed the "would be" terrorist into action but we left it up to the student to incorporate this aspect of the narrative into his or her own role play. We were curious to know how much impact witnessing over television, but not experiencing in reality would play a part in an imagined role-play concerning what the person offered as rationalizations, justifications and motivations for violence.

Moreover, we were curious about the concept of fictive kin – if and how the subject might incorporate this concept into their role-play. Scott Atran (2003) writes about this anthropological concept in terms of terrorism studies stating that current terrorist ideologies, particularly those of an Islamic nature and their sponsoring units often promote this concept within their ideology and practices. They do this by referring to other Muslims, albeit individuals of completely differing cultures and nationalities undergoing traumas in other parts of the world as fictive kin naming them "brothers". On the home front, they also make use of this concept by encouraging terrorist members to identify with their terror cell mates as fictive kin - being loyal to and willing

to die for them as they would for mother, father, brother or sister – a phenomena we have found in our research as well (Speckhard, & Ahkmedova, 2005). We were interested to learn if our subjects would incorporate and identify with as "fictive kin" - the story about two killed children that we had offered them - into their imagined world. We coded for evidence of identifying with fictive kin if the subject created a family member in imagined role play of the same age as the boys and/or directly named a relationship to the boys – i.e. stating they could have been my sons or brothers (and therefore I was willing to die on their behalf).

Table 1:Presence of Fictive Kin by Gender Choice of Target – Revenge and Generalizability of Revenge

saw on television innocents just born into this war killed brutally." Another male student explains how he kept his feelings at bay (in role play) for strapping on the bomb by focusing on his feelings for the children who were killed, "I was thinking of the kids at home the whole time, it made me stronger … it could have happened to them. It could have been my brothers. As I went toward the target I didn't look to the soldiers. I was thinking of those two boys - it made me stronger. I felt conscious of what I was going to do, to help stop massacres. Everyday kids die from Israelis soldiers."

Television and Internet images are an amazing medium when one considers their potential to traumatize. Even when one witnesses events from a distance over this medium, the psychological impact can be immense and the

Remarkably, this concept was quite active in the sample (see Table 1). Seventy-nine percent of the sample (15 of the 19) subjects identified immediately with the shooting of the two small children by fantasizing themselves as either the parent of small children or the older sibling of younger siblings – hence it appeared that they had made the shootings of the small children that they were told were only witnessed from afar (over television) personally "real" for them and a traumatic event with which they identified. One subject, for instance, told us that he was the father of two children and spoke about how disturbed he was by what he had viewed on television, "I

memory of it can be confused with having had the experience in reality. Take, for instance, one subject who was told by the researchers that he witnessed the event on television but in the interview tells us he saw the shooting with his own eyes (neither is true, but he confused having been told he saw it on television with having seen it in reality). From our own interviews with terrorists (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005) and those of others (Haas, 2004; Argo, 2003) we know that many strongly identify with traumas they have only seen over the television. From this research as well as our field interviews we suspect that many people who view traumas over

television and the Internet may feel this way. The same is true for victims of terrorism; some have strong and acute stress responses from viewing televised images of events they were not even close to experiencing.

Humans have a strong, possibly innate, desire for, and willingness to enforce, fairness. There are a limited number of ways to deal with an offense: denying the hurt, reframing it in some way that explains or justifies the offender's behavior, receiving fair restitution, forgiving, accepting the transgression, or obtaining successful revenge. Revenge is also something that is often claimed to be related to Islamic related terrorist ideologies as though Islam is to blame, when in fact the desire for, and willingness to enforce, fairness – even by enacting revenge upon an offender – is more than likely to have an innate basis which can be universally found in all persons.

Indeed it was reported in *Science* (Knutson, 2004) that researchers studying the concept of revenge in laboratory settings found that people playing a game with real money will pay a fine to punish players who stray from concepts of fair play. The laboratory game was set up so that in each interaction a subject was allowed to choose to give their partner money, which was then quadrupled for the recipient. The player receiving money was then given the chance to split half of this windfall. That is, he could reciprocate in fairness to the first player by sharing half of it or defect from the game and keep the money himself. If the receiving partner decided not to reciprocate and defected, the first subject could choose to administer punishment. In the initial trial, the punishing player did not pay to punish, but subsequently the punishing player was only able to punish by fining the other player for not sharing his windfall by having to pay from his own money half the amount of the fine to do so. In both cases, brain imaging of the punishing player suggests that there is an anticipated pleasure associated with the satisfaction of punishing a transgressor and that this pleasure exists even when one must pay to do so. If viewed in strictly economic terms, paying to punish another player is irrational behavior. However, when one factors in the emotional pleasure and satisfaction of punishing a transgressor, this benefit then outweighs spending costly personal resources (i.e. in this case money) to do so.

The Knutson study, which is only one of a growing body of literature, underlies the growing recognition that perhaps concerns over social justice are innate. While extrapolating from laboratory findings of concepts of fair play to individuals witnessing what they perceive as socially unjust actions is perhaps unmerited, it does shed some light on why individuals – even human bombers - might be willing to put aside the personal costs (i.e. sacrificing themselves) in order to punish others, and thereby depriving the anticipated satisfaction of ensuring that transgressors receive their just due. Indeed researchers have often heard exactly this justification given by "would be" bombers, in bomber's last testimonies, from their family members and close associates etc. (Merari, 2005; Speckhard, 2005b ; Speckhard, & Ahkmedova, 2005; Argo, 2003)

It is also interesting to consider the concept of generalized revenge which relates to the individual's, as well as his sponsoring organization's justifications for targeting acts of revenge to a wider group, including civilians, than those who in the bomber's and the sponsoring organization's perceptions are directly responsible for the injustices. Akhmedova (2003) has studied this concept in Chechnya. There, the majority of the population consists of ethnically Islamic people who share in their Chechen traditions the ideology of revenge. According to this ethos when a family member is harmed or killed it is the responsibility of specific family members to seek out the transgressor and make him pay accordingly. This ideology of revenge is strictly codified and does not in normal practice spread beyond seeking out the originator of the harm or his close family and obtaining repayment for his deed. Recently however, with widespread war, resulting psychological traumatization, bereavement and the importation of a terrorist ideology this mindset is changing: revenge is becoming generalized in the minds of many.

Akhmedova (2003) found in her study of 653 clinical subjects who had undergone war traumas that those who had the highest levels of posttraumatic effects had undergone a transformation in this regard (Akhmedova, 2003). They endorsed revenge in thirty-nine percent of the cases and no longer regarded revenge as a duty to find and repay in kind the person who had harmed their family, but instead

generalized their revenge – to enact harm on any member of the ethnic group from whom the harm had originated (i.e. the Russians military or civilians). With increased traumatization, generalized revenge became both sufficient and acceptable. There were also positive correlations between their endorsement for revenge and increasing levels of religiosity, aggression, suspiciousness, and negativism (Akhmedova, 2003).

We see a willingness to target civilians reflected in the Palestinian case. In a research interview from his jail cell in Jericho, the leader of the PFLP, Ahmed Sadat, (Speckhard Palestinian interview October 2004) told us that there are no civilians, except for children in Israel because all women and all men train for the defense force at age 18 and they all serve in reserve units. Therefore, when one targets adult civilians in his logic, one is targeting the defense force. Likewise a mother from Gaza whose children were recently killed in the crossfire between terrorists and Israelis cried out after picking up the body parts of her innocent children, "Let Sharon lose his son. Let Sharon collect the parts of his son". Then, pointing to her own body, "Put the explosives here! I'll go to the tank and explode myself" (Erlanger, S. 2005).

In regard to our thought experiment study, we were curious to observe how easily normal students far removed from conflict zones would, while in role-play, embrace the concept of revenge and how much they would generalize their revenge-seeking behaviors to justify targeting civilians (see Table 2). In this case, it was very interesting to see that only twenty-six percent (5/19) of the subjects who when given complete freedom to chose their target reported limiting their choice to a strictly military or government target (i.e. military checkpoint, government house, etc.). Remarkably, one third of the sample (6/19) deliberately chose targets involving children, teenagers, and extremely sensitive places (children's schools, McDonald's, the Western (Wailing) Wall, UN conference, etc.) in order - as they stated - to inflict the worst and most horrific revenge on their enemies. One young woman explained, "I chose the Western Wall because it is where I'd inflict the most pain, hit them where it hurts." The remainder or forty-two percent of the sample (8/19) chose civilian targets but did not mention specifically targeting children, teenagers or extremely

sensitive locations (i.e. cafes, buses, busy markets, etc.). Hence the majority of the sample – seventy-four percent (14/19) displayed behaviour in line with the concept of generalized revenge and the willingness to target civilian populations.

Examples of statements made by the students about how they picked their targets were as follows: A young man explains, "I was going to the government building, because I wanted the people in charge with some authority to die." A young woman states, "I didn't think for a moment of the people I would kill, of their pain or their relatives' emotions." A young man states that his target was a school. When asked why, he explained, "They kill our children all the time. If you want to hurt them you have to hurt their future." Another young woman stated, "I went on a crowded bus full of civilians. Because they pick civilians - to kill them." A male student explained, "My religion does not encourage killing, but after their atrocities it is what they deserved. There is no distinguishing between victims, as many people could suffer for what had been done." Regarding targeting civilians, a female stated, "I had a quick flash of pity, but I didn't let it overtake me." Another male student recounted, "I wanted to shock as much as possible. I wanted to be sure it will be on television. To be sure of the impact." When asked if he felt any guilt he said, "I've been through so much, all I wanted was revenge."

The student's own amazement at themselves, at how easily and completely they could take on in a role-play the perceived injustices of Palestinians and how strongly they wished in the role-play to enact revenge – and to do so in an expressive manner – causing their enemy to feel the same pain they felt, was one of the most discussed aspects in debriefing with the students. Most stated in the role play and the debriefing that they understood that acts of revenge would likely do very little to change the situation and might even worsen it, but that it was still important to enact revenge to express their pain and for purposes of social justice. One young woman, as stated earlier, became upset with herself and cried briefly after the experiment because she had said she would target a children's school – an aspect of her desire for revenge that deeply surprised and horrified her. Most of the students in the debriefing admitted they knew very little about

suicide terrorism in general and had few opinions on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict prior to participating, yet they surprised themselves that they had identified so strongly with the Palestinians and chosen civilian targets on the basis of the desire for revenge.

student's rationale was as follows: "(After) all the suffering of my people I wanted to do something. I saw a lot of people die. I just want to do something." He goes on to say, eerily echoing words often heard by real bombers, "(It's) something you have to do. It's

Table 2: Goals according to Gender Motivations and Commitment to Carrying out the Act

When we asked our role-playing students about their motivations for carrying out a suicide act, sixty-three percent (12/19) cited oppression or suffering; forty-two percent (8/19) referred to the "fictive kin" story we had told them about the two boys being killed; another eleven percent (2/19) referred to stories they invented about other blood relatives being killed; and five subjects (twenty-six percent) cited expressive reasons – "to give a message".[6] Likewise, when we asked them about their goal in carrying out such an act, seventy-nine percent (15/19) stated enacting revenge and acting for reasons of social justice; eleven percent (2/19) stated political goals of bringing freedom or a better place to live; twenty-one percent (4/19) wanted to send a message; and one subject wanted to bring media attention and public awareness to the Palestinian cause. An example of one male

duty for your people – nothing more."

Out of curiosity, we decided to also ask the role-play students whether, upon being caught, they regretted having carried out their mission or if they remained committed to it. Half the sample volunteered that they would do it again. It was interesting to observe the emotional effect of taking on a martyr identity – that, once in role, they became very committed to their role and the sense of purpose derived from it. Without any suggestions to do so, many described their act as self-sacrifice for their communities and took on a sense of honor for what they were doing. One for instance stated, "I was very angry at these people for stopping me from fulfilling my destiny. (Would you repeat it?) "Yes, I'd plan it better. I'd use a way they couldn't stop me." Another young man described his conflicting feelings (imagining) strapping on a bomb - feelings for which he ultimately came to terms with by seeing himself as a martyr for a greater cause, "it (the bomb) felt very, very cold. Physical aspects, it takes a lot of conviction,

conflicting feelings, (but) in the end you know what you have to do. Intense emotions, a sense of power, sense of duty, purpose. (Fear?) I tried to overcome it. I convinced myself. I felt fear, but it was something I could deal with. I should respond to the call to arms. It was an important way to use my life." This same young man stated, "I feel like I accomplished something, I was ready to die. I'd do it again. I blame them, they drove me to do this to save my people." Another young man stated that in strapping on the bomb he felt a, "Sense of power, a sense of duty – a purpose." Another young man explains that, facing death, "It was worth something. I was not afraid." A young woman compares life in general to her willingness to sacrifice herself, "I don't really mind. There is nothing so amazing on this earth. I wanted to help." A young woman states that even the expressive nature of the act made it worth dying for, echoing how many Palestinian bombers speak of their recognition that often their acts do very little to change things but at least express their pain and make the other feel it as well (Argo, 2003). This young subject states, "It was worth it to die if it sends the message."

Feelings About Facing Death
All the subjects were asked about their feelings facing death. Sixty-eight percent (13/19) stated that they were peaceful when facing death. A young man stated, "I'd be in a much better place. I told my family of my plans, goodbye, it was peaceful on both sides. (Their) provider has left them in a most honored way." A very bright young female student stated in her role-play a somewhat irrational view of how death would bring her peace of mind, perhaps reflecting how young people often do not totally comprehend the finality of death. She explained that she viewed facing death as, "Peaceful, I'd be at peace, no longer frustrated and no longer see others frustrated. It would be good for my own state of mind." Perhaps this can be compared to the real thwarted Palestinian student human bomber who agreed to be a bomber but told his sender he would have to wait for his mission until the day after he completed his exams – as though having completed his exams would make any difference after his death.

Emotional State and Use of Dissociative Defenses to Face Strapping on the Bomb

Dissociative defenses [7] are commonly active in survivors of psychological traumas (those with acute and posttraumatic stress disorder) and in individuals who grow up under repetitively traumatic circumstances, such as those that characterize the lives of many suicide bombers. Dissociation - that is the disruption of the normally integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment - as well as the ability to enter and make use of a dissociative trance state – is frequently observed in trauma survivors. Traumatized individuals, especially those who have suffered multiple and repeat traumas (particularly in childhood) have often learned to utilize this defense to detach themselves from overwhelming horrifying, terrifying and life-threatening circumstances.
Similarly, individuals with near-death experiences often report dissociative responses to them such as depersonalization (the feeling of being outside one's body) or derealization (feeling things are not real). In the near death moment, individuals often report feeling as if they are outside of their bodies, observing from a distance, as if everything is not real, or as if they are watching a movie, are still, blissful, joyful, etc. (Greyson, 2000).
Likewise, dissociation is a defense frequently engaged in individuals enacting normal suicide probably to overcome the horror of taking one's own life. Bruce Bonger (2004), for instance, recalled his work studying the video and audio recordings left behind of normal (i.e. non-politically motivated) suicides who recorded taking their own lives. He stated that, generally speaking, there is clear evidence that the individual becomes highly dissociative as he makes the last moves before taking his own life, particularly when using a violent method. Similarly, an Israeli study of 'normal' suicides showed that suicidal people differ from non-suicidal in their tendencies towards body dissociation, body protection and body in general (Orbach, Israel, et al. 2001; Speckhard, 2004). Their study showed that people who experience physical or mental traumas often change their perceptions and body experiences, and suffer symptoms such as bodily detachment. They also found a very high correlation between dissociation and suicide, suggesting that early trauma can lead to dissociative episodes and furthermore to suicide ideation.[8]

The dissociative function – that is the ability to enter into a trance state and separate oneself from fear, dread, and grief – seems to be both a facilitator and a commonly spoken about characteristic of those who commit acts of suicide terrorism. Failed bombers often speak of utilizing what appears to be a dissociative defense to manage their fears in strapping on a bomb and moving toward their own self-induced deaths. Almost universally, the putative bombers describe their psychological state (with their bombs strapped on) as one of "floating" or "bliss", or they report having "felt nothing", etc. Such descriptions are consistent with dissociative trance and feature prominently and repeatedly in accounts given by failed suicide terrorists to journalists and researchers (Hassan, 2001; Haas, 2004; Speckhard, & Akmedova, 2005; Speckhard, 2005). When bombers speak of feeling in this dissociated state, a sense of euphoria or "dissociative" bliss (Speckhard, A. 2005), we hypothesize that they have accessed a neurobiological brain state which is in all likelihood endorphin induced - as is also hypothesized for other self injurious behaviors (i.e. self cutting, anorexia, bulimia).[9]

An example evidencing the dissociative defense in a real bomber follows below. Arin, a twenty-four year Palestinian woman was arrested after going to bomb herself. She had worn her explosive belt for six hours, but opted against detonating and returned home. She was interviewed in Israeli prison in March 2005 by the first author (Speckhard, 2005). Arin recalled her normal tendency to dissociate when experiencing negative situations and emotions and her mental state with the belt on. "I was not conscious. When I meet bad things I, Arin, move away. I collect the bad things and work out of myself." She stated, with the bomb on, "I felt very nervous. I felt my mind stopped. For six hours I cannot think." Then she stated how her dissociative trance was interrupted by seeing babies. "Just at the last moment. I looked at the people. I looked at the babies. I saw babies. I thought if he dies what should I tell God? What should I tell Him? If he wants to cut my life and take my soul okay, but I don't have the right."

We were particularly interested to learn if the normal students in our role-play exercise would also give evidence of the use of a dissociative defense when imagining strapping on a bomb and if they would also speak of any type of "high" or "blissful" state in describing the time when they approached (in imagination) the final moments before detonating their devices. We were surprised to find that, even in role-play, a majority of the sample, seventy-four percent (14/19) referred to what could be considered a dissociative defense in response to imagining strapping on the bomb. Thirty-seven percent (7/19) of the subjects also described using this dissociative response in a way that went so far as to induce (in their imaginations) a euphoric state of mind. These responses are described below:

A young female student stated, "It (the bomb) felt heavy, not only physically but emotionally heavy, because there was no turning back once it's on. I had no fear – more of a tranquility. Committing so strongly – it is like your medicine, your remedy – that this will solve everything .... The journey with the belt – it was like a dream, I floated along. I interacted with people, but my mind was not there. I was not totally unconscious, but it was a muted scene, my senses were dulled. It felt euphoric, everything at ease." When asked how she felt about being caught, she stated that being arrested felt like "being woken up from a dream." When asked whether, upon being freed, she would attempt another attack, she answered, "I'm not sure if I would do it again. It's like a drug. It's very euphoric, but I'm not sure I would want to do it again, rather just remember it the way it was."

Another female student told us, "It was very easy for me to contact the organization. I did it very quickly after I decided it – it had to be quick. I was in a kind of euphoria. I was afraid it wouldn't last – I had to hurry. I saw a fantasy of myself as a saint, a martyr in a children's book… I was happy people will talk about me."

Another female stated how she felt strapping on the bomb (in imagination), "I felt it was the beginning, starting. Kind of feels like the first step. From then on I started getting adrenalin, a good feeling. I was not scared. I thought of my mission that I was going to fulfill."

A male student explained his imagined mental state with the bomb strapped on, in these words: "Right before I was caught. I felt a very peaceful moment. I'd made everything let go, I'd been cleansed of all doubt, all big burdens lifted from me. There were very vivid, very bright colors, and I

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could smell the air. My adrenaline was pumping and I noticed everything, like in sports."

A young male student explained about putting on the bomb, "It felt good. When you walk in with a sense of purpose, righteousness, correct actions." Answering when we asked him if he felt afraid. "No of what? You know you are going to die." But he did admit that he was afraid of death at other times, but in this purposeful incident he said he was not scared at all. "I was calm. It's like being in control of your own destiny. No matter what happens you can always blow yourself up. I felt confidence and knowledge that my destiny is already sealed - no one can change it. You lose that insecurity of the future." When asked if any of these feelings approximated a sense of bliss or euphoria he answered, "In a way. I felt calmness and security. It wasn't happiness. It was knowing you are doing something right. I didn't consider the possibility of being caught."

A male subject explained pushing his fear out of conscious awareness in favor of focusing solely on his goal at the time when he was anticipating exploding himself, " (There was) not fear – totally empty. I was waiting to explode the bomb. Only my family came to my mind. I will leave them behind for a greater cause." Another young man stated, "I didn't feel it. I was conscious I would kill some people, at least I hoped to. It was the last thing I would carry. …(Fear?) I was trying not to think of it. I was not really conscious of what I had."

A female student explained how she (imagined) feeling putting on the bomb, "I was taught how it would work, I knew if… weird at first. We had practiced. I knew it was the right moment to do it. I knew I would be honoured by family and friends. I had negative feelings that I had to do it to be noticed and then I felt good, the cause would be good. I felt happy because I knew it was good, because I felt a real sense of pride." She goes on to explain how she used a dissociative defense to shut out her fear and recognition of the finality of death. "I was very focused, shut everything out. (In your own world?) Yes. …You just see the plan, in the future, getting to that goal. I don't know why I wasn't terrified. I knew everything would be better afterward."

Religion and Dissociation

Some students mixed statements of religious beliefs with descriptions of their dissociated mental state. A male student, for instance, explained how he felt (in imagination) with the bomb strapped on: "When one is dying for one's religion it is the most noble death one can experience. I also felt heavier. I felt a certain peace of mind. I was dying for my religion and using my religion. I felt a little high on myself, in that state of mind – you have to understand, everything stops around you - you're in your own little world. It's strange. (A good feeling?) Yes definitely. (Still have it?) Yes. (Could it be stronger?) Yes by completing my mission. I felt untouchable and a sense of awe." Another young man regarded his future in terms of religion, "It's up to Allah – he will decide what he will do for me. I wanted to die for him." A young woman stated, "I was very scared, I was scared of the physical hurt, the pain. I was not scared to leave my family because I was persuaded that I would see them again – I am very religious. They will be with me in heaven. If I die tomorrow I will see them again. The only thing I feared was the pain."

Strategies of Mind Control

Even those who did not give decisive evidence of dissociation cited other psychological strategies to enable them to strap on the bomb and go forward in their imagined role. One young man referred to using "self-induced mind control"; another stated, "Yes I was nervous. I tried to keep my feelings inside as best I could. I just tried to keep to myself, not to make eye contact." Another male student stated, "I was trying not to think of it. I controlled my fear by imagining all the good - that I was helping, (I) kept my feelings far away." Another young man expressed the importance of community and family support in keeping focused on his self-destructive goal, "I didn't have to train. (I was) mentally prepared totally because I had nothing else except family but I know they agree and are really proud that I did this." Another male student stated that he controlled his emotions, "by (the) knowledge that my death would have a purpose. I was thinking of suffering we have to go through each day. (Focused?) Yes, but in a meditative way. I told myself, this is the way it should be."

Positive Emotions with Bomb Strapped on

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Incredibly, when asked about what their mental and emotional state was with the bomb strapped on, eighty-four percent (16/19) of the sample imagined experiencing positive feelings going forward to explode themselves.

powerful. First time in life I had ability to do something. I felt in control of my destiny."

Table 3: Emotional State Participants Expressed Regarding Strapping on Bomb

Feelings of Empowerment

Forty seven percent (9/19) stated that they suddenly felt empowered as they strapped on the bomb. A male student explained, "(Once the bomb is strapped on) "your actions are inevitable – no one can stop you no matter what you do. It (the sense of feeling powerful) happens at the decision point, when I knew I wasn't going to stop." Another male stated, "It felt like I had extra power. Knowing I could take someone's life with the press of a button. It felt really good – like I could do anything." Another male, "I felt powerful, very powerful, full of courage, full of might. It was the first time I felt that way." A young woman stated, "yes it has power to kill and to take lives without them having any say, like a surprise. I had never taken another's life in my hands before. I had to be strong and couldn't back down. I couldn't let fear interrupt my mission. I didn't feel joy but pride."

A young male stated, "(It was the) first time in my life (that I) feel powerful over those people who steal the power from me. I never felt

V. Implications

This study, while rather unorthodox in its methods of comparing role-playing 'normal' college students to actual suicide bombers and its reliance on the one side to imaginary experiences does manage to shed some light on how even a normal college student could see him- or herself at a point where he or she is ready to sacrifice him- or herself for what he or she sees as a greater good. In this case, our role-playing bomber students spoke about enacting through terrorism revenge seeking, expressive and social justice seeking behaviors. We were amazed to observe how easily the mix of circumstances, situation, individual motivations, ideology of terrorism and terror sponsorship can lead to an individual, at least in role play, imagining doing what, to Westerners, is nearly always viewed as a complete and total anathema.

Our student subjects were as surprised as we were with how easily they slipped into this role and how deeply they embraced it - however

momentarily. They were impressed, as were we, how once in role, they felt strongly the desire to enact revenge – even choosing children, young people, and sacred places as their targets. Moreover, we were deeply impressed with the fact that while in role-play nearly three quarters of our student sample spontaneously referred to enacting a dissociative defense to enable them to imagine strapping a bomb to their bodies, with one quarter of the sample taking this imagined defense to the point of inducing an imagined state of euphoria.

Chillingly, the students felt empowered with a bomb strapped on and imagined it as a positive rather than negative experience. Likewise, over half of them stated that they would repeat their attempt if they got the chance. We were deeply struck by how impressionable this age group appeared to be and how easily in role-play they could glorify the idea of giving their lives for something greater than themselves. Self-sacrifice and seeing oneself as a hero, appeared important in their descriptions of why they would do it and remain committed to trying to repeat it.

While we cannot know how closely imagined experiences would match the real world - and this was admittedly a small exploratory study - we can compare the role-play students' responses to real world human bombers. In doing so, we find many matches. Both speak of enacting a dissociative defense even to the point of feeling a state of euphoria to enable them to overcome the self-preservation instinct and sacrifice themselves by explosive device. Both justify the act by reasons of enacting revenge, seeking social justice and expressing pain. Both ignore the criminal aspects of their act and consider it instead in terms of taking on a positive identity – the sacrificial martyr on behalf of the community and for the greater good. Both speak of being a bomber as a positive versus negative experience that they regret not having succeeded in carrying out. In the case of real bombers, these rationalizations may have been suggested to them by their sponsoring organization or the terrorist ideology – in the case of our role playing bombers they came up with them spontaneously with little reference to, or knowledge about, terrorism studies. Indeed, in the debriefing period we found that none of the students had strong feelings or in-depth

knowledge about the political situation in Israel or about suicide bombing in general.

Alarmingly, this group of students also provides evidence that primary traumatization experiences may not be necessary as motivators for this type of revenge seeking behavior – that secondary traumatization and identification with victims as "fictive kin" can be equally powerful motivating forces. This is what is seen in non-conflict zones such as Morocco and in Western Europe where instigators have radicalized terrorist recruits through Internet downloads that helped them to identify with the traumas of Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq or Afghanistan (Speckhard, 2005; 2008).

Just as many human bombers are not motivated in any sense by religion despite Islam often being blamed as the source of all suicide terrorism, none of our students were of Islamic background. Yet they easily embraced this act in role-play and, in doing so, gave very similar responses to actual bombers. Clearly being able to realistically contemplate the use of this terror tactic is neither limited to people of Islamic background nor to Islam.

The implications of this experimental study for counterterrorism experts are that we must consider the motivating role of injustices and experiences of psychological trauma – even witnessing from afar - over Internet or television the traumas of others – in potentially opening a pathway and motivation for individuals to consider human bombing. Our study underlines the fact that terror-sponsoring organizations that promote their suicide bombing ideologies over the Internet, making use of visual images and films of the traumas of others – particularly those they can somehow link to their witnessing audiences as "fictive kin" (i.e. your Islamic brothers in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, etc.) - have in their repertoire powerful psychological tools that can strongly motivate individuals into action. Indeed, in Brussels the authors have learned that in certain Internet cafes invitations appear as "pop ups" on the screen to the browser to consider joining the "worldwide jihad"; it directs the interested recipient to further information and contacts. Given how easily we observed our students taking on a martyr identity for a role play and identifying strongly with the victims of injustice (i.e. the two boys we told them about who many identified in their role play as fictive

kin) our findings suggest that normal European and American youth of this age, if psychologically vulnerable for some reason, may not be so difficult to pull into these types of activities.

Currently Europe is home to large pockets of disenfranchised youth, many Muslim, who can readily identify with their oppressed "Muslim" brothers in other lands. Given our findings, we should not be surprised that recruiters are able to use the Internet and images of injustices in other parts of the world to foster identification with, and even ties of "fictive kin" on behalf of the "victims" shown. When they couple this with an ideology that promotes self sacrifice and human bombing to help the victims and as a means of attaining a positive self identity, it may not be difficult for them to move impressionable young people to action. Indeed, Europe has already reported cases of cells and self-radicalization over the Internet, and many more report about recruiters using such images in person. It is important also to say, given our findings of how easily normal students could identify with this role, that it may not be only Muslim youth who are vulnerable but youth in general - and even older persons who are lacking positive life paths and who fall under the influence of such suggestions. We already have evidence of such cases from Europe – Richard Reid (the shoe bomber), Muriel Degauque (the Belgian woman who blew herself up in Iraq), and cases where others have begged their organizations to become martyrs. Indeed, it is not just living in a conflict zone that makes one vulnerable to becoming a human bomber. Ideas - of pain and injustice,

identifying with victims and feeling a sense of expressing that pain, fighting to make it right or at least revenging for it, belonging to something bigger than oneself and taking on a heroic role - all appear to be important factors into what goes into making a human bomber.

Likewise, the use of the dissociative defense may be something that is universal in all human beings and easily accessed by individuals who once having reached their breaking point and signed on to an ideology of self-sacrifice may be able to utilize to experience actually strapping on a bomb as positive goal oriented and even an ecstatic or euphoric, rather than negative experience. If this is combined with religious ideology (of any type) it is likely to reinforce the ecstatic and euphoric qualities induced by the dissociative defense which, in turn, may reinforce the perceived religious nature of the suicide "mission".

The fact that role playing European and American students can so easily embrace the role of human bombers and end up spontaneously giving reasons, rationalizations and defenses similar to those real thwarted bombers give when interviewed, gives credence to the very real possibility that suicide bombing, far from being a mystery that we cannot understand – is a result of that we may all harbor - aggressive, vengeful and justice-seeking tendencies within us. In fact it may only be a mix of circumstances, situation, ideology and relationships that need to come together to bring these to the forefront. Our study shows that indeed we may all carry a human bomber within.

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Notes

[1] A. Speckhard (2005) has, however, argued that bombers coming from conflict zones frequently show evidence of posttraumatic and dissociative symptoms and those coming radicalized Muslim groups such as those found in Europe and totalitarian regimes in the Middle East often suffer from social marginalization, alienation and extreme frustration and may also be utilizing a projective defense, projecting their own sense of badness (for things they feel guilty over) onto the West stating that it must be destroyed.

[2] Speckhard differs from the common view that there is no psychological disturbances observable among human bombers – her interviews with and regarding Chechen and Palestinian bombers often reveals severe personal and secondary traumatization contributing to severe dissociative and posttraumatic symptoms which in her view contribute to the transition in the psyche from normal individuals to those willing to become bombers. Likewise she points out that radicalized Muslim youth in Europe often suffer severe identity issues, which contributes to their willingness to take on self sacrificial roles in behalf of the group.

[3] Palestinian psychiatric researcher in Gaza, Eyad Sarraj, asks in fact, given the daily injustices, chaotic relationship of actions to consequences, and the abnormality of life in conflict zones whether is it not amazing that there are not more human bombers (Eyad El Sarraj, 2002).

[4] We decided for this sample to base our comparisons on Chechen and Palestinian casess. - While the more recent spate of suicide bombers in Iraq has greatly changed the age profile (they tend to be older and often married with children) until recently suicide bombers were often young single persons, many pursuing university degrees or were already college educated.

[5] Also referred to in clinical and other helper settings by Charles Figley as 'compassion fatigue'.
See :"Compassion fatigue as secondary traumatic stress disorder: An overview. Compassion fatigue: Coping with secondary traumatic stress disorder in those who treat the traumatized. Figley, Charles R. (Ed). (1995). Compassion fatigue: Coping with secondary traumatic stress disorder in those who treat the traumatized. Brunner/Mazel psychological stress series, No. 23. (pp. 1-20). Philadelphia, PA, US: Brunner/Mazel.

[6] The total numbers may add to more than 19 because some subjects listed more than one motivation; the same is true regarding goals.

[7] According to the American Psychiatric Association, the essential feature of dissociative disorders is "a disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment" - American Psychiatric Association (1994) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, D.C.: Author. - In the case of suicide terrorism, this means an emotional barrier is unconsciously erected, walling off the negative emotions generated by choosing to die in this manner and may even include compartmentalizing the event from one's ambitions and daily life. One bomber for example, when planning his attack, suggested that he could not carry a bomb until after his

university exams – suggesting that while on the one hand he acknowledged that he was going to his death he was able separate this reality so completely from his mind that he still felt that the need to complete his exams prior to going to explode himself.

[8] This finding is supported by other research as well. A study by Suleyman Salih Zoroglu et al. showed that any kind of trauma and especially dissociation highly contributed to suicide attempts and self-mutilation. In their study they found that those participants who were abused or neglected had 7.6 times higher suicide attempts than those who were not. Another study by A. Bessel at al. yielded similar results. The researchers found that childhood abuse is a predictor for suicidal behavior and that dissociation is correlated with suicide attempts. Their results showed that people with childhood trauma, when under stress, tend to react in a self-destructive manner. Separations with parental figures and lack of a "secure" attachment was found to have a consolidating role in self destructive behavior. Simpson and Porter write that self-mutilating behavior in reaction to hostile environment and/or isolation are related to primitive behavior, that is also found in animals. Gladstone, Gemma et al., found that women with a history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, childhood emotional abuse or parental conflict at home were more likely to attempt suicide and engage in self-harming behavior; they also became depressed earlier (than those without a history of sexual abuse) and were more likely to experience panic attacks. An interesting find in their study is that women who experienced childhood physical abuse are more likely to engage in interpersonal violence in their adult lives.

[9] There is a growing literature showing that dissociative experiences may be endorphin-mediated and that self-injurious behaviors can be related to, or induce, these endorphin-mediated states. See Russ for example who found in a sample women with borderline personality disorder, that women who had more trauma symptoms and higher levels of dissociation did not experience pain while indulging in self-destructive behavior as opposed to those women who had lower levels of trauma and dissociation.

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The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism
**By Alex P. Schmid**

The Definition of Terrorism
Terrorism is a contested concept. While there are many national and regional definitions, there is no universal legal definition approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations (the one proposed by the Security Council in Res. 1566 (2004) is non-binding, lacking legal authority in international law). The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism of the 6th (legal) Committee of the General Assembly has, with some interruptions, been trying to reach a legal definition since 1972 - but in vain. In the absence of a *legal* definition, attempts have been made since the 1980s to reach agreement on an *academic* consensus definition. The latest outcome is the revised definition reprinted below. It is the result of three rounds of consultations among academics and other professionals. A description how it was arrived at can be found on pp. 39 - 98 of Alex P. Schmid (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. The same volume also contains 260 other definitions compiled by Joseph J. Easson and Alex P. Schmid on pp. 99 -200.

Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (2011)
Compiled by Alex P. Schmid
1. *Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on*

various audiences and conflict parties;

2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in *three main contexts*: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;

3. The physical *violence* or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual- phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in 'disappearances' involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).

4. The public (-ized) terrorist victimization initiates *threat-based communication processes* whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;

5. At the origin of terrorism stands *terror* – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety - spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;

6. The main direct *victims* of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are *usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless persons* who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;

7. The *direct victims are not the ultimate target* (as in a classical assassination where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims' plight or the terrorists' professed cause;

8. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual *perpetrators*, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);

9. While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crimeas well as those found in war crimes,terrorist violence is *predominantly political* – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;

10. The immediate *intent* of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;

11. The *motivations* to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;

12: Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone but form part of a *campaign* of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.

Reprinted from: A.P. Schmid (Ed.). Handbook of Terrorism Research. London, Routledge, 2011, pp.86-87.

A Chronology of Attacks onn and Unlawful Interferences with, Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, 1975 – 2010

By Mikhail Kashubsky
Source:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/offshore-gas-and-oil-attacks/html

Abstract

Throughout its history, the oil and gas industry has been a subject of environmental protests, labour disputes, tensions with local communities, and it has also been a target of various violent activities ranging from vandalism to political violence, which have impinged on the security of oil industry workers and interfered with operational activities of oil companies on

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numerous occasions. Although a considerable number of attacks on oil and gas infrastructure occurred over the course of the industry's existence, most of those attacks were directed against onshore petroleum targets. Compared to onshore petroleum infrastructure, attacks on offshore oil and gas installations are relatively rare. The following chronology provides details of attacks, unlawful interferences, and security incidents involving offshore oil and gas installations that happened between 1975 and 2010.

Introduction

This chronology [1] lists some 60 events. [2] The chronology was compiled from publically available data on past attacks against maritime and petroleum infrastructure collected from various sources including databases, policy documents and reports of national and international government and non-government organisations, scholarly commentaries, journal articles, books, and previous studies done by academics and security analysts, as well as media reports, newspapers, and online news. [3] It should be noted that sometimes different sources report different details of offshore attacks and incidents. In some cases, inconsistent and conflicting facts are reported. Where possible, all reasonable effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of information contained in this chronology.

It is recognised that this chronology probably does not list all incidents that happened during that period and it does not reflect the frequency at which they are happening. Therefore, it does not necessarily provide a reliable base for quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made.

General Observations

It is apparent that attacks on, and interferences with, offshore petroleum installations have generally increased in recent years. The majority of attacks/interferences have occurred since the beginning of 2004. In particular, 41 of 60 incidents (almost 70 percent) have occurred since 1 January 2004. Prior to the beginning of this chronology, we found only one security incident/attack, namely the 1899 'Montecito Mob' incident which is also listed. However, there must have been more in the intervening 75 years. The majority of security incidents involved violence (whether actual use of violence or threat of violence), but 15 of 60 incidents (25 per cent) were non-violent.

The types of installations that had been victims of attacks/interferences include fixed offshore production platforms, mobile offshore drilling rigs, floating production storage and offloading units (FPSOs), floating storage and offloading units (FSOs), offshore oil export terminals, and other types of offshore installations such as oil derricks, wellhead platforms, and flow stations. In some cases, the type of facilities attacked was not specified, but incidents involving offshore drilling rigs are the most common. [4]

Attacks and security incidents involving offshore oil and gas installations have taken place in practically all regions of the world. [5] The analysis of offshore security incidents by location shows that most of the incidents occurred in economically and politically unstable countries [6] and some occurred in stable countries, but the incidents listed in this chronology are limited to the following countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Angola, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Guyana/Suriname, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia/Malaysia (Malacca Strait), India, Malaysia, Denmark (Greenland), Cameroon, and Mexico. The majority of offshore incidents (more than 60 percent) took place in Nigeria.

The attacks/interferences have been committed by various types of adversaries including terrorists, insurgents, pirates, hostile nation States, environmental activists, anti-oil activists and other protesters, and sometimes unknown perpetrators. The analysis indicates that insurgent groups are responsible for at least one-third of all incidents. [7] There are five bomb threats and threats of attack (rather than the actual attacks) among the incidents recorded in this chronology. Other incident scenarios include abduction of workers, armed intrusion, hostage-taking, bombing and use of explosives, military strikes, and unauthorised boarding. The most common scenario is armed intrusion and abduction of offshore workers. [8]

In at least 13 of 60 incidents there was some kind of damage caused to platforms and 8 of 60 attacks resulted in human casualties. Almost all incidents caused interruption or shutdown of platform operations. The means of transport that assailants use to reach offshore platforms is often not reported, but in most cases perpetrators used motorboats. In some cases, small fishing vessels

and vessels that look similar to offshore supply   vessels   were   used.

Date	Location	Details of Attack/Incident
2 Aug 1899	USA	When an oil company began to construct an oil derrick off the shores of Montecito, a highly affluent suburb of Santa Barbara in the State of California, a local mob took direct action. They attacked the rig and demolished it. [9] The next day these activists were described approvingly on the front page of the local newspaperas 'a party of the best known society men of Santa Barbara armed to meet any resistance'. [10] The local 'society men' responsible for the attack did not suffer any noteworthy legal repercussions for their actions, despite having been so well known. [11] The incident had become known as 'Montecito Mob'.
25 Aug 1975	UK	Philips Petroleum Company in Yarmouth, England, received three anonymous telephone calls with callers announcing that underwater charges with delayed-action fuses had been attached to the legs of offshore production platforms in the Hewett field, some 20 miles to the east off Norfolk coast. Three platforms were evacuated immediately. [12] A Royal Navy vessel, helicopters, and an expert diving team were dispatched. Two days later, it was concluded that the threat was a hoax, and normal production operations were resumed. The incident cost to the British taxpayers about USD $500,000. [13]
16 May 1977	Angola	An African guerrilla movement, the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (CELF), said that it plans to blow up the offshore drilling complex of the Gulf Oil Company (GOC) in the Cabinda enclave of Angola and warned the company to evacuate its 200 British and American employees within three days. A spokesman for the guerrilla group said the warning must be taken seriously because the movement had acquired ground-to-ground missiles in exchange for coffee and uncut diamonds. [14] The guerrilla spokesman said the guerrillas were opposed to GOC because it was giving the ruling pro-Marxist Angolan Popular Liberation Movement $2 million a day in oil royalties. [15]
25 Jul 1981	USA	Greenpeace activists attempted to board an oil rig operated by Shell 177 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to express their opposition to drilling during a Shell news conference on the rig. Shell denied the group access to the drilling rig. Greenpeace officials sought to explain their fear that the drilling (which had been delayed for six years) would result in oil spills endangering the nearby Georges Bank, home for much of the world's supply of cod, haddock and food fish. [16] Shell denied the group access to the drilling rig and Shell spokesman said Georges Bank is a relatively low-risk geological formation for oil spills.
Oct 1981	USA	An anonymous caller said that a bomb had been placed on one of several attending vessels at *Habitat* Texaco platform located 9 miles offshore, southeast of Santa Barbara, California. No bomb was found after platform and vessel searches. [17]

Mar 1983	Iran	Iraqi planes attacked the Iranian offshore platform at the Nowruz oil field; the damaged platform collapsed, and the oil slick caught fire. [18] The platform burned and spilled oil at an initial rate of approximately 5,000 barrels per day (bpd). The rate slowed to about 1,500 bpd in the two years before the well was capped in May 1985. Overall, approximately 1.9 million barrels of oil spilled into the sea as a result of this incident. [19]
19 Oct 1987	Iran	The US Navy attacked Iranian *R-7* and *R-4* oil platforms in *Reshadat* (also known as *Rostam*)offshore complex blaming Iran for a missile strike on the US-flagged Kuwaiti oil tanker *Sea Isle City* near Kuwait Harbour three days earlier. [20] The Navy destroyers opened fire on *R-7* platform and subsequently detonated explosives on it, completely destroying it; and *R-4* platform was attacked in a similar fashion and severely damaged. [21] As a result of the attack, one platform was almost completely destroyed and another was severely damaged and, according to Iran, production from the *Reshadat* and *Resalat* offshore complexes was interrupted for several years. [22] The attacks caused damage to the nearby *Resalat* offshore complex, connected by underwater pipelines to *Reshadat*. [23]
Apr 1988	UAE	In response to the US attack on the Iranian *Joshan* missile boat, Iranian patrol boats attacked the neighbouring United Arab Emirates's Mubarak oil field. The Iranian boats sprayed several ships and a mobile drilling rig with machine-gun fire and grenades but caused no casualties. [24]
18 Apr 1988	Iran	The US military attacked and destroyed Iranian offshore oil complexes, *Salman* (aka *Sassan*) and *Nasr* (aka *Sirri*), shortly after the US frigate, *Samuel B Roberts* was damaged by a mine, allegedly belonging to Iran, in international waters near Bahrain. [25] According to Iran, the attacks caused severe damage to the production facilities of the platforms and the activities of the *Salman* complex were totally interrupted for four years, its regular production being resumed only in September 1992, and reached a normal level in 1993; and activities in the whole *Nasr* complex were interrupted and did not resume until nearly four years later. [26]
30 Apr 1995	UK	Greenpeace activists occupied *Brent Spar* facility in the North Sea for more than three weeks thereby interfering with Shell's decommissioning operations. [27] Shell subsequently obtained legal permission to evict the protesters from the platform and the protesters were removed from *Brent Spar* on 23 June 1995. [28]
13 Dec 1997	Nigeria	Employees and villagers kidnapped one US citizen, one Australian, and two British oil workers, and at least nine Nigerian staff members of Western Geophysical, a US-owned oil exploration company off the coast of Nigeria. The victims were released in stages on 17 and 18 December 1997. [29]

25 May 1998	Nigeria	Over 100 unarmed and peaceful Ilaje protestors went to the Chevron's Parabe oil production platform about nine miles offshore. Nigerian Navy and Mobile Police stationed at the platform, who were armed, allowed the protestors aboard. [30] The protestors occupied the platform to protest environmental and distribution issues, and to demand monetary compensation for environmental and economic grievances and jobs. [31] After two days of negotiations, Chevron used its contracted helicopters to fly Nigerian security forces to the platform. Security forces opened fire at the protesters which resulted in the death of two protesters and several others were wounded. [32]
27 Jun 1999	Nigeria	Armed youth militants (local anti-oil industry activists) stormed a Shell oil platform in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The attackers caused damage to the platform and kidnapped three foreign platform workers, including an Australian. [33] The attackers then hijacked a helicopter and forced the hostages to fly them to a village near Warri. [34] The hostages were released unharmed on or about 16 July 1999 for an undisclosed ransom. A group calling itself *Enough is Enough* in the Niger River (EENR) claimed responsibility. [35]
20 Jul 1999	Nigeria	Armed men stormed a Royal Dutch Shell operated oil rig in Osoko and held seven British nationals and 57 Nigerians hostage. On 22 July 1999, the youths released the hostages unharmed. [36]
10 Aug 1999	Nigeria	Three British nationals were kidnapped by armed youths from a US operated oil platform in the Niger Delta region. [37] No one was injured, and no one claimed responsibility. On 11 August the youths released the hostages unharmed. [38]
3 Jun 2000	Guyana/ Suriname	The gunboats of the Suriname Navy approached an American owned and operated offshore oil drilling rig, *CE Thornton*, retained by the Canadian corporation CGX Energy. [39] The Canadian company had received a license from the Guyanese government to conduct exploratory drilling in a disputed area of the continental shelf claimed by both Guyana and Suriname. [40] The Surinamese Navy advised that the rig was in Surinamese waters and ordered it to stop unauthorised drilling immediately and clear the area within 12 hours. Fearing that the Surinamese Navy would use force against it, the oil rig decided to follow the orders to withdraw. [41]
31 Jul 2000	Nigeria	About thirty-five armed young men from a village in Bayela State used a rowboat to reach two oil platforms off the coast. They boarded the rig and took 165 oil workers hostage, including 20 foreigners. They demanded that Shell employ more Nigerian nationals and that it pay a fee to the local community for exploiting its petroleum resources. Shell made a deal with the hostage-takers and the employees were released four days later. [42]
23 Aug 2001	Nigeria	The local community group of anti-oil activists boarded a Shell's production platform and the nearby *Trident VIII* jack-up drilling rig. The rig's crew was safely evacuated to Port Harcourt and the activists had withdrawn. [43]
Apr 2003	Nigeria	About 100 oil workers were held hostage aboard offshore installations off the coast of Nigeria by striking Nigerian workers complaining about redundancies and unfair dismissal of Nigerian employees. The hostages included over twenty Americans and over thirty British nationals. [44]

24 Apr 2004	Iraq	Terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack on offshore Al-Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) in the Persian Gulf. [45] Two zodiac type speedboats piloted by suicide bombers approached the terminal at high speed. The lead boat aimed at the platform and was fired upon, after which it detonated before it could hit the platform. The second boat was also fired upon, killing attackers but the boat still rammed *MV Takasuza* oil tanker, yet it failed to detonate/explode. [46] The Al-Basra terminal, capable of exporting up to 900,000 bpd, was shut down for two days, which (combined with a closure of KAAOT) cost nearly $28 million in lost revenues due to oil not being exported during that time. [47] This consequently led to the spike in oil prices on the world markets which resulted in a further loss of approximately US$6 billion to the global economy. [48] The attack was allegedly carried out by Zarqawi network based in Iraq. In addition, the initial security zone of 2 nautical miles around ABOT was supplemented with a 3000 metre warning zone and a 2000 metre exclusion zone. [49]
24 Apr 2004	Iraq	Terrorists carried out a suicide boat attack against offshore Khawr Al-Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) in the Persian Gulf using a dhow. [50] The dhow was intercepted by a coalition forces vessel as it approached the exclusion zone around the platform. Soon after it was boarded by Navy personnel, the boat exploded. Two US Navy sailors and one member of the US Coastguard were killed in the attack, and four others were injured. [51] No damage was reported, but the terminal was immediately shut down by the authorities. [52] KAAOT, which exports about 700,000 bpd, reopened the next day following the attacks. [53] The attack was allegedly carried out by Zarqawi network based in Iraq. The initial security zone of 2 nautical miles around KAAOT was supplemented with a 3000 metre warning zone and a 2000 metre exclusion zone. [54]
Sep 2004	Yemen	Yemeni insurgents abducted several Western nationals based on offshore oil facilities off the coast of the Red Sea. After several hours, the workers were released. Yemeni authorities have increased security at all sea ports and oil terminals in response to the attacks and information 'about the intention of a foreign terrorist group to carry out sabotage acts on vital oil facilities on Yemeni shores'. The security effort included the deployment of helicopters around two oil terminals on the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. [55]
3 Nov 2004	Malacca Strait	In the Malacca Strait, outside Malaysia's and Indonesia's territorial seas, several lookalike fishing boats followed a tug towing the oil rig *Ocean Sovereign*, while underway. [56] The duty officer alerted Master who came to the bridge and observed a boat heading for tug. Crew mustered and as the pirates came within 250 metres of tug, they started shooting, causing extensive damage to navigation equipment, bridge windows and the superstructure. Crew switched on lights, activated fire hoses and fired rocket flares but the pirates continued to shoot with automatic weapons. When they were within 50 metres, the crew took evasive manoeuvres and the pirate boat moved away. The crew suffered no physical injuries but was shaken after the incident. [57]

12 Jun 2005	Nigeria	A group of armed men boarded FPSO *Jamestown* in Warri Region and took hostage all 45 crew members. After lengthy negotiations, the gunmen released all hostages unharmed three days later. [58]
22 Sep 2005	Nigeria	More than 100 armed militants stormed a Chevron-operated *Idama* oil production platform in the southern Niger Delta in response to the arrest of an ethnic militia leader on treason charges and forced it to shut down operations. [59] Armed with assault rifles, militants attacked the platform using about eight boats, each carrying 15 gunmen, and occupied the *Idama* flow station. Six government security forces had their weapons taken from them. Production of 8,000 bpd shut down. [60]
10 Jan 2006 / 11 Jan 2006 [61]	Nigeria	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) rebels attacked Shell's *EA* offshore oil platform located about 15 km offshore and kidnapped four foreign oil workers from a support vessel anchored at the platform. [62] The company shut down 115,000 bpd *EA* platform. MEND demanded the immediate and unconditional release of Dokubo-Asari and Governor D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha. [63] Insurgents also blew up crude oil pipelines, cutting supplies to *Forcados* offshore export terminal by 100,000 bpd. [64] Some sources claim that *EA* platform was not attacked, but a support vessel in the vicinity of the platform was attacked. [65] Hostages were released on or about 30 January 2006.
15 Jan 2006	Nigeria	MEND insurgents, travelling in speedboats, attacked Shell's *Benisede* flow station. They burned down staff accommodation and damaged the processing facilities, [66] killing at least 16 people in the process, including fourteen soldiers and two civilians. [67] Shell's operations were reduced by about 106,000 bpd as a result of the attack and the company was forced to consider evacuating. [68]
18 Feb 2006	Nigeria	MEND insurgents in speedboats bombed the *Forcados* offshore oil loading terminal and abducted nine workers from the nearby offshore barge at the Escravos coast, [69] and they also damaged oil platform equipment. [70] Six workers were released on 1 March and the remaining three on 27 March. [71]
2 Jun 2006	Nigeria	About 30 armed militants boarded a semi-submersible rig, the *Bulford Dolphin,* about 65 km offshore and abducted eight offshore workers. [72] Hostages were released a couple of days later. [73] About 20 non-essential personnel were evacuated to shore and the rest of the rig crew was safe, but operations were temporarily halted. The attack also contributed to the rise of oil prices by about $1 to $71.50 per barrel. [74]
22 Aug 2006	Iran	Iranian Navy attacked and seized control of *Orizont* offshore drilling rig, owned by the Romanian oil company Grup Servicii Petroliere (GSP), in the Salman field. There were 26 Romanian offshore workers on board the platform at the time of the incident. Iranian troops had seized and occupied the rig after firing on it with machine guns from a ship. The rig was operated under a deal signed between Petrom, GSP and Dubai-based Oriental Oil Co, and the shooting reportedly happened as the rig was being taken outside Iranian waters for a mandatory overhaul. Iranian armed forces kept the crew on the rig's heliport for several hours without food and water, but later they allowed the crew to return to their quarters after cutting off all communications between the workers and the company. The incident arose due to a commercial dispute. [75]

22 Nov 2006	Nigeria	FPSO *Mystras* was attacked by armed men while anchored off Port Harcourt. Ten gunmen boarded the facility and kidnapped seven workers. Their boat was intercepted by the authorities and engaged in a shoot-out during which one worker was killed, one injured, and five others were rescued. [76]
22 Mar 2007	India	Mobile offshore drilling unit *Aban VII* (jack-up rig) was attacked by pirates in speedboats near the south west coast of India, outside India's territorial sea. [77] The rig was boarded by three pirates while under tow. Pirates were noticed as they were preparing to transfer some equipment from the rig to their speedboats and the alarm was raised. Pirates jumped overboard and escaped in their speedboats. [78]
31 Mar 2007 / 1 Apr 2007 [79]	Nigeria	*Bulford Dolphin* mobile offshore drilling rig was attacked again by gunmen about 65 km off the coast of Nigeria. One British expatriate worker was abducted and taken ashore from the platform. The attackers, believed to be pirates, boarded the rig via an offshore support vessel, which was secured alongside the platform at the time of the incident. [80] Hostage was released on 4 April 2007. [81]
19 Apr 2007	Nigeria	An offshore security vessel that was supporting *Trident VIII* drilling rig, was attacked and three Nigerian sailors were abducted and another six were injured. The gunmen also seized weapons and equipment. *Trident VIII* rig was later shut down as a result of this incident and the staff of *Don Walker* oil rig, which was within a 10 minute boat ride from the incident, had requested security reinforcements from the nearest naval base. [82]
1 May 2007	Nigeria	Chevron's *Oloibiri* floating storage and offloading (FSO) unit was reportedly attacked by MEND at offshore Pennington field off southern Bayelsa state. One Nigerian sailor was killed during the attack and six other foreign oil workers were abducted, but later released on 2 June 2007. [83] The FSO was moored near *Funiwa* platform. The production at the 15,000 bpd Funiwa field and other fields supported by this vessel was shut down to avoid any additional security or safety incidents. [84]
3 May 2007	Nigeria	FPSO *Mystras* was attacked by gunmen believed to be pirates they boarded via the anchor chain. The intruders kidnapped eight foreign workers, including an Australian, from FPSO and an offshore support vessel. The workers were released the following day. [85] FPSO was moored about 55 km off Port Harcourt (however, some sources report that it was 55 miles offshore). Force majeure was declared at a field capable of producing 50,000 bpd, and the production was shut down for several days. [86] Some sources report that this attack was carried out by MEND, not pirates; and that six foreign workers were kidnapped, not eight. [87]
5 May 2007	Nigeria	*Trident VIII* offshore drilling rig was attacked and boarded by gunmen, believed to be pirates, near Brass oil export terminal. One crew member was kidnapped. [88] The attack triggered a security lockdown of the Brass crude oil export terminal. [89]
22 Jun 2007	Nigeria	In the early hours three gunmen armed with AK-47s boarded the 159,000-dwt *Cape Brindisi* moored at Pennington Oil Terminal (also known as FSO *Oloibiri*) and proceeded to shoot up the vessel. No injuries to the crew were reported as they succeeded in going into lock-down mode, after which the gunmen left the ship. The militants reportedly took control of the FSO *Oloibiri*, where the *Cape Brindisi* had been loading. [90]

20 Oct 2007	Nigeria	Seven workers were kidnapped at the EA field (possibly from FPSO *Sea Eagle*) about 15 km off the coast of Bayelsa state by gunmen in speedboats including four Nigerians, a Russian, a British, and a Croatian. All workers were released two days later. [91]
26 Oct 2007	Nigeria	Gunmen in speedboats attacked FPSO *Mystras* about 85 km offshore at an oil production facility operated by Saipem, taking hostage six oil workers. MEND had claimed responsibility for the attack. [92]
10 Feb 2008	UK	*Safe Scandinavia* oil rig in the North Sea issued a security alert which resulted in one of the biggest evacuations in the history of the North Sea offshore industry. It was reported that a catering worker on the rig screamed 'Bomb!' in her sleep and apparently was 'convinced that her nightmare was about to come true'. The authorities sent helicopters to evacuate more than 500 workers, but it turned out that it was just a dream. [93] The company reported that 161 workers evacuated to the neighbouring *Alba* and *Armada* platforms before the operation was called off. [94]
10 Jun 2008	Nigeria	In the early morning, near Port Harcourt, Rivers, Nigeria, armed assailants in speedboats fired upon an oil facility, killing nine naval officers and wounding four civilians. No group claimed responsibility. [95]
19 Jun 2008	Nigeria	Royal Dutch Shell's *Bonga* floating production storage and offloading vessel (FPSO) was attacked by armed militants about 120 km offshore. It was reported that at about 1:00 am around two dozen armed men in speedboats stormed the floating facility and after failing to get access inside they started shooting at FPSO and those on board. Some people were wounded, but no lives were lost. The attack lasted for almost four hours, during which the militants also encountered and hijacked an offshore support vessel and kidnapped its US captain, but released him later that day. [96] The responsibility for the attack was claimed by MEND, the most high-profile militant group in the region. The facility was damaged in the attack, which forced the company to shut down the entire production at its main offshore oil field in Nigeria, interrupting production of approximately 200,000 bpd and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas. [97]
16 Sep 2008	Nigeria	Shooting was reported near Chevron-operated *Idama* offshore production platform, causing Chevron to evacuate offshore workers as a precaution. [98]
26 Dec 2008	Malaysia	Six armed robbers boarded the mobile offshore drilling rig *Allied Centurion* in Malaysia's territorial sea and stole stores and property from the facility. One crew member suffered head injuries, but remained in stable condition. Authorities were informed and later boarded for investigation. [99]
21 Jun 2009	Nigeria	In Rivers state assailants detonated explosives damaging two oil pipelines at Adamakiri and in Kula respectively as well as an offshore facility at the Afremo oil fields operated by Shell, but causing no fatalities or injuries. MEND claimed responsibility. [100]
25 Jun 2009	Nigeria	MEND militants rejected the government's amnesty offer, arguing it did not address the fundamentals of the crisis in the region. MEND claims to have blown up the second remaining well head platform *Jacket B* of the Shell Afremo offshore oil fields in Delta state. [101]

26 Jun 2009	Nigeria	MEND claims that at least 20 soldiers were killed in one of its attacks on Shell's *Forcados* offshore terminal in Delta state. Chevron evacuated hundreds of workers from the Niger Delta after the attacks. [102] At least six high-profile attacks by MEND on oil well heads, offshore platforms, major pipelines and oil pumping stations were reported. [103]
29 Jun 2009	Nigeria	MEND attacked Shell's *Forcados* offshore terminal facility in Delta state using explosives. [104] Cluster 11 and 30 caught on fire after a massive explosion. A confrontation with a military gunboat patrol that stumbled upon heavily armed fighters resulted in the sinking of the gunboat with about 20-25 soldiers on board. [105]
5 Jul 2009	Nigeria	MEND attacked Shell's *Well Head 20* platform located at Cawthorn Channel 1. The facility connects to the Bonny loading terminal in Rivers state. On the same day MEND militants attacked and blew up the strategic Okan manifold which controled about 80 per cent of Chevron Nigeria Limited offshore crude oil to its BOP Crude Loading Platform in Delta state. [106]
12 Jul 2009	Nigeria	MEND conducted a raid on an oil offloading facility in Lagos. This was the group's first attack outside Niger Delta in several months. Five people were killed in the attack. [107]
5 Jan 2010	Nigeria	A group of pirates attacked FSO *Westaf*, off Lagos, Nigeria. Seven crew members were taken to hospital due to the attack including the master who was wounded in the stomach. The attackers stole cash, crew belongings and expensive ship equipment. [108]
31 Aug 2010	Greenland	Greenpeace activists 'boarded' the drilling rig *Stena Don* operating in Arctic waters offshore Greenland and were suspended 15 meters above the water in tents to protest against drilling operations. The activists had to outrun Danish Navy commandos before climbing up the inside of the rig and hanging from it in tents suspended from ropes. They remained on their position for two days forcing the company to suspend drilling. [109] The drillship *Stena Forth*, which is located about 20 miles away, also had to be shut down during the *Stena Don* occupation. [110]
21 Sep 2010	UK	In the waters off the Shetland Islands in the UK, Greenpeace activists climbed the anchor chain of Chevron-operated drill ship *Stena Carron* and were hanging suspended from the chain in a capsule-tent several days, effectively delaying the company's drilling operations in the Atlantic Frontier. [111]
22 Sep 2010	Nigeria	Armed men (believed to be pirates) attacked and attempted to take control of an offshore oil rig at an oil field operated by Addax Petroleum. [112] The assailants became locked in a sustained gunfire with Nigerian Navy patrol boat after it intervened; later it kidnapped three French employees from an offshore supply vessel while retreating. [113] A Thai employee may also have been taken hostage during the attack. The pirates nearly reached the platform by using a vessel which looked like the ships that routinely provide supplies to offshore rig workers. [114]
7 Nov 2010	Nigeria	A group of MEND insurgents attacked the *High Island VII* offshore drilling jack-up rig at the Okoro offshore field located about 12 km offshore and kidnapped 19 crew members including 12 Nigerians, two Americans, two Frenchmen, two Indonesians and one Canadian. Hostages were freed ten days later. [115]

8 Nov 2010	Nigeria	Gunmen attacked an offshore rig operated by Afren PLC, which was engaged in exploratory/survey work at the Okoro oil field about 11 km off the coast of Nigeria. Seven foreigner workers were kidnapped from an oil rig and the company reported that two workers were wounded in the attack and have been flown out by helicopter to receive medical treatment.' [116]
15 Nov 2010	Nigeria	Armed men boarded ExxonMobil's *Oso* offshore platform on the Nigeria's southeast coast and abducted eight offshore workers. At the time of the attack there were 74 people aboard the platform. The company suspended 75,000 bpd production from the facility. [117] The gunmen allegedly came in five speedboats; they beat up some crew members and cut electricity to the offshore facility. [118] A previously unknown group, which identified itself as the Niger Delta Liberation Force (NDLF), claimed responsibility for the attack and threatened to target oil installations in fresh attacks. [119]
17 Nov 2010	Cameroon	The Africa Marine Commando (AMC) rebel group carried out a deadly assault on an offshore oil platform at the offshore Moudi oil terminal (consisting of production platform, FSO *Moudi* and a single buoy mooring) located in the Gulf of Guinea about 50 km off Cameroon's disputed Bakassi peninsula. [120] Six people were killed in the attack, including three members of Cameroon's Rapid Intervention Battalion (a national defence force) involved in the security of offshore oil and gas installations, two Cameroonian civilians and one of the attackers. [121] Cameroonian security service said that the group had threatened further attacks unless they receive money. [122]
22 Nov 2010	Mexico	Four Greenpeace activists took protesting action by climbing 39 metres over the water at the deepwater oil rig *Centenario*, off the coast of the State of Veracruz, in Mexico. The activists boarded the rig and put up a large banner stating 'Go Beyond Oil' to call for an end to deepwater drilling. [123]

Notes

[1] Attacks on offshore underwater pipelines and oil tankers are not included.

[2] It is arguably the most comprehensive chronology of attacks on offshore petroleum installations that has ever been produced and published.

[3] The sources include the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships* annual and quarterly reports; International Maritime Organisation Maritime Safety Committee (IMO MSC) circulars titled *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*; reports such as *Country Reports on Terrorism* and *Patterns of Global Terrorism* which are produced annually by the US Department of State; *Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports* produced by the US Office of Naval Intelligence; *Anti-Shipping Activity Messages* published by the Federation of American Scientists; *A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets* published by RAND Corporation in 1983; reports based on the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database; *NCTC Reports on Terrorism* published by the US National Counterterrorism Center; the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database maintained by the US National Counterterrorism Center; the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, as well as several studies undertaken by academics and security analysts such as a 2005 study of the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (IIIP) titled *Trends for Oil and Gas Terrorist Attacks* and a study by Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok entitled *Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of "Petroleum Terrorism", 1968-99.*

[4] Distribution of incidents by 'type of facility': offshore drilling rigs – 18 of 60; fixed offshore production platforms – 7 of 60; FPSOs – 5 of 60; FSOs and other storage facilities – 4 of 60; offshore oil export terminals – 5 of 60; other types of facilities (such as oil derricks, wellhead platforms, flow stations) – 4 of 60; and unspecified types of facilities – 14 of 60.

[5] These include: 39 in Africa, 8 in the Middle East, 3 in Asia, 5 in Europe (including Greenland), and 5 in the Americas.

[6] These include: Angola, Iran, Nigeria, Guyana/Suriname, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia/Malaysia (Malacca Strait), India, Malaysia, Cameroon, and Mexico.

[7] Distribution of incidents by 'type of perpetrators': insurgents – 20 of 60; terrorists – 2 of 60; pirates – between 1-7 of 60; environmental activists – 5 of 60; anti-oil activists and other protesters – 6 of 60; hostile States – 6 of 60; unidentified/unknown perpetrators – 12 of 60.

[8] Distribution of incidents by 'tactic/scenario': abduction of offshore workers – 17 of 60; armed intrusion – 17 of 60; bomb threat or threat of attack – 5 of 60; hostage-taking 4 of 60; bombings and use of explosives – 5 of 60; unauthorised boarding – 8 of 60; military strikes – 6 of 60.

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EU Naval Force Delivers Blow Against Somali Pirates On Shoreline

Source:http://www.eunavfor.eu/2012/05/eu-naval-force-delivers-blow-against-somali-pirates-on-shoreline/

Earlier today (May 15, 2012), following the decision taken on 23 March 2012 by the Council of the European Union to allow the EU Naval Force to take disruption action against known pirate supplies on the shore (near Port of Haradhere), EU forces conducted an operation to destroy pirate equipment on the Somali coastline.
The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 and has the full support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The focused, precise and proportionate action was conducted from the air and all forces returned safely to EU warships on completion. Whilst assessment is on-going, surveillance of the area during the action indicates that no Somalis were injured ashore as a result of EU action.
Speaking about the operation, the Operation Commander of the EU Naval Force, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts said "We believe this action by the EU Naval Force will further

be reassured that our focus was on known pirate supplies and will remain so in the future."
At no point did EU Naval Force 'boots' go ashore. Rear Admiral Potts went on to say "The EU Naval Force action against pirate supplies on the shoreline is merely an extension of the disruption actions carried out against pirate ships at sea, and Operation Atalanta remains committed to fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian mission of protecting World Food Programme ships that bring vital aid to the Somali people."
Operation Atalanta is part of the EU's comprehensive approach to tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU strategic framework for that region adopted in November 2011. Currently there are 9 warships in the EU Naval Force and 5 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
The reach of Somali pirates is vast; they have attacked merchant ships up to 1,750

increase the pressure on, and disrupt pirates' efforts to get out to sea to attack merchant shipping and dhows. The local Somali people and fishermen – many of whom have suffered so much because of piracy in the region, can

miles off the Somali coast. Preventing them getting out to sea is a crucial step in removing their impunity ashore and to further the success of counter-piracy operations.

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Somali Eyewitnesses Describe Air Strikes Against Pirate Bases – Somalia Report

Source: http://gcaptain.com/somali-eyewitnesses-describe-strikes/?46674

DFFishing skiffs can be seen along the beach near the coastal town of Hobyo. In 2008, the MV Faina loaded with tanks for the Kenyan government was hijacked and anchored off Hobyo's coast. The vessel, which was was closely watched by the USS Howard and other naval vessels, was eventually released after a ransom was paid.

As we saw yesterday, the European Union's Naval force, known as EUNAVFOR, has conducted its first airstrikes on pirate targets along the beaches in Somalia since declaring in March that they will begin targeting pirate gangs onshore.

The attacks were launched from which were targeted along the coastline near the city of Harardehere, were successful and welcomed by most with no injuries or casualties reported and only used by pirates said to be destroyed. Today, Somalia Report has the details of the attack from witnesses on the ground, both pirate and civilian.

Here is an account of the attack by Omar Haji, a self-proclaimed pirate the Guushaaye pirate group in Handulle, Somalia, which is where yesterday's airstrike was targeted:

> *It was night time and a small group from Guushaaye's men (the holder of the MV Albedo) were chewing khat near their camp. There were three skiffs of which two were tenders for the Albedo while the other one is owned by the hijackers of MV Orna.Around 2:30 or 3:00am there were 13 pirates in the camp we heard helicopters flying towards the area of Hundulle and my friends escaped from the area – and went took small speed boat and went onboard of Albedo.The airstrike destroyed three speed boats and other equipment including four ladders, a half tanker of fuel, two fishing nets and mobiles.*

Somalia Report also sat down with a resident elder of Harardhere, who describes the attacks as follows:

> *It was late tonight when we heard big explosions and then we saw some thing red in the ground. At first we thought that pirates were fighting each other. No one died we heard from pirates but materials were destroyed.*

Another resident of the Harardhere, discusses the attacks and they could effect innocent civilians living in a village overrun with pirate gangs.

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> *Westerners can't clarify who is the pirate and who is the civilian, if they target Harardhere – a lot of civilians will die so we are asking to the world to target pirates carefully.*

Here is an aerial photo that provides a good depiction of why the attacks are so complicated and concerns from innocent civilians are so high. The picture is of a small village to the south-east of Eyl, Somalia, which in the past has been known for pirate activity.

Skiffs and equipment can be seen strewn across the beach in the center of the image. Eyl has previously been known for its pirate activity and has been a location where a number of hijacked vessels and crew have been taken.

So how does the EUNAVFOR distinguish pirates from civilians? There is really no easy answer, at least for those of us that do not have access intelligence in the region, but Somalia Report has some tips.

> *Pirates either steal, rent or purchase small 20 foot fiberglass or plastic skiffs for their operations. There are both cheap Chinese foam filled versions or larger twin engine types. The cheaper Chinese version are stored aboard motherships for short runs, the larger skiffs can navigate many miles out to sea. A large multi engine skiff used by fishermen can $30,000 to $40,000 US dollars but they are typically not pushed up on land. A small pirate skiff powered with an 80 – 100 hp outboard can travel up to 30 knots per hour. Pirate camps are differentiated from fishing camps by the presence of boarding ladders. The area along the coast is remote and the presence of any activity is easily recorded and noted by numerous security forces off shore. These groups include the U.S., two Task Forces based out of Camp Lemonnier, the CIA supported Puntland Intelligence Services, the Puntland Marine Police Force, and both NATO and EU ships offshore.*

So what has the effect of the attacks had on pirates gangs? Well it has seemed to shake them up a bit. There has been pirate movement in Hundelle area over the last few days as the hijackers of the MV Orna await a ransom drop. They have been sharing a camp with the holders of the Albedo. Sources from pirates told Somalia Report that the pirates in that area are now sleeping on the board of vessels – because they fear another attack from EUNAVOR.

Mike Schuler: After graduating the Catholic University of America in 2005 with a B.S.B.A. in Finance, Mike went on to Tahoe to help with the launch of gCaptain's sister site, UnofficialNetworks.com. In June of 2008 Mike joined gCaptain.com as the first full-time employee in charge of the day-to-day operations of gCaptain.com and Unofficial Networks, LLC.

The Mumbai Model and the threat of urban terrorism

By Adam Elkus

Source:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/16/the_mumbai_model_and_the_threat_of_urban_terrorism

A recent wave of complex attacks in Kabul, Paktia, Logar, and Nangarhar has stirred strategic debate about the future of the war in Afghanistan. But they also pose tactical and operational questions closer to home. Security officials and police throughout the West have long worried about complex attacks like the assault that kicked off the Taliban's latest offensive. The mostly professional response by Afghan security forces and NATO troops demonstrates the limits of complex attacks, but the intelligence failures that allowed them to occur illustrate the general principle that sound tactics are only one part of the greater operational picture.

Since the 2008 Serena Hotel attack, Kabul has been plagued by repeated complex urban assaults. Deadly gun and bomb attacks in Pakistan and India have also become an unfortunate fact of life in the last decade. Counterterrorism planners, however, focus most on the 2008 Mumbai attack. Mumbai has powerfully shaped police and intelligence services' perception of future terrorist threats. In part, police have married specific training to combat complex attacks to existing prevention and response measures for "active shooters" in crowded areas. Police envision Mumbai while in practice trying to stop killers like the Virginia Tech shooter.

There is little novelty to the Mumbai attacks or armed assaults writ large. Terrorists have always sought to effect attention-grabbing assaults in public places. Adam Dolnik's work on modern hostage operations and armed assault marks the *sicarii* and *hashashin* sects of antiquity as the earliest terrorists employing assault techniques for strategic purposes. The Cold War saw numerous armed attacks, including deadly attacks by the Japanese Red Army and Palestinian groups throughout the

70s and 80s. The rise of religious terrorists also fueled strikes on targets ranging from Egypt's

Luxor resort to the Oasis residential complex in Saudi Arabia. Mumbai is not the only target terrorists have hit in India; the Red Fort and even Parliament has been attacked.

Unlike the Tet Offensive, an abject failure of its own professed strategic ends with a high (unintentional) symbolic power, the explicit goal of the complex attack is televised gore for strategic effect. Attackers-prepared by fanatical beliefs--fight to the death as suicide commandos, although not all necessarily seek death as the terminus of the operation. In turn, the operational design of complex attacks synergizes disparate killing technologies and finds tactical harmony in off-the-shelf command and control systems. Just like military special operations, attackers aim to gain and maintain relative superiority early on. Body counts and media attention are the primary metrics of tactical success, and hostage-taking and barricading elongates the duration of the raid. Complex attacks, however, require a degree of preparation, training, and coordination that cannot simply be downloaded from a jihadist

chat room. Logistics, discipline, and operational deception differentiate group threats from individual attackers like the Fort Hood killer.

Mumbai exemplifies these deadly operational trends. The terrorists used cell phones, blackberries, and satellite phones to coordinate their

operations in real-time in cooperation with an offsite handler. They continued killing until Indian forces wiped them out to a man, inflicting a toll of 165 dead and 304 wounded. With an open-ended goal of killing and gaining attention, their operations could be tactically fluid. An attacker can change a scenario from an "active shooter" operation that triggers an immediate police response to more drawn out barricaded hostage siege, or detonate explosives to generate more casualties. Both happened during the course of the Mumbai assault. The attackers also effectively disguised their preparations and tactical ingress from Indian intelligence until it was too late.

Complex attacks pose significant difficulties for law enforcement command and control. As John P. Sullivan has observed, police are optimized to respond in a piecemeal manner to calls for service. Police also concentrate in space, whereas distributed attackers like the Mumbai teams concentrate in time over large urban expanses. A distributed assault strains police resources and fragments the response, putting in question the ability of police command and control to keep pace with rapid events.

Since 2008, police and counterterrorism elements have developed new operational methods and intelligence collection methodologies. Mumbai-style attacks targeting Europe have been foiled. In the United States, police in major metropolitan areas are broadly familiar with the complex attack template due to their extensive experience with active shooter response. This training has been mainly tactical, as elite units are unlikely to be the first responders. Regular police must be prepared to deny attackers relative superiority. It remains to be seen, however, whether the command and control problems involved in suppressing an attack that might unfold over a large metropolitan region have been resolved.

The Kabul strikes, despite breathless media coverage, did not constitute a Mumbai or a Tet 2012. The attack, mounted by the Haqqani Network, featured 40 attackers in Kabul and smaller attacks in Paktia, Logar, and Nagarhar. Afghan security forces, with air support, intelligence, and logistics support from NATO, handily suppressed the assault. Though Afghan and NATO tactics during past armed assaults have sometimes been haphazard, the Haqqani Network's operatives did not inflict anything close to the damage the Mumbai attackers wrought nor survive for as significant a duration. Insurgent adaptation is often hailed, the Afghans and NATO have also roughly adapted through years of hard fighting. But a focus on tactical professionalism hides more disturbing operational failures.

First, as Thomas Ruttig noted, the scale and distribution of the attack across multiple provinces with heavy NATO presences is without precedent in the current conflict. The Afghan and NATO failure to observe the sophisticated reconnaissance, planning, and logistics phases of the operation is also a serious intelligence failure. The attackers adapted to sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and NATO tactics, but the Afghan government did nothing to enhance security at the unoccupied buildings Kabul attackers often use as fortified high ground. NATO and the Afghans were still taken by surprise despite having forewarning of a general offensive, and the attack once again demonstrated the ability of a handful

of armed men to briefly hold an entire city hostage and dominate the news cycle.

So will we see a complex attack in a major Western city? The jury is still out. There's a world of difference between operating in a South Asian warzone like Afghanistan or a troubled state with a history of terrorism like Pakistan and causing havoc in a Western city. Kenneth Boulding's "loss of strength gradient" applies to non-state actors too, as actors based

halfway around the world face substantial challenges in projecting force into heavily fortified and intelligence-protected cities in the Western heartland. Could local networks gain a foothold? Complex attacks depend heavily on training and logistics networks that present plenty of rich intelligence targets, and if "jihobbyists" training in backwoods forests get snapped up by the FBI, the prospects for more serious operations appear dim. The failure to

realize Mumbai-style attacks in Europe, an operational environment with greater potential for extremist penetration than the United States, also suggests some cause for skepticism.

However, one lesson from the sophisticated assault on Mumbai is the increasing leveling power of technology in empowering destructive small groups. In London and other cities wracked by political turmoil over continuing economic issues, mostly *unarmed* rioters augmented with peer-to-peer technologies created urban paralysis. The emerging informatization of public infrastructure in the West paradoxically enhances the vulnerability of Western cities to new forms of disruption. Even if a denuded al-Qaeda and affiliates lack power projection abilities today, it would be unwise to foreclose the possibility of future urban assaults and disruption by it or other potential adversaries.

Debates about the future aside, the cities of South Asia will continue to burn as urban assaults continue unabated. The terrorist attacks in Kabul, Mumbai, and Pakistan constitute gruesome evidence of the important role of sound command and control and intelligence in dealing with the urban adversary's potential for operational disruption in crowded cities.

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Terrorism and the Exceptional Individual

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/terrorism-and-exceptional-individual?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120517&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=10 6276a380b24390ac2e30e4a9bebc1f

There has been a lot of chatter in intelligence and academic circles about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) bombmaker Ibrahim al-Asiri and his value to AQAP. The disclosure last week of a thwarted AQAP plot to attack U.S. airliners using an improved version of an "underwear bomb" used in the December 2009 attempted attack aboard a commercial airplane and the disclosure of the U.S. government's

easing of the rules of engagement for unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in Yemen played into these discussions. People are debating how al-Asiri's death would affect the organization. A similar debate undoubtedly will erupt if AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi is captured or killed.

AQAP has claimed that al-Asiri trained others in bombmaking, and the claim makes sense. Furthermore, other AQAP members have received training in constructing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while training and fighting in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This means that al-Asiri is not the only person within the group who can construct an IED. However, he has demonstrated creativity and imagination. His devices consistently have been able to circumvent existing security measures, even if they have not always functioned as intended. We believe this ingenuity and imagination make al-Asiri not merely a bombmaker, but an exceptional bombmaker.

Likewise, al-Wahayshi is one of hundreds -- if not thousands -- of men currently associated with AQAP. He has several deputies and numerous tactical field commanders in various parts of Yemen. Jihadists have had a presence in Yemen for decades, and after the collapse of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, numerous Saudi migrants fleeing the Saudi government augmented this presence. However, al-Wahayshi played a singular role in pulling these disparate jihadist elements together to form a unified and cohesive militant organization that has been involved not only in several transnational terrorist attacks but also in fighting an insurgency that has succeeded in capturing and controlling large areas of territory. He is an exceptional leader.

Individuals like al-Asiri and al-Wahayshi play critical roles in militant groups. History has shown that the loss of exceptional individuals such as these makes a big difference in efforts to defeat such organizations.

Exceptional Individuals

One of Stratfor's core geopolitical tenets is that at the strategic level, geography is critical to shaping the limits of what is possible -- and impossible -- for states and nations to achieve in the long run. Quite simply, historically, the strategic political and economic dynamics created by geography are far more significant than the individual leader or personality, no matter how brilliant. For example, in the U.S. Civil War, Robert E. Lee was a shrewd general with a staff of exceptional military officers. However, geographic and economic reality meant that the North was bound to win the civil war despite the astuteness and abilities of Lee and his staff.

But as the size of an organization and the period of time under consideration shrink, geopolitics is little more than a rough guide. At the tactical level, intelligence takes over from geopolitics, and individuals' abilities become far more important in influencing smaller events and trends within the greater geopolitical flow. This is the level where exceptional military commanders can win battles through courage and brilliance, where exceptional businessmen can revolutionize the way business is done through innovative new products or ways of selling those products and where the exceptional individuals can execute terrorist tradecraft in a way that allows them to kill scores or even hundreds of victims.

Leadership is important in any type of organization, but it is especially important in entrepreneurial organizations, which are fraught with risk and require unique vision, innovation and initiative. For example, hundreds of men founded automobile companies in the early 1900s, but Henry Ford was an exceptional individual because of his vision to make automobiles a widely available mass-produced commodity rather than just a toy for the rich. In computer technology, Steve Jobs was exceptional for his ability to design devices with an aesthetic form that appealed to consumers, and Michael Dell was exceptional for his vision of bypassing traditional sales channels and selling computers directly to customers.

These same leadership characteristics of vision, daring, innovation and initiative are evident in the exceptional individuals who have excelled in the development and application of terrorist tradecraft. Some examples of exceptional individuals in the terrorism realm are **Ali Hassan Salameh** (photo, left), the operations chief of Black September, who not only revolutionized the form that terrorist organizations take by instituting the use of independent, clandestine cells, but also was a visionary in designing theatrical attacks intended for international media consumption. Some have called Palestinian militant leader Abu Ibrahim the "grandfather of all bombmakers" for his innovative IED designs during his time with Black September, the Popular Front for the

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Liberation of Palestine and his own group, the 15 May Organization. Ibrahim was known for creating sophisticated devices that used plastic explosives and a type of electronic timer called an "e-cell" that could be set for an extended delay. Another terrorism innovator was Hezbollah's Imad Mughniyeh, who helped pioneer the use of large suicide truck bombs to attack hardened targets, such as military barracks and embassies.

In the jihadist realm, **Khalid Sheikh Mohammed** (photo, right), who is being tried by a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was such an individual. Not only did Mohammed mastermind the 9/11 attacks for al Qaeda in which large hijacked aircraft were transformed into guided missiles, but he also was the operational planner behind the coordinated attacks against two U.S. embassies in August 1998 and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Mohammed's other innovations included the idea to use modular IEDs concealed in baby dolls to attack 10 aircraft in a coordinated attack (Operation Bojinka) and the shoe bomb plot. Mohammed's video beheading of journalist Daniel Pearl in February 2002 started a grisly trend that was followed not only by jihadists in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia but also by combatants in Mexico's drug war.

Leadership

One of the places where exceptional individuals have been most evident in the terrorist realm is in leadership roles. Although on the surface it might seem like a simple task to find a leader for a militant group, in practice, effective militant leaders are hard to come by. This is because militant leadership requires a rather broad skill set. In addition to personal attributes such as ruthlessness, aggressiveness and fearlessness, militant leaders also must be charismatic, intuitive, clever and inspiring. This last attribute is especially important in an organization that seeks to recruit operatives to conduct suicide attacks. Additionally, an effective militant leader must be able to recruit and train operatives, enforce operational security, raise funds, plan operations and methodically execute the plan while avoiding the security forces that are constantly hunting down the militants.

The trajectory of al Qaeda's franchise in Saudi Arabia is a striking illustration of the importance of leadership to a militant organization. Under the leadership of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, the Saudi al Qaeda franchise was extremely active in 2003 and 2004. It carried out a number of high-profile attacks inside Saudi Arabia and put everyone there, from the Saudi monarchy to multinational oil companies, in a general state of panic. With bombings, ambushes and beheadings, it seemed as if Saudi Arabia was on its way to becoming the next Iraq. However, after the June 2004 death of al-Muqrin, the organization began floundering. The succession of leaders appointed to replace al-Muqrin lacked his operational savvy, and each one proved ineffective at best. (Saudi security forces quickly killed several of them.) Following the unsuccessful February 2006 attack against the oil facility at Abqaiq, the group atrophied further, succeeding in carrying out only one more attack -- an amateurish small-arms assault in February 2007 against a group of French tourists.

The disorganized remaining jihadists in Saudi Arabia ultimately grew frustrated at their inability to operate on their own. Many of them traveled to places such as Iraq or Pakistan to train and fight. In January 2009, many of the militants who remained in the Arabian Peninsula joined with al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen to form a new group -- AQAP -- under the leadership of al-Wahayshi, the leader of al Qaeda in Yemen who served under Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan before being arrested in Iran. An extradition deal between the Yemeni and Iranian governments returned al-Wahayshi to Yemen in 2003. He subsequently escaped from a high-security prison outside Sanaa in 2006.

Al Qaeda in Yemen's operational capability improved under al-Wahayshi's leadership, and its operational tempo increased (although those operations were not terribly effective). Considering this momentum, it is not surprising that the frustrated members of the all-but-defunct Saudi franchise agreed to swear loyalty to al-Wahayshi and join his new umbrella group, AQAP. The first widely recognized product of this merger was the attempted assassination of Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince

Mohammed bin Nayef on Aug. 28, 2009, using a device designed by al-Asiri and carried by his brother, Abdullah al-Asiri.

As with the Saudi group, the fortunes of other al Qaeda regional franchises have risen or fallen based on the ability of the franchise's leadership. In Indonesia, for example, following the arrests and killings of several top jihadist commanders, the capabilities of the regional jihadist franchise there were deeply degraded. Al Qaeda announced with great fanfare in August 2006 that a splinter of the Egyptian jihadist group Gamaah al-Islamiyah had become al Qaeda's franchise in Egypt, and in November 2007 al Qaeda announced that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had become a regional franchise. But neither of these franchises ever really began operations. While a great degree of the groups' ineffectiveness could have resulted from the oppressive natures of the Egyptian and Libyan governments -- and those governments' aggressive efforts to control the new al Qaeda franchises -- Stratfor believes the groups' failures also stem in large part from their lack of effective, dynamic leadership.

Arms Race

Leadership is not the only factor that influences a militant group's ability to carry out terrorist attacks. Groups planning to conduct bombing attacks also require a proficient bombmaker, and an innovative bombmaker like Abu Ibrahim or Hamas' Yahya Ayyash can greatly expand a group's operational reach and effectiveness. This is especially true for groups hoping to conduct attacks in the United States and Europe.

As outlined in last week's Security Weekly, those planning terrorist attacks against aircraft have been in a continual arms race with airline security measures. Every time security is changed to adapt to a particular threat, whether it be 9/11-style hijackings, shoe bombs, liquid bombs or underwear bombs, the terrorist planner must come up with a new attack plan to defeat the enhanced security measures. This is where innovation and imagination become critical. A master bombmaker might be able to show a pupil how to build a simple IED or maybe even something like a shoe bomb. The pupil may even become quite proficient at assembling such devices. But unless the pupil is innovative and imaginative, he will not be able to invent and perfect the next technology needed to stay ahead of security countermeasures.

There is a big difference between a technician and an inventor, and perhaps the best way to illustrate this principle is by drawing a parallel to the music world. A student can learn to play the saxophone, and perhaps even to mimic a jazz recording note for note. But it is quite another thing for that student to develop the ability to improvise a masterful solo like saxophonist John Coltrane could. In music, individuals like Coltrane are rare, and in terrorism, so are exceptional bombmakers -- masters of destruction who can create imaginative and original IEDs capable of defeating security measures.

Following the death of Anwar al-Awlaki, AQAP's English-language preacher, we noted that we did not believe his death would have much operational impact on the group due to his role as the group's English-language ideologue. That argument was based upon the fact that al-Wahayshi, al-Asiri and AQAP operational leader Qasim al-Raymi, who were much more responsible for the group's operations, were still alive. However, if the group were to lose an exceptional individual -- such as its dynamic and effective leader, al-Wahayshi, or its imaginative and creative bombmaker, al-Asiri -- the loss would make a significant difference unless the group could find someone equally capable to replace that individual.

Italy deploys 20,000 to protect sensitive targets

Source:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/05/18/italy-deploys-20000-protect-sensitive-targets.html

Italy increased security Thursday at 14,000 sites, and assigned bodyguards to protect 550 individuals after a nuclear energy company official was shot and letter bombs directed to the tax collection agency.
Under the enhanced measures, Interior Minister Anna Maria

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Cancellieri deployed 20,000 law enforcement officers to protect individuals and sensitive sites. In addition, 4,200 military personnel already assigned throughout Italy will be redeployed according to new priorities.

"Based on a thorough analysis of the situation, Interior Cancellieri has confirmed the need to maintain a high level of vigilance, strengthen the security measures against sensitive targets and those exposed to specific risks," the Interior Ministry said in a statement.

Authorities will also increase intelligence to "neutralize" the risk of subversive actions "that can be nourished in moments of tension," the statement added.

A group calling itself the Informal Anarchist Federation last week claimed responsibility for the shooting of Ansaldo Nucleare CEO Roberto Adinolfi, and pledged in a letter to the daily Corriere della Sera to carry out further actions against Ansaldo's parent company, the state-controlled Finmeccanica.

Italian anarchists sent a letter bomb that exploded at the Rome headquarters of the Equitalia tax collection agency last December, injuring the directory. FAI also claimed responsibility for a series of letter bombs sent to embassies in Rome in December 2010.

More recently, a letter bomb was intercepted at the same office this month, and a Molotov cocktail exploded outside an Equitalia office in Livorno. In addition, there have been numerous reports of letters with suspicious powdery substances sent to Equitalia offices.

The Mechanics of Terror

By Jibril Hambel
Source: http://islamicamagazine.com/?p=192

Pisarov, a Russian revolutionary of the late 19th century, said that the most fanatical of all people are children and adolescents. Albert Camus comments that this dictum applies no less to nation states. If one accepts this premise then the current state of world affairs is dire since most leading players are, historically speaking, children. From the vantage point of history, a nation under three hundred years old is in its childhood. What then are we to make of states either established or merely projected during the last fifty years? The brutal fumblings of political Zionism, the Quixotic War on Terror, and violent theopolitical currents which demand a new caliphate or a theocratic state are examples of an immaturity that would be laughable if presented as satire. In the real world, unfortunately, such immaturity is producing impoverishment and suffering on an unprecedented scale. What else should one expect when the oldest adolescent bully on the block is a mere two hundred and fifty years old and just happens to be the only remaining superpower at large?

In his classic essay on rebellion and mankind's justifications for murder and terror throughout the ages, Camus writes:

Nihilism, intimately involved with a frustrated religious movement, mus culminates in terrorism. In the universe of total negation, these young disciples try, with bombs,

revolvers, and also with the courage with which they walk to die gallows, to escape from the contradiction and to create the values they lack. Until their time men died for what they knew, or for what they thought they knew . . .

The Rebel

Such a statement would not be out of place in a contemporary treatise on the roots of modern "Islamic" terrorism. And yet at the time it was written, no such subcategory of terrorism existed. Terror was terror whatever the root cause attributed, because Camus' argument shows that these alleged causes weren't causes at all. The actual root cause is the real or imagined failure of a code of beliefs or set of social conditions producing a moral/ethical/philosophical vacuum which self-styled reformers and modern-day prophets feel compelled to redress. More often than not, schemes to regenerate a fallen humanity insist on first razing any and all preexisting structures to the ground. Advocates of such Year Zero scenarios and the builders of New World Orders say such wholesale destruction is necessary. History turns a more jaded eye to the process and calls it what it is: a scorched earth policy. History knows we can never fully disengage from our collective pasts, even as the latest academic fad trumpets the death of history.

By looking at the philosophical aspects of terrorism, however, we glimpse only the tip of the iceberg: the reductionisms and rationalizations for the behavior of extremely irrational beings. Some describe mankind as a species of thinking animal. If that is the case it should be noted that he is not a particularly efficient "thinking animal." The present cul-de-sac reached by zealous Pharasitic terror networks on the one hand, and the state sponsored terrorism of national and imperialist agendas on the other, is fueled more often by mankind's collective insecurity, and irrational dreams and phobias, than by reason.

Returning to the metaphoric adolescence of nations, it would be wise to keep in mind one of the hallmarks of adolescent development: rebellion for its own sake.

Adolescent rebellion serves two purposes. It allows the individual an opportunity to gauge his strength, however undeserving the target of rebellion may be. More importantly though, it is ultimately a demand for limitation. Children and adolescents often lash out at the world looking for places where the world hits back. In this way, one's social, emotional and psychological limits are discovered. If no limits are found, the search continues and the rebellion covers more ground. Should no limitations be found we are presented with individuals unmoored to their surroundings, adrift in a universe void of meaning. Nature may abhor a vacuum. Mankind, as a thinking animal, is absolutely unhinged by it

With this in mind, witness the latest current events. The ferocity of abuse doled out to the Palestinians by Sharon's black shirts, the plunder of Afghanistan and Iraq by NeoCons or the propensity to fly aircraft into civilian targets all smack of a spoiled child running unchecked through a china shop. Countries with a bit more history behind them are beginning to curl their lips in revulsion over such disorderly antics but no one seems motivated sufficiently to play the role of disciplinarian. We are fast becoming a world modeled not on The Wealth of Nations, Dos Kapital or scripture, but on Lord of the Flies.

Rage against the machine

Before further examination of generic definitions over the centuries, it would be wise to reflect on how recent events have so rattled our collective cage that we can no longer utter the word terrorism without a degree of self-conscious irony. The sense that we have moved into uncharted waters – akin to the post-atomic Zeitgeist and the wide-reaching moral, ethical and philosophical reassessments it produced – is undeniably perceived despite our inability to articulate iL Words inevitably fall short The nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the attacks on NY and DC on September 11th have left a deeper wound on our psyches than the wound that might have been left by a mere tallying up of human and fiscal losses. The losses, extensive as they were, serve to downplay the event by reducing it to simple mathematics.

It is the mushroom cloud and the inferno in Lower Manhattan added to our archetype library that keeps us awake at night.

Or as one New York Times commentator pointed out 9/11 is a date that will forever have a Before and After attached to it

When discussing the implications of Black Tuesday, we need to probe deeply into why it touches, frightens and fascinates us so. Or to steal a

phrase from journalist Thomas Freidman, why it was such a brilliant piece of terrorism. In its original context Friedman was commenting on the bombing of the Marine base in Beirut It is nothing if not more concise in light of the attacks in New York and Washington.

What helps catapult the 9/11 attacks higher on our Bichter scale of horror is the fact that it occurred during peacetime. After all, the civilian casualties in places like Hiroshima or, say, Dresden, were presented as cruel necessities of war. We are led to believe that the destruction unleashed upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was all the more calculated and heinous because there was no war and therefore no enemy target to strike at

For a large percentage of the world's population, though, peace is in the eye of the beholder. The world at large does not save the word war for those conflicts deemed to be such by an American commander in chief. Most of the world in their simple-minded ignorance thought that the endless conflict in Vietnam was an actual war. No matter how many times we remind them it was a police action, they insist (along with some very unpatriotic Americans) on calling it a war.

It is no doubt a combination of these same international illiterates and a growing number of unpatriotic Americans that now have the audacity to question the meaning of the word "terrorist." A spin doctor's work is never done.

For ages, the meaning of terrorism was fairly simple. It was the use of terror to achieve political ends. From the historic standpoint, it was often the tool of a disenfranchised minority lacking sufficient force and resources to launch an actual army. What a state-sponsored military could do by brute force, the "terrorists" had to accomplish by guerilla tactics. Targets appeared, by necessity, to be random. In addition, the choice of targets had to be vicious and heartless enough to strike fear into the general populace, and of sufficient symbolic resonance to make a point. Terrorism was simply a war-byother-means tactic because rebel contingents involved in a conflict could not actually take a city, or take over the reigns of a nation's media, communications or power supply. Such rebel factions were dubbed "the resistance" if you sympathized with them and "terrorists" if you backed the State.

The twentieth century, it could be argued, offered but variations on a theme. As such dead end philosophies as nihilism and anarchy

came of age, the lines between friend and enemy, people and state, or us and them began to blur; in some cases becoming irrelevant. As political and economic ties became more entangled and labyrinth, the targets of terrorism seemed to grow more deliberately arbitrary. Let's blow up American airliners. Why? Because America supports Israel and Israel is killing Palestinians and taking their land. Well, why not blow up Israeli planes, then? Because they have much better security than the Americans. Oh.

Throw an ever ripening Marxism to the recipe and almost any target becomes justifiable in the name of "class struggle".

That being said, the word terrorism still remained a constant in political dialogue. The PFLP, or the Red Army Faction or the IRA were terrorists or freedom fighters depending on which side of the fence you sat. You might even sympathize with a cause while decrying certain actions of more militant wings as terrorism.

At this point one could offer a fundamental equation. Terrorism is seldom a product of an ideology or an injured sense of justice. As Camus points out with great insight, terror is what rushes into the void when beliefs and ideologies no longer work. To personalize it even further, it is the unholy offspring of helplessness and rage. When all avenues to change seem inexorably closed and changing a system from within becomes the delusional refuge of old men and impotent pacifists, the option of such extreme and absolute means to an end gains a certain appeal. It is, in most cases, an in extremis grasp at taking back the power so long denied. Needless to say it often smacks of megalomania and a misguided sense of martyrdom.

Without rushing to judgment in cases of military conflict, whether it be the Japanese kamikaze ethos or the military tactics in South Lebanon, it is probably safe to say that the majority of sane individuals of any and all political persuasions concur that the attacks on the World Trade Center or Shi'a holy sites in Iraq this year were not acts of martyrdom but rather of helpless rage against a machine the perpetrators had no hope of dismantling.

Why is it then that the concept of today's "war on terror" is not only indigestible, but instead sticks in the gullet and prevents so many from even swallowing?

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Brave new war

The war, therefore, if we judge it by the standards of previous wars, is merely an imposture … although it is unreal it is not meaningless. It eats up the supply of consumable goods, and it helps to preserve the special mental atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs. . .The war is waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact

The very word "war", therefore, has become misleading. It would probably be accurate to say that by becoming continuous war has ceased to exist. The peculiar pressure that it exerted on human beings between the Neolithic Age and the early twentieth century has disappeared and been replaced by something quite different …

George Orwell, 1984

There is little doubt in most people's minds that the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 constituted an act of terrorism. Putting aside the fine lines drawn by those so inclined to cite the Pentagon as a military target while conveniently ignoring the plane load of civilian passengers, it is the WTC that till now remains most deeply seared into the world consciousness. The fact that such an act has met with such profound condemnation by so many opposing ideologies and belief systems is one element that makes it perhaps one of the most purely terroristic actions to date. It is also, by all accounts, the most successful. The use of terror to effect political ends has known no greater success than the suffering and hatred unleashed in response to the strike. As the U.S. continues its transition from victim to victimizes thereby incurring greater wrath, condemnation and abuse from the world at large, one might surmise that Bin Laden knew what he was up to. If the Saudi prodigal son had even an inkling of what kind of Gorgon the U.S. would become in the wake of the attacks, then Thomas Friedman has indeed found the right adjective in the words "brilliant act of terrorism."

In virtually no time at all, the cabal on Capitol Hill, with their dreams of Empire and domination have been unmasked for what they are: the latest incarnation of the will to power in its most malevolent and self-serving form. Even the last century's favorite arch-fiend Hitler

would have had troubles in curtailing civil liberties and invading foreign countries with such swift and reckless abandon. Even the Third Reich had to fawn, manipulate and rationalize like mad to take Poland. In less than a year, the U.S. has appropriated Afghanistan and Iraq and doesn't seem the least bit contrite about having their eye on Iran and Syria for the next course.

Previous despots, in their clumsy and unskilled way, loved to begin the process of Empire building with rabble rousing and scapegoating. Tap the collective insecurities and sense of social decay. Blame someone for it. You know the story.

Till 9/11, that is. The trigger happy response of today's oilfield Machiavels – and never has oligarchy been so shamelessly flaunted as democracy as it has with the Bush dynasty – is not a calculated "What is to be done" but rather a smugly imperial and pyrrhic "who is it to be done to?"

With one brutal stroke, Bin Laden has led the U.S. to the bear trap at the end of the garden path. He has, whether wittingly or not, led the sole remaining superpower on a binge of overexpansion that has been the death knoll of previous empire builders like Napoleon and Hitler to name a few.

Never before has the use of terror to achieve political ends – the ends in this case being the fall of the United States – met with such success.

Such an action cannot help but alter all previous parameters and definitions. The fact that "terrorism" has evolved to new heights, into some hybrid metaterrorism is disturbing. More disturbing still is the fact that the American response has been a war on terror. If we accept the premise that terrorism is "war by other means" in the way that Clausewitz defined war as "politics by other means," we will be forced to acknowledge that a war against a war-by-othermeans is a psychotic construct and doomed to fail. We grow queasy as the spectacle unfolds, resembling more than anything else the sight of a serpent devouring its own tail.

The sorcerer's apprentice

A brief survey of the current world climate should produce a healthy shudder in someone confronted with the willful ignorance of Americans or Westerners who ask: "Why does the

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world hate us so much?" An objective, cursory glance at any one of the world's hellholes reveals systematically impoverished masses that are conveniently not sufficiently despised and neglected enough to be deprived of the right to buy Coca Cola, Marlboro and Adidas.

If we set aside for the moment many of the documented facts at our disposal – the dirty little wars and secret deals, the slush funds and secret ops, and the seemingly endless though unpublicized series of military interventions over the last four or five decades – we would still find plenty of grist for the anti-American hate mill. As a nation, the U.S. seems capable of mass producing hate and rage as fast as it produces second rate automobiles and first rate military hardware.

If it were simply a matter of conflicting world views as the Clash of Civilizations cultists would have us believe; we could scarcely explain away a tenth of the hostilities aimed at the U.S. From within her borders as well as without the tide of resentment rises. It does little good to take action against the manifestations of anti- American sentiment if nothing is done to deal with the root causes.

Think Tank pundits continue taking home handsome salaries to sell us "if it weren't for the Marxists and Muslims, the world would be a safe happy place" scenarios that make no room for real life glitches in the program like Timothy McVeigh, cyber terrorism or the Los Angeles riots in 1992. The sad fact of the matter is that we are producing anti-American terrorists as rapidly and as uncontrollably as Disney's mouse produced hell-bent broomsticks in The Sorcerer's Apprentice.

Without a probing and realistic inquiry into the root causes of terrorism and its increasingly virulent strains, we do little but stick our fingers in a dike rigged with several tons of fertilizer and diesel explosives.

On the other hand, if we bother to examine the causes we would very likely be swamped with data in no time at all. Enough data, one hopes, to straighten out of a particularly bad tailspin. It remains a damning indictment of American sensibility that we remain one of the most racist nations on earth. When Oklahoma City's Murrah building went up, the country plunged immediately into an anti-Arab (or anything that looks Arab) witch hunt. The weeks following 9/11 saw more of the same.

Why is it then, when 1 go to Iraq these days on an American passport, I'm not met with violent contempt? Rather than being beaten, bullied and buggered, I'm offered tea and a chance to practice my Arabic in lively yet civilized political discussions. One theory about American xenophobia struck me as being particularly apt: most of the world is not under the illusion that their government is there to serve them. Most of the world's citizens realize that government is a necessary evil best avoided. One Arabic proverb – oft quoted in reference to the ideal relationship between citizen and State-runs: keep far away from evil and sing to it.

Americans, oddly enough, seem to think they actually have a say in how their country is run. Therein of course lies the rub. How can a people so grossly deluded be expected to interact with their fellow human being as precisely that? A human being. "If our Utopian republic is run by the people, for the people … then yours must be too" is the delusion that leads a great many of us to fear and despise individuals who come from places whose leaders we despise. Political outspokenness is an American trait. Political maturity, alas, is not. Even if such a delusion proved true, leaving us truly empowered to effect change on a grand scale in the day to day affairs of state, we would be hampered by the fact that while students the world over thumb tattered copies of Marx, Weber, Mills, Marcuse, Nietzsche and the like, most Americans feel radical with their nose in a copy of Michael Moore's latest Looking for political enlightenment in the writings of a humorist tends to make Qadhafi's Green Book look like a true beacon of social reform.

If terrorism is to be thwarted in any quantifiable sense, then the means of production need to be shut down. The policies that produced the Taliban and Salvador's ARENA junta, to name but two, need to be met with – at the very least a healthy dose of moral revulsion, instead of our current climate of dazed apathy. Since the one person, one vote fallacy is little more than an excuse for Bush Jr. to laugh up his sleeve; the revolution in question must be social. Like the struggle to end the Vietnam debacle or the fight for Civil Rights, there needs to be a grassroots momentum to reclaim the civil liberties already lost The power of the ballot box has been proven illusionary by the previous election. The power of the wallet, however, has not

By now, one hopes, we all know the game plan. What remains to be seen

is what exactly each of us considers worth fighting for. And at what cost Civil disobethence, a refusal to fill IRS and Pentagon coffers, a demand for National Health Care, and enthusiastic support for nonsubsidized media outlets are but a few of the options available to the public. And while the going may not be easy it will no doubt prove far cheaper in the end than the present alternatives.

A government, when faced with increasing amounts of both dissent and outright assaults on its sovereignty usually chooses the most expethent recourse: to bring everything down to black and white by tarring all "enemies" of the state with the 'terrorist' brush. Such short term measures ignore long term backlashes. Backlashes that are paid for in tax dollars and civilian body counts.

I, for one, have run out of spare change.

Beyond good and evil

By placing most of the blame at the feet of the NeoCon establishment – a special interest group with its genesis in the Reagan era – it should not be inferred that such figures as Bin Laden, McVeigh or Zarqawi are guilty of little more than being overly miffed and ill-tempered about the state of things. Nor are they merely distorted funhouse images of the adolescent American plundering of world resources and power structures. They have their own dangerous delusions, one of which may be best summed up by yet another Arabic proverb: Fight evil with evil.

I remember being highly amused when I discovered that Iran had been flooding the world market with bogus American dollars, printed on American presses donated during the reign of a long gone Shah. The massive influx of phony bills added to the already inflated dollar's decline. I noticed a fellow

American Muslim was not so amused. Given the fact that he was a frequent visitor to Iran as both a student of Persian and a bookseller specializing in hard to find Islamic texts, I questioned his reticence to at least chuckle over such a wily maneuver on Iran's part. I said something like, "Talk about fighting fire with fire …"

His response stopped me in my tracks. "Yeah, it's a fine example of fighting fire with fire." He paused. "Problem is, the professionals fight fire with water."

There may be times when subduing evil with evil applies. A serial killer who is judicially executed does not kill again. There are however, many more cases where, as Gandhi summed up, "an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind."

The present impasse between terrorism and retaliatory State-sponsored terrorism seems to bear out the wisdom of the latter. Thanks to Bin Laden and Friends, there are many more Arabs and Muslims dying because of 9/11 than were dying before it. In addition to such sobering statistics, there are the shared Oil Cartel concerns of Bush and Laden thrown in the mix. And that conjures up an image of self-styled Masters of the Universe hunched over a chessboard world, with all us common mortals simply pawns in their game.

There are, I suppose, benefits to being a lead player in a one-dimensional cartoon saga of good and evil. As I finish the final page of this article early one summer morning, the Word program's spell-check highlights Bin Laden's name. Thinking that most names don't register to a computer spell-check program, I prepare to click the 'ignore all' option, only to discover I had left out the space between Bin and Laden. Osama it seems has made it into the dictionary.

You and I have not.

Jibril hambel is a freelance writer who has lived in the Middle East since 1992, covering points from Baghdad to Beirut. A former editor of both Venture *and* Islamica *magazines, he now lives in Lebanon where he writes and teaches English, business, and drama. He has also produced, written, directed, and acted in a number of plays and films in New York, Damascus, and Amman.*

Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater Moment

Source:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/shooting-to-kill-pirates-risks-blackwater-moment.html

At first the video depicts a seemingly calm, sun-drenched sea from aboard the Avocet,

until a pale blue skiff appears in the distance, cutting rapidly across the Indian Ocean toward the bulk ship's starboard side.

After a tense radio exchange between the ship's armed guards, who believe they're under attack by pirates, their team leader steps through the bridge door and orders warning shots. Immediately, he and another guard fire dozens of rounds at the oncoming boat. The blaze of gunfire continues after the skiff crashes into the ship, with guards shooting down into the vessel, and as it then trails behind the Avocet.

Since 2008, gangs of Somali pirates linked to

clans in the failed state on the eastern coast of Africa, have carried out more than 800 attacks on ships, from private yachts to oil

supertankers. Photographer: Mohamed Dahir/AFP/Getty Images

"Second skiff coming in," he shouts, then they turn and begin firing on the new boat, and the video ends.

At least some of the boats' occupants were probably killed or injured, said Thomas Rothrauff, president of Virginia Beach, Virginia-based Trident Group Inc., which provided the ship's security crew. He said the incident on March 25 last year was the second attempt to hijack the Avocet in three days. After spotting rocket-

propelled grenades on the first skiff, the guards feared for their lives. The shootings were justified and the guards acted responsibly, Rothrauff said, firing warnings before aiming at the boat.

The gunfire exchange highlights a lack of rules governing the use of weapons on the high seas amid questions over how much force is legal and necessary to fight Somali piracy attacks, which targeted a record 237 ships last year. The video, presented at a shipping conference in December and leaked on the internet last month, has fueled debate over when is it acceptable to open fire -- and to keep shooting.

Armed Guards Can Help Cut Insurance Costs for Shipping Companies

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-11/armed-guards-can-help-cut-insurance-costs-for-shipping-companies.html

Insurance costs to pay ransoms if vessels are hijacked by Somali pirates can be reduced by 75 percent if ships employ private armed guards, Seacurus Ltd. said.

The London-based marine insurance broker cuts its premiums by that amount, or more if additional security measures are taken on board vessels transiting a high-risk area, Nick Maddalena, company director, said yesterday.

If owners employ four armed guards, kidnap and ransom insurance rates fall to about $4,500 from $15,000 for a large tanker's single transit, Maddalena said, adding about 20 percent of all ship owners buy the coverage.

Piracy attacks rose to a record off the coast of Somalia and Indian Ocean last year, an area of sea larger than continental U.S. through which 42,500 vessels sail each year. **Owners paid $160 million in ransom payments in 2011 and $79.8 million in 2010**, according to figures from the European Union Naval Force and Broomfield, Colorado-based non-profit One Earth Future Foundation.

Kidnap and ransom insurance is optional, on top of premiums charged by other providers when ships travel through designated high-risk piracy areas, Maddalena said. The additional premium is typically 0.4 percent of the ship's value, he said at the Tradewinds Marine Risk Forum in London.

Additional premiums for very large crude carriers, tankers that ship 2-million barrels of oil, are reduced by 60 percent to $11,200 per transit from $28,000, if shipowners take out kidnap and ransom insurance, Maddalena said. The insurance pricing arrangements mean the price arbitrage can save some larger, more expensive ships, such as liquefied natural gas carriers, as much as $15,000 in fees for each journey, Maddalena said.

Teams of armed guards cost about $60,000 for a crossing, Roland Hoeger, managing director of Hamburg-based shipping company Komrowski Group, said at a conference on April 25.

Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi dies in Tripoli

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18137896

Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the only person convicted over the 1988 Lockerbie bombing above Scotland which killed 270 people, has

died at his home in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

Megrahi, 60, was convicted by a special court in the Netherlands in 2001.

He was released from prison in Scotland in 2009 on compassionate grounds, suffering from cancer.

UK Prime Minister David Cameron said it was a day to remember the 270 victims of "an appalling terrorist act".

Mr Cameron, who is in Chicago for a Nato summit, said Megrahi should never have been freed, Reuters news agency reports.

Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond also said Megrahi's death was an occasion to remember the victims of Lockerbie.

He said Lockerbie was still a live investigation and that Scottish prosecutors had never believed Megrahi was the only person responsible.

Relatives' anger

His release sparked the fury of many of the relatives of the victims of the Lockerbie disaster. The US - whose citizens accounted for 189 of the dead - also criticised the move.

But others believed he was not guilty of the bombing.

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Dr Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora died at Lockerbie, called Megrahi's death a "very sad event".

"Right up to the end he was determined, for his family's sake... [that] the verdict against him should be overturned," said Dr Swire, who is a member of the Justice for Megrahi group.

"And also he wanted that for the sake of those relatives who had come to the conclusion after studying the evidence that he wasn't guilty, and I think that's going to happen."

Died at home

His brother Abdulhakim said on Sunday that Megrahi's health had deteriorated quickly and he died at home in Tripoli.

He told the AFP news agency that Megrahi died at 13:00 local time (11:00 GMT).

The BBC's Rana Jawad, who is outside Megrahi's home in Tripoli, says family members are making preparations to receive guests paying their condolences.

Megrahi's sister told the Libyan Wal news agency that his funeral would take place at Tripoli's main cemetery on Monday, following early afternoon prayers.

Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence officer, always denied any responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988.

It remains the deadliest terrorist incident ever to have taken place on British soil.

All 259 people aboard the plane, which was travelling from London to New York, were

Megrahi: Key dates

- November 1991: Indicted for Lockerbie bombing
- 2001-02: Tried and convicted at special court in the Netherlands
- August 2009: Released on compassionate grounds and returns to Tripoli
- July 2011: Last known public appearance at pro-Gaddafi rally
- 20 May 2012: Dies at home in Tripoli

killed, along with 11 others on the ground.

Investigators tracing the origins of scraps of clothes wrapped around the bomb followed a trail to a shop in Malta which led them, eventually, to Megrahi.

He and another Libyan, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, were indicted by the Scottish and US courts in November 1991.

But Libya refused to extradite them. In 1999, after protracted negotiations, Libya handed the two men over for trial, under Scottish law but on neutral ground, the former US airbase at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands.

Their trial began in May 2000. Fhimah was acquitted of all charges, but Megrahi was found guilty and sentenced to a minimum of 27 years

in prison.

He served the first part of his sentence at the maximum-security prison at Barlinnie, in Glasgow, but was transferred in 2005 to Greenock prison.

He lost his first appeal against conviction in 2002 but in 2007, his case was referred back to senior Scottish judges. He dropped that second case two days before he was released.

No extradition

Last August, after the fall of Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi, Megrahi was reported to be "in and out of a coma" at his home in Tripoli.

There have been calls for him to be returned to jail in the UK or tried in the US.

But shortly after they toppled Colonel Gaddafi, Libyan rebel leaders said they would not extradite Megrahi or any other Libyan.

Our correspondent says that since the fall of Gaddafi, more Libyans are expressing the view that whatever happened at Lockerbie was bigger than just Megrahi, and he may have been used as a scapegoat by the regime.

Last September, it emerged that former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had raised Megrahi's case in talks with Gaddafi in 2008 and 2009 in

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Libya, shortly before Megrahi was freed.
At the time, Libya was threatening to sever commercial links with Britain if Megrahi was not released.

But Mr Blair's spokesman told Col Gaddafi it was a case for the Scottish authorities and no

business deals were discussed.

In his last interview, filmed in December 2011, Megrahi said: "I am an innocent man. I am about to die and I ask now to be left in peace with my family."

He had previously claimed he would release new information about the atrocity but little new has emerged.

Megrahi had rarely been seen since his return to Tripoli, but he was spotted on Libyan television at what appeared to be a pro-government rally in July 2011.

'Gender-based Explosions' launched

Source: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-109688-Gender-based-Explosions-launched

Dr Maleeha Aslam, a former researcher of Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and fellow of Cambridge Commonwealth Association, has warned that Jihadist Islamism will grow rapidly as masculinity across the Muslim world and beyond will grow, at times having

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its political agency co-opted towards or subsumed under terrorism.

Dr Aslam was speaking at the launching of her book 'Gender-based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities, Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism', organised by SDPI here on Monday. Ijaz Haider from SDPI conducted the proceedings.

Dr Aslam said that grievances cannot be removed through development initiatives but mainly by stopping violent means of action. In Muslim societies, socio-economic and political oppression on one hand and culturally idealised gender constructs like bravery on the other hand predisposed men towards militant Islamism and terrorism.

She said that the upheaval in Muslim masculinities is exacerbated by militarism-oriented counter-terrorism as Muslim men are brought under surveillance and their honour codes and kinship affiliations stand threatened. She recommended instituting gender safeguards and gender mainstreaming in counter-terrorism and deradicalisation frameworks.She questioned the impression that martyrdom is considered only of males adding that there is a gender dimension to it. She said that customs like Pakhtunwali become egocentric in case of women and revenge-oriented when issues of men are involved. She said that in Muslim societies, there is hegemonic masculinity and subordinate/complicit masculinity. She said even if you are rich or educated, women feel marginalized.

PPP MNA Dr Nafisa Shah said that the author knows her work very well. She said that she brought the narrative in the centre of perspective. She said masculinity was missing in our literature and the book brings it in limelight. She said that the author says that collective masculinity drives men to violence and jehadis despite their mutual differences. In this context, she said, the author established that even men are victim of jehadism.

Dr Nafisa said that 9/11 rescued women in Afghanistan from atrocities of Jehadis and Taliban but now men are deciding the end-game in Afghanistan and there is a fear that women will again be at losing end. She said that despite gender-sensitive US society, we saw American soldiers treating prisoners badly in Iraq.

Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, SDPI, in his discussion proposed that deradicalising efforts in Sri Lanka and western Indian hilly state would be an interesting topic of study.He said that militants in Pakistan are of four types: Jehadis-Islamists, disgruntled elements from central government, haves and have-nots (like in Swat) and criminals and thugs. He said that militants in Karachi had equipment to cut ATM machines, which ideological groups do not carry.

He said that we are focusing on domestic to international security at the expense of individual security. He said that characteristics of soldiers anywhere in the world are the same. He said that the book is good in understanding militancy in different religions than on the basis of masculinity and ethnicity. He said that there is a need to go beyond Islam to understand nexus between masculinities, terrorism and religion.

In the question hour, a scholar from KP said that Pakhtunwali is a concept of forgiveness and not of violence. He said that masculinity is particular to subcontinent and not present in other parts of the Islamic world like Iran and Egypt.

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Germany steps up security in wake of online terrorist threat against far-right party, magazine

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-steps-up-security-in-wake-of-online-terrorist-threat-against-far-right-party-magazine/2012/05/22/gIQA52QYhU_story.html

Security has been stepped up for employees of a German magazine and for members of a small far-right party after a known terrorist called for them to be killed in a video online, officials said Tuesday.

The video surfaced May 18 on YouTube following street clashes between an ultraconservative Muslim group and the far-right Pro NRW party in Bonn and Solingen, in western Germany.

Three security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, said they have no specific evidence that attacks are being planned in the wake of the video. But they said they worry it could inspire a lone-wolf type attacker like Arid Uka, an Islamic extremist who killed two U.S. airmen at Frankfurt airport last year after being spurred to action in part by a YouTube video preaching jihad, or holy war.

"The danger is very real," said one official.

In the Bonn skirmish on May 5, some 110 Salafist protesters were arrested after they started attacking police with stones and bottles. The police were trying to keep them away from about 30 Pro NRW supporters. Twenty-nine police officers were injured; two were hospitalized with stab wounds.

The rally by the marginal anti-immigration Pro NRW party was one of several it held around North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany's most populous state, ahead of a May 13 state election. Pro NRW won only 1.5 percent of the vote, far short of the score needed to win seats in the state legislature.

The Salafist protesters were upset by Pro NRW's anti-Islam signs, particularly those showing the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad that provoked outrage in 2005 when they were first printed in a Danish

newspaper. Strict Muslims oppose any depiction of their prophet.

In the video, Bonn-born Yassin Chouka, who is believed to be with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, calls for Muslims to kill Pro NRW members.

Speaking in fluent German, Chouka urges the Salafists to move away from street confrontations where the risk of being arrested is too great. He instead tells them to target Pro NRW members at their homes and workplaces, "at best under cover of darkness."

"We should kill all the members of Pro NRW," he said.

He also said employees of Der Spiegel — which has printed photos of the demonstrations showing the Prophet Muhammad signs — and others in the media should be targeted.

"Der Spiegel, which is linked to the Jews, and other German media have insulted the prophet," he said in the seven-minute audio message, played with a picture of the street fights in the background.

As a result of the video, authorities have taken security measures at Der Spiegel's Hamburg headquarters and also in Berlin, the officials said without giving more specific details. In addition, at least one of the Pro NRW members who has been identified by name in pictures has been assigned a security detail.

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Particularly alarming was the call in the video to track down individuals — an escalation from general non-specific calls for attacks by jihadi groups online.

"That is something we have not yet seen," said another of the officials.

Germany's intelligence and security agencies have been increasingly monitoring the actions of the Salafists, who number some 4,000 in Germany, in recent months.

Overall, the officials said some 130 radical Muslims in Germany are known to authorities as being potentially violent, of whom 24 are part of the Salafist movement.

"Of bigger concern are the others — the individuals who have not yet been identified," said the first official. "Young people who decide to do something, either alone or with others, with simple means."

Libyan missiles on the loose

By David Ignatius

Source:http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/libyan-missiles-on-the-loose/2012/05/08/gIQA1FCUBU_story.html

Whenever the CIA uncovers a new plot overseas, like al-Qaeda's latest scheme to blow up civilian aircraft using advanced, hard-to-detect explosives, people breathe a sigh of relief. But this is a multifront war, and almost by definition, the attack that gets you is the one you didn't see coming.

For the past few months, I've been hearing private warnings about another threat to commercial planes — namely, the spread of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles from Libya after the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi's regime. A State Department official said in February that Gaddafi had acquired 20,000 of these weapons, and that only 5,000 of them had been secured through a $40 million U.S. program to buy up loose missiles.

"How many are still missing?" asked Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, in his Feb. 2 speech. **"The frank answer is we don't know and probably never will."**

Here's the scary part: Two former CIA counterterrorism officers told me last week that technicians recently refurbished 800 of these man-portable air-defense systems (known as MANPADS) — some for an African jihadist group called Boko Haram that is often seen as an ally of al-Qaeda — for possible use against commercial jets flying into Niger, Chad and perhaps Nigeria.

The former CIA officers have been trying for eight months to alert U.S. intelligence, without success. Here's a summary of the messages I've seen.

On Sept. 9, 2011, as Gaddafi's regime was collapsing, one of the former CIA officers warned an FBI contact that Libyan missiles were moving south into the Agadez region of Niger inhabited by Tuareg tribesmen, who are believed to have links with al-Qaeda. He explained to the FBI contact that an Arab source "said there are SA-7s and SA-24s (two Russian-made weapons) already on the ground in Agadez from Libya in the hands of Tuareg AQ affiliated groups." He heard nothing back.

In a Sept. 12 e-mail, the former CIA officer wrote his FBI friend that the Niger contacts "have determined locally that the [United States government] doesn't want to help them" chase down the missiles. "I suspect [the Near East division of CIA] squashed this by their normal bureaucratic warfare," he speculated.

The CIA veteran still hoped that U.S. intelligence would get involved, so he provided the name and telephone number of a relative of a former Libyan intelligence officer who allegedly had helped move the missiles out of the country. On Sept. 15, he also sent the FBI contact phone numbers for the Arab source in Niger who was closely monitoring the missile movements.

On Sept. 28, the frustrated ex-CIA officer wrote a U.S. military contact: "The missiles are in the hands of al-Qaeda and being distributed. I would really like to know who in the agency was the roadblock and why."

Still, the former CIA officer heard nothing back. In December, he wrote another FBI contact that a "speed bump" at the agency apparently was blocking communication.

Finally, in late April, the two former CIA officers received information so urgent they felt they had to get it out,

somehow. They sent to a law enforcement contact a picture of a rebel fighter aiming one of the Libyan missiles, and this explanation: "The missiles and munitions that have been streaming out of Libya since the fall of 2011 have made their way to Agadez in Niger and points west. . . . Boko Haram has taken possession of some of the refurbished missiles. They have brought Egyptian army ordnance technicians to refurbish and test the SA-7B missiles pictured below. . . . The source claims that some 800 missiles are available in the area."

Last weekend, the CIA veterans finally heard from someone claiming to represent their former employer. The agency official was interested in talking to their Arab source.

When I asked senior U.S. officials for comment, they said they hadn't heard about the specifics of this case, or the e-mail exchanges. But they agreed the Libyan missiles are a serious problem. "It's probably true that a small number of Libyan MANPADS have been sold on the black market, and that al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is trying to acquire them," said a senior U.S. official.

The White House commissioned an interagency task force last fall to hunt for the Libyan missiles. "This is going to be a long-term risk mitigation effort, to buy down the risk," the senior official explained. That sounds sensible enough, but I wonder why nobody was listening when the former CIA officers began ringing the alarm bell.

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog.

Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) Proliferation
Understanding the Problem
Source: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/MANPADS.html

While addressing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Secretary of State Colin Powell warned that "no threat is more serious to aviation" than man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Easy to use and readily available on the black market, MANPADS do indeed pose an imminent and acute threat to military aircraft and civilian airliners.

The Weapons
Since the development of the American Redeye in the late 1950's, hundreds of thousands of MANPADS have been manufactured worldwide. Among the most numerous and best known are the Russian Strela (SA-7 and SA-14), Igla (SA-16 and SA-18) and the U.S.-manufactured FIM-92 Stinger.

- **Strela-2 (SA-7a):** Fielded by the Soviet military in 1968, the SA-7 is among the least sophisticated and most highly proliferated of these weapons. Strela-2s can engage aircraft flying above 50 meters and below 1500 meters, but only when launched from behind the targeted aircraft. Its infrared (IR) seeker - the device the missile uses to identify its target - homes in on the infrared energy emission of the aircraft. The seeker can be fooled by simple countermeasures such as flares. The

missile's small 1.17 kg warhead detonates upon impact with the target.

- **Strela-2M (SA-7b):** The Strela-2M was developed shortly after the first Strela to address several of its shortcomings. Improvements in the guidance system allows the missile to engage transport planes and helicopters head-on, unless the aircraft is flying faster than 540 km/h. The SA-7b can hit targets flying at much higher altitudes (2300 meters), and as far away as 4.2 km.

- **Strela-3 (SA-14):** The SA-14 was accepted into Soviet service in 1974. Improvements to the missile's IR seeker reduce the effectiveness of flares as decoys and allow the user to engage jet aircraft head-on. The SA-14 also features a larger, more lethal warhead (1.8 kg) and a launching mechanism that prevents the user from shooting at targets outside of its range. It can effectively engage targets flying above 30m and below 3000 meters.

- **Igla-1 (SA-16)** and **Igla (SA-18):** Igla missiles have warheads that are smaller but more lethal than the Strela's, and their warheads are equipped with both a proximity and an impact fuse. The missile's IR-seeker is

specifically designed to distinguish between countermeasures (such as flares) and the targeted aircraft. Both have a maximum range 5.2 km, and are able to engage targets operating between 10 meters and 3500 meters.

- *Stinger* **(FIM-92A/B/C/D):** The Stinger is similar in capabilities to the Russian Igla series. More recent versions are equipped with a cooled two-color, infrared-ultraviolet detector that discriminates between flares and the target. Stingers are able to effectively engage targets head-on, from behind and from the side. The missile's

aircraft were targeted. In two of the five cases, the outcome was catastrophic - all people on board were killed.
  o Insurgent groups seek MANPADS because they are effective against attack helicopters and other aircraft that are used in counter-insurgency operations. During the Soviet occupations of Afghanistan, rebels used U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles to damage or destroy hundreds of aircraft, degrading the threat from Soviet airpower.
- *highly portable and concealable—*

This image identifies the main components of a typical MANPADS.

maximum range is 4800 meters, which is comparable to the Igla, but it has a much shorter minimum range (200 meters versus the Igla's 800 meter minimum). It is one of the fastest MANPADS missiles, traveling at Mach 2.2.

Proliferation

There are an estimated 500,000 MANPADS in the world today, many thousands of which are thought to be on the black market and therefore accessible to terrorists and other non-state actors. MANPADS are attractive to terrorists and insurgents because they are:

- *lethal*—the history of MANPADS usage by guerrillas and terrorists underscores the efficacy of these weapons against both civilian and military targets. Estimates of deaths resulting from MANPADS attacks on civilian aircraft range from 500 to 1000. While most of these deaths were from attacks on smaller aircraft, the Congressional Research Service identified 5 cases in which large civilian turbojet

MANPADS are around 5 feet long and weigh approximately 30 to 40 pounds. They fit in a gulf club bag, in the back of a truck, or in the cargo area of a small boat.

- *inexpensive*—Early model MANPADS can be acquired on the black market for several thousand dollars. In exceptional circumstances, that price can drop to as low as a few hundred dollars; manpads pilfered from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's massive arms stockpiles were later purchased by the Coalition Provisional Authority for a mere $500 apiece. While later generation manpads cost significantly more (>$30,000), they are still within easy reach of well financed terrorist and criminal groups.

Ease of Use and Vulnerability

With proper training, MANPADS are relatively simple to operate. All the user has to do is visually acquire the target, and activate the automatic target lock and launch system by

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pulling a trigger. The missile then uses infrared and/or other seeking capabilities to home in on the target.

In the hands of trained terrorists, MANPADS are formidable threats to unprotected aircraft and most of the thousands of civilian aircraft are unprotected. Furthermore, installing effective countermeasures on these planes would be a time- consuming and costly process. For example, a program to equip

3000 U.S. commercial aircarft with Northrup Grumman's Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system would cost around $3 billion and require 6 years to complete. Outfitting civilian planes worldwide would take much longer, and countermeasures installed today may not be effective against next generation MANPADS. Thus, civilian aircraft are likely to be vulnerable to MANPADS attacks for the foreseeable future.

Mitigating the Threat

Options for addressing the MANPADS threat can be divided into three general categories: susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and non-proliferation. Susceptibility reduction involves measures designed to prevent MANPADS from hitting an aircraft. Vulnerability reduction focuses on improving aircraft survivability in the event of a MANPADS hit. Non-proliferation is aimed at preventing the acquisition and use of MANPADS by problematic end-users (e.g. criminal and terrorist organizations). The measures in each category are not mutually exclusive, and none alone will eliminate the threat posed by MANPADS to civilian aircraft. However, a coordinated strategy that incorporates measures from all three categories can reduce the likelihood of a successful attack.

Susceptibility Reduction

Most discussion on mitigating the MANPADS threat has centered on susceptibility reduction. Included in this category are the following measures:

- *Improved airport perimeter security*— Patrolling the areas around airports could help to detect and deter MANPADS attacks. However, the personnel and equipment necessary to thoroughly patrol the nation's 450 primary airports would be very costly, and the protection provided by these patrols would be imperfect at best. Incoming and departing aircraft fly within the range of many MANPADS for approximately 25 miles, requiring patrols capable of policing a 300-square-mile area surrounding the airport. Nonetheless, more limited patrols could help to deter attacks with shorter-range weapons (such as the SA-7), and at airports surrounded by water or flat, featureless terrain.

- Air Traffic Procedures can be altered to reduce the likelihood of a successful MANPADS attack. Replacing gradual approach and descent patterns with spiral descents and steep, rapid climbouts would reduce the amount of time that commercial aircraft fly within range of modern MANPADS. Such changes are not without risks and costs, however. Spiral descents are harrowing for passengers and would require pilot retraining. Quick climbouts reduce the margin of safety in the event of engine failure. Furthermore, even with these changes to flight patterns, the area over which planes would be within range of MANPADS would still be significant.

- *Technical Countermeasures*—There are a variety of protective systems designed to detect and foil MANPADS attacks. These include the following systems:
  - o Infrared Decoy Flares confuse the infra-red seekers of earlier MANPADS models by dispensing materials that give off an IR signature that is similar to, or more intense than, the signature of the aircraft itself. These systems are less effective against

newer models of MANPADS, which are better able to differentiate between flares and the aircraft. Many flare systems also pose a fire hazard, precluding their use in heavily populated areas.

- o Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCMs) direct infrared energy at the missile's seeker, causing it to veer off course and away from the targeted aircraft. Infrared seeking missiles have seekers - devices that are sensitive to IR - that monitor a target's location and trajectory by constantly measuring the infrared energy given off by the target. If the missile is off course (i.e. the target moves to the outer edge of the seeker's field of view), the seeker sends an electronic signal to the missile's guidance system, which uses the missile's fins to change its trajectory. In this way, the missile makes continuous, minor adjustments to its flight path until it intercepts its target.

  - ▪ DIRCMs direct a beam of infrared energy at the missile's seeker. The beam, which generates a target signal that is stronger than that of the targeted aircraft, fools the guidance system into thinking the missile is off course. The guidance system responds by adjusting the missile's flight path. The DIRCM continues to direct the IR beam at the missile until it is so off course that it no longer poses a threat to the aircraft.

- o Missile warning systems (MWS) alert the targeted aircraft, including the aircraft's IRCMs, of an incoming missile.

Vulnerability Reduction

Vulnerability reduction involves designing or modifying the aircraft to increase the chance of survival in the event of a successful MANPADS hit, and is accomplished through:

- redundancy and separation of flight controls and hydraulic systems,
- improved fire and explosion suppression systems,
- installation of fuel shut-off valves or self-sealing fuel lines,
- hardening of vital areas that are vulnerable to external (MANPADS) threats.[21]

Non-Proliferation

Evolution in MANPADS technologies is making these weapons more lethal and better able to overcome the countermeasures identified above. To ensure that protective systems installed on aircraft today are not rendered obsolete by terrorist acquisition of next generation MANPADS tomorrow, the international community must act decisively to

improve stockpile security and strengthen export controls in countries that import and manufacture MANPADs. Below is a list of recent national and international initiatives to control the proliferation of these weapons:

- The Wassenaar Arrangement's (WA) Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS - Through the adoption of the Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS, the WA's 33 participating states agreed to a set of criteria for evaluating potential MANPADS exports. The agreement discourages MANPADS transfers to end-users other than states, and to governments that are unwilling or unable to protect against theft, loss, misuse, or diversion of the MANPADS themselves or related technical information. It also identifies several safeguards that importing governments should implement, including storing the firing mechanism and the missile in separate locations, taking

monthly inventories of imported MANPADs, and re-exporting imported systems only after receiving prior consent from the exporting government.

- The G8 Action Plan of 2 June 2003 - At their June 2003 meeting in Evian, the Group of 8 major industrialized democracies endorsed the WA's Elements for Export Controls on MANPADS and agreed to take several additional steps. Especially noteworthy is the Group's commitment to:
  - o explore the feasibility of preventing unauthorized use of these weapons through the development of launch control features and other design changes;
  - o help other countries to collect, secure and destroy surplus units;
  - o exchange information on "uncooperative countries and entities."
  - o report on their progress toward implementing these steps in time for the 2004 G8 meeting.
- 2003 APEC Summit, Bangkok Declaration on

Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting, APEC's 21 member states agreed to strengthen national controls on MANPADS production, exports, and stockpile security. Like the G8 agreement, the Declaration also calls on members to ban transfers to sub-national groups, exchange information on national efforts to implement the agreement, and to explore the feasibility of launch control devices.

- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Forum for Security Co-operation, Decision No. 7/03: Man-portable Air Defense Systems - July 2003, the OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation urged member states to "propose projects for tackling MANPADS-related problems..." by improving stockpile security and boarder controls. To faciliate discussion on these and related topics, the OSCE committed to compiling a matrix of data on MANPADS, which will be gathered from submissions by member states as part of their June 2003 information exchange on

Partnership for the Future - At the October 2003 Asia-Pacific

small arms. The deadline for preparing the matrix was 10 October 2003.

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Terrorism and the Not-So-Exceptional Individual

Source:http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/terrorism-and-not-so-exceptional-individual?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120524&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=18142c711d4a4e4a9717540ce848c2f3

In last week's Security Weekly, we used a thwarted underwear bomb plot, as well as the U.S. government's easing the rules of engagement for unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in Yemen, as an opportunity to examine the role of exceptional individuals in militant groups that conduct terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP's) innovative bombmaker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, is one such individual.

Reported by AP on May 7, the news of the thwarted underwear plot overshadowed another event in Yemen that occurred May 6: a U.S. airstrike in Shabwa province that killed Fahd al-Quso, a Yemeni militant wanted for his involvement in the attack against the USS Cole in October 2000. Al-Quso appeared in a video released by AQAP's al-Malahim Media in May 2010, during which he threatened attacks against the continental United States, its embassy in Yemen and warships in the waters surrounding Yemen.

The media and the U.S. government frequently mention al-Quso's involvement in the USS Cole bombing, but they rarely discuss his precise duty the day of the attack. Al-Quso had been tasked to record the attack from ashore so that the video could be used later in al Qaeda propaganda. Unfortunately for the group, al-Quso was derelict in his duty; he slept through his alarm, and the attack went unrecorded.

Oversleeping a terrorist attack was not al-Quso's only operational gaffe. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al-Quso had been dispatched in January 2001 to transport money to al Qaeda facilitator Walid bin Attash in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The money reportedly funded the travel and initial living expenses of 9/11 operatives Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khaled al-Midhar. However, al-Quso failed to get a Malaysian visa. He was stuck in Bangkok, and bin Attash, al-Hazmi and al-Midhar had to meet him in Bangkok to retrieve the funds.

If al-Asiri gives cause to discuss the role of the exceptional individual in terrorism operations, al-Quso provides us the opportunity to discuss the not-so exceptional individual -- and how these maladroit actors nonetheless pose a threat.

Tradecraft Errors

The history of al Qaeda's war against the United States is replete with examples of jihadist operations that were foiled due to tradecraft failures. In September 1992, Ahmed Ajaj attempted to enter the United States with a poorly altered Swedish passport while carrying a suitcase full of bombmaking instructions and other training manuals and videos. Both lapses in judgment are characteristic of a novice. An alert customs inspector stopped Ajaj, who later was detained and charged with passport fraud. Ajaj was traveling from Osama bin Laden's Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan with Abdel Basit, also known as Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center attack. An immigration inspector likewise stopped Basit, but he requested political asylum. Because he was not carrying a suitcase full of bombmaking manuals or using an altered passport, Basit later was released pending a hearing on his asylum claim. (Had he remained in custody, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing would not have been conducted.)

In another instance of tradecraft error, the would-be millennium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, fell victim to "burn syndrome" while attempting to enter the United States from Canada in December 1999. Ressam panicked when approached by a U.S. customs inspector, who was performing a routine check of the ferry on which he was traveling. The inspector was unaware that Ressam was an Islamist militant or that he was in operational mode. In fact, when Ressam lost his composure, she assumed he was smuggling drugs rather than explosives.

The 9/11 Commission Report also detailed a number of errors committed by the supposed al Qaeda elite prior to hijacking the four aircraft on 9/11. Mohammed Atta was cited for driving with an invalid license and failed to appear at the subsequent court hearing, causing a bench warrant to be issued for his arrest. Moreover, known al Qaeda associates al-Hamzi and al-Midhar entered the United States under their own names. (A flight instructor even characterized al-

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Hamzi and al-Midhar as "Dumb and Dumber," saying they were "clueless" as would-be pilots.) Any of these errors could have brought down the entire 9/11 operation.

More recently, we have seen cases where individuals such as Faisal Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi have shown the intent, but not the ability, to conduct attacks. While Shahzad was able to assemble a large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device without detection, the design of the device's firing chain was seriously flawed -- clearly the work of a novice. U.S. government surveillance of Zazi's activities determined that he was an inexperienced bombmaker and that he could not create the proper chemical mixture to manufacture effective triacetone triperoxide (TATP). This is common problem for novice bombmakers. We have seen several planned attacks, such as the London bomb attempt on July 21, 2005, fizzle out due to bad batches of TATP.

In another example, U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdo was arrested and charged with planning an attack on Ft. Hood in July 2011. Abdo was brought to the attention of the authorities after purchasing smokeless powder to be used in an improvised explosive device. His furtive demeanor caused a store clerk to report him to the police.

As Stratfor has noted, there has been a shift in the jihadist threat. Once stemming from the al Qaeda core, the jihadist threat now emanates primarily from grassroots jihadists. While grassroots jihadists pose a more diffuse threat because they are more difficult than hierarchical groups for national intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect, they also pose a less severe threat because they generally lack the terrorist tradecraft required to conduct a large-scale attack. Since they lack such tradecraft, they tend to seek assistance to conduct their plots. This assistance usually involves the acquisition of explosives or firearms, as seen in the February 2010 case involving Amine el Khalifi. In this case, an FBI informant posing as a jihadist leader provided the suspect with an inert suicide vest and a submachine gun before the suspect's arrest for plotting to attack the U.S. Capitol building.

The dynamic of would-be attackers reaching out for help has been seen repeatedly in the United States. In June 2011, two jihadists were arrested in Seattle and charged with plotting to attack a U.S. Military Entrance Processing Station in an industrial area south of downtown Seattle. The men attempted to obtain M16 rifles and hand grenades from an FBI informant. Notably, this trend also has been seen outside the jihadist world. On April 30, five self-identified anarchists were arrested in connection with a plot to destroy a bridge outside Cleveland, Ohio. They had purchased remotely detonated improvised explosive devices from an FBI informant.

The Cleveland group had previously discussed constructing improvised explosive mixtures using recipes they had found on the Internet. But the possibility of buying authentic C4 explosives was attractive to them because, according to the FBI criminal complaint filed in the case, the group believed the real explosives would be more powerful and destructive than homemade explosives.

Would-be attackers, such as Shahzad and the anarchists of the Cleveland group, typically do not have a realistic assessment of their capabilities and therefore tend to attempt attacks that are beyond their capabilities. In attempting a spectacular attack, they frequently achieve little or nothing. As we have previously noted, it is a rare individual who possesses the requisite combination of will, discipline, adaptability and technical skill to make the leap from theory to practice and become a successful militant in a lone-wolf or small-cell environment.

The Danger of 'Kramer Jihadists'

Through retrospective trial testimony or FBI arrest affidavits, the exploits of Abdo, el Khalifi or the Cleveland anarchists can appear almost comical. In fact, such cases often leave people wondering if ridiculous would-be attackers could be involved in terrorist activity to begin with. However, militant groups -- indeed, most organizations -- are composed of exceptional individuals and not-so-exceptional individuals. Just as the business world needs chief executive officers, engineers and assembly line workers, the militant world needs operational planners, bombmakers, foot soldiers and suicide bombers. Placed in the proper roles, these individuals can combine their efforts to produce effective results.

It is easy to dismiss novice militants as inept, but we should keep in mind that if some of these individuals found an actual terrorist facilitator rather than a federal informant, they probably

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would have killed many people in an attack. Richard Reid, often referred to as the "Kramer of al Qaeda" after the bumbling character from the television series *Seinfeld*, came very close to taking down a jumbo jet full of people over the Atlantic Ocean because he had been equipped and dispatched by those more capable than himself. Working under the leadership of exceptional individuals, even al-Hamzi and al-Midhar -- "Dumb and Dumber" -- helped hijack American Airlines Flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11.

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing provides a valuable lesson on dealing with Kramer jihadists. Before the attack, a government informant infiltrated the core group of perpetrators. After the informant proved to

be too difficult to handle, coverage of the group was dropped because its members were considered inept. In truth, many of them were; one suspect, Mohammed Salameh, tried to retrieve the deposit he put down on the rental truck used to transport the bomb. But this only highlights the importance of the exceptional individual -- in this case, Abdel Basit. He was sent to New York to lead what proved to be a successfully executed bomb plot.

History demonstrates clearly that even groups of bumbling aspiring attackers can be organized successfully if they are empowered by someone who provides them with means and oversight. Accordingly, authorities cannot afford to ignore bumblers, no matter how inept they may appear.

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
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Time Magazine and Terrorism: What's Nursing Got to Do With it?

By Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin

Source: http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/time-magazine-and-terrorism-whats-nursing-got-to-do-with-it

By now the May 17th cover of Time Magazine with Jamie Lynne Grumet nursing her son has been seen around the world more than once with a lot of discussion but little concerning why the image has struck such a deep chord.

In 2010 I published The Banality of Suicide Terrorism: The Naked Truth About Islamic Suicide Bombing, Potomac Press. In my book, I coined a new psychological term called the maternal cameo.

"A new concept for suicide terrorism that gives shape to the psychological concept of the maternal fusion by using the image of a mother holding her infant, reminiscent of the Madonna with baby Jesus. Few of us like to consider the time when we were helpless infants and completely delete dependent on our mothers. The maternal cameo gives concrete form to the experience of the maternal symbiosis. It also replicates the terrorists' habit of engaging in concrete and transparent imitative behavior because of their inability both to separate psychologically from the maternal fusion and to mourn the loss of the Early Mother.

The terrorists then are obsessed with re-creating the dyadic experience with objects, both animate and inanimate. This behavior concretely expresses their helplessness, which is experienced as terror. Those feelings then yield to murderous rage against the mother, which is

displaced on to innocent victims. On a spectrum beginning with the first maternal fusion, this maternal cameo would be the prenatal mother or mother + fetus and then the mother + infants as life fusions and the murder-suicide [as in suicide terrorism] as the death fusion." p. 132-133

I am not diagnosing the relationship between Jamie and her son concerning extreme parenting and attachment. Yet, I do want to underscore why her fusional image with her son grounded in the erotic act of nursing, struck such a deep chord in the public. The flagrant voyeurism of viewers added to the sadomasochistic Eros of the picture. Narcissism is rampant in all societies.

None of us knows how this son really feels, views and comprehends his own nursing experience. Time will tell and it is for him to judge. We do not know if this is the misuse of a son as a narcissistic object by a mother to allay her own anxieties about separating and being vulnerable. Perhaps there is even a nonverbal somatic memory of a trauma that is being communicated through this picture? I do not know. There are many unanswered questions. However, one mother put it really well:

"Bobbi Miller, a mother of six who lives in Arkansas, expressed disapproval in a tweet and said in a phone interview, "Even a cow knows when to wean their child." Of the cover, she said: "Why would this even be out there? It's ludicrous. It's almost on the verge of voyeurism."

(http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120521,00.html)

We do know one thing -- that this life giving image of breast feeding has a long history against which Jamie and her son posed. As I have argued in my book the terrorists' death fusion of mass murder-suicide is 180 degrees in the opposite direction of this life giving image of

the mother nursing, as it seeks to destroy this image of life, the mother with child, at an unconscious level. The suicide attack taps into all of our fears and terrors concerning security, being nurtured and loved.

Terrorist behavior is predatory. The bad behavior of Islamic suicide bombing has merely become normalized as if it were good by calling it martyrdom. Preying on the innocent is animal behavior. Bobbi Miller got it right.

A picture speaks a thousand words and more than ninety per cent of what we communicate, we do so nonverbally. See another "maternal cameo" below. As it has been said -- "money is the mother's milk of politics."

The image of a death fusion communicated by the terrorists through the suicide attack attempts to destroy the near sacred image of a mother nursing her child.

The more we can lay bare (and I do not pardon the pun) the concrete level of destruction of the Islamic suicide terrorists by linking it back to this universal referent of mother and infant, perhaps then a serious discussion about the mind of the terrorist can take place with policy makers, neuroscientists and the public. If only the childhood development of the terrorist could receive such intensive worldwide discussion as Jamie and her son did, there just might be a chance to promote change and contain the violence.

Dr. Nancy Kobrin, a psychoanalyst with a Ph.D. in romance and semitic languages, specializes in Aljamía and Old Spanish in Arabic script. She is an expert on the Minnesota Somali diaspora and a graduate of the Human Terrain System program at Leavenworth Kansas. Her new book is The Banality of Suicide Terrorism: The Naked Truth About the Psychology of Islamic Suicide Bombing.

EUROPOL: Games will be al-Qa'ida target

Source:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/games-will-be-alqaida-target-says-europol-7791462.html

European terrorism experts are warning that al-Qa'ida may be planning an assault on the London Olympics in a bid to "maximise their impact"

in 2012.

Europol, the European Union's criminal intelligence agency, has singled out the Games as a "major event" that could be targeted for its symbolic value, in its latest review of terror threats.

Security experts have cautioned that a successful large-scale assault could rejuvenate an organisation whose profile has been

diminished by the death of its leader, Osama Bin Laden, last year.

Europol notes that al-Qa'ida has concentrated on a strategy of "individual jihad" in recent years. But it also warned that the organisation aimed to stage assaults that would "cause mass casualties" and wreak a "psychological impact" that would have "a long-term negative effect on society".

The chilling comments in the agency's report amount to the latest of a lengthening list of credible warnings of threats to the Games, which begin in two months' time.

The Independent on Sunday has also established that the United States is warning that Britain faces a major cyber assault from organised crime gangs and protest groups targeting the Olympics. A report from the Department of Homeland Security says email scams, the use of malicious software and attempts to hack into systems "will continue to grow in scale and complexity as the 27 July opening ceremony in London draws near".

The Government has ploughed millions of pounds into security to

protect competitors and spectators. Measures include surface-to-air missiles stationed on top of high-rise flats, more than 13,000 troops and a weapon that disperses crowds by creating "head-splitting pain".

Transport Minister Mike Penning, in Taiwan last week, said he was not overly concerned that the high-profile measures, including a warship in the Thames, might deter some

always been key targets, but the game has changed since 9/11.

"I would be very confident about the security services' ability to control and protect the main venues. But... the secondary activities and open systems are always, in terms of risk and threat, an open target."

Europol highlighted other concerns – including "returning jihadists" and the "solitary" terrorists

THE FIREPOWER... AND WHERE IT WILL BE DEPLOYED

THE Armed Forces will use a fearsome array of military capabilities to protect the Olympics and Paralympics this summer

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
- Starstreak high-velocity missile systems on tower blocks: the Lexington Building in Bow and the Fred Wigg Tower in Waltham Forest in East London
- Laser-guided Rapier towed missile systems at Blackheath Common and Oxleas Wood, both in South East London, William Girling Reservoir in the Lea Valley, Enfield, and Barn Hill at Netherhouse Farm, Epping Forest

RAF NORTHOLT
- Four Typhoon fighter jets (above) to patrol the skies and shoot down any suicide aircraft
- Three Royal Navy Sea King airborne early warning helicopters

- Three RAF Puma helicopters, with sniper teams, based at a Territorial Army centre in Ilford, East London

HMS BULWARK
(Amphibious assault ship)
- Armed with Goalkeeper weapon system, enhanced radars and sensors and a specialist unit of 350 Royal Marines in Weymouth Bay and Portland Harbour, Dorset, to protect the sailing events

HMS OCEAN
(Amphibious assault ship)
- Berthed at Greenwich, South East London, it will have up to 800 soldiers or Royal Marines aboard. Four Royal Navy Lynx helicopters (above) will also be on board with sniper teams

ADDITIONAL FORCES
- 13,500 servicemen and women to help guard 150 venues and training sites around the country including:
- 5,000 troops providing specialist capabilities including bomb disposal, search and dog teams
- 1,000 personnel to provide logistical support
- Up to 7,500 troops providing venue security

- Royal Fleet Auxiliary Mounts Bay – an amphibious support platform – in Weymouth Bay
- Three RAF E-3D Sentry surveillance aircraft at RAF Waddington, Lincolnshire

people from attending the Games.

But the man who drew up the original security strategy for the 2012 Games last night said there would, inevitably, be gaps in protection – notably on transport networks where it is more difficult to control access.

Tarique Ghaffur, who acted as head of security planning for the London Olympics when he was assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, said: "Public events like this have

considered one of the greatest threats to EU security. But it also concluded that al-Qa'ida remained a significant threat: "The efforts of al-Qa'ida-affiliated or inspired terrorists are likely to remain concentrated on attacking their long-standing targets in EU member states and may seek to capitalise on major events such as the London Olympics to maximise their impact."

The US report details how British law enforcement has been collaborating

with US counterparts to fend off threats. With an IT staff of more than 5,000 – of whom half are volunteers – there is "potential for insider attacks", the report warns.

London's defences are said to include 48,000 staff from security forces and 13,500 troops, and a "safe zone" cordoned off by an 18km electrified fence, patrolled by 55 teams of attack dogs.

The London Olympic Games Act gives the police sweeping powers to clear key areas, demonstrations and individuals deemed to be guilty of anti-social behaviour.

Oroitz Gurruchaga Gogorza, ETA Military Chief, Arrested In France

Source:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/27/oroitz-gurruchaga-gorgorza-eta-spain_n_1549 298.html

The military chief for of the violent Basque separatist group ETA was arrested Sunday in southern France along with another man accused of being his assistant, Spanish authorities said.

Oroitz Gurruchaga Gogorza and Xabier Aramburu were taken into custody in the small rural town of Cauna in southwestern France by

plates when they were arrested, the ministry said.

Gurruchaga, 30, joined ETA in 2008 and rapidly rose through its ranks to become the group's top military commander, the ministry said, and also led ETA's recruitment efforts. Aramburu , 32, fled to France in 2010 after being accused of carrying out several bombing attacks, including a 2008 car bombing that wounded people, the ministry said.

ETA has killed 829 people since the late 1960s in a campaign of bombings, shootings and extortion aimed at forcing the creation of a Basque homeland in northern Spain and southwestern France. It is classified as a terrorist organization by Spain, the United States and the European Union.

French police working with Spanish authorities, Spain's Interior Ministry said in a statement.

Both men were armed with handguns and traveling in a stolen car with falsified license

But the group has been decimated in recent years by waves of arrests, and declared last October that it was laying down its weapons for good.

Al-Shabab plotting attack in Netherlands

Source: http://www.rnw.nl/english/bulletin/al-shabab-plotting-attack-netherlands

A former commander of the Somali al-Qaeda-linked organisation al-Shabab has said that dormant cells in the Netherlands are secretly preparing terrorist attacks. The commander, who left al-Shabab because of a dispute with its leaders, said the militant Islamist group is actively recruiting and training members of the Somali diaspora in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States to launch attacks in the countries where they have a residence permit. Dutch public broadcaster VPRO spoke to a BBC reporter, Mary Harper, on its radio programme *Bureau Buitenland*. Ms Harper had interviewed Mohamed Farah al Ansari who said Somalia was becoming the new hub of jihadism. Al Ansari joined up with government forces and entered a protection programme with the interim

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government after he stopped activities with Al Shabab. The Somali commander was questioned by US security officials at the American embassy in Nairobi.

Standing Guard

Day is done, gone the sun,
From the lakes, from the hills, from the sky
All is well, safely rest
God is nigh!
Fading light dims the sight
And a star gems the sky, gleaming bright
From afar, drawing near
Falls the night.
Thanks and praise for our days
Neath the sun, neath the stars, neath the sky
As we go, this we know
God is nigh!
by Horace Lorenzo Trim

Source: Email sent to us from a friend at Pure Pursuit Intelligence Center – Thank you Nena!

Terrorism in 2025: Likely Dimensions and Attributes

Source: http://itac.gc.ca/pblctns/tc_prsnts/2007-3-eng.asp

Summary

The strategic conditions underlying the 9/11 attacks emerged in the late 1970s and the 1980s. They include accelerated globalization, unreformed economies, youthful and bulging populations, religious schooling, and unemployment. All of these conditions are likely to remain in place in 2025. There will be a large and growing pool of unemployed, frustrated, and religiously schooled young men to draw on for terrorist activity.

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The more tactical attributes of terrorism in 2025 will have had their roots in the early post-9/11 period. The attacks revealed the powerful economic implications of a terrorist strike. This demonstration, combined with the essential economic underpinnings to terrorists' grievances, means that future targets are likely to be economic. The focus will be on transportation systems, information systems (cyber attack), and especially energy infrastructure and oil. Tankers operating in the world's busiest waterways may be especially attractive targets.

There has been a shift from hard political and military targets to soft targets. The factors that gave rise to this trend, including Al Qaeda's decreased freedom of manoeuvre and new decentralized structure, are likely to persist, and with them the emphasis on soft targets. There is no consensus on whether Iraq is serving to establish a new training ground/launching point for attacks. Iraq, as well as the horn of Africa and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are areas of high concern but it is unlikely terrorists will become as well established as they were in Afghanistan under the Taliban.

Future attacks are likely to be smaller in size, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope. Yet Al Qaeda is proving more resilient than was previously thought, which suggests a major attack involving a significant number of deaths, while unlikely, remains possible.

Most attacks in 2025 will be directed against traditional countries that are trying to modernize or against countries that have close ties to the West. Attacks against the energy infrastructure of oil producing U.S. allies are especially likely. The United States will remain a key target, but striking it directly will be difficult so more attacks are likely to be aimed at Europe. Britain is particularly vulnerable because of its historical ties to Pakistan. There are likely to be terrorist attacks in the oil producing states of Africa and the Caucuses, and in the major shipping routes in Southeast Asia. Oil producing Canada, and emerging globalizers China and India, could be targeted.

The rise in domestic terrorism in a number of Western countries can be attributed to people being caught between traditional and market values and therefore turning to terrorism, and these same people being frustrated by a lack of economic prospects. Such factors cannot change quickly. In 2025 all Western countries will be susceptible to domestic terrorism, but Europe and especially Britain are most likely to be targeted. India is also likely to be a victim of domestic terrorism.

Any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack is likely to involve a radiological or low-tech biological weapon, with the goal of eliciting panic among the population, rather than mass casualties. Due to the technical difficulty of launching a WMD attack, terrorists are unlikely to be able to carry out large-scale unconventional attacks. Large conventional bombs are more likely to be used against hard targets like oil refineries or tankers. In all cases the overall goal will be to bring about massive economic disruption to those who are benefiting from accelerated globalization.

Introduction

The strategic conditions for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States emerged in the late 1970s and the 1980s, some one to two decades before the attacks. Factors surrounding accelerated globalization provided the most important underlying source of the terrorists' grievances, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan furnished the training grounds for terrorists to hone their skills to act on these grievances. Meanwhile, accepting that hindsight is always 20/20, actual or planned terrorist attacks in the decade before 9/11 provided "tactical" evidence of "trends [that were] clearly there."

The fact that a roughly two-decade strategic and tactical time line presaged 9/11, indicates that projecting in 2007 what may be the attributes and dimensions of terrorism in 2025 is, while extremely daunting, not an entirely unrealistic task. It requires a two-level focus of analysis. At the strategic level, it is necessary to examine the most important broad underlying sources of contemporary terrorism, and whether these conditions are likely to continue. At the more tactical level, what is required is to project answers to some important questions that emerge from an understanding of these broader strategic conditions.

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The Key Strategic Trend: Accelerated Globalization

Of the many reasons put forward for the current era of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism against the Western world one of the most compelling or explanatory, is accelerated globalization. Globalization can be defined as "growing interconnectedness [as] reflected in the expanded flows of information, technology, capital, goods, services and people throughout the world." The emphasis here is on "accelerated" globalization because globalization is by no means a new phenomenon — it is just that it is now proceeding at a much faster rate than was previously the case. The first great era of globalization was from roughly 1870 to 1914, but with the disruptions of two world wars, the great depression, and the Cold War, international capital flows as measured by foreign ownership of assets relative to world income, did not return to 1914 levels until 1980. Since then they have increased significantly. Generally speaking, accelerated globalization has been driven by the technological revolution that started in the late 1970s. The sources of contemporary terrorism date from this time period.

Michael Mousseau has drawn out the distinction between "clientalist" and "market" economies and how terrorism can emerge when clientalist economies are bombarded with, but cannot adapt quickly enough to the market forces of globalization. Clientalist economies are based on implied and long-enduring obligations, reciprocity, gift giving, social linkages, ethnicity and kinship. They naturally lend themselves to the creation of in-groups and out-groups. Market economies are based on explicit contracts and statements of self interest among strangers that come to an end when the contract is completed. They naturally lend themselves to the liberal values of individualism, universalism, tolerance, equity, the rule of law and democracy. When a clientalist economy is increasingly exposed to market forces, clientalist linkages start to break down. But cultures change slowly; people experience the breakdown of their traditional forms of interaction, but they do not yet have the new values and beliefs. There is a period of social anarchy; a zero-sum culture emerges as people pursue their own interests without regard to any shared values, either market or

clientalist. People deeply resent this new Hobbesian world, caused, in their view, by the growing Westernization or Americanization of their societies. The protection they are granted by virtue of being part of an in-group is fading and they are vulnerable to being enticed by any other in-group system that promises to put an end to insecurity, including religious fundamentalism. In extreme cases the result is the support of terrorism — facilitated by the in-group/ out-group values held by clientalist societies. "From the clientalist perspective, all in-group members are privileged and all out-group members are potential enemies or, at best, outsiders unworthy of empathy. This paucity of empathy is necessary for doing harm to, and tolerating the suffering of, all out-group members."

Mousseau's analysis is supported by reports, scholarly articles, and books that implicitly or explicitly find the broad underlying source of contemporary terrorism to be people responding to, or coming to grips with, accelerated globalization and/or modernization. The 9/11 Commission report argues that Usama bin Laden "appeals to people disoriented by cyclonic change as they confront modernity and globalization... For those yearning for a lost sense of order in an older, more tranquil world, he offers his 'Caliphate' as an imagined alternative to today's uncertainty." A report by America's National Intelligence Council points out: "In a rapidly globalizing world…religious entities provide followers with a ready-made community." One scholarly expert on terrorism, noting that terrorism "is as old as human history," argues that the current phase is characterized by "religious fanatics who are the terrorists and the far more politically motivated states, entities, and people who would support them because they feel powerless and left behind in a globalizing world [emphasis added]." Another scholar describes the dominant feature of the contemporary and future security environment as being "a saga of individuals, freed from the constraints of tradition and culture and repression, finding their place in a changing, globalizing world." American defense analyst Thomas Barnett predicts more nationalism as globalization proceeds because "globalization empowers the individual at the expense of the collective, and that very American transformation of culture is quite scary for traditional societies."

Conflict is likely to be the outward expression of the psychological impact of globalization on traditional societies. "When a massive, accelerating, and disorienting process of modernization creates enormous social discord around the world, that search for identity and dignity can and will generate conflict." Barnett gives the geographic boundaries of these conflicts. He argues they will take place within the "non-integrating gap" of countries that, in contrast to the "functioning core" of states that are progressively integrating their national economies into the world economy, remain fundamentally disconnected from globalization's "expanding web of connectivity." For Barnett, the functioning core of states encompasses roughly two-thirds of the world's population, including North America, Europe, Russia, China and India, while the non-integrating gap comprises most of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Will it Continue?

If one accepts that accelerated globalization is a key strategic trend underlying contemporary terrorism, then any prediction as to the attributes and dimensions of terrorism in 2025 must include an assessment of whether and/or to what degree the world's "non-integrating gap" of countries is likely to share in the benefits of globalization over the next two decades. There are two sides to this coin, both of which are addressed in only cursory fashion here, and would benefit from greater analysis by economic and regional experts.

On one side is the degree to which globalization's leaders — the West and increasingly China — are likely to facilitate the ability of developing countries to share in the wealth; that is, whether or not they are likely to pursue protectionist measures. Here, the projections have become less optimistic over time. A 2002 assessment argues that, contrary to the claims of anti-globalization advocates, the current wave of globalization has actually promoted economic equality and reduced poverty around the world. But this view is based primarily on economic growth in China and India, two countries which, as noted earlier, are not (or are no longer) part of the non-integrating gap. African (less South Africa) and Middle Eastern (less Israel) countries remain the poorest and least connected in the world. A 2004 study asserts that growing global interconnectedness due to the information

technology revolution is almost certainly irreversible, and that although other aspects of globalization could slow or stop (as in 1914), this is unlikely. Overall, it argues that the world economy will grow significantly in the period to 2020, but that the benefits of globalization won't be global — and "those left behind in the developing world may resent China and India's rise." Finally, a recent scholarly article highlights the "hypocrisy of U.S. and European governments, which constantly push for greater market access while protecting their own agricultural and light-manufacturing sectors through tariffs." It finds that there will likely be increasing restrictions on the flow of investments, goods and services, and labour between countries in the coming decades as a result of growing protectionist measures, most notably in China and the United States, but also in Europe.

On the other side of the coin, is the degree to which disconnected regions are likely to take measures to become connected. Specifically, argues a U.S. government study, "the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' will widen unless the 'have-not' countries pursue policies that support the application of new technologies — such as good governance, universal education, and market reforms." These three things are in many ways inseparable. The 9/11 Commission report describes how the unprecedented flood of oil wealth in the 1970s and 1980s created societies in the Middle East dependent on government largess, but that diminishing oil revenues in the 1980s combined with significant population growth made these entitlements unsustainable in the 1990s. The result was growing resentment, exacerbated by the fact that these state-centred regimes placed their emphasis on retaining elite control of national wealth, rather than on adopting policies that could foster dynamic economies and generate jobs. Meanwhile, unable to afford to provide state-funded education to the growing population, these countries increasingly left education to private religious schools run by Islamic fundamentalist groups that, apart from radicalizing some of the students, did not teach marketable skills. "By the 1990s," points out the Commission, "high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily

increasing population of young men without any reasonable prospect of suitable employment." This is a dangerous situation, notes one scholar, because "the lack of a proper education makes individuals vulnerable to terrorist ideologies…the anger, resentment and frustration of the unemployable make them want to use violence to achieve change."

These trends, which began to emerge some two decades ago, are likely to still be in place two decades from now and therefore to influence the attributes and dimensions of terrorism. In the Middle East, education continues to be provided by religious institutions. Demographically, the region is in the middle of a youth boom with over half the population under the age of 25 and fertility rates about double the Western average. Women are repressed and denied educations, further reducing overall economic productivity. Most, if not all, regimes, "frightened by the winds of change," have not instituted the necessary economic reforms. For at least one scholar, "Arab governments will probably not reform peacefully." The overall impact will be "huge and accelerating numbers of disconnected young males. Ill-educated, unemployed and poor, they have the time, testosterone and grievances to spare…for at least another generation the Taliban and other terrorist groups will have no problem replenishing their stock of young fighters [and] suicide bombers."

Questions that Emerge from the Broad Strategic Trends

Types of Targets
Economic Targets

The persistence of the broad underlying sources of international terrorism that gave rise to 9/11 will provide the overall strategic context of terrorism in 2025. One question that emerges from this trend is what sorts of targets people "against modernization" are likely to set their sights on. Experts have noted that generally speaking, terrorist thinking has shifted "from the desire to inflict mass casualties to one of inflicting severe economic damage." Analysts argue that Al Qaeda first realized the potential of economic attacks as a form of terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Although the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and (it is believed) the Congress were chosen for their symbolic commercial,

military, and political status, the financial damage and the ongoing damage to the airline industry was enormous.

The trend toward economic targets is likely to continue, given that the change in emphasis is consistent with Mousseau's assessment of contemporary terrorism as being an expression of "antimarket…rage". The shift has several implications. Because efficiently running transportation systems are central to economic vitality, they are likely to remain as targets in the future. The 2004 Madrid train bombing, 2005 London underground and bus bombing, and 2006 plots against airliners departing Britain for the United States reflect this trend. In addition, in 2004 U.S. agencies received specific intelligence that Al Qaeda terrorists planned to use hijacked aircrafts in suicide attacks. Because so much of Western economic prosperity depends on the smooth functioning of information technology systems, we can also expect terrorists will step up their attempts to carry out a devastating cyber attack.

One of the most effective ways to disrupt the global economy is to attack oil supplies. Over the last several years, there have been numerous attacks against pipelines and refineries in places like Yemen, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Aside from the direct targeting of oil assets in oil producing states, since 2000 there have also been a number of maritime related attacks, either planned or successfully carried out. A good example was the 2002 bombing of a French-registered supertanker, which experts believe confirmed Al Qaeda's desire to attack the financial anchors underpinning the Western capitalist system. Energy security analysts have also noted the growing nexus between piracy and terrorism as a result of the fact that most of the world's oil and gas is shipped through the world's most piracy-infested waters. Intelligence agencies believe that Al Qaeda and its affiliates now own dozens of ocean going ships, and there are reports of terrorist pirates hijacking tankers to practice steering them through crowded sea-lanes, with little interest in learning how to dock them.

Terrorists are likely to focus many of their future attacks on world oil supplies and energy infrastructure. Terrorism expert Martin Rudner has described Al Qaeda and its affiliates as working in the context of a seven-stage, 20-

year post-9/11 plan under which stage 3, from 2007 to 2010, explicitly targets energy. Whether future attacks are against the production, piping, or maritime transportation of oil, the objective will be the same: to raise the price of oil to the extent that it significantly and adversely affects the prosperity of the globalized world. In the words of Rudner, the goal is to "make the West walk and freeze," but "It's not just the West…It's [also] India and China."

Soft Targets

Risk analyst experts have noted a post-9/11 trend towards "soft targets" like hotels, bars and discos, places of worship, transportation, office complexes, foreign workers, and contractors. This is because with greater security around the West's "hard" (political and military) targets, Al Qaeda's loss of a strategic operating base in Afghanistan, the seizure of important components of Al Qaeda's financial base, and increased intelligence cooperation among countries since 9/11, the ability for terrorists to organize against and penetrate hardened targets has significantly declined. Moreover, many scholars and analysts point out the centralized Al Qaeda structure that organized the 9/11 attacks has evolved into a loosely structured network of decentralized subsidiaries around the world. Al Qaeda has moved from being a tangible entity with a sophisticated infrastructure, to being an amorphous "movement of movements" a galvanizing idea with no discernable organization.

An assessment of whether the trend toward soft targets will continue centres on whether Al Qaeda's decreased freedom of manoeuvre and new decentralized structure is likely to persist over the next two decades. For the former, many scholars and analysts argue that the 9/11 attacks have "decisively limited the environmental and strategic context in which Al Qaeda is able to operate." But some also go further to argue that this established trend will strengthen, not weaken, in the coming years. "Over time," wrote one terrorism expert in 2004, "the post-9/11 counter- and anti-terrorism measures developed will have an impact on terrorist groups and their support bases. Therefore, the threat of terrorism, although ever present will decrease substantially in the coming years [emphasis added]."

New Training Ground?

As for persistence in the decentralized structure, the key element is the degree to which a new training ground for terrorist activity has been established in the post-9/11 era. As indicated in this paper's opening paragraph, an important factor behind Al Qaeda's ability to carry out the 9/11 attacks was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A decade of conflict in that country gave Islamic extremists a rallying point and a training field. Not surprisingly, many analysts are focussing on whether, in the post-9/11 era, there has been a newly established Soviet Afghanistan.

There is broad agreement that the 2003 invasion of Iraq has created a new rallying point for radicalized Muslims worldwide, attracting more young Muslims to militant circles than might otherwise have been the case. This was the conclusion, for example, of a leaked U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in September 2006. But that is different from saying Iraq is a new terrorist training ground, and here there is little consensus. While the National Intelligence Council has argued Iraq provides terrorists with "a training ground, a recruitment ground, [and] the opportunity for enhancing technical skills," others have made the case that Iraq is more important as a symbol than a physical battlefield or training ground. From this perspective Iraq, like other conflicts around the world — Chechnya and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict come to mind — is best understood as a force for inspiration than anything else. Indeed, Rudner notes that "al-Qaeda's Islamist world view operates independent of specific events."

Even if Iraq is proving to be a training ground, there is no consensus on whether the new generation of trained terrorists is staying in Iraq (and therefore making the rest of the world safer) or spreading out around the world. The unique aspect of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan is that many, if not most, of the fighters were from outside Afghanistan (Usama bin Laden being one prominent example). Al Qaeda originally focussed on Afghanistan, but broadened its scope to worldwide operations after the Soviet withdrawal. In the case of Iraq, by contrast, only one in ten jihadists are from outside the country. As a result, "It is not obvious now how many Iraqi Jihadists will support the global jihad of bin Laden, and how many will focus their efforts on Iraq's fledgling state."

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Beyond Iraq, particular areas of concern with regard to new training grounds include Africa (especially the horn of Africa), and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where it is believed Al Qaeda has regrouped. An assessment of the degree to which these areas will be future training grounds for terrorists is beyond the scope of this paper. It would involve examining the effectiveness/success of a whole range of initiatives, just a few of which are, the U.S. troop build-up in Iraq and efforts to stabilize that country; U.S. air strikes against Al Qaeda members in Somalia in 2007; the creation of a U.S. Africa command in 2007; the deployment of U.S. troops to Africa over the past several years to train indigenous forces in anti-terrorist skills; NATO's mission in Afghanistan, particularly anti-terrorist measures in the south and east of the country; and, diplomatic relations with Pakistan and the degree to which Pakistan is able to assist in eliminating the threat along its border with Afghanistan. At a minimum, it can be argued that terrorists are unlikely to become as well established as they were in Afghanistan under the Taliban. The decentralized structure of international terrorism is likely to remain in place in 2025 and this, combined with continued restrictions on freedom of manoeuvre, indicates that most future targets will be soft targets.

Scope of Operations

A related point, drawing on the above mentioned trends, is that future attacks are likely to be smaller in size, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope. This assessment well describes the January 2007 attack by "locally grown leftists" against the U.S. embassy in Athens. In addition, it is expected that by 2025 Al Qaeda will be superseded by similarly inspired but more diffuse Islamic extremist groups.

But there also is some recent evidence that Al Qaeda is more resilient than was previously thought. There are indications that, in addition to being a source of inspiration for "a new generation…[of] jihad seekers…who are not waiting for Al Qaeda to recruit them," Al Qaeda remains a cohesive organization that can plan its own attacks. This suggests that a major attack involving a significant number of deaths, while unlikely, remains possible.

Location of Targets
The Near Enemy

Much of contemporary terrorist activity is directed against traditional countries that are trying to modernize or against countries that have close ties to the West. "Some of the strongest language in the early communiqués of Usama bin Laden and his associates was directed at Hosni Mubarak of Egypt… and even Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish state," notes one respected newspaper: "Their crime, in Al Qaeda's eyes attempting to modernize and in some cases secularize their states." Thus, the post-9/11 array of terrorist attacks includes bombings against Riyadh housing complexes, and explosions in a synagogue, British consulate, and Hong Kong and Shanghai bank in Istanbul. In the latter case, the perpetrator was a Turkish terrorist organization that is "a violent opponent of Turkey's secular government and its ties to the European Union and the West." Because these targets can be explained in terms of the anti-globalization anger noted above, the persistence of that broad strategic condition indicates attacks in these sorts of locations are likely to still be part of the landscape in 2025. Attacks against the energy infrastructure of oil producing countries that are allied with the United States are especially likely.

The Far Enemy

The United States remains a key target. This is clear in many of the rhetorical statements made by bin Laden in recent years, and also in several planned but thwarted attacks. In 2004, there was an alleged plot to target prominent financial institutions in New York, Newark and Washington D.C., including the Stock Exchange, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Intelligence officials have also determined that the plan to use liquid explosives to blow up airliners out of Heathrow airport in August 2006 involved exploding the airliners over U.S. cities, rather than the Atlantic, to increase the loss of life and the economic impact. For terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, this case indicates that Islamic extremists remain focussed on attacking the United States directly, on U.S. soil. It also further illustrates the essential economic underpinnings to contemporary terrorism.

Targeting the United States directly has become much more difficult

because of post-9/11 security measures, and as result it is U.S. allies who have become targets. Examples include the Bali nightclub bombing in November 2002 (which targeted Australians), the 2004 train bombing in Madrid, and the 2005 subway and bus bombing in London. U.S. interests abroad have also been targeted, as demonstrated by the bombing of the US embassy in Athens in 2007.

The National Intelligence Council believes that over the next two decades the United States and its interests abroad will remain prime terrorist targets, but that more terrorist attacks are likely to be aimed at its allies in Europe. Britain is particularly vulnerable because of the coincidence that Al Qaeda's leadership is based in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where Britain has colonial links and as a result there is a significant flow of people going back and forth. Geographically speaking, we can also expect terrorist attacks in the oil producing states of Africa and the Caucuses and also in the major shipping routes in Southeast Asia. Canada with a large oil-producing sector could be targeted, as could the emerging globalizers China and India.

The Enemy Within

The most notable feature of the past few years has been the rise in domestic terrorism against Western states, perpetrated by citizens of the targeted country — in some cases by people who have been born in that country. The Madrid and London transit attacks are the most visible examples, but there have also been many thwarted plots in Canada, the United States, and Germany. The fact that some of the plots against the United States were discussed in Canada by American citizens is, for some analysts, a sign of new era in which Islamists view the United States and Canada as "one strategic arena for operations." The rise in domestic terrorism in a number of Western countries (whether planned or perpetrated attacks) can be understood in part as a domestic-level version of the clientalist/market pattern of interaction at the global level. These are "Muslims that have abandoned the food, music and customs of the "old country" but still feel repelled by the ethos and values of the "new country" argues one scholar, in an assessment that echoes the earlier discussion of countries that have abandoned the clientalist system but have not yet adopted market values. Recruitment of

"citizen-terrorists" is fuelled by a "sense of isolation and disappointment in Western culture," and by "a general sense of frustration with their lives."

Another parallel with the global level analysis is that economics appears to be a key factor in the rise of domestic terrorism. "On the evidence of most European countries, adequate material and social conditions do not always stop people from becoming terrorists. But the reverse may hold true: if people are economically deprived or socially excluded, the pool of potential killers and bombers will grow. In the highest levels of the British government, the dominant thinking is that economics does matter." Particular concerns are the high levels of unemployment among the Muslim populations of Europe, and the fact that most of the Muslim women do not do paid work. Both contribute to lower family income.

Projections as to which countries will be most susceptible to domestic terrorism in 2025 must be specific to each country and would benefit from a more detailed analysis than can be presented here. Canada is thought to be less of a target because it is not a major power, has no imperial past in the Middle East, and no big symbolic targets. Experts argue that the United States is less susceptible to domestic terrorism than European countries for a number of reasons, including a professionally employed and upwardly mobile Muslim population, a greater acceptance of publicly displayed religion, and the fact that the United States is a land of immigrants. These factors could also be attributed to Canada. By contrast, European Muslims tend to be poor, non-professional, and isolated in ethnic enclaves, and their religion threatens secular values. Britain has the added dimension of a colonial legacy and ties to Pakistan (as mentioned earlier). The nature of most of these factors is such that they cannot change quickly; some can never change. As a result, it is likely that present trends in domestic terrorism will continue to exist in 2025. All Western countries will be susceptible to domestic terrorism, however, Europe and especially Britain are most likely to be targeted. India, as a state that is increasingly integrated into the world economy and that boasts a large Muslim population is also likely to be a victim of domestic terrorism.

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Types of Weapons

It is useful to consider what sorts of weapons future terrorists are likely to use. The greatest concern among many intelligence agencies is that terrorists will turn from conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction. The concrete evidence (in the open literature) that Al Qaeda is attempting to acquire WMD includes, among other things, the following: two Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Usama bin Laden in 2001; documents seized in Pakistan in March 2003 revealed that Al Qaeda has acquired the necessary materials for producing biological and chemical weapons; that same year Usama bin Laden received fresh approval from a Saudi cleric for the use of a nuclear weapon against the United States, considered a significant milestone; specific intelligence received by US agencies in 2004 indicated that Al Qaeda planned to conduct an attack using a radiological bomb; captured Al Qaeda leaders have confessed to the CIA their attempts to smuggle a radioactive device into the United States; and, in 2006 a British Muslim admitted to plotting a series of co-ordinated terrorist attacks in Britain, including one involving a radioactive dirty bomb. There is no evidence the organization has nuclear weapons, aside from Al Qaeda's own claims that it has acquired briefcase nuclear weapons. Some experts make a convincing case that the risk of nuclear terrorism is overstated.

Predicting future weapons use involves tracing "historical trends and current events to extract growing patterns of Al Qaeda's behaviour in order to make a statement about their capabilities for the future." The historical trends indicate a consistent desire over the past several years to acquire WMD, as well as possibly the actual acquisition of chemical, biological and/or radiological weapons. As indicated above, the trends also indicate a growing and future emphasis on economic related attacks, including a strong emphasis on energy infrastructure. If terrorists have not yet acquired nuclear weapons (the open literature suggests they have not), then targeting energy infrastructure can best be done with conventional weapons, since it would involve blowing up assets rather than killing masses of people. Experts predict that should a WMD attack take place, terrorists will undertake strikes with the primary goal of economic disruption, rather than significant loss of life, and they will use a radiological or low-tech biological attack. It is anticipated that, due to the technical difficulty of launching a WMD attack, in the period to at least 2020, terrorists will have little ability to carry out large-scale unconventional attacks.

Conclusion

The strategic conditions underlying terrorism in 2025 will be those that first emerged some two decades ago. They include accelerated globalization, the way in which Middle Eastern states have responded both economically and in terms of schooling and the demographic bulge. In 2025, there is likely to be a large pool of unemployed, frustrated, and religiously educated young men to draw on for terrorist activity.

The more tactical attributes of terrorism in 2025 will have had their roots in the early post-9/11 period. The events of September 11, 2001, revealed the powerful economic implications of a terrorist attack. This demonstration, combined with the economic underpinnings to terrorists' grievances, means that future targets are likely to be economic. Energy infrastructure will figure centrally, but there will also be a large number of soft targets. Smaller groups around the world will carry out the majority of strikes, yet Al Qaeda may remain as an organization to contend with.

Future strikes could be in modernizing countries, and in the United States or other Western countries; however, India and China could be increasingly in the terrorist's sights. Europe, most notably Britain, will be especially vulnerable to domestic terrorism, but the growing number of plots in North America suggests a future attack in this strategic arena. Logic also points toward domestic strikes in India. Low-tech weapons of mass destruction could be used against soft targets to elicit panic, while large conventional bombs are more likely to be used against "hard" targets like oil refineries or tankers. In either case the goal will be the same: to bring about massive economic disruption, and ideally, downfall to all those who are benefiting from contemporary, accelerated, globalization.

Elinor C. Sloan – Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

ROYAL JUBILEE THAMES FLOTILLA

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Why?

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Azerbaijan captures terrorists organising attempt on president's life, as well as terror attacks during Eurovision 2012

Source: http://pda.trend.az/en/2031850.html

Azerbaijani National Security Ministry detained an armed criminal group which planned an attempt on Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's life during his visit to the north-western region of the country, as well as sabotage and terror acts on the eve and during the Eurovision Song Contest 2012 in Baku, the Ministry's Public Affairs Centre reported.

The aim of a dangerous transnational armed criminal group was to commit provocative terrorist acts, in individual groups on the eve and during the Eurovision Song Contest 2012 in Baku, to organise explosions and armed attacks where massive loss of life would ensue, including in Hilton Baku and JW Marriot Hotel Absheron, as well as to commit major explosions in the Baku Crystal Hall gaining access through purchasing tickets by any means and at the National Flag Square.

As previously reported, the aim of the armed group that underwent special training and was equipped with various types of firearms, ammunition, explosives and devices, as well as other military devices, was to commit a series of terrorist attacks in several regions of Azerbaijan, to create chaos and anarchy in the country, fear and confusion among the public, to create resistance on the ethnic and religious grounds, to disrupt stability and damage the image of Azerbaijan in the international arena. To do this, it was planned to blow up a number of places of pilgrimage, considered sacred among the population, mosques and religious sites that are considered places of worship of other faiths, and to commit other dangerous actions. In addition, the group planned murder of law enforcement officials and attacks on office buildings in order to seize weapons and ammunition. It was also planned that armed groups related to this group would hide in the areas bordering on the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation and mountain forests, and places for temporary residence, bunkers and trenches would be prepared.

To neutralize this dangerous transnational criminal armed group, which poses a serious threat to social and political life of Azerbaijan, for timely suppression of terrorist actions the National Security Ministry has conducted large-scale special operations in Baku, Ganja, Sumgait, as well as in Gakh, Zagatala, Sheki, Gusar, Absheron, Khachmaz and Shabran regions. In some cases, armed resistance by members of the group was suppressed, in particular Vugar Padarov was killed and most of the members of the armed group were disarmed.

It should be noted that one of the main goals of dangerous transnational armed crime group in committing provocative terrorist acts, in individual groups on the eve and during the Eurovision Song Contest 2012 was to organise explosions and armed attacks where massive loss of life would ensue. So in order not to create concern and not to cause fear among the public, including citizens of Azerbaijan and foreign guests, as well as for holding of such a prestigious international event at a high level and in a festive atmosphere, nothing was reported at that time about the cruel plans of this dangerous transnational crime.

But the operational situation was under serious control of the relevant bodies, the necessary intensive measures for security and protection were taken.

As a result of the anti-terrorist operations, continuing to neutralize the other members of this armed group, to suppress other planned criminal acts 22 members of the group were detained. During the anti-terrorist operation conducted in Nasimi district of Baku on May 16, 2012, a member of the armed group Azerbaijani citizen Ruslan Huseynov, not obeying to legal requirements of the Ministry's special purpose officials to surrender, opened fire. Timur Huseynov, who showed resistance

and used force, posing a hazard to life and health of the authorities in the discharge of official duties, was killed. During the operation the Ministry's two officials received wounds of varying severity.

During the operation, one of the leaders of the group - Samir Saniyev, nicknamed 'Abu Ubeidah' to whom the international terrorist network gave the same powers with Vugar Padarov to commit terrorist acts in Azerbaijan, and who was given the title of "Emir", managed to escape. To catch him, the search operations were launched, all the relevant authorities were informed.

allocated a lot of money. 'Amir of the Dagestan Front' Ibrahimkhalil Daudov nicknamed "Saleh" appointed Vugar Padarov nicknamed "Bursa" as 'Emir' of a new armed group, and it was filmed on the phone of Padarov.

In July 2011 Vugar Padarov, Samir Saniyev and Elmir Nuraliyev, illegally crossing with weapons the border of the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation towards the Gusar region, arrived in Azerbaijan. By a predetermined plan in Gusar region Vugar Padarov, Samir Saniyev and Elmir Nuraliyev were met by a member of the group Amir Muradov and by his car took them to the city of

Saniyev while trying to leave Azerbaijan was arrested in Gazakh region by local police. He offered armed resistance and wounded a police officer. Saniyev was disarmed, a Stechkin pistol, 40 cartridges and two chargers were seized from him.

In addition to the features identified during the investigation of illegal activities of members of armed groups, new facts were established. It was found that in February 2011 Samir Saniyev along with Vugar Padarov and Elmir Nuraliyev participated in the meeting of 'Council of emirs of Dagestan' in the discussions about the conduct of jihad in Azerbaijan near the village of Kadar of Dagesta. Following the meeting 'Council of emirs' gave Vugar Padarov, Samir Saniyev and Elmir Nuraliyev appropriate instructions and

Sumgait. Samir Saniyev went to Baku, Vugar Padarov, Elmir Nuraliyev and Amir Muradov went to the city of Zagatala.

It was revealed that in order to implement the plans of the international terrorist network to conduct a series of terrorist acts in Azerbaijan, to create panic among the population, ethnic and religious conflict, to disrupt the stability and damage the reputation of Azerbaijan Vugar Padarov, Samir Saniyev and Elmir Nuraliyev were instructed to act both jointly, and individually.

On the basis of instructions Vugar Padarov and members of the armed group under his leadership were to make an attempt on the Azerbaijani President's life during his visit to the north-western region of the country, and to organize

armed attacks on the buildings of law enforcement agencies, the murder of their employees in order to seize weapons and ammunition, and blow up a number of holy places, mosques and places of worship of other faiths.

Elnur Nuraliyev with Vugar Padarov to carry out terrorist acts in Baku had to gather the necessary intelligence information, find out the layout of a number of state organizations, their work schedule, number of personnel, determine the positions for snipers and other factors. Samir Saniyev, in turn, together with the armed group planned to carry out large-scale explosion in the areas of maximum concentrations of tourists, including at the Hilton Baku and JW Marriot Hotel Absheron and other hotels, as well as the Baku Crystal Hall, where the Eurovision 2012 song contest was to be held, and at the National Flag Square.

After committing these heinous acts of terrorism and creating atmosphere of chaos in the country members of the armed group had planned to take refuge in the mountain forests in the north of Azerbaijan in the previously prepared shelters. It was planned that members of the group would operate in conjunction with additional terrorist forces that were to come from Dagestan.

Samir Saniyev and people subordinate to him in order to create explosive devices purchased a large quantity of explosives, and Timur Huseynov and others conducted surveillance of persons against whom terrorist attacks were preparing. In addition, it was found that in order to commit terrorist acts Samir Saniyev bought the Nissan Pathfinder. According to him, pre-purchased explosives were to be laid down in this car, as well as vehicles belonging to other members of the group, after which the cars had to be parked on the main square of Baku, in parking lots of Hilton Baku and JW Marriot Hotel Absheron, and others, which are symbols of the dynamic development of Azerbaijan. At the same time, Timur Huseynov had to buy a ticket to the final of Eurovision 2012 international song contest, to penetrate into the Baku Crystal Hall, and blow up there specially prepared explosive device, known among specialists as a "shock bomb", leading to a mass panic and stampede, which would ensue victims among the audience. At the same time explosive devices planted in cars parked in front of hotels should have triggered and made

explosions were to be accompanied by great destruction. In addition, in the yard of a house near the National Flag square in the Bail township it was planned to blow up another car packed with explosives. However, as a result of counter-terrorism measures, as well as the professionalism of law enforcement personnel, explosions, terrorist and subversive activities, which could cause massive loss of lives, were prevented timely and in decisive manner, the authority of Azerbaijan as a stable and secure country was preserved.

The ministry has so far detained 40 members of the armed criminal terrorist group, in general, 13 submachine guns, one RPK automatic rifle, 12 handguns of various types, three carbines, 3,424 cartridge of various calibers, 66 clips for automatic weapons and pistols, 23 RGD-5 hand grenades, 26 F-1 grenades and three RG-42 " hand grenades, a large number of fuses for them, a variety of specially made explosive devices, over 2,352 grams of explosive plastids, as well as two 10-liter tanks, which held about 20 kilograms of explosives, 675 grams of TNT blocks, electric detonators for 19 bombs, 19 detonators and caps, 48 Kenwood portable radio transmitters, other ammunition and items prohibited by law, the various edged weapons, as well as literature that promotes terrorism and jihad, whose use was are planned during the terrorist-subversive actions were seized from the members of the armed group.

In addition, one explosive device, which is a manufactured under special schemes, mostly inherent to international terrorism, a toy car with remote control, capable of destroying a living creature in a radius of 100 meters, within which explosives were placed - 438.2 grams of plastids, TNT per 200 and 75 grams, capsule, metal chips, designed for mass destruction were seized.

It should be noted that an explosive device seized from members of the group in a cylindrical shape as a normal bundle of newspaper impregnated with explosives, which can not be determined by conventional detectors and which do not arouse suspicion by its appearance, had a powerful destructive force that could cause many casualties, cause a great damage to human health, openly demonstrates the scale of the intent and purposes of the international terrorist network.

To investigate all the circumstances of the crime, determine other participants of criminal acts investigations and operational search measures continue.

"Al-Qaeda had training camps in FYROM"

Source: http://www.b92.net//eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=05&dd=30&nav_id=80510

Al-Quaeda had three training camps in FYROM, claims retired **professor of the Skopje Faculty of Security Ivan Babamovski**. Despite this, "the international anti-terrorist coalition" is not helping Skopje in any way, he noted. The security situation in FYROM and the region is fairly poor and more violent incidents can be expected after the murder of five men near the village of Smiljkovci, western FYROM, on April 12, Babamovski stated. He believes the murders near Smiljkovci was a terrorist act meant to spread fear among the population. Al-Qaeda had three training camps in FYROM, he noted. Babamovski stated that 25 members of "an ethnic group" in FYROM had undergone terrorist training in Tehran, Iran, and that one of the leaders of that community had been to Qom, the Shia spiritual center, where he was trained in leading groups related to terrorism. Despite all that, the members of the anti-terrorist coalition are not assisting FYROM financially, technically or in terms of personnel, he remarked.

BOOK - Financing Terrorism

Source:http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&pageSubject=0&calcTitle=1&title_id=11626&edition_id=15160

Without money, terrorists cannot function as organizations and cannot conduct attacks. Yet the questions remain, how vulnerable are terrorists to financial disruptions? Can governments put pressure on their finances in meaningful ways or are they too resilient and adaptive to be affected by state actions? These and other questions about terrorism financing are vigorously debated by scholars and policymakers, particularly since the

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attacks of September 11th 2001 . While there is a growing literature on policy issues, strategies, and countermeasures, states must first understand their enemies before developing strategies to defeat them. So, instead of focusing on the state response, this book asks a more foundational question: How do different terrorist groups actually raise money? What are their budgets? What do their portfolios look like? How have they changed over time? What are the advantages and disadvantages of different sources of financing? The book includes case studies of 11 different terrorist groups or sets of groups within a country. It is clear that each group has a different portfolio tailored to their needs and their environment and this makes countering terrorist financing more challenging for the state.

This topical book (May 2012 – 266pp.) will be required reading for all students and scholars interested in terrorism financing as well as those working in government agencies tasked with combating terrorist groups and their financial resources.

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Editor

Michael Freeman is an Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, USA.

Reviews

"Freeman has assembled a timely and important collection of insightful case studies that demonstrate how combating modern terrorist groups requires an understanding of their financial complexities and vulnerabilities. This book will be well-received by scholars, teachers and students in the field of terrorism studies as well as counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners." - James J.F. Forest, University of Massachusetts Lowell, USA

"Financing Terrorism offers a unique examination of how and why terrorist groups raise money. The combination of innovative theory and rich case studies from leading academics and practitioners make this book an invaluable contribution to the study of terrorism"' - Seth G. Jones, RAND and Georgetown University, USA

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Break-away Mali region now under al Qaeda-affiliate control

Source: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120604-breakaway-mali-region-now-under-al-qaedaaffiliate-control

Following a March 2012 military coup in Mali, and the disintegration of the Mali military into rival factions, Tuareg secessionists in northeast Mali have seized two-thirds of that country — an area larger than France, but with a mostly-nomad population of between one-and-a-half and two million people – and proclaimed the Independent State of Azawad.

Sharia law on a reluctant population; have called in hundreds of foreign jihadists – some from as far as Pakistan and Afghanistan; and have increased cooperation with the North African branch of al Qaeda – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

One of the noticeable results of this Islamic take-over of Azawad has been a wave of

Reports from Azawad now portray a grim picture of the situation on the ground: three months after the declaration of the independence of Azawad, an al Qaeda-affiliated Islamist fundamentalist movement, Ansar Dine (or Defenders of the Faith) is controlling the vast territory. The Islamists have marginalized the Tuareg-based National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); are in the process of imposing a strict

Tuareg refugees fleeing the newly independent territory: the *Financial Times* reports that in the last three months, some 400,000 thousands – or about a quarter of the population – have left Azawad to villages and cities in the southwest of Mali.

The deepening crisis in Mali is not only a humanitarian crisis. As the *Financial Times* observes: "[W]hat initially appeared to be a quest for a

secular homeland has turned into something much more dangerous, for Mali and far beyond: the possibility of an Islamist-aligned mini-state that could offer a base to the jihadist groups and criminal gangs that roam the Sahara."

 The January rebellion by the Tuareg against the central Mali government was the fourth such rebellion since Mali gained independence from France in 1960, but the first to seek a separate homeland for the northern Azawad region. This time, the Tuareg rebellion was helped by two developments: well-armed Tuareg soldiers, who were used by Colonel Qaddafi as mercenaries in an effort to suppress the anti-Qaddafi uprising in Libya, returned to Mali after the fall of Qaddafi and boosted the ranks of the MNLA. The second development was the 22 March coup which toppled to Mali government and divided the country's military.

The *Financial Times* reports that fighting alongside the MNLA, quietly at first, was Ansar Dine, formed by a disgruntled veteran of previous Tuareg rebellions. Iyad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar Dine, served in Mali's consulate in Saudi Arabia in 2007, but the Saudi authorities, alarmed by Ghali's ties to a fundamentalist Islamic group in Saudi Arabia, asked him to leave. He returned to Mali, and used his connections with Islamic fundamentalist movements to become a mediator in several multimillion-dollar negotiations over Western hostages kidnapped by AQIM in north and west Africa. In late fall 2011 he actively agitated to become the leader of the newly formed MNLA, and, at the same time, also become the leader of his Tuareg clan, but was rebuffed in both attempts. In response, and using money he collected in commissions for his mediating efforts, he formed his own militia – the Ansar Dine.

The *New York Times* reports that Ansar Dine, bolstered by money, foreign Jihadi soldiers, and close connections with AQIM, soon proved more disciplined and effective than the MNLA. The main reason is that the Tuareg community is deeply divided over the issue of independence, with the uprising supported by only a section of the Tuareg population. Also, the rebellion, and the cause of independence of Azsawad, has little or no support from ethnic groups such as the Songhai, the biggest ethnic group in northern Mali. With the secular-nationalist Tuareg forces divided over both ends and means, the more disciplined Ansar Dine, without much difficulty, has become the de facto ruler of Azawad.

Smoking in public and listening to music are now prohibited in Azawad. Bars have been destroyed and hotels closed. Women must cover their faces and bodies and be accompanied a male relative when venturing out of their homes. Men, too, must watch out: the Islamists decreed that men's trousers cannot descend to the ankles, and men caught with ankle-length trousers are subject to public lashing. .

A quarter of the Azawad population has already fled the draconian Sharia laws Ansar Dine has been imposing. The *Financial Times* reports, though, that even before the Mali military regroups and, as expected, launch a campaign to reunify the country, Ansar Dine may soon have to fight to keep its hold over the territory: other ethnic groups in the north, such as the Songhai, are likely to form their own militias to take on the Islamists, leading to civil war.

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Al-Qaida Leader Killed in Drone Strike Played Role in NYC Terror Plots

Source: http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/al-Qaida-Killed-Drone-Strike-New-York-City-Terror-Plots-Abu-Yahya-al-Libi-157345505.html

The al-Qaida leader killed in a drone strike Monday was linked to at least two terror plots that targeted New York City, security officials tell NBC 4 New York.

Videos made by Abu Yahya al-Libi were used to recruit the terrorists who planned to be

begin to flourish, come alive and shine

suicide bombers on the city subways in the 2009 Zazi bomb plot.

Officials also said al-Libi gave orders to terrorist Neal Vinas, who later scouted the Long Island Railroad for a possible terror attack.

Al-Libi moved up to the number two position in al-Qaida after the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

"He served as al-Qaida's general manager responsible for overseeing the group's day-to-day operations," said White House spokesman Jay Carney.

Al-Libi was killed in a drone strike that is believed to have killed a total of 15 terror operatives.

During this year's subway bomb trial, admitted terrorist Najibullah Zazi testified that he and his fellow plotters attended a terror training camp in Pakistan where Al-Libi's videos were played for them to inspire them to carry out an attack. And Vinas testified at the same trial that he personally met with al-Libi before returning to the U.S. to scout possible targets.

According to the trial transcript, prosecutors asked Vinas about his travels to Lwara, Pakistan.

"Whose command were you under at that point?" prosecutors asked.

Vinas responded, "Sheikh Abu YaYa al-Libi."

Al-Libi played a role in making videos calling for attacks on U.S. targets, both overseas and in the U.S. Intelligence officials said he actively reached out to al-Qaida affiliates across the globe encouraging terror strikes. And inside Pakistan, security officials said he played a direct role in a suicide bombing that targeted the Danish embassy in Islamabad.

Al-Libi had been in U.S. custody in Afghanistan but escaped from a prison at Bagram Air Base in 2005. That escape and his religious background made him popular among al Qaeda members.

Sen. Charles Schumer called on Pakistan to do more to target al Qaeda groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

He added drone strikes will continue against terror leaders so long as they are operating in the Waziristan region.

"The latest strike shows how good our intelligence is and we can take these people out," Schumer said. "Al Qaeda is a much weaker organization today even than it was the day after Bin Laden was killed."

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Ayman al Zawahiri remains al Qaeda's top leader and other terror operatives like Adnan Shukrajuma – linked to the Zazi subway plot – are believed to be hiding in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

Security officials say terrorists in Yemen remain a growing threat with a bomb-maker and supporters there behind recent underwear bomb plots targeting US airliners.

The End of Counterinsurgency and the Scalable Force
By George Friedman
Source: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/end-counterinsurgency-and-scalable-force?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120605&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=cacbebd2910842ed8200eb0832290605

The U.S. military for years has debated the utility of counterinsurgency operations. Drawing from a sentiment that harkens back to the Vietnam War, many within the military have long opposed counterinsurgency operations. Others see counterinsurgency as the unavoidable future of U.S. warfare. The debate is between those who believe the purpose of a conventional military force is to defeat another conventional military force and those who believe conventional military conflicts increasingly will be replaced by conflicts more akin to recent counterinsurgency operations. In such conflicts, the purpose of a counterinsurgency is to transform an occupied society in order to undermine the insurgents.

Understanding this debate requires the understanding that counterinsurgency is not a type of warfare; it is one strategy by which a disproportionately powerful conventional force approaches asymmetric warfare. As its name implies, it is a response to an insurgency, a type of asymmetric conflict undertaken by small units with close links to the occupied population to defeat a larger conventional force. Insurgents typically are highly motivated -- otherwise they collapse easily -- and usually possess superior intelligence to a foreign occupational force. Small units operating with superior intelligence are able to evade more powerful conventional forces and can strike such forces at their own discretion. Insurgents are not expected to defeat the occupying force through direct military force. Rather, the assumption is that the occupying force has less interest in the outcome of the war than the insurgents and that over time, the inability to defeat the insurgency will compel the occupying force to withdraw.

According to counterinsurgency theory, the strength of an insurgency lies in the relationship between insurgents and the general population. The relationship provides a logistical base and an intelligence apparatus. It also provides sanctuary by allowing the insurgents to blend into the population and disappear under pressure. Counterinsurgency argues that severing this relationship is essential. The means for this consist of offering the population economic incentives, making deals with the traditional leadership and protecting the population from the insurgents, who might conduct retributive attacks for collaborating with the occupying force.

The weakness of counterinsurgency is the assumption that the population would turn against the insurgents for economic incentives or that the counterinsurgents can protect the population from the insurgents. Some values, such as nationalism and religion, are very real among many populations, and the occupying force's ability to alter these values is dubious, no matter how helpful, sincere and sympathetic the occupying force is. Moreover, protecting the population from insurgents is difficult. In many cases, insurgents are the husbands, brothers and sons of civilians. The population may want the economic benefits offered by the occupying force, but that does not mean citizens will betray or ostracize their friends and relatives. In the end, it is a specious assumption that a mass of foreigners can do more than intimidate a population. The degree to which they can intimidate them is doubtful as well.

An Alternative to Counterinsurgency?
There is of course another dimension of asymmetric warfare, which encapsulates guerrilla warfare and special operations warfare. This is warfare by which highly trained light infantry forces are deployed on a clearly defined mission but are not dependent on the local

population. Instead, these forces avoid the general population, operating on their own supplies or supplies obtained with minimal contact with the population. Notably, either side could adopt these tactics. What is most important in considering guerrilla warfare from the perspective of the counterinsurgent is that it is not merely a tactic for the insurgent; it is also a potential alternative to counterinsurgency itself.

Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the U.S. military is not very good at counterinsurgency. One could argue that the United States should improve its counterinsurgency capabilities, but there is little evidence that it could master such capabilities. There is, however, another form of light infantry warfare to consider, and it is a form of warfare the United States is good at. The alternative does not seek to win over the population but is designed to achieve very definable military objectives, from the destruction of facilities to harassing, engaging and possibly destroying enemy forces, including insurgents.

Special Operations Forces are highly useful for meeting these objectives, but we should also include other types of forces. The U.S. Marine Corps is one such example. Rather than occupying territory, and certainly rather than trying to change public opinion, these forces have a conventional mission carried out in relatively small unit operations. Their goal is to assert military force in highly defined if limited missions designed to bypass the population and strike at the opposition's capabilities. This is exemplified best in counterterrorist operations or the assault on specific facilities. These operations are cheap and do not require occupation. More important, these operations are designed to terminate without incurring political cost -- the bane of prolonged counterinsurgency operations. The alternative to counterinsurgency is to avoid occupational warfare by rigorously defining more limited missions.

To illustrate these operations, consider what we regard as a major emerging threat: Non-state actors potentially acquiring land-based anti-ship missiles. Globalism brings with it intensified maritime trade. Meanwhile, we have seen the dissemination of many weapons to non-state actors. It is easy to imagine that the next stage of diffusion would be mobile, land-based anti-ship missiles. A guerrilla group or insurgency, armed with such weapons, could

take advantage of land cover for mobility but strike at naval vessels. In fact, we have already seen several instances where groups employ this strategy. Hezbollah did so in operations against Israel in 2006. Pirates off the coast of Africa are a non-state threat to maritime shipping, though they have yet to use such weapons. Likewise, we see this potential in suicide boat bombs launched from the coast of Yemen.

The world is filled with chokepoints, where the ocean narrows and constricts the flow of ships into corridors within range of land-based anti-ship systems. Some chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Gibraltar, are natural, while others, such as the Panama and Suez canals, are man-made, and they are vulnerable to weapons far less sophisticated than anti-ship missiles. These chokepoints, as well as other critical coastal waters, represent the vulnerabilities of the global economic system to state and non-state actors. Occupying them is the logical next step up from piracy.

Providing naval escorts to protect commercial vessels would not solve the problem. The escorts would not be in a position to attack the land-based attackers, whose location would be unknown. Airstrikes are possible, but as we have learned in places like Kosovo, camouflage is an effective counter to airstrikes despite its shortcomings.

These are the circumstances under which scalable, self-contained units would be needed. U.S. Marines, who have forces of sufficient scale to engage attackers in relatively larger areas, are particularly well suited for such missions. Special operations teams would be useful against identified and static hard targets, but amphibious light infantry in various sized units would provide the ability to search, identify and destroy attackers who are constantly moving or redeploying. Because these would be land-sea operations, cooperation between naval forces and ground forces would be critical. These clearly are Marine missions, and potentially urgent ones.

This is one mission among many that can be imagined for smaller-unit operations against non-state actors in a hybrid war scenario, which would avoid the obvious pitfalls of counterinsurgency. Most of all, it would provide boots on the ground distinguishing between targets, camouflage and innocent victims and

still be able to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles and other assets.

The issue is not between peer-to-peer conflict and counterinsurgency. While increasingly rare, peer-to-peer conflict still represents the existential threat to any country. But the real problem is matching the force to the mission without committing to occupation -- or worse still, the social transformation of the country.

Scale and Mission

The type of government that Afghanistan has is not a matter of national interest to the United States. What is of national interest is that terrorist attacks are not planned, practiced or launched from Afghanistan. Neither occupation nor transformation of the social structure is necessary to achieve this mission. What is necessary will vary in every conflict, but the key in each conflict is to contain the commitment to the smallest level possible. There are three reasons for this. First, doing so defines the mission in such a way that it can be attained. This imposes realism on the mission. Moreover, minimizing commitment avoids the scenario in which prudent withdrawal is deemed politically unacceptable. Last, it avoids the consequences of attempting to transform an entire country.

Military intervention should be a rare occurrence; when it does occur, it should be scaled to the size of the mission. In the chokepoint scenario addressed above, the goal is not to defeat an insurgency; an insurgency cannot be defeated without occupying and transforming the occupied society. The goal is to prevent the use of land based missiles against ships. Missions to destroy capabilities

are politically defensible and avoid occupational warfare. They are effective counters to insurgents without turning into counterinsurgencies.

These missions require a light force readily transportable by multiple means to a target area. They should be capable of using force from the squad level to larger levels if necessary. Forces deployed must be able to return as needed and remain in theater without needing to be on the ground, taking casualties and engaging in warfare against non-essential targets and inevitably against civilians. In other words, the mission should not incur unnecessary political costs.

The key is to recognize the failure of counterinsurgency, that warfare is conducted on varying scales of size and that any force must be able to adapt to the mission, ideally operating without large onshore facilities and without moving to occupation.

The current debate over counterinsurgency opens the door to a careful consideration of not only the scalability of forces but also the imperative that the mission includes occupation only in the most extreme cases. Occupation leads to resistance, resistance leads to counterattacks and counterattacks lead to counterinsurgencies. Agile insertion of forces, normally from the sea, could beget disciplined strategic and operational planning and war termination strategies. Wars are easier to end when all that is required is for ships to sail away.

Not all wars can be handled this way, but wars that can't need to be considered very carefully. The record for these wars does not instill optimism.

Can al-Qaeda survive the drone strikes?

By Frank Gardner (BBC security correspondent)
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-18347533

Much is being made in Washington's defence and security circles of the demise this week of the man described as "al-Qaeda's Number Two".

Abu Yahya al-Libi - real name Mohammed Hassan Qaid - was killed on Monday by a missile fired from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone in Pakistan's tribal territory of North Waziristan.

A White House spokesman called it a major blow to al-Qaeda, saying that the dead militant had no clear successor.

So how much of a blow to the group is it in the long term? And can the wider al-Qaeda movement survive the steady attrition of its operational leaders by the targeted missile strikes that have increased dramatically under President Barack Obama?

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'Core al-Qaeda'

Amongst his jihadist admirers, Abu Yahya al-Libi possessed a rare combination of operational and organisational skills, Islamic scholarly credentials,

charisma and an almost folkloric status as the man who broke out of Bagram airbase in Afghanistan in 2005.

Libi was one of the key central figures of what has become known as "Core al-Qaeda", based in Pakistan, and his role has been described as that of a "general manager" overseeing the leadership's relations with other branches in places like Yemen.

As a Libyan in an organisation dominated by Saudis and Egyptians, he also had a role as a go-between.

"Libi was one of the few Libyans within al-Qaeda that could stomach [its current leader, Ayman] al-Zawahiri," says Sajjan Gohel of the Asia Pacific Foundation.

"There has often been a tense relationship between the Libyan and Egyptian factions within al-Qaeda and it is believed that Libi bridged that gap," Dr Gohel adds.

Controversial policy

His death by drone strike follows similar recent US missile strikes in Yemen and Somalia.

In the first five months of this year, there has been one strike in Somalia, 18 in Pakistan and 22 in Yemen.

> **Militants killed by drones in Pakistan**
> - **June 2012:** Senior al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi
> - **February 2012:** Al-Qaeda commander Badar Mansoor
> - **August 2011:** Al-Qaeda commander Atiyah Abd al-Rahman
> - **June 2011**: Senior al-Qaeda figure Ilyas Kashmiri (according to reports)
> - **August 2009:** Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud

The policy is highly controversial. Proponents of the drone strikes - mostly in US government circles - say they are having a devastating effect on al-Qaeda's leadership, killing off key operational commanders and leading ideologues like Anwar al-Awlaki at a faster rate than they can be replaced.

Supporters of the policy say they allow the US to eliminate its enemies in ungoverned places where there is no sovereign rule of law or where the federal government is unwilling to act.

But human rights activists argue the drone strikes amount to extrajudicial killings, and neutral observers worry that collateral casualties amongst the civilian population further deepen hostility to the US.

Although an on-the-ground investigation in Pakistan by the Associated Press this year found that "the drone strikes were killing far fewer civilians than many Pakistanis are led to believe and that a significant majority of the dead were combatants", the policy is still deeply unpopular at local level.

This month, a major US newspaper said that drone strikes had replaced the US detention centre at Guantanamo Bay as the prime recruiting sergeant for al-Qaeda's cause.

Resilience

Ten years ago, in the initial wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, the idea that robust "executive action" alone could defeat al-Qaeda would probably have held more sway than it does today.

But counter-terrorism officials reluctantly concede that the global jihadist movement is remarkably resilient, despite its loss of leaders, numbers and territory.

In 2001, al-Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan, losing its training camps and its bases; it moved across the

border into Pakistan then nurtured recruits living in the West.

In Yemen, an offshoot has exploited the chaos that surrounded the slow, violent departure of the previous president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to take ground in the south and even establish its own rule of law in some towns.

In Iraq, jihadists who fought the US military and the Iraqi government are now believed to be turning their attention to the mayhem in Syria.

The longer the conflict in Syria continues unresolved, the greater the risk of a transnational influx of violent extremists. Already the country has suffered bombings of such devastating force that al-Qaeda's involvement is suspected.

Democratic threat

In the long term, perhaps the most serious threat to al-Qaeda lies not so much in the unseen death from the air through drone strikes but in an eventual evaporation of its cause.

Last year's mass democratic movement, dubbed by some the "Arab Spring" or "Arab Awakening", completely bypassed al-Qaeda, which had always insisted that violent jihad was the best and only path to just government.

With the recent departure of Western forces from Iraq and the imminent withdrawal of international combat forces from Afghanistan, the global jihadist movement will be deprived of a significant recruiting tool.

But it would be foolish to believe that the movement is finished.

Where there is weak and corrupt governance, a sense of injustice or deep resentment against the US, Israel or the West in general, the movement will still find recruits.

Since the London bombings of 2005, there have been numerous narrow escapes with sophisticated devices on planes, for example, evading security but failing to explode.

Al-Qaeda's operatives know that regardless of how many adherents the movement has left, they only need one successful high-profile "hit" to get back in the world's headlines.

Drone strikes: Should US capture, and not kill, Al Qaeda leaders?

Source: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0606/Drone-strikes-Should-US-capture-and-not-kill-Al-Qaeda-leaders

But by killing off Al Qaeda leaders and operatives by means of the unmanned drones rather than capturing them, is the US losing out on valuable intelligence on an evolving organization – and thus on information that might also be crucial in defeating the terror group?

While few voices are lamenting the demise of the man considered to have become Al Qaeda's global ambassador for Islamist extremism following the death last year of Osama bin Laden, some critics are beginning to find fault with President Obama's increasing use of the drones in targeted killings.

Osama bin Laden papers: top 5 revelations

Their reasons are not concerns about international law or the violation of other country's territorial sovereignty that others have raised, but rather that the US is wiping out potential troves of intelligence – think Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged 9/11 mastermind held for years in detention in Guantanamo.

Terrorism experts concur that there can be a "loss' in terms of uncollected intelligence in an over-reliance on drone strikes. But they also note that the alternative is boots-on-the-ground intervention, even if only by small special-operations teams, that incur their own risks and potential costs.

Other critics even accuse the White House of relying on the high-profile strikes, and in particular of building up their national-security impact, as a means of boosting Mr. Obama's image as a successful anti-Al Qaeda warrior.

After a recent New York Times article – based on White House leaks – described Obama's close involvement in the deliberations on targeting key terrorist figures, Sen. John McCain (R) of Arizona blasted the leaked information as intended to "enhance President Obama's image as a tough guy" before the November election.

Senator McCain did not criticize the operations themselves, saying only that disclosure of information about

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them could "undermine" future operations. But some conservative critics fault what they see as the downside of relying on drone strikes to take out terrorists rather than capturing, detaining, and interrogating them: the loss of what conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer calls "potentially life-saving intelligence." (Some of Obama's harshest critics suggest that one reason he has embraced the drone-strike approach to high-profile targets is that it avoids the controversial issues of long-term detention and methods of interrogation.)

"Certainly there is a considerable benefit from a tactical point of view" in eliminating a high-profile terrorist like Mr. al-Libi, says Yonah Alexander, director of Potomac Institute's International Center for Terrorism Studies in Arlington, Va. "But from a strategic point of view the picture is not as clear," he adds, noting that, like Mr. bin Laden's, al-Libi's "legacy will live on … especially as he is transformed into a martyr."

Then there is the intelligence question. "If you could capture and interrogate someone of this level, presumably you could get some very valuable information," Dr. Alexander says.

Indeed, he says that al-Libi was already in US custody once, at Bagram air base in Afghanistan in 2002, but that somehow he managed to escape a few years later.

Officials in the countries where the drone strikes are increasingly employed – in Pakistan, where al-Libi was killed, and in Yemen, where the American-Yemeni Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in a drone strike last September – tend to agree that while the strikes may be tactical successes, they are strategic disasters, as they infuriate and alienate local populations.

Alexander says that in the years ahead "the battle of ideas will be the key challenge we face" in addressing Islamist extremism. And in that battle, he says the elimination of leaders and operatives won't be the only or even the most effective means of dealing with terrorism.

"We can eliminate the people," he says, "but can we eliminate the attraction of their idea?"

Al-Qaeda's remaining leaders

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11489337

The killing of Osama Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders has led to new leaders emerging. The BBC profiles some of the most prominent names.

Ayman al-Zawahiri

Ayman al-Zawahiri, an eye surgeon who helped found the Egyptian militant group Islamic Jihad, was named as the new leader of al-Qaeda on 16 June 2011, a few weeks after Bin Laden's death.

In a statement, al-Qaeda vowed to continue its jihad under the new leadership against "crusader America and its servant Israel, and whoever supports them".

Zawahiri was already the group's chief ideologue and was believed by some experts to have been the

"operational brains" behind the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US.

Zawahiri was number two - behind only Bin Laden - in the 22 "most wanted terrorists" list announced by the US government in 2001 and continues to have a $25m (£15m) bounty on his head.

He was reportedly last seen in the eastern Afghan town of Khost in October 2001, and went into hiding after a US-led coalition overthrew the Taliban.

He was thought to be hiding in the mountainous regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border with the help of sympathetic local tribes.

However, the killing of Bin Laden on 1 May 2011 in Abbottabad, north of the Pakistani capital Islamabad, suggests this may not be the case.

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His wife and children were reportedly killed in a US air strike in late 2001.

Zawahiri was for a time al-Qaeda's most prominent spokesman, appearing in 40 videos and audiotapes since 2003 - most recently in April 2011 - as the group tried to radicalise and recruit Muslims worldwide.

He has also been indicted in the US for his role in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa, and was sentenced to death in Egypt in absentia for his activities with Islamic Jihad during the 1990s.

Abu Yahya al-Libi

Abu Yahya al-Libi is believed by US officials to have been killed in drone strike on Pakistan's tribal north-west on Monday 4 June 2012. But his death has not been confirmed by sources in Pakistan.

Also known as Hasan Qayid and Yunis al-Sahrawi, Libi is thought to have been a member of the Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) before he allied himself to Osama Bin Laden.

He then emerged as al-Qaeda's leading theologian, and later its most visible face on video, surpassing Ayman al-Zawahri in recent years.

Libi is believed to have spent five years as a religious student in Mauritania in the 1990s.

He claimed to have been captured by Pakistani forces in 2002 and then sent to the US military airbase at Bagram in Afghanistan, from where he escaped in July 2005 along with three other al-Qaeda members.

Al-Qaeda named Libi as a field commander in Afghanistan, though he subsequently styled himself in his many videos as a theological scholar, and spoke on a variety of global issues of importance to the group.

Khalid al-Habib

Khalid al-Habib, thought to be either Egyptian or Moroccan, was identified in a November 2005 video as

al-Qaeda's field commander in south-east Afghanistan, while Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was named as its commander in the south-west.

Habib seems to have assumed overall command after the latter's capture in 2006.

He was described as al-Qaeda's "military commander" in July 2008.

US military officials say he oversees al-Qaeda's "internal" operations in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.

Habib may be operating under an assumed identity, according to some analysts. One of his noms de guerre is believed to be Khalid al-Harbi.

Adnan el Shukrijumah

In August 2010, the FBI said Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah had taken over as chief of al-Qaeda's "external operations council". Having lived for more than 15 years in the US, he is the first leader intimately familiar with American society to have been placed in charge of planning attacks for the group outside Afghanistan.

Such a position - once held by the alleged mastermind of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed - necessitates regular contact with al-Qaeda's senior leadership and military commanders, and makes him likely to be killed or captured.

Born in Saudi Arabia, Shukrijumah moved to the US when his father, a Muslim cleric, took up a post at a mosque in Brooklyn.

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They later moved to Florida.

In the late 1990s, he became convinced that he had to participate in jihad in place like Chechnya, and left for training camps in Afghanistan.

Shukrijumah has been named in a US federal indictment as a conspirator in the case against three men accused of plotting suicide bomb attacks on New York's subway system in 2009. He is also suspected of having played a role in plotting al-Qaeda attacks in Panama, Norway and the UK.

Saif al-Adel

An Egyptian in his late 30s, Saif al-Adel is the nom de guerre of a former Egyptian army colonel, Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi. He travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight Soviet forces with the mujahideen.

Adel was once Osama Bin Laden's security chief, and assumed many of military commander Mohammed Atef's duties after his death in a US air strike in November 2001.

He is suspected of involvement in the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa, training the Somali fighters who killed 18 US servicemen in Mogadishu in 1993, and instructing some of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.

In 1987, Egypt accused Adel of trying to establish a military wing of the militant Islamic group al-Jihad, and of trying to overthrow the government.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Adel is believed to have fled to Iran with Suleiman Abu Ghaith and Saad Bin Laden, a son of the late al-Qaeda leader. They were allegedly then held under house arrest by the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Iran has never acknowledged their presence.

Several letters and internet statements bearing Adel's name or aliases have been released since 2002, leading analysts to believe he is still in contact with al-Qaeda's leaders in the region.

Recent reports say Adel may have been released and made his way to northern Pakistan, along with Saad Bin Laden.

Mustafa Hamid

Mustafa Hamid, the father-in-law of Saif al-Adel, served as instructor in tactics at an al-Qaeda camp near Jalalabad and is the link between the group and Iran's government, according to the US.

After the fall of the Taliban, he is said to have negotiated the safe relocation of several senior al-Qaeda members and their families to Iran. In mid-2003, Hamid was arrested by the Iranian authorities.

Saad Bin Laden

Saad Bin Laden, one of Osama Bin Laden's sons, has been involved in al-Qaeda activities. In late 2001, he helped his relatives flee to Iran.

He made key decisions for al-Qaeda and was part of a small group of al-Qaeda members involved in managing the organisation from Iran, according to US officials. He was arrested by Iranian authorities in early 2003, but recent reports say he may have been released and made his way to northern Pakistan.

US officials said an "adult son" of Osama Bin Laden's was killed alongside him in the raid in Abbottabad in May 2011. It is not known if it was Saad.

Hamza al-Jawfi

Hamza al-Jawfi, a Gulf Arab, is believed by some to have become al-Qaeda's external operations chief after the death of Abu Ubaida al-Masri from hepatitis C in December 2007. However, the FBI has said this year that Adnan el Shukrijumah had assumed this role.

Matiur Rehman

Matiur Rehman is a Pakistani militant who has been identified as al-Qaeda's planning chief. He is said to have been an architect of the foiled "liquid bomb" plot to explode passenger aircraft over the Atlantic in 2006.

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Abu Khalil al-Madani

Little is known about Abu Khalil al-Madani, who was identified as a member of al-Qaeda's Shura council in a July 2008 video. His name suggests he is Saudi.

Midhat Mursi

An Egyptian chemist, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Omar has allegedly overseen al-Qaeda's efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons.

Also known as Abu Khabab, he left Egypt to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. A fellow mujahideen says he was slow to join al-Qaeda because he disagreed with the group's central strategy and was not an ally of Ayman al-Zawahiri, but changed his mind in part because he needed the money.

Mursi was a trainer at al-Qaeda's Derunta camp in Afghanistan when it was set up in the late 1990s.

In addition to teaching courses on conventional explosives, he wrote manuals on how to make toxic weapons and conducted a variety of experiments as part of Project al-Zabadi, or "curdled milk".

The US believes he may be living in Pakistan, although other reports suggest he escaped to the Pankisi Gorge in the Caucasus region in 2001. US intelligence officials do not believe he occupies a senior leadership position.

Adam Gadahn

Adam Gadahn, a US citizen who grew up in California, has emerged as a high-profile propagandist for al-Qaeda, appearing in a string of videos.

After converting to Islam as a teenager, he moved in 1998 to Pakistan and married an Afghan refugee. Gadahn performed translations for al-Qaeda and become associated with al-Qaeda's captured field commander, Abu Zubaydah. He is also thought to have later trained at a militant camp in Afghanistan.

In 2004, the US justice department named him as one of seven al-Qaeda operatives planning imminent attacks on the US.

Shortly afterwards, he appeared in a video on behalf of al-Qaeda, identifying himself as "Azzam the American".

In September 2006, he appeared in a video with Ayman al-Zawahiri and exhorted his fellow Americans to convert to Islam and support al-Qaeda.

The next month, Gadahn become the first US citizen to be charged with treason since World War II. The indictment said he had "knowingly adhered to an enemy of the United States... with intent to betray the United States". A $1m bounty was placed on his head.

Analysts say Gadahn is not part of al-Qaeda's senior leadership, and does not hold any operational or ideological significance.

Nasser Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi

Wuhayshi, a former aide to Osama Bin Laden, is the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which was formed in 2009 in a merger between two offshoots of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

US counter-terrorism officials have said it is the "most active operation franchise" of al-Qaeda beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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Wuhayshi, who is from the southern Yemeni governorate of al-Baida, spent time in religious institutions before travelling to Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

He fought at the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, before escaping over the border into Iran, where he was eventually arrested. He was extradited to Yemen in 2003.

In February 2006, Wuhayshi and 22 other suspected al-Qaeda members managed to escape from a prison in Sanaa. Among them were also Jamal al-Badawi, the alleged mastermind of the USS Cole bombing, and Qasim al-Raymi, al-Qaeda's in the Arabian Peninsula's military commander.

After their escape from prison, Wuhayshi and Raymi are said to have overseen the formation of al-Qaeda in Yemen, which took in both new recruits and Arab fighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The group claimed responsibility for two suicide bomb attacks that killed six Western tourists before being linked to the assault on the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008, in which 10 Yemeni guards and four civilians died.

Four months later, Wuhayshi announced in a video the merger of the al-Qaeda offshoots in Yemen and Saudi Arabia to form "al-Qaeda of Jihad Organisation in the Arabian Peninsula".

The group's first operation outside Yemen was carried out in Saudi Arabia in August 2009 against the kingdom's security chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, though he survived.

It later said it was behind the attempt to blow up a US passenger jet as it flew into Detroit on 25 December 2009. A Nigerian man charged in relation with the incident said AQAP operatives had trained him.

Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud

A former university science student and infamous bomb-maker, Abdelwadoud is the leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

He became leader of the head of the Algerian Islamist militant organisation, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), in mid-2004, succeeding Nabil Sahraoui after he was killed in a major army operation.

After university in 1995, Abdelwadoud joined the Armed Islamist Group (GIA), a precursor to the GSPC which shared its aim of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria. He is said to have become a member of the GSPC in 1998.

Abdelwadoud, whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdel, was one of the signatories to a statement in 2003 announcing an alliance with al-Qaeda.

In September 2006, the GSPC said it had joined forces with al-Qaeda, and in January 2007 it announced it had changed its name to "al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb" to reflect its allegiance. Abdelwadoud said he had consulted Ayman al-Zawahiri about the group's plans.

Three months later, 33 people were killed in bomb attacks on official buildings in Algiers. Abdelwadoud allegedly supervised the operation. That December, twin car bombs killed at least 37 people in the capital.

The ambitions of the group's leadership widened, and it subsequently carried out a number of attacks across North Africa. It also declared its intention to attack Western targets and send jihadis to Iraq. Westerners have also been kidnapped and held for ransom; some have been killed.

Man Beheaded by Tunisian Muslims for Converting to Christianity

Source: http://www.bestgore.com/beheading/man-beheading-tunisia-muslim-convert-christian/

The religion of peace is at it again. There's no spreading the message of peace like Muslims do. Especially when it comes to respect and tolerance.


Many Islamic scholars believe that people guilty of apostasy must be executed. Many practitioners of Islam carry executions out. The man in the video is accused of converting from Islam to Christianity and refusing to renounce his faith. And for that, he was beheaded.

The video was broadcast on "Egypt Today" – a liberal talk show hosted by Tawfiq Okasha. In the video, a young man appears laid on his side with head pulled back by a masked man. At around the 2:15 minutes mark, just before the beheading starts, the camera zooms in on the victim's face which shows incredibly deep fear and pain. He knows what's coming and makes no attempt to escape his fate, yet you can read fear clearly from his face.

Cameraman chants a lot of Allahu Akbar stuff and then the sawing begins. Traditionally, the knife used appears incredibly dull. It hardly cuts through tender tissue on human neck though the executioner manages to find the spot between the vertebrae so spine is severed relatively quickly for a beheading by knife.

After the beheading, the host of the program Tawfiq Okasha points out the reference from one of the canonical hadiths in which Prophet

Muhammad commands: "Whoever leaves his religion, kill him". Apparently, according to the founder of Islam, any Muslim who leaves Islam must be killed.

Although the video was broadcast on Egyptian TV, the beheading was allegedly carried out by the Tunisians. Egypt however, could be faced with similar executions becoming part of the norm, seeing how Muslim Brotherhood's grasp over the country is tightening. These hard core Salafis want to force Sharia Law upon everyone and executing anyone who converts from Islam appears to be an important part of the Sharia.

WARNING – The video is unbelievable...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=sxGWIOQZyEs&oref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.defencenet.gr%2Fdefence%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26task%3Dview%26id%3D43917%26Itemid%3D56&has_verified=1&skipcontrinter=1

▶ **NOTE:** According to other open sources this video refers to "Free Syrian Army" beheading a civilian. The terrain, dialect and clothing are suggestive of Syria, certainly not Tunisia. The

man is insulted using words that are used to denigrate Shia suggesting this man is likely to have been an Alawite not a Christian.

A Psychological Look Behind Jihadist Terror

By Louis Rene Beres

Source:http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/columns/louis-rene-beres/a-psychological-look-behind-jihadist-terror/2012/06/06/0/

Sculptor Alberto Giacometti's "Man Pointing" gesticulates ominously. Emaciated, skeletal, and tormented, the iconic sculpture is an artistic expression of humankind's stalwart march toward suffering and recurring annihilation. Resembling the Swiss creator's gaunt and unnaturally elongated figure, each of us has now become both a potential observer and a prospective casualty.

Today, as I have pointed out before in The Jewish Press, each of us is more or less threatened by *jihadist* sacrificial murder, a distinctly homicidal ethos that reassuringly (for the perpetrators) masquerades conveniently as "martyrdom."

Where is Giacometti's man pointing? Does he gesture toward the masses of still likely victims, or, judgmentally, to the always unrepentant murderers? Does his extended finger indict an entire species, or, rather, does it cast focused responsibility only upon certain discrete individuals or groups? Understood in terms of terrorism, especially the chemical/ biological/ nuclear threat now hanging perilously over the United States and Israel, the long finger points knowingly in *several* directions.

In the final analysis, the problem of all *jihadist* terrorism, including WMD terrorism, is a matter of primal human behavior. Moreover, such behavior is always the result of compelling *private needs*, and of seemingly irresistible *collective expectations*.

More than almost anything else, sometimes even more than the normally overriding drive to avoid death, human beings need to *belong*. This ubiquitous requirement can be expressed more or less benignly, as in familiar sports hysteria, or tumultuous rock concerts. Or it can be expressed grotesquely – in genocide, war, and terrorism.

Oddly enough, the underlying dynamic is always the same. In all cases, the individual person feels utterly empty and insignificant apart from his/her membership in the "herd." Sometimes that herd is the State. Sometimes it is the Tribe. Sometimes it is the Faith.

Sometimes it is the "Liberation" or "Revolutionary" movement. But whatever the particular herd of the moment, it is the persistent craving for *membership* that can bring the terrible downfall of individual responsibility, and the terrifying corollary triumph of the collective will.

Unless certain of our fellow humans soon learn how to temper their overwhelming desire to belong, the prevailing military and political schemes to prevent and control anti-American and anti-Israeli terrorism will fail. To succeed, therefore, we will likely benefit more from an understanding of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung than Carl von Clausewitz.

Today, the overwhelming desperation to belong is most evident in the Arab/Islamic world. How significant is this desperation to a real understanding of anti-American and anti-Israel terrorism? The philosopher Nietzsche can be helpful. Aware of the substantial harm that can be generated by the immense attractions of membership, Nietzsche declared with remarkable prescience: *"To lure many away from the herd, for that I have come. The people and the herd shall be angry with me. Zarathustra wants to be called a robber by the shepherds."*

The most primary dangers of jihadist terrorism now stem from the combining of certain susceptible individuals into war-centered herds. Not every herd is terroristic, of course, but terrorism cannot take place in the absence of herds. When individuals crowd together and form a herd, the destructive dynamics of the mob may be released, lowering each person's moral and intellectual level to a point where even mass killing may become altogether acceptable.

To understand what is happening behind the news, one must first recognize the manifest irony of terrorist objectives. Publicly, all Arab/Islamic terror is sacred violence, animated by the presumed will of Allah. In reality, however, the net effect of suicide bombings and mass

slaughters is always to drown out any hint of godliness. By definition, there is simply no room in such "tactics" for human empathy, compassion, comity, or kindness.

In the presumed name of God, Arab/Islamic terror imposes upon the world neither salvation nor redemption, but rather the breathless rhythm of ritual murder and voluptuous killing. Although the killers would have us believe that God is their sole inspiration and their special witness, the inevitable end of all the delirium they create is despair. In the supreme irony of Arab/Islamic terror, the most conspicuous result of all this delirium is *to prevent Man from remembering God*.

To begin urgent investigations of already ongoing Arab/Islamic *jihad* against the United States, our scholars and policy makers should look closely at *human meaning*. To prevent expanding violence against the United States and Israel, Arab/Islamist terrorist groups must somehow be shorn of their capacity to bestow meaning. Even before this can happen, however, those individuals who turn to terrorist group membership must first discover more private sources of belonging. An underlying cause of terrorist crimes is always the continuing incapacity of individuals to draw authentic meaning from within themselves.

At its heart, the problem of terror/violence is always a problem of *displaced human centeredness*. Ever anxious about drawing meaning from their own inwardness, human beings draw closer and closer to the herd. In all too many cases this herd spawns hatreds and excesses that make certain forms of killing desirable. Fostering a ceaseless refrain of "us" versus "them," it prevents each affected person from becoming fully human, and encourages each such person to celebrate the death of "outsiders."

When, a few years ago, Palestinian mothers and their children crowded into a newly constructed "museum" celebrating the immolation of Israeli mothers and children in a then recently-bombed Sabarro pizza restaurant, it was not fellow parents and children that they recognized. Rather, they saw only *"Israelis," "infidels," "Zionists"* – a set of loathsome abstractions, a despised population so presumptively vile that their longingly hoped for extermination of "The Jews" could carry absolutely no hint of human regret.

Each person does harbor the potential to become fully human, an empathetic possibility that could ultimately reduce corrosive loyalties to the terror group herd and thereby prevent mega-terrorist violence. Significantly, it is only by nurturing this essential possibility that we can now seek serious remedies. Futile as it may seem, our immediate task must be to encourage masses of people in the Arab/Islamic world to discover the way back to *themselves*, as authentic persons, as feeling and caring individuals.

If we should fail, large elements of this world (large enough to number in the tens of millions) will continue to embrace the openly annihilatory ideals of a homicidal religious collectivism. Our national and homeland security agencies should continue to take heed, and to think "behind the news." After all, for the aspiring jihadist terrorist, a perpetually dreadful life of conformance and fear could soon render even chemical/biological/nuclear terrorism "sacred."

Louis René Beres, strategic and military affairs columnist for The Jewish Press, is professor of political science at Purdue University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), he lectures and publishes widely on international relations and international law and is the author of ten major books in the field. In Israel, Professor Beres was chair of Project Daniel.

American in running to be al-Qaida No. 2

Source: http://www.inlandnewstoday.com/story.php?s=24406

With the death in Pakistan of al-Qaida No. 2 Abu Yahya al-Libi in a Predator attack early Monday, the terrorist group's highest councils once again face the daunting task of filling both a leadership void and selecting a next-generation jihadist capable of succeeding current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

But despite the obvious dangers that go with a prominent al-Qaida post, counterterrorism experts inside and outside the U.S. government have identified at least five potential next-generation leaders -- three of them former U.S. residents and one an American citizen.

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"It would be a mistake for anyone to conclude there is no one on the bench," said one U.S. official familiar with counterterrorism strategy, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It's a thinning bench, but there are still bad guys, with bad aspirations in al-Qaida's core group in Pakistan. However, these individuals are not as

The next generation of al-Qaida leaders, say counterterrorism officials, is an eclectic mix of fighters, propagandists, clerics and administrators.

Those identified as potential next-generation successors are:

Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah   Adam Gadahn   FBI

capable and don't have the profile or following in the wider extremist movement that Abu Yahya or his predecessor, Abu Atiyah, had."

But Michael Leiter, former director of the National Counter Terrorism Center and an NBC News analyst, said the candidates to move up into al-Qaida's senior ranks in the wake of al-Libi's death all lack his seasoning.

"The real answer is NONE of them are serious by comparison with Abu Yahya across a very wide range of skills and respect," he said.

Indeed, the U.S. has killed four of the five al-Qaida operatives identified as possible successors to Osama bin Laden at the time of his death on May 1, 2011. The only one who remains alive is Zawahiri, al-Qaida's longtime No. 2 who assumed command shortly after bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

► **Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah.** The 36-year-old Saudi is known as "Jaffar the Pilot" because he has a pilot's license. Reportedly addressed as director of operations for al-Qaida. Shukrijumah spent his teenage years in Brooklyn, N.Y., and Broward County, Fla., where he earned a degree in computer science. He is reported to have had roles in the 2009 plot to bomb the New York City subway and was put on the FBI's "Most Wanted" list a year later. He has been sought by the U.S. since 2003.

► **Jaber A. El-Baneh.** A 45-year-old Yemeni known as Jubair, el-Baneh emigrated to New York where he settled for a time in Buffalo. He was viewed as the mastermind of the Lackawanna Six plot in 2003, having financed and recruited other members. After escaping to Yemen,

he was jailed there but sprung in a jailbreak. A senior Obama administration official said last month that el-Baneh has risen to a leadership position in the Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). "I do see, more and more, el-Baneh being a real concern," said the official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity. "He has longtime connections, including to Egyptian extremist elements. And he does seem to be more engaged in trying to support attacks."

But Leiter, the former director of the National Counter Terrorism Center, said that whoever succeeds al-Libi will have to be a member of al-Qaida central, not one of its affiliate terror groups, meaning el-Baneh would not be considered.

▶ **Adam Gadahn.** A 33-year-old American known as Azzam al Amriki, or "Azzam the American," Gadahn, formerly regarded as an al-Qaida propagandist, is now viewed as a strategist. Materials found in bin Laden's Abbottabad compound included correspondence between the al-Qaida leader and the American jihadi. "Bin Laden took his mail," the U.S. official said of Gadahn. "He's not just a propagandist --more a strategist-- clearly someone who is not a crazy person. There are a number of people who were there on 9-11. That clearly gives him some standing." Gadahn has been charged in California with treason, a capital crime, and giving material aid to terrorism.

▶ **Sheikh Khalid Abdur Rahman al-Hussainan.** A 45-year-old Kuwaiti, known as Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti, al-Hussainan is one of al-Qaida's newest faces. He's a charismatic cleric and teacher who's responsible for "the religious training and the salvation of the soldiers of the al-Qaida network," according to an al-Qaida publication. Educated at Saudi-Arabian universities, he worked for a time as a scholar at Kuwait´s Ministry for Religious Affairs. He's considered less doctrinaire than the older generation trainers. In an interview with an al-

Qaida publication, he said he would "converse with them (his students) in an exciting way. We would make them laugh and kid around with them."

Evan Kohlmann, an NBC News counterterrorism analyst, notes, "Nobody talks about him, but he appears as a featured speaker on as-Sahab videos nowadays more often than Zawahiri and Abu Yahya combined."

▶ **Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri.** A 46-year-old Egyptian known as Abd al-Aziz al-Masri, al Bakri is not well known. But the National Counter Terrorism Center, the government's primary organization for tracking terrorism, notes that he is a "member of the al-Qaida Shura council (its governing body) and a close associate of Zawahiri." Al-Bakri is considered dangerous because he has explosives and chemical weapon expertise and has trained al-Qaida operatives as far back as the late 1990s. He attempted to hijack a Pakistani passenger flight in December 2000. "It is likely that he continues to train al-Qaida terrorists and other extremists," reports the NCTC.

"Ever since the death of bin Laden, the al-Qaida core we've known since 9/11 is the closest it has ever been to a tipping point," said the U.S. official familiar with counter terrorism strategy. "This does not mean the group is dead or the threat is gone, but core al-Qaida in Pakistan is on life support, and its chances of recovery are more daunting when they lose a guy like Abu Yahya.

"Undoubtedly, some al-Qaida members will be tapped to try to backfill Abu Yahya's responsibilities, but in the days that follow, the succession won't be obvious either to them or Zawahiri."

Indeed in the past year, mainly through Predator and other drone attacks, the U.S. has been able to "remove from the battlefield" in the words of one senior Pentagon official, one al-Qaida leader after another.

US appeals court expands piracy definition
Source: http://www.kens5.com/news/national/153176215.html

A federal appeals court on Wednesday expanded the legal definition of piracy, saying an armed attack on a U.S. vessel can be

considered piracy even if no one ever boards or robs the ship.

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The nearly 200-year-old U.S. Supreme Court definition of piracy has been in dispute in two attacks on Virginia-based Navy ships in April 2010 in waters off East Africa. The defendants were prosecuted in Norfolk, the first in a series of government prosecutions aimed at slowing the spread of piracy off Africa.

The court's ruling gives prosecutors wider latitude to go after people who attack U.S. vessels, U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride said.

"For decades, the international community has considered violent attacks on the high seas as an act of piracy, and today's ruling will strengthen our ability to hold those who attack U.S. vessels by force accountable, regardless

charged, or whether attorneys would appeal the court's ruling on the piracy definition to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Attorneys for the Nicholas defendants said they would discuss the ruling among and decide whether to pursue a hearing before the full 4th Circuit or take the case to the Supreme Court.

"Our arguments very simple: you have to steal the boat," said attorney David W. Bouchard. "That's piracy and it has been for 200 years."

Lawyer Jon M. Babineau said the ruling "upset a couple hundred years of what I believe is precedent. Now it turns out our law in the United States is being viewed by some international standard, which is ever changing."

of whether they are successful or not," said MacBride, whose office handled both cases.

In one case, a lower court judge dismissed charges against five Somalis in an attack on the USS Ashland (photo above), ruling since the men had not taken control or robbed the ship their actions did not rise to the definition of piracy.

In the other case, prosecutors convicted five Somali men who attacked the USS Nicholas. It was the first piracy conviction in a U.S. courtroom since 1819.

The ruling by the three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld those convictions and the life sentences the men received.

It was not immediately clear whether the Somalis in USS Ashland attack would again be

The attacks came as pirates increased assaults in the waters off East Africa despite an international flotilla of warships dedicated to protecting vessels and stopping the pirate assaults.

The Nicholas, which was part of the flotilla, was mistaken for a merchant ship because the Navy used a lighting array to disguise the 453-foot (138-meter) warship and attract pirates. Three pirates in a skiff fired rocket-propelled grenades and raked the ship with AK-47 fire in the Indian Ocean north of the Seychelles Islands. No sailors were injured in the attack.

During arguments before the federal appeals panel, an attorney representing one of the Somalis said the government was using "amorphous" interpretations of

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international law to make the piracy count stick. Attorney James R. Theuer argued the U.S. Supreme Court has been clear that the key element of piracy was "robbery at sea."
They also argued the men were innocent fishermen who had been abducted by pirates and forced to fire their weapons at the ship.
The court wrote that piracy under international law has evolved for decades to encompass other violent conduct.

The expanded definition "has only been reaffirmed in recent years as nations around the world have banded together to combat the escalating scourge of piracy," wrote Judge John King.
In the attack on the Ashland, a 610-foot (186-meter) dock landing ship, the ship's 25mm cannons destroyed a skiff, killing one Somali man and injuring several others.

France fears 'terrorist' camps in northern Mali

Source:http://www.france24.com/en/20120611-france-fears-terrorist-camps-northern-mali-islamist-niger-tuareg-rebels-aqmi

There is a risk of "terrorist" groups setting up in the deserts of northern Mali, French President

Francois Hollande warned Monday after talks with Niger's President Mahamadou Issoufou in

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Paris.

"There is a threat of terrorist groups setting up in northern Mali. There is outside intervention that is destabilising Mali and setting up groups

whose vocation goes well beyond Mali, in Africa and perhaps beyond," Hollande said.

Issoufou, whose country shares a long and porous desert border with Mali, warned last week that jihadi fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan were training Islamist groups there as world powers mull armed intervention.

Mali, once considered a beacon of democracy in western Africa, has plunged into chaos since the collapse of Moamer Kadhafi's regime in

Libya last year scattered mercenaries and weapons across the Sahel.

Tuareg rebels rekindled their decades-old struggle for independence in January and conquered the entire northern half of Mali virtually unopposed in March, after renegade soldiers who accused then-president Amadou Toumani Toure of failing to do enough to fight the rebellion toppled his regime.

The Tuareg rebels fought alongside a previously unknown Islamist group called Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), which is believed to be backed by Al-Qaeda's north African branch.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been active for years in northern Mali, where it has launched attacks against government army positions, kidnapped foreigners and allegedly benefitted from drug running.

Government troops have no control over Mali's north, a territory larger than France, heightening fears in the region and beyond that the landlocked country could become a new global haven for Al-Qaeda.

Can Buildings Be Protected From Terrorists?

Source: http://designbuildsource.com.au/buildings-protected-terrorists

"Two weeks from now you will weep."

That was the ominous warning posted on an al-Shebaab website, warning Kenya of a forthcoming attack on skyscrapers and other large buildings.

"Something big is coming," the web site warned. "Watch your towers come down."

The warnings, which follow an April 28 bomb attack in Kenya's capital of Nairobi highlight what Kenyan intelligence authorities say is an increasing likelihood of attacks by the Islamic militant group. Towers most likely to be targeted include housing hostels and offices of government, media and prominent corporations.

Obviously, there is not much builders or engineers can do to stop a terrorist attack from happening.

Still, the Kenyan warnings highlight an important question that has relevance not just

in North Africa, the Middle East and other hot spots but in virtually every part of the world:

How can buildings and infrastructure be designed and constructed to best minimise the impact of any attack which occurs?

Guiding Principles

In its publication Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks, the US Department of Homeland Security sets out a framework for basic concepts behind design considerations from a security perspective.

First, given the severity of extreme terrorist incidents, along with the unpredictability of the form of attack – explosive, airborne, chemical/biological, radiological or otherwise – and budgetary and other constraints, absolute and full protection of most commercial

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buildings is not feasible. With regard to explosive attacks, for

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Primer
for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks

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example, the focus revolves around damage limitation and mitigation as opposed to a blast-resistant approach.

In addition, security concerns need to be balanced against other considerations, such as accessibility, natural hazards and mitigation, fire protection and energy efficiency and

aesthetics. Security measures should be part of an overall, multi-hazard approach.

Given the relatively low likelihood of a major terrorism incident in many buildings, security

measures should not interfere with the building's ability to withstand more likely hazards such as fires, earthquakes and hurricanes. Wherever possible, security measures should also not unduly interfere with everyday operations of the building and its occupants.

That said, given the consequences of a significant attack, reasonable measures should be undertaken so as to save lives and also to minimise business disruption in the event that a terrorism incident does occur.

What can be done?

The aforementioned limitations notwithstanding, plenty can be done.

For starters, urban landscaping or barrier methods can be used to secure the perimeter against vehicular intrusion. Buildings should be placed as far away from the secured perimeter as practical. Any unsecured areas should be placed outside of the main structure or in the exterior bay.

Within the building, itself, vulnerable spots such as entry and delivery areas can be physically isolated from the rest of the structure by using floor-to floor walls in these areas. Lightweight, non-structural elements can be used for the building's exterior and interior. Air intakes should be as far above the ground as is practical. Exterior window systems and cladding can be designed so that the framing, connections, and supporting structure have a lateral-load-resistance that is equal to or higher than the transparency or panel.

Finally, measures can be enacted to resist progressive collapse – whereby the failure of one structural element of the building results in a disproportionate level of flow-on damage to other structural elements – and indeed, the building as a whole – through a domino-type effect.

Architects, engineers and others involved in the design and construction of large buildings cannot

stop terrorist attacks, but a few fundamental basic steps just might save hundreds or even thousands of lives if an attack does occur.

NOTE: You can download the FEMA Report for the website of the Newsletter – "CBRNE-CT Papers" section. ▶ Of special notice is section "**6.6**" referring to "**CBR Protection**".

Risk Management Series
Safe Rooms and Shelters
Protecting People Against Terrorist Attacks
FEMA 453 / May 2006
FEMA

READ ALSO:

Safe Rooms and Shelters - Protecting People Against Terrorist Attacks

Source: http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=1910

The objective of this manual is to provide guidance for engineers, architects, building officials, and property owners to design shelters and safe rooms in buildings. This manual presents information about the design and construction of shelters in the work place, home, or community building that will provide protection in response to manmade hazards. NOTE: This publication is available free to Local and State government staff. All other interested parties can obtain this publication via online download only.

NOTE: You can download the FEMA Report for the website of the Newsletter – "CBRNE-CT Papers" section.

"Let's just keep quiet about this, and maybe some terrorist group will claim credit."